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The outcome of the multiyear partnership between the Global Center 
for Health Economics at the School of Public Health, University of 
California Berkeley; the Africa Region Health, Nutrition and Population 
Unit of the World Bank; and the Human Development Department at 
the African Development Bank has produced an academically rigorous 
book that provides a new understanding of the Human Resource Crisis 
in Africa. The tools and concepts in it have many applications to offer 
across low- and middle-income countries, making this book one that will 
be used around the globe. 
The Human Resources for Health Specialists of the World Bank and 
African Development Bank have made many visits to Berkeley to work 
with Professor Scheffler and our graduate students, and to learn from one 
another. Numerous workshops were held at Berkeley and in various 
African countries, bringing the various editors and authors together with 
African practitioners and academics. This partnership and the research 
highlighted within the jointly produced book also led to the development 
of the Global Health Labor Markets course, which was taught at Berkeley 
and attended by human resource researchers and policy makers from 15 
low- and middle-incomes countries. Indeed, this partnership is a role 
model for what can be accomplished by academic institutions working 
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with the World Bank and the African Development Bank. We are pleased 
and proud of this book, which will be a landmark in the field of human 
resources for health around the globe.
Stephen M. Shortell, Ph.D., M.P.H., M.B.A.
Dean, University of California, Berkeley,
School of Public Health
As African countries race toward the finish line to reach the 
Millennium Development Goals by 2015, this book comes at the right 
time for us, policy makers who are looking for ways to scale up health 
services and improve the performance of our health workers. Over 
the last few years, we have tested various models in Africa to help us 
understand how to create fiscal space, rapidly scale up the number of 
health workers, and get them to work in rural areas. We found that 
perhaps the most important ingredient in financing health services is 
flexibility and innovation. In Rwanda, for example, we established 
performance-based financing to better link the deployment and remu-
neration of health workers to their actual performance in delivering 
services. This book provides tremendous value to us, in providing an 
inventory of what works, providing tools to scale up health worker pro-
duction and improve the distribution and performance of health work-
ers, and negotiate the ins and outs of health markets in Africa. It 
provides lessons learned in Africa on the most recent country analysis, 
using state-of-the-art tools and new empirical results. I am sure this 
book will be useful to academicians, heads of human resources depart-
ments, researchers, the global international health community, and the 
community at large, who are helping African governments design better 
policies for human resources development.
Kampeta Sayinzoga
Permanent Secretary and Secretary to the Treasury
Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Rwanda
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Preface
Addressing the challenge of decent healthcare and education for low-
income families is critical to building the human capital that African 
countries need to sustain economic growth in the years ahead. Within this 
broad goal, specific challenges linked to Human Resources for Health 
(HRH) in Africa must be addressed to achieve stronger health systems, 
universal access to health services, and greater improvements in actual 
health outcomes. Today, it is widely recognized among Ministries of 
Health and development partners that the overall availability, distribution, 
and performance of health workers in Africa must be rapidly improved.
Since HRH first gained prominence on the international development 
agenda in 2002, African governments have made significant headway in 
obtaining critical data and evidence on HRH that was previously lacking. 
With several partners, the World Bank has been supporting governments 
in their efforts to develop this evidence base and subsequently their strat-
egies, policies, and programs on HRH. The emerging consensus is that in 
order for policy solutions to work, they must take into account the 
unique and rapidly evolving dimensions of national health labor markets 
in Africa. 
Once dominated by governments, health labor markets today often 
involve multiple private and nongovernmental players. Identifying why 
there is a problem with numbers, distribution, or performance in a public 
xxii       Preface
labor market thus requires moving beyond the traditional focus on pro-
duction or education only. The funding and management capacity avail-
able to competing employers and the behavior of health workers, which 
is motivated by different working and living conditions and incentives, 
both merit greater attention. 
This book draws on the lessons, knowledge, and data gathered by the 
World Bank’s Africa Region Human Resources for Health Program. For the 
first time, the various complexities of HRH labor markets are addressed 
comprehensively in one volume. Given the increasing demand in countries 
for strong health workforces that can help achieve universal health cover-
age, we hope this book will be beneficial to researchers, policy makers, and 
practitioners who are trying to develop evidence-based HRH interventions 
to achieve this end. 
Ritva Reinikka 
Director, Human Development
Africa Region
The World Bank
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C H A P T E R  1
Labor Market Analysis of Human 
Resources for Health
Agnes Soucat and Richard Scheffler
Health systems in Sub-Saharan Africa have changed profoundly over the 
last 20 years. The economic crisis of the 1980s and 1990s rattled public 
health care systems, which were largely holdovers from the colonial and 
postcolonial eras. The later wave of structural adjustments and public 
sector reforms wrought further change. As African economies opened to 
market-based approaches, the private sector became a sizable source of 
health care service. Today about half the health expenditures in Africa 
are private, and private providers play a major role in the delivery of 
outpatient services.
Democratization and better access to information have put pressure 
on African governments to expand health care access and improve quality 
of services. Service delivery is now often at the center of political plat-
forms. In 2002 free primary education and basic health care were part of 
electoral programs in Uganda. More recently the debate in Ghana’s 2009 
elections centered largely on health insurance.
Economic growth in the past decade has given African governments 
the fiscal space to grow their health budgets. Increases in government 
health spending and official development assistance for health raised 
demand for health workers in the region (OECD DAC 2009). Too often, 
however, the supply of qualified workers remains rigid, leading to 
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 inflationary pressures on wages and shortages of health workers. When 
more and more funding is available for the same pool of health workers—
and the public sector, private sector, and donors compete for a limited 
number of qualified health workers—pressure on wages grows. Policy 
makers recognize that the human resources problem in the region is 
hampering the expansion of services needed to reach the Millennium 
Development Goals (WHO 2006).
Sub-Saharan Africa’s labor market for human resources is changing 
rapidly. The notion that African labor markets comprise small pools of 
public sector workers characterized by low productivity, poor perfor-
mance, and inadequate financing is false. Africa’s labor markets are com-
plex, with resources from governments, donors, the private sector, and 
households. Health workers are no longer exclusively civil servants: they 
may also be private sector employees or independent contractors, or some 
combination of all three, working through both formal and informal 
arrangements.
The private sector is an emerging force in the health worker labor 
market on both the demand and supply sides. On the demand side, more 
financing from economic growth and official development assistance is 
passing through nongovernmental organizations. On the supply side, bur-
geoning private medical and nursing schools in some countries testify to 
the private sector’s growing contribution to the health worker labor mar-
ket. This contribution and its interplay with the public sector is redefining 
how Africa produces, distributes, and manages health workers.
The Labor Market for Health Workers in Africa: A New Look at the Crisis 
sheds light on the status of health worker need, supply, and distribution 
across Africa. It analyzes regional and country data to answer six key ques-
tions: What are the specific levels of human resources for health in Africa? 
What are the differences in human resources for health across countries? 
What are the changing roles of the public and private sector in the health 
worker market? What motivates health worker performance? How do you 
train health workers? How do you produce them?
This book uses the analytical tools of labor markets and views the 
human resource crisis in health from an economic perspective. It relies 
on new information and innovative approaches in Africa. This chapter 
describes the framework for labor market analysis used in this book 
and summarizes the subsequent chapters. It also sets out the contribu-
tors’ main conclusions and recommends steps to better understand 
health labor markets in Africa and other low- and middle-income 
countries.
Labor Market Analysis of Human Resources for Health       3
The Health Labor Market Framework
The Labor Market for Health Workers in Africa: A New Look at the Crisis 
employs a labor market framework of analysis to examine the building 
blocks of the labor market and how they interact. Figure 1.1 is a sche-
matic overview of the labor market framework applied in this analysis.
The analysis of the health labor market starts with an assessment of 
need (see figure 1.1, box A), which is the traditional public health 
method for determining health worker supply. This book proposes a new 
methodology to determine need that incorporates contextual factors 
within each country (chapter 2). This new and improved method is a 
starting point for estimating the need for health care workers.
A needs-based analysis alone does not consider the full labor market 
for health workers. From a demand-side perspective, three major sectors 
that demand health workers also shape health worker labor markets: 
public, private, and donor (box B). Governance structures also influence 
health
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the health worker market by setting rules and establishing the role of 
public policy in enabling the market to function (box C).
From a supply-side perspective, the training, education, migration, and 
attrition of health workers influence the market by determining the pool 
of available workers for each country (box D).
The effects of training, migration, and attrition are reflected in the sup-
ply of qualified health workers (box E). A country’s production of quali-
fied health workers, offset by those who move abroad or leave practice, 
determines its ability to match supply with demand. Training also impacts 
the intrinsic motivation of health workers, which, along with manage-
ment incentives, influences performance (box F).
Health worker need, demand, supply, training, and governance com-
bine to determine employment conditions, including wage levels; fringe 
benefits; and institutional, geographic, and specialty distributions (box 
G). Taken together these factors define performance and productivity 
(box H) and, ultimately, health system outcomes (box I).
Structural Overview
This book has four sections. Part I establishes the framework and tools 
needed to analyze health labor markets in Africa and low- and middle-
income countries in other regions. Part II presents empirical evidence on 
the supply and distribution of the health workforce in Africa, drawing 
lessons from these experiences. Part III details how performance can be 
analyzed, measured, and improved. It examines the productivity of 
health workers, incentives for performance, intrinsic motivation, and key 
management issues. Part IV presents information on the production of 
health workers. It looks at education, barriers to becoming a health stu-
dent in Africa, and financing for higher education in health care in 
African countries.
Part I. Tools for Health Workforce Analysis
Chapter 2, “Needs-Based Estimates for the Health Workforce” (Scheffler 
and Fulton), opens the discussion of needs assessment. The chapter begins 
by explaining the World Health Organization’s needs-based approach for 
determining the benchmark ratio of health care workers. It expands on 
this method with other health workforce indicators and contextual data 
from a variety of African countries. With this improved needs-based 
approach it provides new estimates for health worker needs and work-
force benchmarks. Chapter 2 develops a framework that can be used not 
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only in Africa but also in low- and middle-income countries in other 
regions.
Chapter 3, “A Labor Market Approach” (Andalón and Fields), presents 
an innovative approach to examining health labor markets in Africa. 
Using analytical tools for understanding labor markets from an economic 
perspective, it identifies key challenges of the health worker crisis in 
Africa: production, underutilization, distribution, performance, and 
financing. This chapter explains why the number of employed health 
workers in African countries is lower than what is “needed” to meet a 
given policy objective. It suggests that more empirical data, a full labor 
market analysis, and social cost-benefit criteria are necessary before policy 
recommendations can be confidently offered.
Chapter 4, “Productivity of Health Workers: Tanzania” (Mæstad and 
Mwisongo), sets out a new approach to analyzing productivity and 
explores the limitations of this analysis using different measures of pro-
ductivity. The strengths and weaknesses of each are detailed. The authors 
suggest that health worker productivity in Tanzania is poor, on average 
about 22 percent of what is technically possible.
Chapter 5, “Health Worker Performance” (Brock, Leonard, Masatu, 
and Serneels), presents a model of health worker performance that 
examines inputs, outputs, and policy levers that influence health worker 
performance. The analysis is anchored by an examination of rural 
Tanzania, which offers context and lessons on the barriers to health 
worker performance. The health worker performance model examines 
three aspects of health worker motivation: adherence to medical proto-
cols, confidence, and absenteeism. This new way of thinking about per-
formance is key to labor market analysis in Africa and other low- and 
middle-income settings.
Chapter 6, “Fiscal Issues in Scaling Up the Health Workforce” (Soucat, 
Vujicic, Sy, and Sekabaraga), focuses on public sector budgeting and how 
government fiscal policy affects staffing levels. It uses data and informa-
tion from Kenya, Rwanda, and Zambia on the wage bill and employment 
practices to illustrate labor market rigidities in African countries. It argues 
that contrary to population perception, wage bill ceilings do not hamper 
expansion of the health workforce; rather, outdated policies that fail to 
account for the changing role of the public and private sectors restrict 
expansion.
Chapter 7, “Politics and Governance in Human Resources for Health” 
(Mitchell and Bossert), describes how government and political struc-
tures affect labor markets and how these structures can be improved. 
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There is a trend toward labor market–oriented systems with greater regu-
lation in private markets. The chapter points out the dangers of poor 
performance in a health labor market not adequately regulated. The 
authors draw on examples from Ethiopia, Ghana, Rwanda, and Zambia.
Part II. Distribution of Health Workforce
The analysis of the distribution of the health workforce begins with 
chapter 8, “How Many Health Workers” (Ahmat, Bilal, Herbst, and 
Weber). This chapter presents the best available data on the total supply 
of health care workers in Africa. It illustrates how poor the data collec-
tion is and how collection differs between countries. Estimating health 
worker numbers is a difficult task because the data are not uniform across 
countries and estimates vary. Even with data problems, it is clear that 
health work strategies differ in African countries.
Chapter 9, “Rural-Urban Imbalance of Health Workers in Sub-Saharan 
Africa” (Lemière, Herbst, Dolea, Zurn, and Soucat), examines the key 
issue of rural and urban imbalances, offering tools to analyze distribution 
equity. It presents case examples from Benin, Chad, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Kenya, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, and 
Senegal. The authors highlight the barriers to appropriate and adequate 
urban and rural distributions in Africa. There appears to be an adequate 
supply in most urban areas and a severe shortage in rural areas.
Chapter 10, “Migration and Attrition” (Özden and Sewadeh), focuses 
on the migration of health workers in Africa. It notes that approximately 
a fourth of physicians trained in Africa now work in Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development countries. The top four desti-
nations for African-trained doctors are the United Kingdom, the United 
States, Canada, and Australia. This chapter discusses migration rates 
across African countries and the key reasons for migration, drawing les-
sons from a survey of Ghanaian physicians living abroad. The chapter 
finds that training, remuneration, and career opportunities all contribute 
to a high rate of physician emigration.
Chapter 11, “Public and Private Practice of Health Workers” (Ensor, 
Serneels, and Lievens), examines the economic issues that influence 
health workers’ choice between the public and private sectors, using 
qualitative and quantitative studies from Ethiopia, Ghana, and Rwanda. 
The authors note that while most African countries have opened their 
health care markets to private sector providers, policies in these countries 
are still tailored toward an exclusively public sector model. The chapter 
presents a case study of dual practice from Ethiopia, offering insights 
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about the conditions that result in widespread dual practice across the 
continent.
Chapter 12, “The Equity Perspective” (Gwatkin and Ergo), examines 
the health worker labor market by discussing different concepts and 
definitions of equity, and the ambiguity of this concept. It analyzes health 
workforce equity in Ethiopia, Ghana, Mozambique, Rwanda, and Zambia, 
illustrating a fundamental dilemma: equity across geographical areas is an 
important concept but it is limited. Many poor populations live in areas 
with adequate supplies of health workers but remain underserved. 
Workforce equity is a serious problem in all African countries.
Part III. Performance of the Health Workforce
The analysis of health worker performance opens with chapter 13, 
“Incentives for Provider Performance” (Soucat, Gertler, Basinga, Sturdy, 
Vermeesh, and Sekabaraga). The chapter explores a new model for 
financing health workers’ pay for performance and shows that many 
African countries are testing pay-for-performance measures. It presents 
the analytical framework for pay for performance and provides a detailed 
case example of its application and results in Rwanda.
Chapter 14, “Intrinsic Motivation” (Leonard, Serneels, and Brock), 
provides an innovative behavioral framework for examining intrinsic 
motivation, applying it to choice of health occupations in Africa. It looks 
at how norms are determined and how health worker motivation can be 
analyzed and improved. The chapter uses a case example from Rwanda 
to examine motivation. The evidence surprisingly suggests that health 
worker motivation is very poor.
Chapter 15, “Facility-Level Human Resource Management” (Lemière, 
Mahoney, and Nyoni), focuses on best practices in human resources man-
agement, including management skills, autonomy of decision makers, and 
incentives. It provides an analytical framework for management and per-
formance and applies it to Tanzania. Finally, it looks at the barriers to 
improving human resources management in Africa and the lack of good 
evidence on the topic.
Part IV. Education and Training of Health Workers
The chapters in part IV examine health worker training and education in 
Africa. Chapter 16, “Health Worker Education and Training” (Tulenko, 
Gasakure, and Neusy), shows how preservice education affects produc-
tivity, stock shortfalls, and distribution of health workers. The authors 
note that there is little or no connection between the employers and 
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trainers of health care workers, leading to a disconnect between training 
and service. The chapter explores the factors behind high student attri-
tion, barriers to adequate financing, and the lack of flexibility in training 
health workers. It provides country examples from Ethiopia and 
Malawi.
Chapter 17, “Becoming a Health Worker Student” (Righetti, Strasser, 
Materu, and Herbst), focuses on enrollment of health care workers in 
health science education programs. It examines three defining factors of 
student enrollment in health science training programs: academic prepa-
ration, financial barriers, and institutional capacity. It looks at enrollment 
patterns in 14 African countries and data on the application and admis-
sion to medical training programs.
Chapter 18, “Paying for Higher Education Reform in Health” (Preker, 
Beciu, Robyn, Ayettey, and Antwi), presents a detailed analysis of the cost 
estimates of scaling up health worker education and applies the analysis 
to Ghana. It sets out the investment and recurrent costs of expanded 
training and explores financing sources that countries can pursue to meet 
the additional costs. The chapter provides financing scenarios for educat-
ing health care workers in Ghana. This country-specific analysis can be 
applied to other African countries as well.
Conclusion
As the chapters in this book make clear, Africa is not homogenous. 
Country realities differ, sometimes greatly. Not every country has a short-
age of health workers. Wages vary, as do worker preferences and public 
policies. What does this book tell us about the human resources for health 
crisis in Africa today?
• Some African countries have made tremendous progress developing 
innovative approaches to managing human resources for health. South 
Africa developed an approach to selecting and training students that 
led to a rise in health workers in rural and impoverished communities.
Ethiopia launched a massive effort to increase the number of health 
workers to deliver services that contribute to the Millennium Develop-
ment Goals. It has trained and hired more than 30,000 health extension 
workers to deliver a basic package of promotive and preventive inter-
ventions, including family planning and malaria prevention and treat-
ment. It is also tripling the production of medical officers and doctors 
trained to address maternal mortality and most illnesses that require 
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referral or hospital care. Ethiopia is also analyzing incentives to reduce 
emigration of qualified health workers and distribute workers to rural 
areas.
Ghana increased remuneration of both doctors and nurses. Early 
data suggest that the pay increases reduced migration but have not 
affected performance. The Ghana experience raises interesting ques-
tions about the fiscal consequences of the salary increase and the pres-
sure it places on the government to boost wages of other public sector 
employees.
Rwanda implemented the broadest reform of human resources 
observed in low-income countries. A substantial and growing portion 
of health worker remuneration now depends on performance contracts 
between the government and autonomous facilities. Rwanda decentral-
ized its health care framework, and all facilities are now fully autono-
mous and can hire and fire health workers. The country’s innovative 
approach supports cooperatives of community health workers who are 
under contract with the government.
• The traditional manpower planning framework is outdated and should 
be revised to include the parameters influencing the health labor mar-
ket. Typically, analysts and policy makers rely on a manpower planning 
and management approach to forecast needs, plan production and 
deployment, and manage health workers in a centralized manner. This 
approach almost always focuses on the public sector and supply side 
exclusively, underestimating the demand for health labor generated by 
private resources from households and growing aid for health. It largely 
ignores the market forces that influence wages and the incentives envi-
ronment that health workers operate in. Too often this framework relies 
on models from countries outside Africa, with different political, insti-
tutional, and societal contexts. This outdated manpower framework 
must be replaced with a more dynamic health labor market framework 
that builds on a broad range of international experience in public sector 
reform.
• Policy makers and analysts should distinguish between deficiency and 
shortage, which are often confused in policy debates. Deficiency—often 
wrongly labeled shortage—exists when there is a gap between needs 
and actual numbers of health workers. This is a problem in all African 
countries. Africa remains the region with the fewest health workers in 
relation to total population.
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True shortage occurs when there is a gap between the funding for 
health workers and the number of available health workers. Shortage 
leads to inflationary pressures on wages and crowding out of the public 
sector, including poaching of health workers. Unlike health worker 
deficiency, not all African countries experience health worker short-
ages. True shortage is an issue only in Ethiopia, Malawi, Mozambique, 
and Zambia. By contrast, Kenya and Nigeria have large numbers of 
unemployed health workers. Deficiency and shortage call for different 
policies tailored to the specific situation and political economy of the 
country in question.
• Health worker deficiency is a rural problem. Few countries are 
responding to the lessons learned from international experience about 
the need to develop specific approaches for the training of rural health 
workers. Ethiopia developed a health extension program comparable 
in size and ambition to the effective and well-documented family 
health program in Brazil. Brazil’s program has more than 200,000 
community health workers that form the backbone of rural health 
service delivery. Thailand’s program for developing a pipeline of rural 
doctors is emulated by only Ethiopia and South Africa. Most medical 
schools in Sub-Saharan Africa are still located in capital cities, though 
there is progress in moving nursing schools to rural areas. Very few 
African countries have a truly effective policy that creates incentives 
for health workers to practice in rural areas; workers in urban areas 
usually earn more than their rural counterparts. Governments and 
donor communities should focus on rural deficiency and stimulate 
the production of health cadres most likely to serve the rural poor.
• Many African countries pay little attention to the emerging private sec-
tor. More than half of the health expenditures in Africa are private, and 
private nursing schools have blossomed throughout Sub-Saharan Africa. 
The provider/purchaser split is already a reality in countries like the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Mali, Rwanda, and Zambia. Yet many 
countries report only their public sector health workers to the World 
Health Organization. Many governments only finance public schools 
and do a poor job of regulating private schools and clinics. Ethiopia’s 
accreditation of private nursing schools is a good example of how to 
address nurse deficiencies and shortages. Rwanda’s approach of con-
tracting faith-based organizations engages private providers in the deliv-
ery of essential services to the poor. Uganda and Zambia are 
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experimenting with similar programs. Overall the African health labor 
market is similar to the European market: a diverse mix of institutional 
models with various degrees of private sector participation in providing 
and financing services.
• The performance of health workers is mostly unknown but the few 
rigorous studies available (Rwanda and Tanzania) paint a bleak picture. 
Performance is typically associated with skills and training and indeed 
these factors are critical. Effort is also essential, however, and in some 
cases determines performance more so than skill. Health workers often 
do less than what they are capable of doing. Innovations such as perfor-
mance-based financing, which Burundi and Rwanda are scaling up, can 
make a difference by aligning financial incentives to producing relevant, 
quality services. Incentives are not the only answer, and it is important 
to cultivate intrinsic motivation by selecting students with altruistic or 
rural backgrounds and encouraging professional and/or public ethos 
through training curricula.
• Migration is often blamed for the ills of African health systems, but 
available studies show a more nuanced picture. Cohort studies in 
Ethiopia show a relatively low initial desire to migrate, which grows 
over time. Health workers with higher income and urban backgrounds 
are more likely to migrate, suggesting that poverty is not the main 
driver. Instead, the opportunity to pursue higher income may be the 
primary driver. Higher income plays a role in retaining health work-
ers, as in Ghana. Emigration and rural-urban imbalance seem to be 
two faces of the same phenomena. Recruiting health workers from 
rural areas and offering training tailored to local diseases (rather than 
diseases more common in richer countries) are promising strategies.
• The issue of fiscal space for wages is a red herring in the health worker 
debate. A more binding constraint is likely the insufficient funds avail-
able for investment in growing the supply of qualified health workers. 
Available evidence shows that wage bill ceilings are not the problem in 
most cases: in the majority of African countries there is no wage ceiling 
issue.
Several countries have dramatically expanded their fiscal space for 
health worker wages. Most have increased resources for health, chan-
neling a large part to health worker remuneration. Countries are inno-
vative in tackling wage issues, often breaking the rigid rules of 
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postcolonial integrated civil service, as in Ghana and Rwanda. But not 
enough financing is channeled to the supply side and health worker 
education. Governments should reestablish the balance and make more 
resources available for investments that relax supply constraints by fos-
tering public-private partnerships for nursing and medical education.
• Overall we know very little about the supply and distribution of health 
workers in Africa. The information deficit is staggering, even for the 
most basic indicators. This dearth of data limits the impact of policy. For 
most African countries we do not know the number of qualified health 
workers in the country at a given time, let alone how health worker 
density evolves in contexts where populations are rapidly growing. We 
know even less about health worker distribution at subnational levels 
and between the public and the private sectors. We know close to noth-
ing about health workers’ gender, income, and socioeconomic back-
ground. And, we know very little about their specific motivations and 
the incentives that influence their behaviors. A major investment is 
required to generate the evidence needed to support effective  policies.
• Finally, health worker issues are country-specific. Each country should 
diagnose its own health labor market issues taking advantage of the 
tools presented in this book. Producing more health workers and paying 
them more is not always the right answer. There is no one-size-fits-all 
policy.
National governments and the donor community should systemati-
cally support country-specific analyses of the labor market to under-
stand the binding constraints on both demand and supply sides. The 
analysis should include wage analyses; discrete choice experiments; 
institutional analyses; cost and efficiency analyses; analyses of supply 
constraints; analysis of health worker performance, including measure-
ments of skills and efforts; and impact evaluations of the policies imple-
mented. Only then can countries respond effectively to the human 
resource crisis.
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C H A P T E R  2
Needs-Based Estimates for the 
Health Workforce
Richard M. Scheffler and Brent D. Fulton
A trained health workforce is at the center of the health system, and 
without one, medical equipment, supplies, facilities, and medication will 
be inefficiently used. Accurately estimating the number of required 
health workers in Sub-Saharan Africa is important given limited regional 
resources, and these estimates will help governments and donors allo-
cate health care budgets prudently. A needs-based approach can esti-
mate health workforce requirements by assessing the extent that the 
existing health workforce meets health care needs. This chapter uses a 
needs-based approach to estimate empirically health worker require-
ments to meet various health care needs in 18 Sub-Saharan countries. 
Health worker requirements vary greatly, and depend on the specific 
health care need that is used to generate the requirement, and the 
population distribution of the individual country.
A Conceptual Needs-Based Approach to Estimating Health 
Workforce Requirements
Well-trained cadres of health workers are essential to maximize the effec-
tiveness of a country’s health care system and improve the health status 
of its people (Chen and others 2004). For health care planners and 
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 government officials, estimating the required number of health workers 
for specific health care needs is an important part of strengthening health 
systems and achieving the health-related Millennium Development 
Goals (Crisp and Gawanas 2008). This chapter presents a conceptual 
framework—the needs-based approach—to estimate human resources 
(specifically doctors, nurses, and midwives) for health requirements for 
various health care measures, and applies the framework empirically to 
53 countries, including 18 in Sub-Saharan Africa.
How can we estimate needs-based requirements for health workers? 
We can do so by showing the relationship between a country’s health 
workforce and its specific health care service use or health outcome goals, 
which serve as proxy measures for need. The approach begins by selecting 
health care services or health outcome measures. Examples include the 
proportion of births attended by a skilled health worker, breast cancer 
screening, infant and maternal mortality, and the burden of disease for 
conditions such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria. The number of 
health workers required to achieve goals on the selected measures is then 
estimated using data from multiple countries or from multiple regions 
within a country.
Using this needs-based approach, the World Health Organization 
(WHO) found that countries that did not have at least 2.28 doctors, 
nurses, and midwives per 1,000 residents were, on average, unable to 
achieve 80 percent coverage of births by a skilled birth attendant (2006). 
WHO selected the 80 percent threshold partly because it wanted to set 
a minimum desired coverage level, and partly because the benefit of 
additional health workers on the birth coverage rate began to diminish 
near this threshold.
To estimate the number of health workers that a country requires, 
however, a model should incorporate additional health care measures and 
factors that affect worker productivity. This chapter thus improves on the 
WHO method in two ways. First, WHO estimated the number of 
required health workers using a single health care measure: birth atten-
dance by a skilled health worker. This chapter examines multiple health 
care measures to show how the number of workers required to achieve a 
specific goal is sensitive to the measure used. Second, the relationship 
between health workers and health measures varies across countries 
because of differences in worker productivity. These differences stem 
from dissimilar health care systems, financing mechanisms, worker train-
ing, geographic characteristics, and population distributions, as well as 
variations among such other factors as medical facilities, equipment, 
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 supplies, and pharmaceuticals. WHO did not account for these produc-
tivity differences in its analysis.
To demonstrate elements of this more nuanced approach, this analysis 
includes two country-level population distribution factors—urbanization 
and land area per capita—to show how human resources for health 
requirements vary by country. Extending this approach would include 
the other factors that affect worker productivity just mentioned.
Applying the Needs-Based Approach
The approach is applied to 53 countries, including 18 in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, using data from the World Health Survey 2002. WHO sponsored 
this survey, which randomly sampled about 4,000 adults per country. 
Respondents were asked about their own and family members’ health 
status and health care use and expenditures, as well as demographic infor-
mation, including whether the respondent lived in an urban or rural set-
ting. Health workforce supply estimates are from WHO (2006).1 To be 
consistent with that publication, the analysis defined health workers as 
doctors, nurses, and midwives. Country population estimates are from the 
U.S. Census Bureau’s 2002 Global Population Profile.
The resulting statistics for the full sample of 53 countries and 18 Sub-
Saharan countries are based on a country as the unit of analysis, and are 
not weighted for population differences, consistent with WHO (2006; 
table 2.1). Except for vaccinations and vitamin A supplement, health 
care service use was generally lower for Sub-Saharan Africa than for the 
full sample. Also, for all 53 countries the average number of health care 
workers was 4.25 per 1,000 population, while the Sub-Saharan average 
was 1.73.
To examine the relationship between the size of the health workforce 
and measures of health care service use and outcomes, 12 health care 
services and two health outcomes were analyzed (see table 2.1). The 
basic analysis included the number of health workers per 1,000 popula-
tion, and further analyses included the percentage of the country’s 
population living in an urban area and the country’s land area per capita, 
because these characteristics may be related to an individual’s access to 
health care services (see annex 2A for more detail on methods). The 
results illustrate which health care services and health outcomes were 
statistically related to the size and composition of the health workforce, 
and whether the required number of health workers varied according to 
a country’s population distribution.
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Table 2.1 Country Health Care Service, Health, and Population Distribution 
 Statistics
All countries 
(n = 53)
Sub-Saharan 
countries 
(n = 18)
Mean
Standard 
 deviation Mean
Standard 
deviation
Health care services
Birth attended by health worker 
(1 yes, 0 no)a 0.83 0.23 0.74 0.23
Birth attended by doctor (1 yes, 0 no)a 0.67 0.34 0.46 0.30
Birth attended by nurse or midwife 
(1 yes, 0 no)a 0.77 0.27 0.73 0.27
Pelvic examination in last three years 
(1 yes, 0 no)b 0.37 0.28 0.17 0.14
Pap smear test in last three years 
(1 yes, 0 no)b 0.55 0.27 0.44 0.14
Mammography in last three years 
(1 yes, 0 no)c 0.16 0.17 0.05 0.04
HIV testing offered when pregnant 
(1 yes, 0 no)d 0.25 0.25 0.19 0.16
Received health care when needed it 
(1 yes, 0 no) 0.96 0.04 0.94 0.04
Received any vaccination (1 yes, 0 no)e 0.71 0.20 0.76 0.11
Received DPT vaccination (1 yes, 0 no)e 0.91 0.09 0.93 0.05
Received measles vaccination (1 yes, 0 no)e 0.77 0.14 0.82 0.10
Received vitamin A capsule or similar 
 supplement (1 yes, 0 no)e 0.46 0.25 0.61 0.21
Health outcomes
Health rating (1 very good or good, 
0  otherwise) 0.60 0.14 0.64 0.11
Health satisfaction (1 very satisfied or 
 satisfied, 0 otherwise) 0.61 0.13 0.59 0.14
Health workforce
Doctors per 1,000 population 1.30 1.34 0.21 0.27
Nurses and midwives per 1,000 population 2.95 2.84 1.52 1.68
Health workers per 1,000 population 4.25 3.98 1.73 1.85
Population distribution
Land (square kilometers) per capita 0.04 0.08 0.08 0.12
Urban (percent of total population) 49.80 24.50 38.00 21.33
Sources: WHO 2002; CIA’s The World Factbook (land area); U.S. Census Bureau, Global Population Profile: 2002 
(population).
Note: DPT = diphtheria, pertussis (whooping cough), and tetanus.
a. Asked of women who were pregnant in the last five years (since January 1998).
b. Asked of women ages 18–49.
c. Asked of women ages 40–69.
d. Asked of women who were pregnant in the last two years (since January 2001).
e. Asked of children under five years old.
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Relationship between Health Workers and Health Measures
The number of health workers per 1,000 population was positively 
related to many of the health care service measures. These included births 
attended by a health worker (doctor, nurse, or midwife), births attended 
by a doctor, births attended by a nurse or midwife, a pelvic examination 
in the last three years, a Pap smear test in the last three years, a mam-
mography in the last three years, HIV testing offered during pregnancy, 
and health care received when needed (tables 2A.1 and 2A.2). No rela-
tionship was found between the number of health workers and whether 
a child received vaccinations.2
To illustrate one specific relationship, figure 2.1 shows the percentage 
of births attended by a health worker as a function of the number of 
health workers per 1,000 population, for all 53 countries. Each dot rep-
resents a country, and the curved line shows the predicted percentage of 
births attended by a health worker. Similar to WHO (2006), this analysis 
found that coverage varied significantly among countries with similar 
numbers of health workers per 1,000 population, emphasizing the need 
to incorporate additional variables into the model.
Countries where about 90 percent or more of births were attended by 
a health worker had a wide range of such workers per 1,000 population, 
Source: Bivariate regression result in table 2A.1 (row 1).
Note: The vertical line indicates the WHO threshold of 2.28 health workers per 1,000 population.
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Figure 2.1 Percentage of Births Attended by a Health Worker versus Number of 
Health Workers per 1,000 Population, by Country
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largely because the additional health workers are providing nonbirth–
related care (see figure 2.1). Of the 23 countries that fall below the 
WHO threshold of 2.28 health workers per 1,000 population, 14 (or 
61 percent) did not achieve 80 percent coverage for births, which was less 
than the 85 percent found by WHO (2006; see figure 2.1).
Figure 2.2 shows the predicted percentage of people in the 18 Sub-
Saharan countries that would receive health care on the basis of different 
numbers of health workers per 1,000 population. The health care services 
have a statistically significant relationship with the number of health 
workers, after accounting for each country’s population distributions 
(that is, urbanization and land area per capita). The predictions were 
based on Sub-Saharan countries’ average population distributions: the 
proportion of the population living in urban areas (38 percent) and land 
area per capita (0.08 square kilometers).
These results suggest that a country would require various numbers of 
health workers to achieve particular levels of use of specific health care 
services. For example, to achieve 80 percent coverage of births by a health 
worker, a country would require 1.7 health workers per 1,000 population 
Source: Multivariate regression results in tables 2A.1 and 2A.2.
Note: The vertical line indicates the WHO threshold of 2.28 health workers per 1,000 population.
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Box 2.1
Service Delivery and Health Worker Productivity
The World Health Organization selected the 80 percent coverage rate for births 
partly to set a minimum desired coverage. As seen in figure 2.2, however, the 
predicted coverage of HIV testing offered during pregnancy (line D), pelvic exam-
inations (line E), and mammographies (line F) come nowhere close to this stan-
dard, even when the number of health workers is significantly higher than the 
World Health Organization’s 2.28 health worker threshold. Other factors, such as 
supplies and equipment, are likely to be the key constraint, rendering these tests 
and examinations virtually useless (for lack of treatment).
If investments addressed these constraints, health worker productivity could 
rise. In figure 2.2 this would shift each line upward, signifying countries’ ability to 
use more health care services without increasing the number of health workers.
(see figure 2.2, line A). This level would, however, achieve much lower 
percentages on the other measures, such as Pap smear tests (line C), HIV 
testing offered during pregnancy (line D), pelvic examinations (line E), 
and mammographies (line F). If health worker productivity increased, 
each line would shift upward (box 2.1).
To illustrate how the required number of health workers varies based 
on a country’s population distribution, figure 2.3 shows the estimated 
number of health workers per 1,000 population required to achieve 
80 percent coverage of births for the 18 Sub-Saharan countries. The aver-
age is 1.7, ranging from 0.7 in the Republic of Congo to 4.3 in Namibia. 
The required number varies by country because of differences in the 
proportion of the urbanized population (p < .1) and in land area per 
capita (although this was not a statistically significant result). These fac-
tors partly explain why countries with about the same number of health 
workers per 1,000 population had different shares of births covered by a 
health worker (see figure 2.1). The average proportion of people living in 
urban areas for the 18 countries is 38 percent, ranging from 10 percent 
in Malawi to 92 percent in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Based on 
the analysis, the share of births attended by a health worker is predicted 
to increase by 0.3 percentage points for every percentage point rise in the 
population that lives in an urban area (p < .1).
The variation among countries in figure 2.3 shows that the average 
required number of 1.7 health workers per 1,000 population is a poor 
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estimate for many individual countries (box 2.2 discusses Chad, an out-
lier example). In the same vein, WHO’s 2.28 health workers per 1,000 is 
a poor estimate for many individual countries. As seen, therefore, includ-
ing additional variables—such as geographic characteristics—that affect 
the relationship between the number of health workers and health care 
service utilization measures can improve estimates.3 Such a needs-based 
analysis can also be applied below the national level, using regions or 
districts.
Limitations of—and Potential Improvements in—Needs-Based 
Analyses
The required number of health workers per 1,000 population is sensitive 
to the chosen health measure and varies across countries, based on their 
population distribution. Each country—or region within a country—
needs to select a combination of relevant health measures and contextual 
factors to include in their models to estimate the health workforce 
requirement. The needs-based approach has four limitations (some can 
be overcome with additional data).
First, the government and private sector have to decide how best to 
spend their limited health funds. When the needs-based approach finds a 
shortage of health workers, this does not necessarily mean that additional 
Source: Multivariate regression results shown in table 2A.2 (row 1).
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Figure 2.3 Estimated Number of Health Workers per 1,000 Population Required 
to Achieve 80 Percent Coverage of Births, 18 Sub-Saharan Countries
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funding should be spent to train and hire more health workers. It may be 
more cost-effective for funds to be spent on increasing the productivity 
of existing health workers, either through training and incentives or by 
increasing spending on other factors, such as medical facilities, equip-
ment, supplies, or pharmaceuticals. For example, among the 18 Sub-
Saharan countries, the average rate of HIV testing offered during 
pregnancy was only 19 percent. The binding constraint to achieving a 
higher testing rate may not be health workers, but lack of testing kits and 
antiretroviral medications. On the other hand, if a country determines 
that it is most cost-effective to scale up its health workforce, it may need 
to expand other parts of the health care system to use the new workers 
most efficiently.
Second, the needs-based approach estimates the required number of 
health workers per 1,000 population, but does not inform decision mak-
ers about optimal distribution of health workers in a country. So, the 
needs-based approach should use data from multiple communities within 
a country, when available, to estimate the required number at the com-
munity level.
Box 2.2
Population Distribution and Human Resources for Health 
Requirements, Chad
In Central Africa, Chad is less urbanized (22 percent versus 38 percent) and has 
more land (0.14 square kilometers versus 0.07 square kilometers) per capita than 
the average of the 18 Sub-Saharan countries in WHO (2002). Low urbanization 
makes it more difficult for a health worker to attend a birth, and the country’s 
coverage of births by a health worker was only 23 percent.
In 2004 (the year of the data in WHO 2006), Chad had 9.45 million people. It 
had 2,844 health workers (0.32 per 1,000 population), comprising 345 doctors 
(0.04 per 1,000 population) and 2,499 nurses and midwives (0.28 per 1,000 popu-
lation). The 18 Sub-Saharan countries require an average of 1.7 health workers per 
1,000 population to achieve 80 percent coverage for births. On this basis, Chad 
would require 16,000 health workers, implying a shortage of some 13,000 health 
workers (1.4 per 1,000 population).
Once Chad’s urbanization and land area are included in the model, however, 
its requirements shoot up to 25,500 health workers (2.7 per 1,000 population), 
pointing to a shortage of about 22,500 (2.4 per 1,000 population).
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Third, the lack of data on factors associated with health care services 
use (such as health facilities, equipment, supplies, and pharmaceuticals) 
and health outcomes (such as genetic factors, demographic characteris-
tics, the environment, behavioral choices, education, and the above health 
systems factors) limits researchers’ ability to offer more refined estimates 
of the number of required health workers. Most health workers do mul-
tiple tasks, so it would be ideal to measure productivity for particular 
tasks, and incorporate task shifting when it is cost-effective (Fulton and 
others 2011; Scheffler and others 2009). When these data are incorpo-
rated, more refined health worker requirement estimates can be made.
Fourth, the needs-based approach ignores economic factors such as 
health workers’ wages and a country’s economic capacity to train and 
employ them. Taking these factors into account leads to a demand-based 
approach that determines the number of health workers that a country can 
afford to train and employ (Scheffler 2008; Scheffler and others 2008).
Annex 2A Supplemental Information on Data, Methods, and 
 Results
Data
The primary data are from WHO (2002), which randomly sampled 
adults in 70 countries; about 4,000 adults per country were asked ques-
tions about their households. When the survey question had more than 
two possible responses, the analysis collapsed the responses into two 
responses, so that multiple measures could more easily be plotted on the 
same figure.
For example, the question that asked a woman when she last had a 
pelvic examination, the possible responses were: less than three years, 
four to five years, more than five years, and never. These responses were 
collapsed to indicate whether the woman had a pelvic examination in the 
last three years.
The analysis includes the following 53 countries by WHO region4:
• African Region (18): Burkina Faso, Chad, the Comoros, the Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, 
Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Namibia, Senegal, South Africa, 
Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
• Eastern Mediterranean Region (4): Morocco, Pakistan, Tunisia, and the 
United Arab Emirates.
• European Region (14): Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Latvia, the Russian 
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Federation, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, and 
Ukraine.
• Region of the Americas (7): Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Guatemala, Mexico, Paraguay, and Uruguay.
• Southeast Asia Region (5): Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Nepal, and Sri 
Lanka.
• Western Pacific Region (5): China, the Lao People’s Democratic Repub-
lic, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam.
The survey suffers from two limitations related to any household sur-
vey. The first is whether the sample is nationally representative because 
of nonresponse, particularly within subpopulations such as pregnant 
women. Second, there may be biases when the adult respondent does not 
have full information about a member in the household who is included 
in the survey, such as children.
Methods
The analysis estimated two regression models for each of the 12 health 
care services (1–12 in table 2A.1) and health outcomes (13–14 in table 
2A.1). The dependent variable in each model was the proportion of a 
country’s respondents that received the health care service or achieved 
the health outcome.5 The first model included the logarithm of the num-
ber of health workers (doctors, nurses, and midwives) per 1,000 popula-
tion as the only independent variable.6 The second model included 
additional variables to control for the percentage of the country’s popula-
tion living in an urban area and the country’s land area per capita, because 
these characteristics may be related to an individual’s access to health 
care services. To capture other factors specific to Sub-Saharan Africa, the 
second model also included a dummy variable indicating whether the 
country was in Sub-Saharan Africa.
In both models, the logarithm transformation of health workers was 
done because it allows for a nonlinear relationship between the number 
of health workers and the dependent variable, which may be the case 
because of diminishing marginal returns of an additional health worker. A 
quadratic specification was also tested for the multivariate models, which 
on average produced a similar R2 statistic.
Results
Table 2A.1 presents the bivariate and multivariate regression results for 
the logarithm of the health worker variable for the 14 sets of models. 
The results for models 2 and 3 are for the logarithm of doctors and the 
Table 2A.1 Health Care Services Use and Health Outcome Measures Regression Results for Health Workers
Dependent variable
Bivariate models: log (health workers per 
1,000 population)
Multivariate models: log (health workers 
per 1,000 population)
Parameter 
 estimate
Standard 
error t-statistic
Parameter 
 estimate
Standard 
error t-statistic
 1. Birth attended by health worker (1 yes, 0 no)a 0.329 0.05 6.54*** 0.301 0.074 4.06***
 2. Birth attended by doctor (1 yes, 0 no)a 0.390 0.05 7.85*** 0.519 0.109 4.76***
 3. Birth attended by nurse or midwife (1 yes, 0 no)a 0.244 0.07 3.31** 0.206 0.094 2.19*
 4. Pelvic examination in last three years (1 yes, 0 no)b 0.433 0.06 7.72*** 0.153 0.066 2.33*
 5. Pap smear test in last three years (1 yes, 0 no)b 0.390 0.06 6.66*** 0.314 0.086 3.65***
 6. Mammography in last three years (1 yes, 0 no)c 0.268 0.03 7.84*** 0.161 0.048 3.33**
 7. HIV testing offered when pregnant (1 yes, 0 no)d 0.297 0.06 4.83*** 0.258 0.089 2.91**
 8. Received health care when needed (1 yes, 0 no) 0.049 0.01 5.39*** 0.048 0.014 3.40**
 9. Received any vaccination (1 yes, 0 no)e −0.004 0.06 0.07 0.016 0.090 0.18
10. Received DPT vaccination (1 yes, 0 no)e −0.030 0.03 1.19 −0.004 0.039 0.11
11. Received measles vaccination (1 yes, 0 no)e −0.055 0.04 1.31 0.000 0.064 0.00
12.  Received vitamin A capsule or similar supplement 
(1 yes, 0 no)e −0.395 0.05 7.79*** −0.365 0.075 4.89***
13. Health rating (1 very good or good, 0 otherwise) −0.108 0.04 2.87** −0.096 0.058 1.64
14.  Health satisfaction (1 very satisfied or satisfied, 
0 otherwise) 0.000 0.04 0.00 −0.027 0.063 0.43
Source: Based on data from World Health Survey 2002.
Note: DPT = diphtheria, pertussis (whooping cough), and tetanus. All statistics are for logarithm of health worker variable, except model 2 is logarithm of doctor variable and model 3 is 
logarithm of a nurse or midwife variable. For multivariate models, control variables include land (square kilometers) per capita, percent urban, and an African region dummy variable. 
Number of observations ranged from 48 to 53.
a. Asked of women who were pregnant in the last five years (since January 1998).
b. Asked of women ages 18–49.
c. Asked of women ages 40–69.
d. Asked of women who were pregnant in the last two years (since January 2001).
e. Asked of children under five years old.
*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001.
26  
Needs-Based Estimates for the Health Workforce       27
logarithm of nurses and midwives, respectively. The bivariate and multi-
variate regression results had similar statistical significances, but the 
bivariate parameter estimate magnitudes tended to be larger. The param-
eter estimates for the health worker variable were statistically significant 
at the 0.05 level for the following eight dependent variables (models 
1–8): births attended by a health worker (either a doctor, nurse, or mid-
wife), births attended by a doctor, births attended by a nurse or midwife, 
a pelvic examination in the last three years, a Pap smear test in the last 
three years, a mammography in the last three years, HIV testing offered 
during pregnancy, and health care received when needed.
The models involving children receiving vaccinations did not have a 
statistically significant relationship with the number of health workers, 
but whether a child received a vitamin A capsule or similar supplement 
actually had a negative relationship with the number of health workers 
per 1,000 population, which requires further investigation. For the health 
outcome variables in the multivariate models, neither health rating nor 
health satisfaction was statistically associated with the number of health 
workers per 1,000 population.
The magnitudes of the parameter estimates have the following inter-
pretation. A 1 percent increase in the number of health workers (hw) 
results in a b /100 unit change in the dependent variable (y). For example 
using model 1’s bivariate result, if the number of health workers increased 
by 10 percent, the probability that a birth would be attended by a health 
worker would be predicted to increase by 0.0329, or 3.29 percentage 
points [Δy = ( b /100) × %Δhw; 0.0329 = (0.0329/100) × 10].
Table 2A.2 shows the detailed regression results for the 14 multivari-
ate models. The independent variables and statistics not shown in table 
2A.1 are now discussed. The proportion of the population residing in an 
urban setting was positively associated with pelvic examination in the last 
three years, Pap smear test in the last three years, and mammography in 
the last three years (all p < .05), and approached being positively associ-
ated with HIV testing offered during pregnancy and having a birth 
attended by a health worker (both p < .06). A country’s land area per 
capita was not statistically associated (p < .05) with any of the dependent 
variables, but it approached being positively associated with having a 
birth attended by a nurse or midwife and with a child receiving a vitamin 
A capsule or similar supplement (both p < .08). This result requires fur-
ther investigation. The Sub-Saharan Africa binary variable was not statis-
tically associated with any of the dependent variables, except it had a 
positive association for having a birth attended by a doctor (p < .05).
Table 2A.2 Health Care Services Use and Health Outcome Measures Multivariate Regression Results
Dependent variable
Independent Variables
Health 
workers (log)
Land (sq km) 
per capita
Urban 
(% of total 
population)
Sub-Saharan 
Africa Constant N R2 F-statistic
1.  Birth attended by health 
worker
0.301*** 
(0.074) 
−0.352 
(0.315)
0.003 
(0.001) 
0.106 
(0.063) 
0.558*** 
(0.065) 
51 0.52 12.6*** 
2. Birth attended by doctor 0.519*** 
(0.109) 
−0.410 
(0.413)
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.258* 
(0.118) 
0.683*** 
(0.103) 
51 0.61 17.8*** 
3.  Birth attended by nurse 
or midwife 
0.206* 
(0.094) 
−0.843 
(0.455)
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.134 
(0.085) 
0.563*** 
(0.094) 
51 0.26 4.1** 
4.  Pelvic examination 
<3 years 
0.153* 
(0.066) 
−0.072 
(0.279)
0.006***
(0.001) 
−0.098 
(0.056)
0.026 
(0.057) 
51 0.73 31.6*** 
5. Pap smear test <3 years 0.314*** 
(0.086) 
0.250 
(0.366) 
0.003*
(0.001) 
0.053 
(0.074) 
0.239** 
(0.075) 
51 0.53 12.8*** 
6. Mammography <3 years 0.161** 
(0.048) 
0.005 
(0.205) 
0.003** 
(0.001) 
−0.027 
(0.041)
−0.034 
(0.042)
51 0.62 19.2*** 
7.  HIV testing offered when 
pregnant 
0.258** 
(0.089)
0.192 
(0.376) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.081 
(0.076) 
−0.036 
(0.077)
51 0.43 8.6*** 
8.  Received health care 
when needed 
0.048** 
(0.014)
−0.008 
(0.060)
0.000 
(0.000)
−0.006 
(0.012)
0.945*** 
(0.012)
51 0.36 6.6***
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Dependent variable
Independent Variables
Health 
workers (log)
Land (sq km) 
per capita
Urban 
(% of total 
population)
Sub-Saharan 
Africa Constant N R2 F-statistic
9. Received any vaccination 0.016 
(0.090)
−0.471 
(0.377)
0.001 
(0.002)
0.122 
(0.076)
0.626*** 
(0.077)
49 0.07 0.9
10.  Received DPT 
vaccination
−0.004 
(0.039)
−0.172 
(0.162)
0.000 
(0.001)
0.028 
(0.033)
0.934*** 
(0.033)
49 0.07 0.9
11.  Received measles 
vaccination
0.000 
(0.064)
−0.185 
(0.265)
0.000 
(0.001)
0.083 
(0.053)
0.759*** 
(0.054)
49 0.08 1
12.  Received vitamin A 
capsule or similar 
supplement
−0.365*** 
(0.075)
0.595 
(0.313)
−0.001 
(0.001)
−0.006 
(0.063)
0.621*** 
(0.064)
49 0.59 16.0***
13. Health rating −0.096 
(0.058)
0.127 
(0.249)
−0.001 
(0.001)
−0.010 
(0.050)
0.664*** 
(0.051)
52 0.15 2
14. Health satisfaction −0.027 
(0.063)
0.048 
(0.263)
0.000 
(0.001)
−0.036 
(0.053)
0.623*** 
(0.054)
48 0.01 0.1
Source: Based on data from World Health Survey 2002.
Note: Results are parameter estimates and standard errors in parentheses.
*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001.
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The R2 statistics for the health care services use models were 0.41 on 
average, with a range from 0.07 to 0.73. The R2 statistics for the health 
outcome models were lower. The models that included vaccines and 
health outcomes did not have a statistically significant F-statistic (p < .05), 
emphasizing the need for additional variables.
Notes
 1. The data year for the health workforce supply estimates varied by country. 
For the 53 countries of interest, most of the years were 2000–04.
 2. The relationship between the number of health workers per 1,000 popula-
tion and a child receiving a vitamin A capsule or similar supplement was 
negative, a finding that requires further investigation. For the health outcome 
variables, neither health rating nor health satisfaction was statistically associ-
ated with the number of health workers per 1,000 population, which is partly 
attributable to other factors that affect health, such as individual behaviors 
and the environment.
 3. This can be extended to each country’s health care system, financing mecha-
nisms, and worker training, as well as other health care factors, such as medi-
cal facilities, equipment, supplies, and pharmaceuticals. Theory should 
determine the variables, along with their specifications, to include in the pre-
dictive model. When theory is not conclusive, different models can be tested 
empirically. One commonly used empirical goal is to minimize the mean of 
the squared error terms. A cross-validation method could be employed where 
the model is estimated for a subset of the sample, and predictions are made 
on the remaining sample. This procedure is repeated, for example, 10 times 
by excluding a different 10 percent of the sample each time (Hastie, 
Tibshirani, and Friedman 2001).
 4. The World Health Survey 2002 covered 70 countries, but not all its modules 
were fielded in 17 countries.
 5. As in WHO (2006), the analysis also estimated human resource requirements 
using a dependent variable that was transformed with the arcsine function 
(sin−1), because proportions violate the variance homogeneity assumption 
across observations. Given that the results were very similar to the models 
with an untransformed dependent variable, the analysis presents the untrans-
formed models, as the parameter estimates are easier to interpret.
 6. When the dependent variable was whether the birth was attended by a doc-
tor, the key independent variable was the logarithm of the number of doctors 
per 1,000 population. The analogous change was made when the dependent 
variable was whether the birth was attended by a nurse or midwife.
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A Labor Market Approach
Mabel Andalón and Gary Fields
Through the perspective of labor market economics, this chapter 
 identifies five challenges of the health worker crisis in Africa: produc-
tion, underutilization, distribution, performance, and financing.1 Labor 
market economics clarifies the functioning of health worker labor mar-
kets in Africa as well as the dynamics that lead to specific labor market 
outcomes.2 This perspective helps to explain why workers are paid what 
they are, why employers hire as many (or as few) people as they do, and 
why the number of employed health workers is what it is, and not neces-
sarily what is “needed” to meet a given policy objective. Sound labor 
market analyses that collect empirical data together with social cost-
benefit criteria are needed in most African countries before we can 
confidently offer policy recommendations to address these challenges 
(Fields 2007).
Five Challenges Associated with the Health 
Worker Crisis in Africa
One overarching problem that policy makers in African countries face is 
ensuring that they have enough human resources to meet a certain objec-
tive for delivering health care services. The number of health workers 
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needed is referred to as the benchmark of needs, commonly derived from 
the needs-based approach (see chapter 2).
Although countries are advised to set their own benchmarks according 
to nation-specific health care policy objectives, cross-country compari-
sons are often based on the World Health Organization (WHO) bench-
mark of 2.28 well-trained health workers (doctors, nurses, and others). 
The ratio of 2.28 health workers per 1,000 population is estimated to be 
necessary to achieve 80 percent coverage of deliveries by skilled birth 
attendants, a health intervention clearly associated with the achievement 
of the Millennium Development Goals (WHO 2006).3
The ratio of health workers falls short of the WHO benchmark in 
36 of 46 African countries. Of all African countries, only The Gambia, 
Mauritius, the Seychelles, and South Africa have 3.9 or more health 
workers per 1,000 inhabitants. Ghana, Nigeria, and Zambia had less than 
two, and many other countries actually had less than one (table 3.1). 
There were 1.9 health workers per 1,000 inhabitants in the whole African 
region, compared with 7.78 in the WHO region of the Americas in 2009 
(see chapter 8).
Based on Africa’s population in the early years of the first decade of 
the 2000s, meeting the WHO target of 2.28 health workers per 1,000 
population would have required a 139 percent increase of health workers 
working in the field, from about 600,000 to 1,400,000 (WHO 2006). 
This huge gap between the observed density of health workers in African 
countries and the benchmark of needs—which we name a shortfall of 
health workers—is unlikely to have narrowed recently. A lack of health 
workers being produced, and less than full utilization of those produced, 
partly explains this shortfall.
Table 3.1 Number and Density of Health Workers per 1,000 Population, Selected 
African Countries
Country
Physicians Nurses
Year
Total density 
per 1,000
 populationNumber
Density per 1,000 
population Number
Density per 1,000 
population
Ethiopia 1,936 0.03 14,893 0.21 2003 0.24
Ghana 3,240 0.15 19,707 0.92 2004 1.07
Nigeria 34,923 0.28 210,306 1.70 2003 1.98
Rwanda 227 0.03 4,344 0.48 2005 0.51
Tanzania 822 0.02 13,292 0.37 2002 0.39
Uganda 2,209 0.08 16,221 0.61 2004 0.69
Zambia 1,264 0.12 19,014 1.74 2004 1.86
Source: Ministry of Health of Ethiopia 2007. The numbers for Rwanda are calculated based on Herbst (2007).
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Production
The production challenge arises because Africa lacks people trained as 
health workers relative to a benchmark of needs (see chapter 16). The 
number of health workers trained in Africa plus the number of Africans 
trained elsewhere is the total prospective quantity of health workers. 
Although data on the total number of health workers trained in Africa are 
not readily available for most African countries, the best available esti-
mates suggest that the total prospective quantity of health workers is 
below the benchmark.
Figure 3.1 represents the production challenge in a national labor mar-
ket for health workers of a given African country, which for concreteness 
we will call AFR. Since we plot the monthly real compensation level 
(COMP, y-axis) as a function of the density of health workers (HW, 
x-axis), the WHO benchmark is the vertical line B. So, the density of 
health workers needed to achieve a particular health intervention is inde-
pendent of the compensation level. The total prospective quantity of 
health workers is also a vertical line, in this case represented by P. The 
horizontal gap between the number of trained health workers, HW-All, 
and the HW-Benchmark of needs represents the production challenge: 
the number of additional professionals necessary to reach the WHO 
Figure 3.1 The Production Challenge
HW-Benchmark 
of needs
production 
challenge
HW
COMP
HW-All
P B
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benchmark, assuming that African countries could devote whatever 
resources were needed to recruit all their trained health workers.
Scaling up the training of health workers in educational institutions 
would undoubtedly ameliorate production—reflected by a shift of the 
P line toward the HW-Benchmark of needs in figure 3.1—and raise the 
total prospective quantity of workers. Whether these newly trained 
health workers work in their field in Africa would, however, depend on 
the labor market conditions for health workers, there and elsewhere.
Underutilization
The difference between the number of persons trained as health workers 
in Africa and the number working (the employment level) is referred to 
as underutilization. This difference has several real and putative causes.
In areas of conflict or with high rates of HIV/AIDS, some trained 
health workers do not work simply because they die early. Available infor-
mation for Lesotho and Malawi, for example, shows that 2.4 percent of 
medical doctors are lost each year due to premature mortality (Tawfik 
and Kinoti 2006). HIV’s impact on health workers might, however, have 
peaked in the early years of the epidemic, as health workers have become 
more informed and prevention measures (and treatment) have become 
more widely available.
Of the health professionals trained in Africa, some are not working 
there because they are in other countries (see chapter 10). One study 
reported that, in 2004, almost a fourth of African-trained physicians were 
working in that role in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development countries (Bhargava and Docquier 2008). Another study 
found that a fifth of African-born physicians and a tenth of African-born 
nurses were working in developed countries (Clemens and Pettersson 
2008). Of Zimbabwe’s trained nurses, 34 percent were living abroad 
(WHO 2006). Dovlo and Nyonator (1999) estimated that more than 
60 percent of doctors trained in Ghana between 1982 and 1994 emi-
grated to work in other countries, primarily the United Kingdom and the 
United States. These studies suggest that other countries’ labor markets 
for these workers are better than Africa’s.
Some argue that many health workers trained in Africa are unem-
ployed. For labor economists, a health care worker is unemployed if he or 
she does not have a job and is actively looking for one. Unemployment is 
unlikely to be a big problem in Rwanda, where the government argues 
that it is difficult to find suitable staff (Sy and others 2008) or Malawi, 
where more than 64 percent of nurse posts are vacant (Government of 
A Labor Market Approach       37
Malawi 2005). Available evidence does not allow us to be certain about 
unemployment in African countries. To the extent that there is unem-
ployment, it is necessary to diagnose its magnitude, its type, and its causes 
(see annex 3A).
Some health workers might be working in nonhealth sectors or retir-
ing early. But high-quality data on the numbers and locations of well-
trained health workers who left the African health sector over the years 
(and have not returned) are unavailable, making it hard to calculate 
this aspect of underutilization, and the number of workers who could, 
in principle, be recruited from other sectors in Africa and in other 
countries.
Thus, labor market conditions in Africa and elsewhere affect trained 
health workers’ labor market decisions, which ultimately determine the 
quantity of labor services at each level of compensation (box 3.1).
Distribution
Even though the density of health workers in some African countries is 
close to or even exceeds the needs benchmark, some population groups 
in those countries get less than their proportionate share of available ser-
vices or resources—a problem of distribution. On the supply side, a 
shortfall for certain population groups may stem from health workers’ 
desire to work in particular areas or serve particular types of patients. On 
the demand side, a shortfall may arise for groups lacking purchasing 
power. Although our discussion below revolves around the rural-urban 
dimension (see chapter 9), other distribution groups can be identified, 
such as region; tribe; gender; and income; as well as sector (public-private 
for-profit, private not-for-profit, or a mix of these); public health versus 
clinical care and treatment of high-risk versus other diseases.
Examples of Africa’s rural-urban distribution issue abound. In 2004 
about 20 percent of all public Ethiopian doctors worked in Addis Ababa, 
home to about 5 percent of the population (Hanson and Jack 2010). In 
2006, 75 percent of Rwandan doctors worked in the city of Kigali, even 
though less than 20 percent of the population lived there (Ministry of 
Health of Rwanda 2006). In Zambia, the density of workers in both rural 
and urban areas is below the benchmark of needs, but in urban areas the 
density (1.71) is much higher than in rural areas (0.77) (Herbst and 
Gijsbrechts 2007).4
Reluctance to work in rural areas is related to personal characteristics, 
wages, and other job attributes. Health workers seem more likely to accept 
employment in areas that are similar to where they were born and raised. 
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Box 3.1
Labor Market Outcomes in Africa and Other Regions
Both the number of health workers employed in Africa—what economists call the 
employment level—and the market’s compensation levels are the result of health 
labor market policies in the continent itself, in other sectors of the region, and in 
other countries, as well as the functioning of these labor markets. (Annex 3A gives a 
short description of nine basic concepts for understanding how labor markets for 
health workers function.) Data on wages, salaries, and other components of com-
pensation packages for health workers can be found in McCoy and others (2008).
Box figure 3.1.1 illustrates how labor market characteristics in different coun-
tries lead to different employment and compensation levels. Curve SAFR depicts a 
labor supply curve in Africa, expressing the number of people willing to work as 
health workers in Africa as a function of monthly compensation, everything else 
being constant. The supply curve is upward sloping because the number of peo-
ple wanting to work as health workers in Africa increases as real compensation 
rises. Factors other than compensation, such as the conditions in other labor mar-
kets, affect the position of the labor supply curve.
Box Figure 3.1.1 Labor Markets in Africa and Other Regions
COMP*AFR
COMP*OTHER
HW*OTHERHW*AFR
DAFR
COMP
HW
AFR
Other
regions 
SAFR
SOTH
DOTH
Curve DAFR depicts a labor demand curve, expressing the number of people 
employers want to hire as a function of the real compensation paid to each worker, 
(continued next page)
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In Ethiopia residents of the capital city prefer to work in urban areas 
(Serneels and others 2007). Health workers with altruistic motivations, 
such as those trained in faith-based schools or those expressing willingness 
to work for the poor, more readily move from urban to rural areas for less 
money, or stay in rural areas (Serneels and others 2007, 2010).
Health workers’ location decisions are also influenced by wages, other 
job attributes, and location-specific factors. In Rwanda, for example, 
health workers consider salaries and benefits (such as housing and access 
to health care), other job attributes (such as access to training, chances of 
promotion, and opportunities for holding a second job), and location-
specific factors (such as access to good schools for their children and to 
infrastructure like electricity, water, quality housing, food markets, roads, 
and transport) (Serneels and Lievens 2008).
Building on the evidence of the factors relevant for workers when 
making location decisions, the methodology of contingent valuation has 
enabled the design of incentive schemes to attract or retain workers in 
 everything else constant. One reason that curve DAFR is downward sloping is that, 
because the budget is relatively fixed, the ability of employers to hire more people 
decreases as real compensation increases. Aspects of the job other than compensa-
tion, such as job training, affect the position of the labor demand curve.
Because we assume that market equilibrating forces are free to operate, in 
equilibrium, the number of health workers currently working as health workers in 
Africa is represented by HW*AFR and the corresponding compensation level by 
COMP*AFR.
Box figure 3.1.1 also shows that Africa has fewer health workers (and so less 
health care) than other regions. In labor market economics this is because Africa 
is very poor. Africa’s poverty makes it unable to create effective demand for health 
services: at any given compensation level, fewer health workers are demanded 
than if the continent were richer. So, Africa’s demand for health workers lies to the 
left of that in other regions.
But because African countries lack means to train many health workers at any 
given compensation level, fewer health workers are available to work than if Africa 
were richer. So, the supply of health workers in Africa lies to the left of the supply 
of health workers in other regions. Africa thus has fewer employed health workers 
per capita than other, richer regions.
Box 3.1 (continued)
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disadvantaged areas. The schemes are based on the compensation that 
health workers have reported to be willing to accept to stay in or move 
to rural areas (Hanson and Jack 2010). For example, an incentive of 
US$1,000 was offered to people who agreed to move to rural areas in 
Liberia (Walsh 2007). Other countries (including Burkina Faso, Cameroon, 
Ghana, Malawi, Mali, and Zambia) have launched workforce strategies to 
improve compensation packages so that more people will work in rural 
areas (GHWA 2006).
Performance
The performance of health workers in Africa has been hypothesized to 
be unsatisfactory along three main dimensions. First, health workers are 
inefficient because they produce fewer health services than they poten-
tially could given their skills and knowledge, because they do not have 
the means to do their jobs (see chapter 5). Second, the quality of the 
health services they produce is low relative to the medical protocols that 
should be followed for the interventions needed by the population 
served (see chapter 4). This can occur if health workers do not have 
appropriate skills and knowledge or decide not to follow the protocols. 
Third, health workers’ behavior might be inadequate either because they 
have poor attitudes toward patients (see chapter 14) or because they 
engage in corruption and embezzlement.
One explanation for the low quality—and low quantity—of health 
workers’ services in Africa is lack of equipment (such as hospitals or 
medicines) and other health support systems (such as health manage-
ment, support workers, or information systems; Dieleman and Harnmeijer 
2006). In Uganda essential drugs are out of stock more than half the time 
(Uganda MOH 2008). Hard evidence on the extent of this challenge in 
other countries is thin. Evidence on whether improving basic infrastruc-
ture and supplies in African countries affects the health services delivered 
is also limited (WHO 2006).
An alternative explanation is that health workers lack necessary skills 
and knowledge (Dieleman and Harnmeijer 2006), but the evidence is 
mixed. In many African countries with high maternal ratios and child 
mortality, basic treatment skills are deficient, particularly among doctors 
at the bottom of the competence distribution (Das, Hammer, and 
Leonard 2008). By contrast, studies in Tanzania (Leonard and Masatu 
2007) and Rwanda (Basinga and others 2010) show that health workers 
are generally knowledgeable about the procedures that should be fol-
lowed, but do not always follow them.
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In areas where health workers’ skills and knowledge are poor in Africa, 
either the quality of education itself is frequently low (Walsh 2007), or 
there is an inconsistency between the education received—often based 
on western models—and the country’s epidemiological needs (Soucat 
and others 2007). Certificates issued by unaccredited institutions add to 
the problem (Walsh 2007). Further, some employers hire people with less 
than acceptable qualifications because of the difficulty in finding suitable 
candidates. As one doctor in Rwanda puts it: “There are health centers 
where the auxiliary health worker is head of the health center” (Lievens 
and Seerneels 2006, 37).
Given evidence on the association between years of training and 
knowledge of medical protocol among doctors (Leonard, Masatu, and 
Vialou 2007), in-service training programs are one strategy to upgrade 
health workers’ knowledge and skills. Such programs can be adjusted to 
the nature of services delivered (rural or urban). For example, 30,193 
new health extension workers in rural Ethiopia were trained in 2005–10 
to offer an essential package of life-saving services that are particularly 
relevant in those areas, such as family planning, bednets, and immuniza-
tion to its rural population (MoFED 2010). The effect of these tailored 
training programs on the knowledge of health workers and the quality of 
health care services delivered has still not been determined.
The inefficiency of health workers is associated with absenteeism and 
shirking. On any given day, 37 percent of health workers in Uganda are 
absent from work for no apparent reason (Chaudhury and others 2006). 
Some economists have proposed methods to address this failing, among 
others (box 3.2).
Some evidence shows that health workers in Africa have a bad attitude 
toward patients. According to one poor person in Tanzania: “[Health 
workers] treat us like animals; worse than dogs” (Narayan and others 
2000, 76). Weak patient-management skills, corruption, and embezzle-
ment are also identified as important behavioral problems of health 
workers in Africa, but we were not able to find any evidence supporting 
this argument.
Financing
The fifth component, financing, refers to the limited resources available 
in Africa for addressing the first four challenges. Verboom, Tan-Torres, 
and Evans (2005) estimated that bridging the global gap in health worker 
salaries by 2025 would require an increase for the average country of 
$10 per person per year. We regard this figure as much too low because 
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it does not adjust for the attrition caused by out-migration or the invest-
ment costs in training. It represents an additional 25 percent of current 
yearly spending on health services in countries with current shortfalls.
Eliminating the shortfall of health workers alone requires huge 
resources. Still, governments can base interventions on their ability to 
supplement the private sector headcount, maximizing the number of 
health workers with available funding (see chapter 6). Based on Africa’s 
resources and past trends, a further 600,000 health workers could be 
employed over 2008–15, assuming a fixed labor-cost ratio, no wage 
change, and no skill-mix shift (World Bank 2007). Training these people 
in the period would require additional resources of about $14.2 billion 
(real 2006 US$). WHO data reveal that this is 36 percent of what is spent 
on health in Africa (WHO 2009).
Box 3.2
Choice of Performance Levels: Economists’ Views 
and Policies
To analyze performance’s dependence on pay, labor economists developed the 
concept of “efficiency wages” (Stiglitz 1976). The idea is that employers who pay 
more than efficiency wages will be able to attract higher quality workers and 
induce existing workers to reduce absenteeism and shirk less.
Health worker performance, such as the number of work hours and the quality 
of treatment delivered, depends on pay and nonpay aspects. Thus, employers can 
influence worker performance by increasing pay or upgrading work conditions. 
Employers see benefits from improving pay and nonpay conditions of employ-
ment, but doing so is also costly. Policies to maximize health care outcomes need 
to be formulated accordingly.
Various policies have been implemented to address low performance. There 
is no evidence on the effectiveness of policies such as monitoring and account-
ability (Bjorkman and Svensson 2008; World Bank 2008), or professional norms. 
Performance-based financing (or pay for performance, see chapter 13) has been 
associated with a rise in health worker efficiency and a boost of enthusiasm and 
motivation (Basinga and others 2010; Rusa and others 2009). Whether the bene-
fits of performance pay outweigh the costs, and therefore whether social welfare 
increases or decreases, has not yet been assessed (Scott and Jan 2011).
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Eliminating the rural-urban disparity in per capita health workers in 
Ethiopia, for example, would require an estimated health budget increase 
of 30–42 percent (Serneels and others 2007).
Conclusion
Taking a labor market economics perspective, this chapter discussed five 
challenges in the health worker sector in Africa: production, underutiliza-
tion, distribution, performance, and financing. The chapter explained why 
workers are paid what they are, why employers hire as few people as they 
do, and why the number of employed health workers in African countries 
is lower compared to what is “needed” to meet a given policy objective.
Addressing any of the challenges is a laudable goal, but there are lim-
ited resources available in Africa for addressing multiple challenges. Using 
scarce resources on, for example, the quantity challenge in health means 
not using them on the performance challenge—or other sectors’ develop-
ment needs. If additional resources become available, countries should 
have a criterion for allocating these resources among the different devel-
opment priorities. The framework we would advise is to compare the 
social benefits of each possible intervention with the social costs in order 
to identify the intervention with the highest net benefit to the country as 
a whole. More empirical data, a full labor market analysis, and social cost-
benefit criteria are needed before policy recommendations can be confi-
dently offered.
Annex 3A Key Concepts from Labor Market Economics
• A labor market is the place where labor services are voluntarily bought 
and sold. A worker may sell his labor services to an employer in exchange 
for compensation. He may also decide to be self-employed—that is, to 
sell labor services to himself.
• Mainstream labor market economics analyzes the dynamics leading to a 
specific labor market outcome, which consists of the number of people 
working and the real compensation they receive for their work.
• The fundamental building blocks for analyzing the workings of any single 
labor market are labor supply, labor demand, and a compensation-
determination process. Underlying these building blocks are several 
equilibrating forces.
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• The market labor supply is the number of doctors, nurses, midwives, 
traditional healers, and other health workers wanting to work in the 
health professionals’ labor market.
• The market labor demand is the number of health professionals with 
the necessary qualifications employers desire to hire and have the 
means to pay for. The country’s public sector, private hospitals and clin-
ics, faith-based organizations, self-employed, and patients themselves 
are all employers of health workers. The demand for health workers’ 
labor is derived from the demand for what that labor produces (health 
services). The lower the demand for health services, the lower the 
demand for health workers will be.
• Markets clear when the amount of labor supplied equals the amount 
demanded. The market clearing quantity HW* has a corresponding com-
pensation level COMP*. If the compensation is initially below COMP*, 
there is a “labor shortage” as there is more labor demanded than supplied. 
If the compensation level is initially above COMP*, there will be a “defi-
cient demand unemployment,” which results from the fact that employ-
ers lack the resources to hire all the health workers willing to work.
• There are three standard equilibrating forces in labor markets. First, 
workers are free to supply their labor to any given labor market or not. 
Second, employers can operate in the most advantageous location and 
hire the number of workers consistent with their ultimate goals given 
their available resources. Third, compensation will tend toward the 
market-clearing level.
• A compensation-quantity pair is an equilibrium if the market tends 
there, and, once there, the market tends to stay there. When equilibrat-
ing forces are free to operate, the labor market will be characterized by 
a market-clearing equilibrium, regardless of initial conditions. When the 
initial situation is characterized by unemployment or shortage, the 
equilibrating forces will eliminate them through changes in the behav-
ior of employers and employees. When the compensation level is ini-
tially at the market-clearing level, neither employers nor employees 
have incentives to change the compensation level. Thus, the initial 
market-clearing pair will be an equilibrium.
• Nonmarket-clearing equilibria occur when standard equilibrating forces 
are not free to operate. Compensation might be kept above the 
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 market-clearing level because of trade unions, minimum wages, 
 government pay policy, multinational corporations’ pay policy, and/or 
labor codes. In this situation unemployment persists in equilibrium. In 
like fashion, compensation might be kept below the market-clearing 
level, resulting in an equilibrium characterized by a labor shortage.
Notes
 1. We use the term health worker for simplicity. Other terms are health care 
professional, health service professional, and health service provider. Health 
management and support workers, such as clerks and cleaning people, are also 
important for the success of a health system, but that is not our focus. Health 
workers (as used in this chapter) account for two-thirds of the 59.8 million 
workers in health worldwide (WHO 2006).
 2. For a comprehensive introduction to labor economics, see Ehrenberg and 
Smith (2012).
 3. Allowing for uncertainty, countries with 2.02–2.54 per 1,000 inhabitants are 
regarded as failing to achieve 80 percent coverage for deliveries by skilled 
birth attendants.
 4. Some authors suggest a distribution problem (also called geographic imbal-
ance) when the proportion of health workers in urban areas is greater than in 
rural areas. This is not a problem if that proportion reflects their share in the 
total population—for example, if 20 percent of health workers are in urban 
areas because 20 percent of the population lives there.
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C H A P T E R  4
Productivity of Health Workers: 
Tanzania
Ottar Mæstad and Aziza Mwisongo
Health worker productivity analysis can improve the use of scarce 
human resources for health in Africa. Productivity analysis identifies 
health facilities that organize their work more efficiently than others. 
These facilities can then serve as a basis for knowledge transfer among 
facilities. Productivity analysis also compares workloads across health 
facilities, identifying room for more efficient allocation of productive 
resources. This chapter provides an introduction to productivity analysis 
and presents a set of analytical tools, which are then applied to produc-
tivity data from Tanzania. Our analysis suggests that the health work-
force is underused in many places, but overstretched in others.
High Workloads for Tanzanian Health Workers
The sun has already been up for a couple hours in Dar es Salaam, the 
largest city in Tanzania. At one of the city’s health centers, eight nurses 
and clinicians are sitting on benches for their morning staff meeting. 
They share information about the two women who delivered during the 
night, the cholera patients, and the researchers who will spend the day 
at the center to learn more about how the health workers manage their 
workload.
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A couple of days earlier we interviewed staff from this and other 
health facilities about how the health worker shortage affected their per-
formance. What we heard gave reason to worry: “We are not doing our 
work properly because of the shortage of staff.” “If the doctor decides to 
listen to everyone carefully and concentrates on each patient, at the end 
of the day that doctor will find he has attended only 20 patients, with 100 
patients still in line.” “As a result the doctors decide to rush in order to 
catch up with the large number of patients waiting.” High workloads 
seem to make doctors reduce the quality of their work.
We were there to see with our own eyes. We spent the whole day on 
the waiting bench at the outpatient department, watching the flow of 
patients as they arrived, patiently waited, and quickly entered and left 
the doctor’s office. What we saw astonished us: between 9:00 a.m. and 
1:00 p.m., that office saw more than 90 consultations. During that time 
the doctor also left once or twice to see patients in the inpatient depart-
ment. Each consultation lasted only two minutes on average, often only 
one. We were struck by the high productivity of the doctor, able to treat 
so many patients. At the same time our worries about the impact of the 
health worker shortage on the quality of health services was confirmed.
One year later, we were on our way to a small health center in rural 
Tanzania with our research team. We were about to start a large survey 
to look more systematically into the relationship between workload and 
health worker performance. After a three-hour drive we arrived at the 
center around 8:30 a.m. Two patients had just finished their consulta-
tions, but no more patients were in sight. During the next four hours, only 
two patients showed up. Again, we were astonished. Two health workers 
saw fewer than a handful of patients a day! We came back the next day 
and saw the same pattern.
These contrasting experiences raise important questions. Are Tanzania 
and other low-income countries using their small health workforces effec-
tively? Is workload sufficiently accounted for when staff are allocated 
among health facilities? Are many health workers spending their days 
waiting for patients, while others are seriously overworked? Can reallocat-
ing health workers to places overcrowded with patients improve health 
outcomes?
These questions call for studies of health worker productivity (or effi-
ciency). Health worker productivity analysis shows how much output 
(such as number of consultations) is produced per health worker at one 
health facility compared with others, shedding light on relative workload. 
The results may lead to more efficient allocation of productive resources, 
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either through reallocation of health workers or through more targeted 
recruitment policies. Further, such analysis helps identify health facilities 
that organize their work more efficiently than others, which may serve as 
a basis for knowledge transfer among facilities. Finally, this analysis can be 
used to study productivity changes over time, both at health facilities and 
at the level of district or country.
This chapter introduces various approaches to productivity analysis.1 
It starts with a brief explanation of basic concepts and next discusses 
time and motion studies to analyze the extent that health workers spend 
their work time on productive activities. It then analyzes output-input 
ratios (total factor productivity) and the unit cost of production, dis-
cussing the importance of establishing relevant benchmarks to assess 
productivity and efficiency. To this end, it presents two methods for 
estimating the maximum level of output achievable for a given set of 
inputs (or equivalently, the minimum inputs needed to obtain a given 
output): data envelopment analysis (DEA), a linear programming tech-
nique; and stochastic frontier analysis (SFA), a statistical method similar 
to regression analysis, but more complex.
Our presentation of the various approaches to productivity analysis is 
accompanied by empirical illustrations based on survey data from 
Tanzania. The data suggest significant scope for productivity improve-
ments—even with few health workers per capita—and thus considerable 
potential for strengthening health services and improving health out-
comes given current resources.
Basic Concepts in Productivity Analysis
Our discussion uses standard concepts of productivity analysis, describing 
health care as a production process where inputs (such as staff and equip-
ment) produce certain outputs (such as patient consultations). Productivity 
analysis is concerned with the efficiency of production: transforming 
inputs into outputs (see chapter 5). A production frontier describes the 
maximum attainable level of outputs at any given level of inputs. Technical 
efficiency is a measure of a health facility’s ability to attain its maximum 
output given its inputs. Technical efficiency is usually scored between 
0 and 1, where 1 indicates full efficiency as the facility operates on the 
production frontier. A score of 0.6 implies that the facility produces only 
60 percent of its maximum output given its current use of inputs.2
A facility that is technically efficient might increase its output-input 
ratio by changing the size of its operations. Scale efficiency is a measure of 
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the extent that a facility is optimizing its size. Since a health facility’s 
scale of operations is often largely outside the management’s control, we 
prefer, in this context, productivity measures that do not incorporate 
scale in efficiencies.
Total factor productivity is the ratio of outputs over inputs. When there 
are several inputs and outputs, they need to be combined into output and 
input indices to calculate total factor productivity. Changes in both tech-
nical efficiency and scale efficiency will affect total factor productivity.
Cost efficiency is a facility’s ability to produce a given output at mini-
mum cost, given the price of inputs. A facility that is technically efficient 
is not necessarily cost efficient because it may be able to produce the 
same output with an even cheaper combination of inputs. The ability of 
a facility to choose its input mix in order to minimize cost is called input 
mix allocative efficiency.
But cost-minimizing behavior is not usually expected in health 
facilities for two main reasons. First, the facility rarely has discretion in 
choosing inputs, and when it can, price signals may be weak. Second, 
decisions on input mix may deliberately follow criteria other than 
minimizing cost, such as maintaining certain service standards. Many 
studies of productivity in the public sector therefore confine their 
attention to technical efficiency. We, too, prefer this approach, though 
we discuss other techniques.
Time and Motion Studies
The original idea of time and motion studies—dating back to Frederick 
W. Taylor, Frank B. Gilbreth, and Lillian M. Gilbreth in the early 20th 
century—was to study the time use and number of motions for particular 
work tasks with the aim of increasing productivity, as well as reducing 
worker fatigue. “Taylorism” or “scientific management” was developed in 
the context of assembly lines, and has been criticized for its dehumaniz-
ing view of workers. The applicability of this approach to the study of 
health worker productivity is clearly limited, but it is still used.
Our interest in the time and motion concept lies in its ability to 
identify slack capacity: to what extent health workers spend their work 
time on unproductive activities (such as waiting for patients) rather 
than productive work. This may not be a typical approach to standard 
productivity analysis, but it is still useful in this context, as identifying 
slack capacity can lead to more efficient use of the health workforce.
A time and motion study in the health sector typically involves fol-
lowing health workers over an extended period (for example, one 
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week) while noting at few-minute intervals the activities they perform 
(including nonproductive activities). The method is simple but resource 
demanding. Its costs can be reduced by increasing intervals between 
observations, since the surveyor may then follow several workers simul-
taneously. For example, if a surveyor records activities every sixth min-
ute, the surveyor may be able to follow three health workers, recording 
activities for one worker every second minute.
One of the problems of time and motion studies is that workers may 
become more “productive” simply by being observed (the Hawthorne 
effect). This is not necessarily a serious problem, though, because if all 
workers change their productivity proportionately (admittedly, a huge if), 
we may still make unbiased comparisons across workers, health facilities, 
and over time.
Empirical Illustration
In light of the widespread shortage of health workers in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
one might assume that service providers have little or no slack capacity and 
that time and motion studies therefore have little to offer. Results from 
several studies in Tanzania suggest, however, a different picture.
One such study was conducted in 2006 on a sample of 158 health 
workers from two districts: Mwanga, where health worker density per 
capita was relatively high, and Meatu, where it was low (figure 4.1). 
Figure 4.1 Productive and Unproductive Time Use, Meatu and Mwanga 
Districts, 2006
Source: Leon, Mwisongo, and Mcharo 2006.
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Each worker was followed during an entire work day for five consecutive 
days, and their activities were recorded every sixth minute. Results show 
that workers spent only 60 percent of work time on productive activities 
and 40 percent on direct patient care; they spent 18 percent of their 
time waiting for patients. Another important finding showed that the 
share of nonproductive time increases sharply during the course of the 
day (Leon, Mwisongo, and Mcharo 2006). A similar study of 65 health 
workers from Zanzibar revealed almost identical results (Ruwoldt and 
Hassett 2007).
The findings suggest that the average slack capacity is significant and 
there is potential for increased outputs, especially in the afternoons.
Total Factor Productivity and Unit Cost Analysis
Total factor productivity is the ratio of outputs to inputs (Coelli and 
 others 2003; Farrell 1957).
Total factor productivity = Output index
 Input index
Health workers are the most crucial input in the health sector. Other 
major inputs include drugs, medical equipment (such as thermometers, 
stethoscopes, and gloves), and physical infrastructure (such as buildings 
and beds). The ultimate output is improved population health, but due 
to the difficulty of measuring changes in health outcomes, outputs are 
usually measured in terms of, for example, the number of patients treated, 
children immunized, or babies delivered.
Unit costs are simply the inverse of the total factor productivity mea-
sure, using total input costs as an index for total use of inputs:
Unit costs = Total cost of inputs
 Output index
An important challenge for total factor productivity and unit cost 
analysis in the health sector is finding ways to aggregate different outputs 
into a meaningful output index. Even the smallest health facilities usually 
offer a broad range of services that require substantially different resource 
inputs and thus cannot be aggregated into a single output measure—the 
number of consultations, for example. Productivity analysis of firms that 
operate in competitive markets uses market prices of outputs as weights 
for aggregating multiple outputs, but such prices are seldom available in 
the health sector.
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A different approach aggregates outputs into a standardized unit of 
output index using relative resource requirements for various types of 
outputs as weights. One example is the following index from Lindelöw, 
Reinikka, and Svensson (2003) for measuring aggregate outputs at lower 
level health facilities:
Standardized unit of output = (12 × deliveries) + (0.5 × immuniza-
tions) + (1 × number of outpatients) + (1 × antenatal care visits) + (1 × 
family planning consultations) + (5 × outreach patients). (Separate stud-
ies of resource use, perhaps including time and motion studies, are 
required to determine the index weights.)
Empirical Illustration
To illustrate the various approaches to productivity analysis, we will use 
the Health Worker Motivation, Availability, and Performance (MAP) 
dataset from Tanzania, even though the data were not collected for pro-
ductivity analysis purposes.3 The dataset, collected in 2007, includes data 
on outputs and inputs in outpatient departments of a stratified random 
sample of 126 health facilities in nine rural districts. We will confine our 
attention to one output—the number of outpatient consultations—
 and one input—the number of full-time health workers in the outpatient 
department.
Most of the 3,500 patients in the dataset presented with fever, cough, 
diarrhea, and other relatively mild symptoms. These conditions required 
the health worker to ask a set of questions and do certain physical exam-
inations, without the need for much equipment (a thermometer and 
stethoscope generally sufficed). The health workers’ time and effort thus 
accounted for most of the inputs.
The number of outpatient consultations was collected from facility 
records for two months before the survey. These data were available from 
99 of the 126 health facilities. On average, the historic output levels 
matched the output levels on the day of observation very well. The num-
ber of health workers in the outpatient department was adjusted for part-
time activity in other facility departments.
Total Factor Productivity. With only one output and one input, total fac-
tor productivity is simply the ratio between the two. The results are 
striking (figure 4.2 and table 4.1). In a large part of rural Tanzania the 
number of patients per health worker in the outpatient department 
appears quite low—the slack capacity at the first facility visited was not 
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exceptional. In more than 40 percent of the health facilities, a health 
worker had fewer than 10 patients per day. Further, the number of 
consultations per health worker differed widely across facilities, from 
less than one patient to more than 60 patients per day. (The average 
time per consultation was less than six minutes.)
Table 4.1 Alternative Productivity Measures, MAP Dataset, Tanzania
Mean Median
5th 
percentile
95th
percentile
Consultations per health worker (n = 99) 14.8 14 1.6 37.3
Total factor productivity (n = 99) 0.226 0.188 0.025 0.570
Unit costs of labor per outpatient (T Sh) 
(n = 85)a
1,072 719 250 2,679
Data envelopment analysis 0.308 0.243 0.025 0.820
Stochastic frontier analysis 0.477 0.498 0.096 0.781
Source: MAP data set.
Note: T Sh = Tanzanian shilling.
a. Of the 99 facilities with data on historic output levels, 14 did not provide salary data.
Figure 4.2 Consultations per Health Worker in Outpatient Departments, Rural 
Tanzania
Source: MAP data set.
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Total factor productivity is low. When we normalized the productivity 
of the most efficient provider to 1, our estimate of average productivity 
is 0.226. The low productivity is driven partly by a single provider with 
much higher productivity than the second most productive unit. But 
even if we eliminate this outlier, average productivity remains low at 
0.325.
The results suggest a need to reconsider the allocation of health workers 
across health facilities (or outpatient departments) in order to improve 
health workforce utilization—but with a word of caution. Among the 
health facilities with fewer than 10 patients per health worker per day, 
23 percent had only one health worker and another 44 percent had 
between one and two full-time health workers. Reallocating health work-
ers in these circumstances would entail closing down some facilities. This 
may be sensible if other facilities are near (in fact, mission-based and 
government health facilities were sometimes located next to each other 
in our study area). Otherwise, reallocating health workers may reduce 
access to health care for parts of the population, making the tradeoff 
much more involved. Health facilities operating at a minimum staffing 
level are indivisible. This fact needs to be kept in mind in productivity 
studies of countries where small health facilities are scattered in sparsely 
populated areas.4
Unit Cost Analysis. Combining data on the number of health workers 
with data on gross salaries (table 4.1), the MAP dataset enables the cal-
culation of unit labor costs per outpatient. We observe a 10-fold differ-
ence in unit costs between the 5th and 95th percentiles, suggesting again 
that productivity differentials are substantial. They are, however, not as 
large as indicated by total factor productivity, because some facilities with 
very few patients are staffed with less qualified staff on lower salaries.
Bjorkman and Svensson (2008) report similar results from a study of 
50 lower level health facilities in Uganda. They identified a sevenfold dif-
ference in unit labor costs per outpatient, decreasing to a fivefold differ-
ence when they included other outputs and inputs using the above 
method.
Data Envelopment Analysis
If we are interested in technical efficiency, such as a health facility’s ability 
to attain its maximum output at its current input, total factor productiv-
ity and unit cost analysis rarely suffice. Total factor productivity merges 
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technical efficiency and scale efficiency into one measure, so it does not 
separate productivity loss resulting from inefficient sizes of health facili-
ties.5 Unit cost analysis suffers from the same problem, because it implic-
itly assumes that it is meaningful to compare unit costs of the most 
efficient health facility with those of other facilities. As explained above, 
unit cost analysis also captures aspects of input mix allocative efficiency 
that are not necessarily relevant for productivity analysis in the health 
sector. Finally, the simple approach to total productivity analysis and unit 
cost analysis, which uses a standardized unit of output index with fixed 
weights for aggregating outputs, makes strong and rigid assumptions 
about production technology. In practice, it is more likely that the appro-
priate weights differ depending on output-input mixes and the size of the 
health facility.
A measure of technical efficiency compares current output to the 
maximum achievable output as described by the production frontier. The 
frontier is, however, unknown and needs to be estimated. DEA and SFA 
offer two different approaches to estimate it.
DEA is a linear programming approach that estimates a production 
frontier based on the productivity of the best performers in the dataset 
(Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes 1978; Coelli and others 2005). Figure 4.3 
explains the method for one output and one input, with black dots rep-
resenting observed output-input combinations of seven production units 
(such as departments or health facilities). We construct the production 
frontier by drawing a piecewise linear curve joining the output-input 
Figure 4.3 Data Envelopment Analysis
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combinations of the most productive units. Five units are on the frontier, 
and are defined as technically efficient (in a simple analysis of output-
input ratios, B would perform better than all others and would therefore 
be the only technically efficient unit).
We immediately realize that because the frontier is estimated from 
actual data, at least one health facility will always be scored as technically 
efficient. This does not imply that the facility has no room for improving 
efficiency; it only reminds us to interpret productivity estimates as rela-
tive and not absolute.
Two units fall below the frontier in figure 4.3. We measure the inef-
ficiency of these units by comparing their output-input levels with 
those of their closest peers. If, for example, we want to know how 
much output facility A should be able to produce at the current input, 
we compare its output with a combination of the outputs of its peers, 
B and C. The production frontier on the segment BC thus defines 
what A should be able to produce. The technical efficiency of A is then 
a/(a + b), while the “unused potential” b/(a + b) is a measure of tech-
nical inefficiency.6
DEA allows us to compare health facilities with similar input/output 
levels to one another. In this way, more similar health facilities are com-
pared with each other. Further, unlike other approaches to productivity 
analysis, DEA imposes very little structure on the production function. 
There is no need to specify weights up front to aggregate outputs and 
inputs—the only requirement is that if two output-input combinations 
are feasible, a third that combines the first two will also be feasible (con-
vexity). The method is thus suitable when little is known about the pro-
duction frontier. Finally, DEA assumes that the observed output-input 
combinations are feasible. This assumption is satisfied if the data present 
no measurement errors, which should not be taken for granted, especially 
in datasets from countries with weak systems for data collection and 
management.
Applied to the MAP data, the DEA method estimates higher average 
productivity than in the total factor productivity analysis, at 0.308 versus 
0.226 (see table 4.1 and figure 4.4). The difference is explained by scale 
inefficiency, as some facilities are not optimally sized. Productivity esti-
mates based on total factor productivity are therefore lower than the 
technical efficiency measured by DEA. The main results from the above 
discussion are still valid, though: productivity is low on average and highly 
variable across health facilities.
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Stochastic Frontier Analysis
SFA offers an alternative approach to estimating the production frontier, 
based on statistical analysis (Coelli and others 2005; Fried, Lovell, and 
Schmidt 2008). One advantage of SFA is that, unlike DEA, it can take 
account of measurement errors (“noise”) in the data. With DEA all 
deviations from the frontier are taken as signals of technical inefficiency. 
Amid measurement errors and other sources of statistical noise, DEA 
therefore does not precisely estimate efficiency.
SFA takes account of statistical noise by assuming that the production 
frontier can be estimated from observed output-input combinations 
through a model of the type:
yi = f (xi ) + vi – ui,
where yi is observed output of provider i, xi  is observed input, f (xi ) is the 
production frontier, vi is a random error term that captures statistical 
noise (this term can be positive or negative), and ui is a nonnegative con-
stant measuring the degree of technical inefficiency.
Figure 4.4 Productivity in Outpatient Departments, Rural Tanzania
Source: MAP dataset.
DEA = data envelopment analysis, SFA = stochastic frontier analysis.
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In figure 4.5 the dots again illustrate observed output-input combina-
tions of different providers. The SFA frontier fits the data but does not 
necessarily include all observed output-input combinations within the 
production possibility set, as illustrated by providers B and C. Their 
observed output levels exceed the production frontier, which is possible 
because the model allows for noise in the observed data. Now consider 
the technical efficiency of provider A. In the DEA model A’s efficiency 
was measured relative to outputs of B and C. In the SFA model, tech-
nical inefficiency is measured as the distance u. In this case, the SFA 
model predicts less inefficiency than the DEA model for two reasons. 
First, the SFA production frontier is delinked from—and in this case falls 
below—the output-input combinations of B and C. Second, the SFA 
model allows for some random noise in the measurement of outputs, 
here illustrated by the distance v. Only the remaining gap—the distance 
u—expresses technical inefficiency.
The SFA method has three main disadvantages. First, it requires the 
analyst to make assumptions about the shape of the production fron-
tier. A common approach is to assume a translog production function, 
a flexible specification. Second, the analyst needs to make assumptions 
about the distribution of the inefficiency term u. (Statistical software 
packages have, however, several standard options built in, making it 
easy to test the robustness to different assumptions.) Third, estimating 
and interpreting results is quite complex, especially with multiple 
outputs.7
Figure 4.5 Stochastic Frontier Analysis
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Applied to the MAP dataset, the SFA method estimates the mean 
technical efficiency at 0.477, significantly higher than DEA (0.308) 
(see table 4.1 and figure 4.4).8 The SFA model apparently attributes a 
large share of the observed output-input differences to statistical noise. 
Even so, with an estimated average technical efficiency of less than 0.5 
(with a standard deviation of 0.21), the overall conclusion remains the 
same as with the other approaches: productivity levels in outpatient 
departments in rural Tanzania are low and highly variable. Box 4.1 
describes how a facility in Tanzania came out with varying methods for 
measuring productivity.
Box 4.1
Comparing Methods for Measuring Productivity
Ngori is a fairly large government health center a couple of hours away from the 
headquarters of a rural district in Tanzania. Its workload and productivity are about 
average among the facilities in the MAP dataset.
Three clinicians work in the outpatient department at Ngori, consulting 45 
patients a day on average. The workload is moderate relative to Msasa health 
center, the busiest in the area, where two doctors consult 130 patients a day.
Total factor productivity at Ngori, compared with Msasa, is (45/3)/(130/2) = 0.23.
Since Ngori has more staff than Msasa, the two facilities are not directly com-
parable. With the DEA method, we may take this into account by comparing pro-
ductivity at Ngori with one health center that is smaller and one that is larger. The 
smaller is still Msasa, and the larger is Chimamba hospital, which has five clinicians 
and 190 patients per day.
A linear projection, as used in DEA, implies that if it is possible to treat 130 
patients with two clinicians and 190 patients with five, it should be possible to 
treat 150 patients with the three clinicians available at Ngori: 130 + (190 – 130)/
(5 – 2) = 150.
DEA technical efficiency at Ngori is 45/150 = 0.30.
The difference between the DEA technical efficiency of 0.30 and total fac-
tor productivity of 0.23 is explained by scale inefficiency. An efficiently sized 
health center in this case will have two clinicians (as this is the size of the most 
(continued next page)
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Conclusion
Productivity analysis can contribute to better use of Africa’s scarce 
human resources. Our analysis of data from Tanzania suggests that the 
health workforce is underutilized in many places while overstretched in 
others. We also found that average productivity in health facilities was 
low. Policy makers need to draw implications with great care, however, 
taking into account realities in the field, particularly given that some 
facilities are operating at a minimum staffing level.
The chapter offered a set of analytical tools suitable for productivity 
analysis. All the tools have advantages and disadvantages, and a choice 
needs to be made in each case depending on the purpose of the study 
(among other things). When several methods are applicable, the general 
advice would be to apply them all to test the sensitivity of efficiency 
estimates to the choice of method.
Productivity analysis has limitations that analysts need to keep in mind 
when interpreting results. It does not include any measure of output qual-
ity, and there may be systematic differences in case mix and the quality 
of inputs across health facilities. These facts may cause biases in the pro-
ductivity estimates.
Further research should focus on getting high-quality input and 
output data from more countries to estimate productivity more
reliably.
productive unit, Msasa). Because Ngori is larger, it is not scale efficient. If there 
are good reasons for taking the size of Ngori as given, we might not emphasize 
such scale inefficiencies, making the relevant measure of productivity accord-
ing to DEA 0.30.
Estimating a production frontier with the SFA method predicts that a health 
facility with three clinicians should be able to treat 85 patients a day. This is much 
less than suggested by the other methods, because SFA puts less emphasis on 
outliers with very high productivity (it assumes that outliers are created partly by 
measurement errors). SFA also predicts a measurement error for each facility, 
based on the overall pattern of the data. For Ngori SFA predicts that the true 
number of patients is 40 rather than 45.
SFA technical efficiency at Ngori is 40/85 = 0.47.
Box 4.1 (continued)
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Notes
 1. Coelli and others (2003, 2005) and Fried, Lovell, and Schmidt (2008) go into 
greater detail on productivity analysis.
 2. This is called an output-oriented measure of technical efficiency. An input- 
oriented measure of technical efficiency expresses the extent that the use of 
inputs is minimized given the level of outputs.
 3. See Mæstad, Torsvik, and Aakvik (2010) for a more complete description of 
the data and their collection.
 4. For an example of total factor productivity analysis using the SOU approach, 
see Vujicic, Addai, and Bosomphra (2009).
 5. Scale inefficiency may arise when the production technology exhibits 
decreasing or increasing returns to scale.
 6. Scale inefficiency can also be measured with DEA methods, illustrated in the 
diagram as the distance between the maximum attainable output for A given 
by the production frontier, and the output that A would have achieved if A 
had had the same output-input level as B (the unit with the highest total 
factor productivity). The output level (2) will lie on a straight line from origo 
through B.
 7. SFA analysis with several outputs is feasible by using distance functions. See 
Coelli and others (2003).
 8. We estimated the translog production function Inyi = a  + b Inxi + 0.5g (Inxi)2 
+ vi – ui and assumed half-normal distribution of the inefficiency term ui.
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C H A P T E R  5
Health Worker Performance
J. Michelle Brock, Kenneth L. Leonard, 
Melkiory C. Masatu, and Pieter Serneels
This chapter presents an overview of health worker performance, with 
the goal of understanding the role it plays in health systems by examining 
its inputs, outputs, and policy levers. The chapter acknowledges the 
importance of recognizing how much health workers do for their patients 
even when care is inadequate. While many constraints African countries 
face are common across the continent, some health sectors do better than 
others. Thus, even though most sectors in most African countries are 
below acceptable standards, they have as much to learn from each other 
as they do from other parts of the world. Even if there is little evidence 
on how to make health care in Africa adequate, there is substantial evi-
dence on how to improve it.
Overview of Health Worker Performance
Whereas one of the main subjects of this book is the health worker short-
age in Sub-Saharan Africa, this chapter develops a framework for under-
standing the performance of those health workers who currently practice. 
It suggests, as Rowe and others (2005), that low performance may be at 
least as important as shortages to explain poor outcomes. Rather than 
review the evidence of such failures, we develop a model to understand 
68       Brock, Leonard, Masatu, and Serneels
their sources. The first section of this chapter gives a snapshot of the 
health sector in Africa by examining a typical facility in rural Tanzania. It 
describes constraints to performance and provides insight into how to 
measure and understand this performance. Also, it outlines the impor-
tance of comparing different institutional frameworks of health care 
provision in Africa as a whole, and in different countries. The second sec-
tion describes a conceptual model of health worker performance that 
helps us to understand its role in the health care system.
We begin by describing a typical rural health dispensary from the per-
spective of both the patient and the health worker. This overview is 
drawn from our extensive research in rural and urban areas of the Arusha 
region over the past nine years.1
A Typical Rural Health Facility in Tanzania
The patient’s view. A typical health dispensary in rural Tanzania is staffed 
by a clinical officer or clinical assistant, and one or two nurses. Clinical 
officers traditionally have “ordinary level” education (four years of sec-
ondary schooling) and two years of medical training. Clinical assistants 
have an elementary school education and three years of medical training. 
National standards require dispensaries to have both a clinical officer and 
a clinical assistant, but due to chronic staffing shortages, no facilities meet 
these standards, and only half have a clinical officer on staff. The first 
posting for a clinical officer just out of school is often rural, so clinicians 
in rural areas have less experience than the average urban clinician.
Health facilities usually follow the rhythm of agricultural life, and 
because most people are busy in the early morning, the facilities rarely 
open until 10:00 a.m. or 11:00 a.m., closing around 2:00 p.m. or 
3:00 p.m. They are busier on market days and when they hold specialty 
clinics. A nurse may greet arriving patients, but more frequently 
patients immediately queue outside the clinician’s room. Facilities usu-
ally have two or three examination rooms and might have a large 
veranda that doubles as a waiting room. The facilities are not equipped 
to admit patients, but often have a couple of beds for observation. Few 
rural health facilities have running water or electricity. Water is often 
available nearby, usually at a pump.
Around 25 percent of clinicians are absent from rural posts on any 
given day (Klemick, Leonard, and Masatu 2009). When a nurse and a 
clinician are present, the nurse dispenses medicine, provides injections, 
and dresses wounds, with the main diagnostic tasks left to the clinician; if 
only a clinician, he or she will handle all these tasks. In practice, even if 
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the only clinician is absent, the nurse takes over the duties of consulting 
patients, so a facility rarely closes. But because the nurse is not trained to 
do the clinician’s job, absenteeism has consequences.
There is no triage, so a patient with an urgent case must negotiate a 
better place in the queue with the other patients. After waiting his or her 
turn, the patient enters the consultation room, greeted by a clinician sit-
ting at a desk. Patients are supposed to carry their own medical records, 
as health facilities do not keep them. Since many patients do not carry 
them, the only health history available is drawn from the questions the 
clinician asks the patient.
In Tanzania many patients obtain medicines prescribed at no or low 
cost in the facility. Even when medicines are not available in the facility, 
they can be bought in local markets. So when patients value a clinician’s 
diagnosis, they might visit a dispensary even if it does not have medicine. 
Similarly, patients might visit a facility with subsidized medicines, even if 
they have no faith in the clinician’s diagnostic ability.
The average clinician asks four questions, and does one and a half 
physical examination procedures (such as taking the temperature). The 
average consultation takes just over six minutes. The lower quartile of 
clinicians asks two questions, performs no physical examination, and 
takes only three minutes to see a patient (from door opening to door 
closing) (Das, Hammer, and Leonard 2008). As nurses do not examine 
patients before they see clinicians, clinicians in this quartile do not know 
the patient’s temperature, pulse, weight, or blood pressure when they 
diagnose their illness.
The health worker’s view. Rural health facilities suffer more than urban 
facilities from the health workforce shortage, largely because most health 
workers posted to rural areas either do not accept the position or only 
stay a short period, after which they find jobs in urban settings.
Both anecdotal and empirical evidence point to various factors deter-
ring health workers from staying in rural facilities.2 These include eco-
nomic disparities between rural and urban areas, poor communications in 
rural areas, a poor working environment, isolation from other economic 
opportunities, fewer possibilities for promotion and further training, and 
lack of good schools. The communication infrastructure, such as roads 
and telephones, is poor in rural areas. Some roads are passable only in the 
dry season, making it hard to travel to urban areas. Working conditions are 
also an important factor. For a health worker to perform well, the health 
facility needs to have basic medicines, equipment, and other supplies, and 
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here, too, conditions are better in urban settings (though the government 
is trying to distribute amenities equitably).
Because civil servants’ salaries are generally low (the wage of the aver-
age clinician in Tanzania is $150–$350 a month), most health workers 
have to find other income-earning activities, such as working part-time in 
a private health facility, opening a chemist shop, or engaging in petty busi-
ness. These opportunities do not exist in rural areas, so the total earnings 
of rural workers are likely to be much lower than their urban peers.
The system of promoting civil servants, including health workers, is not 
functioning as expected—to the detriment of rural workers. Although a 
civil servant with satisfactory performance might expect to be promoted 
every two years, the reality is different. Most health workers are not pro-
moted when due, and some work more than 15 years without promo-
tion.3 Because the authorities responsible for promotions are at the 
district or ministerial level, urban workers can access those authorities to 
enquire about delays, unlike their rural counterparts.
There are various professional development training programs for 
health workers at dispensaries and health centers. The majority target 
those practicing in a rural setting. In the public sector, workers are eligible 
for further training on government sponsorship after two years of post-
degree work. If a health worker wants or needs further training, he or she 
has to register with the district medical officer, who in turn submits the 
name to the ministry of health for eligibility scrutiny. Those who qualify 
must take entry examinations, prepared by the ministry of health and 
administered at regional headquarters. But given the communication 
problems in rural areas, most rural health workers do not register with the 
district medical officer. Others fail to turn up to the examinations, either 
because they are unaware of the dates or because of travel difficulties. So, 
they miss out on professional development.
Finally, rural areas have very few good schools. The medical profession 
requires longer and arguably tougher training than other professions, 
including a sound education in primary school. Because many health 
workers would like their children to attend good schools, as they did, and 
because rural areas are hard pressed to offer them, they prefer to work in 
urban areas.
Comparative Analysis of Institutional Types
As the brief description from a health worker’s perspective highlights, 
delivering proper health care to rural populations is difficult under the 
best of situations. Many problems that health workers face are inevitable 
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features of health care in rural Africa. Some are surmountable; some are 
not. In outlining a view of health worker performance, it is important to 
be realistic about what can and cannot be done. One of the best tools for 
understanding the limitations and potential in the health care industry is 
comparing performance across sectors of the health care system. Sector 
refers to whether the health care facility is public, private, or not-for-
profit. Note that rather than compare public sector workers’ performance 
to an ideal standard of care, we compare them to other sectors where 
health workers face similar problems.
Absenteeism, for example, is very high across Africa, but it is also 
important to compare absenteeism between urban and rural settings, and 
private and public facilities. High rural and low urban absenteeism sug-
gest an inherent difficulty in living and working in rural areas, while high 
rates in both settings point to a structural problem. Similarly, when absen-
teeism is as high in the private as in the public sector, it is hard to blame 
incentives for public sector performance; but when absenteeism in the 
public sector is significantly higher, incentives are much more likely to be 
important.
Very little of rural Africa has for-profit private health services. It is there-
fore more useful (despite caveats) to compare the public sector with the 
not-for-profit private sector—generally nongovernmental organizations—
than with the for-profit private health care sector. The public and not-for-
profit private sectors share a similar mission of service to the public sector, 
and most of them run systems of health facilities (dispensaries and hospi-
tals) in rural and urban areas.
How to Measure and Understand Performance
One way to measure performance is to compare what is expected with 
what the practitioner was taught. We call this adherence—a measure of 
the delivery of necessary services according to patients’ presenting symp-
toms. Another way to measure performance is to consider the practitio-
ners’ actual ability to provide the necessary service. We call this 
competence. While adherence compares each health worker to an ideal 
standard, competence compares what a health worker does for his 
patients relative to what he is capable of doing. In most cases adherence 
will be less than competence, as on average a health worker will perform 
below what he or she is maximally capable of. Using a sample of clinicians 
working in outpatient clinics in Tanzania, we can relate adherence and 
competence (figures 5.1 and 5.2; each shows the same data for the same 
sample, analyzed differently).4
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Figure 5.1 Adherence and Competence: Analyzing the Employment Sector
Sources: Leonard and Masatu 2007, 2010b.
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Figure 5.2 Adherence and Competence: Analyzing Types of Clinicians
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The solid, 45-degree line shows where adherence is equal to 
 competence—that is, where the clinician does what he knows how to 
do. Most of the observations are well below the line. The points near 
the line represent those who do, in practice, what they are able to 
demonstrate as their competence. The few clinicians with observations 
above the line represent cases where a clinician demonstrated low 
levels of competence, but provided care that was much better.
The two figures demonstrate several points about performance. First, 
adherence is very low. The average clinician does around 40 percent of 
the things he or she should do for patients. But as the best clinician in our 
sample does 60 percent of the necessary things, adherence is not a good 
absolute measure. Some of these clinicians are good and help their 
patients, while others are not good and do not help their patients. We do 
not know where to draw the line between good and bad, so it is better to 
analyze these clinicians looking for factors that increase adherence rather 
than expecting absolute adherence.
Second, competence is also very low, though higher than adherence. If 
training drives competence, these clinicians do not have enough. But 
where is the appropriate cutoff between adequate and inadequate com-
petence? Although 100 percent competence may be a worthy goal, no 
clinician in the sample achieves it, making it a measure of limited use for 
comparing behavior.
Third, for most clinicians, competence and adherence show a signifi-
cant gap (also referred to as the know-do gap.) The distance below the 
45-degree line demonstrates how little these clinicians do relative to what 
they know how to do. This gap is a function of the effort they put into 
their work. Thus, effort—choosing to do what you know how to do—is 
an important input into the health care system.
Fourth, clinicians in the private not-for-profit sector have almost 
exactly the same average competence as clinicians in the public sector, 
but their adherence is higher (see figure 5.1, where sector A refers to the 
public sector and sector B refers to the private not-for-profit sector). This 
result is consistent with the interpretation that the private not-for-profit 
sector hires clinicians with the same capacity as the public sector, but gets 
them to perform better.
Fifth, for clinicians in the public sector, there is no significant relation-
ship between competence and adherence. Except at the lower end of 
competence, the dashed line showing the average relationship is not 
upward sloping (see figure 5.1). This means that increasing competence 
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does not increase adherence, so training would not improve quality for 
clinicians in this sector.
Sixth, if there were a way to move clinicians from the public to the 
private not-for-profit sector, quality of care would rise, even with no addi-
tional training (see figure 5.1). In this example, we have not detailed what 
would be involved in such a shift, but the graph demonstrates the poten-
tial for improvement from changes in the work environment.
Seventh, the type of clinician leads to significant differences in the 
relationship between adherence and competence (see figure 5.2). The 
definition of the clinician types in figure 5.2 comes from data other than 
those shown, but it is clear that clinician type 1 stands out significantly 
from the rest. Their competence is somewhat higher than other clinicians 
(labeled as type 2) and the relationship between adherence and compe-
tence is very different. They do not follow the 45-degree line exactly, but 
the gap between adherence and competence is much smaller.
These views offer multiple ways to address poor performance in 
African settings, without simply stating “performance is poor and must be 
improved everywhere.” They allow us to think about the value of more 
training and effort. More important, they suggest that analyzing the dif-
ferences between the two sectors or the qualities of clinicians of type 1 
could offer important lessons (see box 5.1 on the literature measuring 
provider quality in developing countries).
Box 5.1
Measuring Provider Quality in Developing Countries
A large body of work evaluates clinician performance in the United States and 
abroad. In general, researchers study doctor effort by looking at clinician perfor-
mance over a defined set of tasks. Authors commonly use randomized controlled 
studies, usually with an aim to determine which means might improve adherence 
to specific sets of protocol (Boekeloo and others 1994; Fairbrother and others 
1999; Tierney, Hui, and McDonald 1986). But few studies use economic theory to 
inform the interventions (see Fairbrother and others 1999, for example). And while 
some hint at the behavioral underpinnings of their interventions, these issues 
have not been studied empirically (Soumerai and Avorn 1990).
(continued next page)
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Box 5.1 (continued)
Authors that work on evaluating and improving provider quality in develop-
ing countries have made inroads into evaluating individual clinician quality—
otherwise known as process quality—directly. Studies of process quality have 
been carried out in Indonesia (Santoso 1996), Paraguay (Das and Sohnesen 
2007), India (Das and Hammer 2005), and Tanzania (Leonard and Masatu 2005, 
2006; Leonard, Masatu, and Vialou 2007). The consensus is that quality is poor 
not only because of structural shortcomings but also because clinician compe-
tence is low. Santoso (1996) shows that health care providers in Indonesia are 
undereducated on the appropriate use of drugs for acute diarrhea, a leading 
cause of child morbidity and mortality. Das and Hammer (2005) determine that 
overall competence is low in their study region in India—and that clinicians 
who are highly competent relative to the sample merely have “the ability to 
identify life-threatening conditions and act accordingly.” Compellingly, Leonard 
and Masatu (2005) find that despite low levels of competence, practice (pro-
cess) quality is still lower than it could be; clinicians in Tanzania have the capac-
ity to improve quality without additional training. Reliably measuring clinician 
performance allows us to investigate incentives and effort among individual 
clinicians.
While previous work identified important components of between-doctor 
variation, much variation in practice quality remains unaccounted for. Using 
vignettes and direct observation, researchers have studied the variation in quality 
by cadre, tenure, and type of organization. Das and Hammer (2005) find that the 
differences in competence between doctors in India are largely explained by 
training. In contrast, they also find that work experience in a neighborhood has 
little impact on competence. Training is also important in determining differences 
in the gap between knowledge and practice among Tanzanian clinicians (Leon-
ard, Masatu, and Vialou 2007). But training differences between clinicians, while 
nontrivial, do not tell the entire story. Besides training, the study highlights the 
importance of the type of organization a clinician works for (public, nongovern-
mental, private). In their sample, organization type accounts for 50 percent of the 
dependent variable’s variation. But considering these numbers together can be 
misleading: the authors are limited by their sample size and are forced to run a 
number of reduced form regressions, making the results’ meaning unclear. Even 
so, it is apparent that a good deal of the variation in practice quality is explained 
by these differences between clinicians.
(continued next page)
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Box 5.1 (continued)
Using data from Paraguay, Das and Sohnesen (2007) consider the possibility 
that clinicians make strategic effort choices. Such choices would imply that their 
motivation is intrinsic, tied to the characteristics of the patients they serve. Das 
and Sohnesen analyzed clinician behavior toward patients relative to both clini-
cian and patient characteristics. For patients, the study focused on wealth, hypoth-
esizing that clinicians would discriminate against patients based on income. Pri-
mary results suggest little difference in doctor effort across different patient 
backgrounds but large differences across physicians and facilities along the lines 
of doctor gender, contract type, facility type, and doctor salary. Importantly, clini-
cians did not vary effort according to the income of their patients. The authors 
conclude that clinicians do not discriminate against poor patients, but it is not 
clear whether the authors are capturing social preferences with this result.
A Framework for Health Worker Performance
This section offers a model of health worker performance5 that allows us 
to think about the interaction of the multiple factors at work. Figure 5.3 
shows a rough schematic presentation of the factors and decisions around 
health worker performance. The health system is driven by policy, but 
policy makers have only a few tools to improve the health system, called 
policy levers. From the perspective of health worker performance, these 
levers affect the supply of certain health worker characteristics, either by 
selecting different types of health workers to enter the system or by train-
ing health workers with different skills and personalities. These health 
workers supply service inputs into health care when they interact with 
patients. Policy levers act as tools to encourage (or discourage) health 
workers to supply certain service inputs. The quality of practitioners’ 
interactions with patients can be described by a series of service attributes. 
Although policy can affect service attributes directly (setting fees, or 
building laboratories on site), most service attributes are determined by 
the provision of service inputs by health workers themselves. These service 
attributes are the factors that patients use to determine whether to seek 
care (and at which facility). The service attributes combined with demand 
determines performance outputs and health system outcomes. One of the 
more important performance outputs is health worker utility, particularly 
income or self-satisfaction, because anticipating utility determines the 
levels and service inputs that health workers will provide.
Figure 5.3 Model Schematic for Health Worker Performance
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Broadly, the model shows that policy levers → health worker charac-
teristics → service inputs → service attributes → performance outputs → 
health system outcomes.
The schematic representation and the model of health worker perfor-
mance are easiest to explain by starting with the key element of any 
health care system: the patient-health worker interaction. Thus, we begin 
our discussion in the middle, moving from service attributes through 
health system outcomes and then from service inputs back to policy 
levers.
• Service attributes. Health workers provide health care to patients with 
at least four attributes: presence, performance, satisfaction, and expense. 
Presence represents the fact that if the patient chose to visit a particular 
provider, services would be provided (because the clinician is present). 
Performance is the medically assessed quality of the care, compared to 
some standard of care for a given condition. Satisfaction is how happy 
patients are with the services, including how the patient perceives qual-
ity, politeness, and responsiveness. Expense is the cost to the patient of 
the services provided. These attributes contribute to the demand for 
health care, in particular the demand for services at a given provider. 
The provision of health care also potentially generates revenue or 
income for the health worker, a feature which is not important to 
patients,6 but can be important to health workers.
• Performance outputs. Whereas service attributes are measured at the 
level of the patient-health worker interaction, performance outputs are 
measured at the level of health worker, facility, or potentially the health 
system. We examine three types: the productivity of health workers, 
the quality of services provided, and the integrity of services provided.
• Health system outcomes. Performance outputs are important because 
they improve health system outcomes in society. There are many pos-
sible outcomes, but some examples include the number of immuniza-
tions, number of assisted deliveries, and percentage of the population 
covered with quality services.
• Service inputs. Provider effort and capacity are the service inputs, deter-
mining the attributes of a patient’s visit. Effort is both whether the 
health worker provides a given service and how hard he or she works 
to diagnose and treat the patient. Capacity is the ability of a health 
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worker to provide certain services, generally limited by training and the 
equipment available in the health facility. Whereas there may be an 
expectation that capacity, not effort, limits performance, overwhelming 
empirical evidence from developing countries points to inadequate 
effort. The Hawthorne effect demonstrates large changes in the quality 
of care in the hour following the arrival of a peer at the health facility 
(see box 5.2 later in the chapter). If quality can change simply because 
someone visits the health worker, it cannot be limited by training or 
equipment, because these things cannot change that quickly. Effort is 
not the only input into health care quality, but it is an important one in 
this context.
• Health worker characteristics. The characteristics of a health worker—
including ability and intrinsic and extrinsic motivation—determine 
effort and capacity. Motivation directly affects effort. Further, the 
source of motivation will also have an important impact on the type of 
effort exerted, determining performance, satisfaction, and expense.
• Policy levers. The policy levers are selection, training, norms, work envi-
ronment, incentives, and monitoring. The category of policy levers is a 
list of ways that policy makers can influence the outputs and outcomes 
given the motivation and abilities of health workers. Policy makers can 
design the education and recruitment of health workers so as to select 
those with the greatest ability or with certain motivational characteris-
tics. Initial and continued training and established and encouraged 
norms can change the behavior of health workers: increasing their 
capacity to provide health care or motivating them to provide greater 
and more appropriate effort. Policy levers also affect the characteristics 
of health workers directly, through work environment, incentives, and 
monitoring.
A Model of Health Worker Performance
This section describes a model of health worker performance.
Service Inputs Lead to Service Attributes
This descriptive model follows directly from the framework presented 
above. We begin by examining the characteristics of a visit if a particu-
lar patient chose to visit a particular health worker. The visit remains 
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hypothetical until the patient, comparing the service characteristics that 
would be available at all potential providers, decides to visit the health 
worker. The health worker chooses the services that he or she will pro-
vide based on the condition of the patient (and potentially other charac-
teristics) as well as his or her own capacity to provide services. The choice 
of what services to provide generates three attributes of the visit: perfor-
mance, satisfaction, and expense.
We focus on performance first. Performance is a combination of effort, 
competence, and whether a particular service is indicated (medically use-
ful) for the patient. Performance is positive if the health worker is capable 
of performing the service and provides the effort to do so, and the item 
is indicated. Take the example of using a stethoscope to listen to a 
patient’s breathing pattern. Capacity requires a stethoscope and the 
knowledge of how to use it. Its use is indicated if the patient’s condition 
suggests listening to the heartbeat is medically useful. Effort is whether 
the health worker chooses to use the stethoscope. Performance is only 
positive when the stethoscope is present, the health worker knows how 
to use it, the condition indicates its use, and the health worker uses it. 
Providing items that are useless (not indicated by the patient’s condition) 
but not dangerous does not increase or decrease performance.
Effort also produces satisfaction for patients and is judged by the 
patient. Just as each service contributes to performance if it is indicated by 
the patient’s condition, each service contributes to satisfaction if patients 
with that condition value the service. Performance and satisfaction can, 
however, be different: the same service can contribute to performance but 
not satisfaction, satisfaction but not performance, or both. Bedside manner, 
politeness, and responsiveness are elements of satisfaction but not of per-
formance. Satisfaction can also be contrary to performance. In some cases, 
what a patient wants is contrary to professional standards, and providing 
that service is both good for satisfaction and bad for performance.
For patients, an important feature of the services provided by a health 
worker is their expenditure on the services provided. The expenditure is 
determined by the services provided and the fee for those services. Note 
that the health worker cannot charge for the effort provided, only 
whether a service was provided. These expenses do not include nonmon-
etary costs (a patient’s lost earnings) or travel costs. Fees are not a function 
of the capacity of the health worker and are frequently not a function of 
effort. For example, patients often pay a fixed fee for the consultation—
which does not differ by the number of services provided—rather than for 
performance or satisfaction.
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Finally, effort and capacity influence the health worker’s income. The 
expenditure of patients is not the same as the income of health workers. 
In some cases, health workers earn the fees paid by patients, but they also 
have to pay costs to provide these services (the wholesale cost of medi-
cines, for example). In some cases, even if there is no charge for a service, 
the employer may still compensate the health worker for providing the 
service. It is also possible that the employer will compensate a health 
worker only when he or she provides a service that is indicated for the 
patient’s condition. Thus health worker income is a function of the fees 
charged, services’ costs, and direct incentives from the employer. In decid-
ing whether to provide a given service, the health worker is potentially 
concerned with the change in income from providing that service, not 
overall income. Thus, health workers may earn a high salary, but what 
matters for effort is the additional income from services provided.
Three common empirically measured service attributes (performance 
measures) can be drawn from this simple model: adherence to protocol, 
competence, and presence (absenteeism).
Adherence is the proportion of required items actually provided, 
among all required items, for a given patient, health worker, and work 
environment. Competence is the proportion of this same list that the 
health worker is able to provide. Adherence is a function of average effort 
for that type of patient and the competence of the provider. This two-
part contribution to adherence allows us to examine the two important 
inputs into adherence separately. Increasing effort or capacity can improve 
adherence. More important, the value of increasing effort is a function of 
capacity, and the value of increasing capacity is a function of effort. When 
effort is low, increasing capacity has low returns; when capacity is high, 
the value of increasing effort is high.
To measure presence (absenteeism) we need to know whether the 
health worker would provide any services for a hypothetical visit. Thus, 
presence is a variable that measures whether the patient can expect to 
receive services if they were to visit the provider: a hypothetical measure 
of the probability of receiving care conditional on visiting a provider. 
Thus, if the health worker is always present (even if they provide very low 
effort), the expected presence is 1; if the health worker is present half of 
the time, expected presence is 0.5, whether the health worker provides 
high or low effort when they are there. Presence is the obvious counter-
part to absenteeism. Just as with expected presence, absenteeism does not 
take into account the effort that health workers provide when they are 
there, nor does it take into account whether the patient visits the provider. 
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A health worker is absent if they are not available to see patients, whether 
there are patients or not.
Service Attributes Lead to Performance Outputs
As we introduce outputs, we are no longer discussing the attributes of 
hypothetical visits to providers. A visit can contribute to an output only 
if it occurs. Therefore, we need to know whether the patient will actually 
go to a particular provider when they suffer from a particular illness or 
condition. Note that patients do not demand particular services; they visit 
the provider when they are sick and are offered particular services. It is 
easiest to think of demand as a binary choice: the patient visits or the 
patient does not visit.
Demand. The demand for services provided at a particular facility is a 
function of patient satisfaction, expense, and presence (the probability 
that a health worker will be present for that particular visit), as well as 
these same characteristics at all other available facilities. Demand for 
services at one facility can go up because a health worker is more likely 
to be present, charges lower fees, or provides services that boost patient 
satisfaction. Demand can also rise because the other potential providers 
do a worse job on any of these. Note that all attributes that attract 
patients are hypothetical—what would happen if the patient visited—
and do not indicate that the patient actually visits all other places. Thus, 
when effort leads to increased satisfaction (and does not greatly increase 
the expenses), it increases the probability that a patient will visit.
Productivity. Measured by the number of services provided by each 
health worker, productivity depends on the health worker’s effort and the 
number of patients seeking care. The service is provided if the patient 
comes to the health worker and the health worker is present. A service is 
not provided if demand for the provider is zero or the health worker does 
not provide the service. The productivity of a health worker in a given 
work environment is the total number of each type of service provided 
over all patients—or the weighted sum of all services provided, where 
weight represents the importance (or cost) of each type of service pro-
vided. Note that productivity indicates only the number of services pro-
vided, not the number of quality services or even the number of indicated 
services provided. If a service has zero or negative weight on performance, 
it is still a service provided.
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Quality of services. It is possible to measure the quality of a provider, 
facility, or health system by looking at the average performance for all 
services provided. Quality is similar to adherence, but measured over a 
wide range of services. The quality-weighted productivity of a health 
worker, facility, or system depends on the demand for services provided, 
as well as the average performance or quality of services provided by a 
health worker, facility, organization, or country, as demanded by patients. 
Looking at this measure by type of service and by practitioner and work 
environment is productive.
A given sector’s overall performance is the performance for all ser-
vices provided (available and demanded), divided by the number of 
services provided. When the performance for each service is high, overall 
performance will be high. If the demand for services with high perfor-
mance is high and the demand for services with low performance is low, 
overall performance will be high, even if the performance for existing 
services is average. Demand and performance interact to determine over-
all performance.
Integrity. Integrity reflects the extent that health workers provide services 
that are in their patients’ best interest. Because performance also reflects 
the patients’ best interest, we choose a definition that contains different 
information about the services provided. The integrity of the services 
provided by a health worker is a function of the expense of indicated and 
provided services, divided by the expense of provided services. In other 
words, the integrity of the visit is measured by the proportion of total 
expenses incurred that are indicated for the patient’s condition. Note that 
this is the profession’s view of value, not the patient’s. Patients might 
value services that are not indicated and not value some services that are 
indicated.
This definition is connected to adherence, but instead of the propor-
tion of indicated items actually provided, it reflects the number of indi-
cated items out of the total number of items provided, as well as the cost 
of those services. Whereas adherence increases if health workers perform 
more indicated services, integrity increases when fewer unnecessary ser-
vices are provided. Integrity also reflects each item’s expense, suggesting 
a motivation for providing more effort than is indicated: earning fees. A 
visit to a health worker characterized by indicated services has greater 
professional value, potentially reflecting a health worker with greater 
integrity. Note that this measure does not reflect the average cost of the 
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visit (which matters to patients) but the proportion of the average 
expense that is professionally indicated.
Health Worker Characteristics Lead to Service Inputs
The health worker maximizes utility when deciding what effort to pro-
vide to a patient. In the short run, his or her capacity is predetermined. 
Effort has a direct cost, and its benefits come from the attributes of a visit 
to a health worker (performance, satisfaction, and expense) as well as the 
income earned from the visit. Recall the important features for health 
workers, all determined by effort: performance, satisfaction, expenditure, 
and income.
The benefit of exerting effort is a function of these four attributes and 
the weight health workers put on each. How much health workers care 
about performance, patient satisfaction, their own income, and patient 
fees (expenditure) varies, reflecting the tastes of health workers. In addi-
tion, how much health workers care about performance can vary by the 
service provided and the work environment. Thus a health worker can be 
described by his or her preferences for performance as well as for service- 
and environment-based performance.
How much health workers care about patient satisfaction varies by the 
patient’s characteristics, and therefore some health workers prefer satis-
faction and some prefer identity-based satisfaction.
Income earned from providing a service can vary considerably across 
patients, but how much health workers care about income varies only by 
health worker.
How much health workers care about patient expenses can vary by 
patient type and health worker, producing preferences for expenditure and 
identity-based expenditure. Note that if health workers care about expen-
diture, they prefer lower expenditure for their patients—expenditure is 
not the same as income.
Thus the health worker potentially gains utility from each service to 
the degree that it increases performance, satisfaction, and income, and 
decreases expenditure. But providing services has a cost—the opportunity 
cost of effort. When the health worker decides only whether to provide 
a service, he or she will exert effort if the gains from visit attributes 
exceed the cost of effort.
The health worker provides effort only once, so if any source of motiva-
tion is large enough, the health worker will provide effort. For example, if 
the net fee earned from a service is worth more than the cost of effort for 
that service, a health worker who is not motivated by performance or 
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satisfaction will provide the service. At the same time, a health worker 
who cares about performance or satisfaction will provide the service even 
if he or she earns no income from it. Thus, sources of motivation are, 
in many cases, substitutes; either source of motivation can lead to effort, 
but motivation from both sources does not necessarily lead to increased 
provision.
When a service is indicated, but does not lead to patient satisfaction 
(and when providers do not care about patient expenses), the service is 
provided only if the health worker cares about performance or is com-
pensated by their employer for providing that service. When a service is 
not indicated, but leads to patient satisfaction (and when providers do 
not care about patient expenses), the service is provided only if the pro-
vider cares about patient satisfaction or revenue.
Health worker utility and patient demand. The model only describes 
what the health worker would do when visited by a particular type of 
patient. To understand a health worker’s motivation, we must also con-
sider whether the patient seeks the service and what other activities the 
health worker must perform. For example, by considering demand, we 
see that patient satisfaction can be an important indirect source of moti-
vation for health workers who are motivated entirely by earned income; 
without patients, they have no income.
Performance and patient demand. This simple model of one patient’s 
visit introduces an interesting conundrum for the health worker moti-
vated only by performance. When performance also leads to patient sat-
isfaction, the health worker will augment patient load by performing 
activities that raise performance and by not performing activities that do 
not raise performance. Since the health worker earns utility from perfor-
mance, he or she can choose an optimal workload by raising fees when he 
or she has too many patients.7 The health worker will earn greater utility 
from performance as well as greater income, even if he or she is not moti-
vated by income.
The conundrum arises if performance does not automatically lead to 
patient satisfaction. The health worker motivated by performance can 
experience lower utility by increasing effort slightly. Improved perfor-
mance leads to a smaller workload and fewer opportunities to earn utility 
from providing high performance care. Why? Because this type of health 
worker does not earn utility from knowing that they would provide high 
quality care if they had patients; they earn utility from actually providing 
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high quality care to patients who visit. Thus, even if health workers care 
nothing for satisfaction and income, they may find their utility increases 
by “giving-in” to patients’ demands in order to earn utility from providing 
high-quality care to a larger number of patients. This will be particularly 
true when effort for a service provides no contribution to performance, 
but contributes to satisfaction, encouraging the patient to visit and allow 
the health worker to provide other services that do increase performance. 
So, a health worker who cares only about performance may be motivated 
to prescribe unnecessary drugs, even when they know these drugs do not 
improve performance.
Health worker utility for many patients. Health workers do not make 
decisions about each hypothetical patient independent of other patients 
they are seeing. What they would do if a patient was their only patient is 
likely to be different from what they do when they have many patients. We 
limit the question by thinking of the activities a health worker faces in a 
given period, which could be a day or even a week. The health worker 
decides how much effort to exert (which services to provide) taking into 
account the total effort that he or she will exert over the period. Each unit 
of effort has a benefit in the individual visit, independent of other visits, 
but the cost of effort depends on how many other visits there are.
As effort’s cost depends on all the activities of the health worker, we 
can introduce the intuitive concept that health workers have a limited 
amount of time—or get tired after seeing many patients. Thus, the cost of 
effort for one patient rises if the health worker sees more patients. When 
a health worker sees two patients a day and provides low effort, it is 
because there is no good reason to provide effort. When a health worker 
sees 60 patients a day and provides low effort, it is because the cost of 
working harder for each of the 60 patients would be overwhelming, even 
if desired.
Increasing motivation can have multiple impacts on effort. When a 
health worker has low overall motivation, he or she provides low effort. 
Any rise in motivation is thus likely to have two impacts. First, it will 
encourage the health worker to provide more services to each patient. 
Second, it will increase his or her willingness to see more patients. The 
second effect arises because, at low effort, little additional motivation can 
overcome the cost of effort; the cost of working harder is not very high. 
At high effort, however, increases in motivation from other sources are 
less likely to improve the quality of care for individual patients or to raise 
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the number of patients that a health worker is willing to see. This is 
because additional units of effort are very costly to health workers who 
already provide high effort.
More important, increases in incentives are likely to be tied to particu-
lar services. The health worker’s employer can choose to implement a 
reward for a type of service by changing the compensation for that ser-
vice. This will cause the health worker to provide more of this service, 
increasing effort. At the same time, it raises the cost to the health worker 
for all other services because it increases total effort. If the health worker 
was providing another service to patients because it raised performance, 
and the health worker cared about performance, more direct incentives 
may cause the health worker to decrease the other service.
This task shifting is particularly important in health care because no 
employer can pay a health worker for every necessary service, so increas-
ing raising incentives for a subset of services will have important conse-
quences if health workers have no other source of motivation.
Also, for a health worker motivated entirely by performance, raising 
incentives for particular services will increase income, but not motivation. 
He or she earns income from already doing the right things, and is not 
more likely to do them because of this incentive. So, for performance-
motivated health workers, incentives do not help, and can even damage 
performance for such workers.
As chapter 14 on intrinsic motivation shows, empirical evidence points 
to a crowding out of motivation. This can happen for two reasons. First, 
as with task shifting, pushing health workers to do more of one service 
can cause them to do less of another. Second, and more pressing, it can 
signal importance to the health worker. Thus, when the employer changes 
incentives, it suggests to health workers that income matters, not perfor-
mance by itself. This can attract health workers who care more about 
income than performance, and it can teach health workers that their pri-
orities are wrong.
Description of Health Worker Characteristics
Health workers respond by varying degrees to performance, satisfaction, 
income, and patient expenditures. Thus, each health worker’s personality 
can be summarized by the weights they put on these attributes. These 
variables do not, however, explain why health workers are motivated to 
provide these characteristics.
Generally, health workers with intrinsic motivation do not need exter-
nal incentives; they are motivated by performance, satisfaction, or expense. 
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Those with extrinsic sources of motivation care primarily about income. 
Of course, health workers can be motivated by both at the same time. 
Chapter 12 examines extrinsic motivation among health workers, and 
chapter 14 looks at intrinsic motivation.
In addition, the health worker’s ability is an important characteristic. 
Here, ability measures the degree that health workers can learn or trans-
form training into capacity, determined by the combination of training 
and ability.
Policy Levers
Policy can have an important impact in two ways. First, it can determine 
the characteristics of health workers, including their ability and intrinsic 
and extrinsic motivation. Second, it can interact with the characteristics 
of existing health workers, using their ability and motivation. This chapter 
cannot provide an extensive overview of policy, but can point out how 
policy interacts with our model.
First, policy levers can determine the underlying characteristics of 
those who choose to become health workers. This may be particularly 
important for intrinsic motivation and ability. As chapter 14 discusses, 
evidence shows that much of an individual’s motivation is a stable char-
acteristic, something he or she is either born with or learns early in life.
Second, policy levers can mold the intrinsic motivation triggered dur-
ing the training experience through shared norms within the health pro-
fession. Thus, individuals are exposed to training that allows them to 
continue to enjoy acting as professionals for the remainder of their 
careers.
Third, through monitoring and incentives, or through changes in the 
workplace’s structure, policy can boost the effort of health workers. These 
levers do not change the sources of motivation, but do change the oppor-
tunity to earn utility. The most straightforward example is offering addi-
tional payments (rewards, bonuses, pay for performance) for specific 
services when they are indicated. This incentive interacts with a health 
worker’s extrinsic motivation to encourage further effort. Such examples 
can also be found for intrinsic motivation.
Changes in the workplace environment can alter how much effort a 
health worker is willing to exert to improve performance. For example, 
the Hawthorne effect shows that when the average health worker is 
observed by a peer, the health worker’s effort greatly increases in the 
short run (box 5.2). This effect is unlikely to be caused by extrinsic moti-
vation: if the health worker believed that the peer altered his or her 
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Box 5.2
The Hawthorne Effect as Evidence of Untapped Motivation
The effect of peer-based esteem-seeking is apparent in the Hawthorne effect, 
when peers observe health workers performing their normal activities. Leonard 
and Masatu (2006) examined the adherence to protocol of health workers in a 
sample of facilities in Tanzania. In each facility a clinician on the research team sat 
in and observed one of the clinicians working in the clinic. Box figure 5.2.1 shows 
average adherence before (t from −10 to 0) and after (t from 1 to 10) any clinicians 
knew the team had arrived. The team observed the activities of one clinician in 
each facility and the average is shown as the solid line; the dotted line shows the 
average for clinicians who were not observed.
Box Figure 5.2.1 Adherence Over the Course of One Day 
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Both groups provide approximately the same quality care under normal 
 circumstances. As soon as a peer entered the room, however, observed clinicians 
increased adherence by 20 percent (10 percentage points over a baseline of 
50 percent). Typical of the Hawthorne effect, this change is only temporary. The 
clinicians returned to their normal adherence after approximately 10 patients. 
There was no change for other clinicians.
The large change in adherence to protocol shows that the average clinician 
can increase effort without any increase in competence or other resources.
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income-earning possibilities, he or she would not return to normal effort 
in the peer’s presence. Instead, it shows that health workers react to peers 
and expect peers to provide feedback. When the peer is passive, this 
changes the motivation of the health worker, and he or she returns to 
normal. The Hawthorne effect demonstrates the importance of the work 
environment for encouraging and rewarding intrinsic behavior.
Conclusion
A study in rural Tanzania found that a quarter of medically trained clini-
cians ask their patients only two questions, never touch the patient, and 
spend only three minutes from the moment the patient enters to the 
moment they leave with a prescription (Das, Hammer, and Leonard 
2008). This is unacceptable health care. Almost all these clinicians can 
demonstrate that they know how to treat patients (Leonard and Masatu 
2005), and in Tanzania, at least, the facilities have the medicines to treat 
most of the illnesses seen. More important, because the health workers 
are trained and have resources, this situation demonstrates a failure of 
effort and therefore motivation.
Thus, this book rightly discusses both the shortage of health workers 
and the low motivation of existing health workers. In developing a 
model of health worker performance, we set out to describe the interac-
tion between health worker and patient in a way that allows for absen-
teeism, low effort, low training, and poor quality care. Moreover, we set 
out to show the link between these outcomes and motivation, and 
between these outcomes and policy levers. No health worker goes to 
work as a machine, seeking to accomplish all tasks they were trained 
to do. Health workers choose whether to go to work, how much effort 
to exert, and which circumstances to do so in. Their effort helps to deter-
mine whether they have patients, how many they will see, and which 
kinds they will see. The reasons they do this are many, and vary greatly 
from health worker to health worker. Two health workers with very dif-
ferent motivations may do the same thing, just as two similarly moti-
vated health workers may do very different things in different work 
environments.
Notes
 1. Research is documented in Leonard and Masatu (2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 
2010a, 2010b); Das, Hammer, and Leonard (2008); Klemick, Leonard, and 
Masatu (2009); and Leonard, Masatu, and Vialou (2007).
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 2. See Masatu, pers. comm.; Jack and others (2009); Lindelöw and Serneels 
(2006); Serneels and others (2004).
 3. Masatu, pers. comm.
 4. Adherence and competence are discussed in more detail below. The data for 
these graphs are discussed in Leonard and Masatu (2010b) and in more detail 
in chapter 14.
 5. The model presented in this chapter is based on the more detailed presenta-
tion in Brock and others (2011).
 6. Income for the health worker is not the same as expense to the patient, even 
in the private sector.
 7. Raising fees only regulates patient flow. This type of health worker does not 
gain utility from increasing fees because either he or she cares nothing for 
money or he or she works in an institution that does not pass fees on to the 
health worker directly.
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C H A P T E R  6
Fiscal Issues in Scaling Up the 
Health Workforce
Agnes Soucat, Marko Vujicic, Aly Sy, and Claude 
Sekabaraga
Low public demand due to fiscal constraints is often considered a major 
impediment to the growth of the health workforce. Yet the effect of caps 
on expansion of the wage bill has been limited. Several African countries 
have developed innovative approaches to increase the number and remu-
neration of their health workers, some quite successfully. Most of Africa 
is now enjoying rapid economic growth, and fiscal constraints are likely 
to relax. The relevance of each policy depends on the country, and policy 
makers must weigh challenges against expected benefits. 
Africa is the region with the lowest ratio of health workers to popula-
tion. Restrictive wage bill policies in African countries are often invoked as 
a key factor restricting the growth of the health workforce. In most, a large 
number of health workers are employed in the public sector, their salaries 
often paid from the government’s overall wage bill budget. When govern-
ments limit expansion of the overall wage bill—often for sound economic 
reasons—they may constrain health worker hiring. Much of the global 
debate on health worker deficiencies focuses on the limits that fiscal con-
straints place on the scaling up of the publicly employed health workforce 
(Vujicic, Ohiri, and Sparkes 2009). But are fiscal constraints really the 
most important obstacles to expanding the health workforce in Africa?
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To date, policy experts have debated the health worker deficiency in a 
data void because of the lack of documented country experiences. This 
chapter aims to fill that void, at least in part, by reviewing how health 
wage bill budgets are determined and examining how fiscal policies affect 
the ability to expand health sector staffing. It draws on a review of litera-
ture and country case studies from Ghana (World Bank, forthcoming), 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Mali, Rwanda (World Bank 2010b), Uganda, and 
Zambia (Vujicic, Ohiri, and Sparkes 2009). It also looks at the strategies 
that countries pursue to expand public financing for health workers, and 
it concludes by outlining a way forward for policy analysis.
Although wage bill ceilings can be restrictive, they do not result from 
unsound fiscal policy. They generally are resorted to in systems where 
health workers are part of an integrated and centralized civil service sys-
tem (box 6.1), rather than being a health sector issue per se. Several 
Box 6.1
Wage Bill Ceilings
A wage bill ceiling is usually a short-term response to a fiscal crisis or to a wage bill 
that exceeds the budget. Governments may also enact a ceiling as part of an 
effort to reduce the size of the civil service. A ceiling usually provides only a short-
term fix that must ultimately be supplanted by budget and civil service reforms. 
Developing countries with International Monetary Fund (IMF) programs often 
focus on controlling the size of their overall wage bill. Half of all IMF Poverty 
Reduction and Growth Facilities have some form of wage bill conditionality, 
implemented in countries with high wage bills relative to gross domestic product 
or where government expenditures are growing rapidly. A wage bill ceiling 
should be accompanied by civil service reform and should be imposed only when 
other options have failed. 
The IMF now recognizes that its programs overuse wage bill ceilings. Although 
a ceiling is a useful temporary device when out-of-control payrolls threaten mac-
roeconomic stability, such situations are rare. In practice, the ceilings imposed 
often lack a clear rationale. Critics claim that they hinder low-income countries 
from expanding employment in areas that are key to reducing poverty, such as 
health and education, compromising the countries’ ability to achieve the Millen-
nium Development Goals. 
(continued next page)
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African countries have addressed this problem successfully by improving 
management, decentralizing, giving facilities more autonomy, legal 
reform, and better alignment of donor funding to country systems.
The Links between Fiscal Policy and the Health Workforce 
The gap estimated to exist between current public sector wage bills and 
the financing needed to support health workers in most African countries 
is large. Scheffler and others (2009) estimated that the annual wage cost 
for the number of health workers required to meet the health goals of 31 
African countries would be about $3.6 billion (see chapter 2). Their 
study estimated that the current annual wage bill in those countries is 
about $1 billion. Even if enough additional health workers were available 
in the job market, bridging the $2.6 billion gap would require the coun-
tries to grow economically, as well as to mobilize both public and private 
financing. 
The impact of fiscal policy on the health workforce depends on the 
workers’ employment arrangements. In Africa three models predominate. 
The integrated civil service model, inherited from the postcolonial integra-
tion of public service delivery, remains common in many places. In it, the 
government employs health workers directly as civil servants, and their 
wages are part of the overall government wage bill, along with those of 
teachers, police, and other civil servants. Wage policies are often rigid, as 
they are constrained by cross-sectoral considerations. To gain flexibility, 
some countries experiment with contract workers. The legal framework 
Recent evidence offers some support for that claim. In response to the 
 criticism, the IMF reconsidered its position, issuing new guidelines that call for 
transparent and flexible ceilings that can accommodate higher spending in the 
social sectors, particularly spending of donor funds. 
As countries’ budgeting and payroll systems strengthen, the need for wage bill 
ceilings will diminish. Governments should impose ceilings only in exceptional 
cases and with clear justification, limited duration, sufficient flexibility, and 
 periodic reassessment.
Source: Verhoeven and Segura 2007; Fedelino, Schwartz, and Verhoeven 2006; Vujicic, Ohiri, and 
Sparkes 2009.
Box 6.1 (continued)
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often remains unchanged, however, and contractors are almost always 
hired as full civil servants as the result of political pressure (World Bank 
2008). In Benin, for example, all short-term contract workers in the 
health sector were integrated in the general civil service in 2011.
The decentralized model is an increasingly common alternative. As more 
countries adopt fiscal decentralization, subnational units, such as districts 
or local governments, also employ health workers. In this model, health 
worker remuneration may still be part of the wage bill as an earmarked 
grant, as in Uganda. Or it may be part of a general needs-based block 
grant handled as a transfer, as in Ethiopia. Such decentralization can cre-
ate more flexibility, but much depends on local political and economic 
conditions. Zambia famously decentralized the health wage bill to district 
health boards in the 1990s but later reverted to the integrated civil ser-
vice model. 
In the third, health facility model, health workers’ wages are paid 
from the operating budgets of autonomous facilities, whether private or 
public. The government may subsidize wages through transfers, which 
do not count directly against its overall wage bill. Such transfers often 
occur via government subsidies to faith-based providers, as in Uganda 
and Zambia, or to community associations (CSCOMs), as in Mali. 
Health workers may also be self-employed and receive government 
subsidies to deliver important public services, as are general practition-
ers in rural Mali.
In the integrated civil service model, the ministry of health typically 
has little authority over its salary budget. That authority usually lies with 
treasury or ministry of finance. Because salaries are the largest share of 
government health spending (35 percent to 55 percent in Sub-Saharan 
countries), the ministry of health thus lacks effective control over a big 
part of its total budget (figure 6.1). Augmenting the health workforce 
thus requires either reallocating salary money from other sectors to 
health, or increasing the overall wage bill. Reallocating salary is politically 
difficult. Under the civil service model, the budgeting process for the 
health wage bill usually involves two steps. The central authority (often 
the ministry of finance) determines the overall resources available for the 
wage bill for the next one to three years. Line ministries and the central 
authority then negotiate which budgets to increase and which to cut. 
Reallocating salary budgets can also be difficult when governments do 
not implement their stated policies. 
Wages are adjusted for all sectors at the same time. However, specific 
sector measures can also be implemented. Kenya, Rwanda, and Zambia 
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had explicit policies to protect the health sector during a period of  overall 
government wage bill downsizing. In Kenya and Rwanda, the policies 
were effective: the health sectors benefited from steadily increasing 
shares of the overall wage bill. In Zambia, the health sector share of the 
overall wage bill decreased steadily, however. The government, contrary 
to its stated policy, cut the health wage budget more than those of other 
sectors and did not give priority to health spending. In another case, in the 
context of fiscal expansion, the health wage bill of Ghana increased over 
time as a share of the total wage bill. In Uganda, its share remained stable 
while the overall wage bill increased slightly over time (figure 6.2).
Reallocating salary budgets may also be of little help to scaling up the 
health workforce under the civil service model. In Kenya, despite the 
availability of a large number of health workers, and despite the priority 
given to the health sector in the budget, the number of staff hired each 
year remained flat. Reductions in the overall wage bill constrained any 
scaling-up of the health workforce, at least in the short term. If the over-
all wage bill is shrinking, even a government that gives priority to the 
health sector may not be able to support large-scale hiring.
Increasing the overall wage bill also poses significant challenges. A 
strong economic rationale supports controlling the size of the public 
Figure 6.1 Example of Alternative Budgeting Systems
Source: Vujicic, Ohiri, and Sparkes 2009.
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 sector wage bill, measured in relation to gross domestic product (GDP). 
Excessive spending on wages can lead to macroeconomic volatility, 
crowding out other spending. The available evidence does not clearly 
define the level at which spending becomes too high, triggering those 
negative effects. Ministries of health may find it difficult to influence 
wage bill policy because they often are not party to the decision making. 
Yet in most cases the direct fiscal impact of health sector hiring, even 
if it is greatly expanded, is small. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the health sec-
tor is a relatively small portion of the overall civil service at roughly 
10 percent (figure 6.3). Simulations for Zambia and Kenya show that 
raising the number of doctors by 25 percent would only increase the 
overall wage bill by 0.24 percent in real terms. If the entire health work-
force was expanded by 25 percent, the overall wage bill would increase 
by 2.6 percent. As long as GDP grows by at least that amount, which is 
well below forecast, such an increase in health hiring would not have 
much impact on the ratio of the wage bill to GDP.
In practice, however, it is difficult for governments to expand hiring or 
raise wages in one sector without doing so in other sectors. And when 
Figure 6.2 Share of the Health Wage Bill in National Wage Bills in Selected African 
Countries
Source: Authors. 
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increased hiring in the health sector spills over into education and other 
sectors, the fiscal implications become substantial. In Ghana, initially 
exceptional increases in pay for medical doctors were soon followed by 
increases for nurses, then teachers. The simulations for Kenya and Zambia 
show that if hiring in the education sector also increased, the overall wage 
bill would spike by a much larger amount.
The situation is different where local governments or facilities receive 
a block grant accounted as a transfer. Because health worker wages are not 
directly budgeted and accounted for within the overall wage bill, wage 
bill policies and the health workforce are not directly linked. Operating 
units (either facilities or local government entities) have significant 
autonomy over allocating their budgets across wage and nonwage items. 
They also have flexibility to channel funds from various sources, includ-
ing facility revenues, to wages. 
Expanding the health workforce in the facility model requires larger 
budgets for operating units. Additional funds may come from the govern-
ment or other sources, including insurance, user fees, and donors. By 
mobilizing funds from nongovernment sources in autonomous units, 
health systems can raise expenditures without affecting the overall wage 
bill. In this case the health workforce is not part of the civil service, and 
Figure 6.3 Distribution of Civil Service Employees by Sector
Source: Vujicic, Ohiri, and Sparkes 2009.
Note: For all levels of government.
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changes in hiring and wage policies do not directly influence the wage bill 
policies of other sectors. 
Policy Experiences in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Africa’s economic growth in the past 10 years, as well as increases in 
official development assistance for health, made more resources available 
to hire and remunerate health workers (Gottret, Schieber, and Waters 
2008). Between 2001 and 2010, six of the world’s 10 fastest-growing 
economies were in Sub-Saharan Africa. Countries adopted different pol-
icy options to expand the health workforce in situations where govern-
ment fiscal policies remain restrictive. There is no one-size-fits-all 
solution. The choice of policy depends on the country, and policy makers 
must weigh challenges against expected benefits. 
First, and somewhat surprisingly, countries may struggle to ensure that 
funds budgeted for health worker salaries are actually spent, as budget 
execution rates often fall well below 100 percent. Administrative 
 inefficiencies in hiring processes, the timing of the budget cycle, and health 
worker shortages may be to blame. Low budget execution rates and 
 persistently high vacancy rates clearly rule out fiscal constraints to hiring. In 
Zambia, the budget execution rate for health worker salaries was 50  percent 
in 2006 and 2007. The government offered jobs to fill vacancies of as much 
as 40 percent in rural health centers and hospitals (Picazo 2008). Kenya 
faced a similar ordeal: filling a nursing position advertised by the ministry of 
health took an average of 15 months. In Madagascar, budget execution rates 
were less than 70 percent between 2005 and 2008 (World Bank 2010a). 
But sometimes resources may not be available. In those cases ministries 
of health can improve their negotiation strategies in wage bill budgeting 
processes. When the health workforce is part of the civil service, the 
health sector competes with other sectors for more money for wages. 
Ministries of health could ensure that human resources for health strate-
gies are well designed and make a strong case for additional resources. 
Such efforts involve moving beyond the traditional focus on forecasting 
long-term staffing needs to a much more incremental, short-term, results-
based approach. Ministries of health can identify priority, short-term 
actions and show how they can produce improvements in the delivery of 
health services, with corresponding benefits to national priorities. 
Ethiopia illustrates this approach. Ethiopia’s ministry of health 
 analyzed elements in the system that were preventing increased use of 
 high-impact interventions that support the Millennium Development 
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Goals, such as family planning and insecticide-treated nets. It prepared a 
strategy based on the evidence. As part of its strategy, the ministry 
designed a health extension package, creating a new cadre of health work-
ers to deliver these high impact interventions (see chapter 16). Local 
governments identified, trained, and hired more than 30,000 young 
women in rural communities, deploying them over 2006–2009 (Bilal and 
others 2011). The program was fully financed by the government as part 
of Ethiopia’s budget expansion. 
Another way to expand the fiscal space for health wages is to partially 
disconnect the health workforce from the civil service. That involves enacting 
particular laws for health workers, who remain public workers but are 
exempt from general civil service rules. In 1998 Ghana (see Figure 6.4 for 
staffing and wage bill trend) introduced an Additional Duty Hours  Allowance 
for highly qualified workers to prevent migration. In 2006 it enacted a law 
establishing an entirely new salary structure for health workers, under which 
their average wages grew by 20 percent (Appiah-Denkyira and others 2012). 
In some countries, including Ethiopia and Nigeria, local government–run 
health systems are autonomous and receive government subsidies. Block 
grants to local governments provide flexibility if the national government 
wishes to raise health spending using domestic resources or donor aid. It can 
adjust the transferred funds to align with policy objectives and priorities, for 
example, by introducing a needs-based or poverty-based formula that gives 
poor rural regions more resources to attract health workers. Districts with 
the greatest need can expand staffing. Resources become more fungible as 
the budgeting processes for the health wage bill and for other expenditures 
are no longer separate. 
Because the block grant is part of the transfers, it does not affect the 
size of the overall wage bill. In both countries, intergovernmental transfers 
from the federal government are formula-based, with no earmarks for 
wages. A challenge thus could arise if national objectives and local priori-
ties and capacities are not aligned. Local governments may not give prior-
ity to health and may have low capacity to manage the health workforce. 
Some countries fully separate the health workforce from the civil ser-
vice, which brings them closer to the service delivery models of most 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
countries. Such a system requires autonomous facilities, which may be in 
place in some countries, as in Mali. In other countries, establishing such 
autonomy would require substantial public sector reforms. 
Separating the health workforce and the civil service offers three impor-
tant advantages: First, facilities that employ health workers have more 
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Source: World Bank (forthcoming); based on data from the Controller and Accountant General’s Department, the Integrated Personnel and Payroll Database, and the Ministry of Health, 
Ghana (2005–2009). 
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control over how their budget is allocated across wage and nonwage items. 
That control gives them flexibility to combine inputs most  effectively to 
deliver quality services. Second, expanding the autonomy of facilities 
allows more flexible combinations of finance sources. Government subsi-
dies can be pooled with private sector contributions and donor contribu-
tions. Third, when the health workforce is separate from the civil service, 
health workers are accountable to the facility and no longer move with 
their budget allocation. If a health worker leaves a facility, the budget for 
his or her remuneration remains, allowing the facility to hire a replacement.
Rwanda’s broad-based reforms show how some of the challenges asso-
ciated with detaching the health workforce from the civil service can be 
addressed. In 2008 frontline health service providers moved out of the civil 
service, becoming employees of autonomous facilities. Of those facilities, 
60 percent are public and autonomous, and 40 percent are private and 
not-for-profit. Rwandan health sector salaries include two  components: a 
fixed component, paid out of a needs-based transfer to the facility, and a 
variable allowance component based on performance. Allowances, calcu-
lated with a well-defined formula, are a main source of remuneration, 
raising the basic salary by 50 percent to 120 percent (see chapter 13). 
Facilities can use block grants to hire additional staff and provide bonuses. 
The Rwandan system gives districts and facilities much more control 
over the health wage bill. Facilities pay wages and social benefits, includ-
ing contributions to the health insurance system and the social security 
fund. They can supplement the salary budget (which comes from ear-
marked central funds) and provide incentives to improve retention and 
health worker performance. The approach has led to greater overall 
health worker wages—on a performance basis—without any impact on 
the overall wage bill (box 6.2).
Box 6.2
Rwanda’s Performance-Based Financing Reform
In 2008 Rwanda reformed its human resources for health, decentralizing the hir-
ing, management, and payment of health workers to the individual facility.
Rwanda has four main sources of funding for human resources for health. The 
first is a transfer from the ministry of finance to the autonomous facilities in the 
form of population-based and poverty-based block grants. The second source is 
(continued next page)
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performance-based grants; some of the grants supplement salaries, but they are 
not necessarily earmarked for that purpose. The third source is local revenue gen-
erated by the facility, such as health insurance reimbursements and user copay-
ments, which can be used to hire lower-cadre health workers. The fourth source 
is donor funding transferred directly to facilities, most often for HIV treatment and 
care. Donors fund salaries directly, in accord with Rwanda’s policy.
The fixed compensation and the variable, performance-based financing pro-
vide substantial resources for paying salaries and allowances. Compensation in 
the form of fixed salaries grew from $6.4 million to $21.4 million, mostly as a result 
of a dramatic rise in the number of health workers.
Compensation from the performance-based, variable portion of earnings 
grew tenfold, from $0.8 million to $8.9 million in just three years (figure B6.2.1). 
Performance-based financing represented 11.9 percent of the funds paid as sala-
ries in 2005 and 41.6 percent in 2008. As a share of overall public expenditures on 
human resources for health, this represents an increase from 10.7 percent to 29.4 
percent.
Figure B6.2.1 Increases in Basic and Performance-Based Compensation 
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Box 6.2 (continued)
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Mali offers a variation on the full autonomy model. There the govern-
ment supports community health centers that are run by community 
associations and private general practitioners in rural areas (see chapter 9). 
The community health associations and general practitioners operate on a 
fee-for-service basis but receive an installation grant to start their practices, 
as well as subsidies to deliver preventive and other public health services.
Donor assistance to developing countries for health has risen substan-
tially in recent years, and donors increasingly identify health workforce 
capacity as a priority. But the duration of donor funding commitments 
and the current terms of work in the public sector often do not align. 
Health workers in the public sector are often hired under permanent 
contracts, but donor assistance for health is short-term, unpredictable, 
and volatile. 
A recent analysis of wages in several countries suggests that govern-
ment salaries often do not match those elsewhere in the economy 
(McCoy and others 2008). Donor funding can crowd out government 
funding by drawing health workers away from the public sector into 
donor-funded projects. In Rwanda, salaries in donor-funded projects were 
five to six times higher than public salaries (World Bank 2010b). If 
donors make long-term commitments and align their wage policies to the 
government’s, that discrepancy could be corrected. Ghana, Mali, 
Mozambique, and Uganda receive donor support that helps pay their 
wage bills. In Malawi, donors provide budget support earmarked for rais-
ing health worker salaries (box 6.3). Projects also fund wages, as in 
Ethiopia, where the multidonor Protection of Basic Service (PBS) pro-
gram provides block grants to local governments to help pay salaries. 
Short-term contracting arrangements also help close the gap between 
public sector and donor-funded salaries by making it easier to finance sala-
ries with donor aid. In Kenya, the Emergency Hiring Program hired health 
workers on three-year contracts to match donor commitments, paying 
their salaries with donor resources (box 6.4). In Rwanda, donor agencies, 
which cannot directly provide budget support, transfer funds to health 
facilities to support health workers, consistent with government policy. 
Conclusion
Macroeconomic realities limit the expansion of fiscal space in all coun-
tries, rich or poor. Over the last decade the limitations have eased in most 
Sub-Saharan countries as a result of strong economic growth and increased 
development assistance for health. Although wage bill restrictions can 
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Box 6.4
Aligning Donors with Government Processes and Priorities 
in Kenya
Kenya shows how donor resources can help expand short-term hiring in the 
heath sector. Beginning in 2006, donors worked with the Kenya Ministry of Health 
to develop an Emergency Hiring Program to address staffing shortages in under-
served areas. The U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief; the Global Fund 
to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria; and the Clinton Foundation provided 
resources to support hiring health workers on three-year contracts, tied to specific 
geographic areas. 
The program had a substantial impact on the fiscal space for hiring health 
workers in the public sector. In 2006 health worker hiring in the public sector was 
Box 6.3
Malawi Emergency Human Resources Programme, 
2005–2009
To address an acute shortage of health workers in Malawi, the Department for 
International Development gave budget support to the government to enable it 
to offer incentives to aid in the recruitment and retention of Malawian staff in 
government and mission hospitals. The scheme includes a 52 percent taxed sal-
ary increment for 11 professional occupational categories, coupled with a major 
initiative to recruit, create new positions, and re-engage qualified Malawian staff. 
The Emergency Human Resources Programme—which also expanded health 
worker training—accomplished its primary goal of increasing the number of pro-
fessional health workers in Ministry of Health and faith-based (Christian Health 
Association of Malawi) institutions. Across the 11 priority cadres, the total number 
of professional health workers funded by the civil service increased by 53 percent, 
from 5,453 in 2004 to 8,369 in 2009, for an additional cost of $0.70 per capita, 
representing 8 percent of total health expenditures. In addition, from 2009 salaries 
for civil servants increased uniformly by an average of 15 percent, compared to an 
inflation rate of around 8 percent, for a real increase of about 7 percent. Recently, 
however, the program has been jeopardized by macroeconomic mismanage-
ment and interruption of donor support. 
(continued next page)
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limit spending for health worker wages, the constraints that such ceilings 
place on efforts to improve staffing have been overemphasized. Focusing 
the policy dialogue on wage bill restrictions is unlikely to make more 
money available for health workers in Africa. 
As most of Africa is enjoying rapid economic growth, fiscal constraints 
are likely to relax. Many African countries have expanded financing for 
health workers in recent years. Several governments increased their sub-
sidies for health worker wages dramatically, recruiting and training many 
workers and improving compensation. Successful strategies include fiscal 
decentralization, better management and greater efficiency in existing 
expenditure programs, and new laws to relax the constraints of a unified 
civil service. Strategies that allow providers autonomy—by separating the 
health workforce from the rest of the civil service and tapping other 
sources of financing—have freed up additional financing for health work-
ers. Donors have also found ways to fund human resources through bud-
get support and projects. 
Strategies to improve financing for health workers must be country- 
specific, rooted in analysis of real constraints, and led by national policy 
makers. As seen in chapter 3, understanding the labor market is critical. 
When formulating health worker financing strategies, decision makers 
must consider factors, such as whether a labor shortage exists or unem-
ployment is the problem, and whether reliable information is available on 
the wage equilibrium point and the market’s public–private mix. 
Decision makers should systematically analyze the information against 
triple the level in previous years, with the majority (83 percent) funded by donors 
through the program. 
Donors issue funds to the government, and the Ministry of Health employs the 
staff, offering the same salaries and allowances as for regular ministry employees. 
Because the staff are hired on short-term contracts, the government incurs no 
contingent wage bill liability. The government has indicated that after three years 
it will have the resources to absorb the additional staff, but it has not made a formal 
commitment. The donors have bought time for the government to raise resources. 
Evidence suggests, however, that some staff were hired away from private sec-
tor clinical jobs and that the program had a limited additional effect in the avail-
ability of health service workers in Kenya.
Source: Vujicic, Ohiri, and Sparkes 2009.
Box 6.4 (continued)
108     Soucat, Vujicic, Sy, and Sekabaraga
the fiscal space available for health, whether in the wage bill or as 
 transfers to local governments or autonomous organizations.
References
Appiah-Denkyira, E., C. H. Herbst, A. Soucat, C. Lemiere, and K. Saleh. 
“Towards Interventions in Human Resources for Health in Ghana”: Evidence 
for Health Workforce Planning and Results. Directions in Development, 
World Bank, Washington DC.
Bilal, K., C. Herbst, F. Zhao, A. Soucat, and C. Lemière. 2011. “Scaling Up HRH 
in Ethiopia: A Success Story.” In Yes Africa Can: Success Stories from a 
Dynamic Continent, ed. P. Chuhan-Pole and M. Angwafo, 433–44. Washington, 
DC: World Bank. 
Fedelino, A., M. Schwartz, and M. Verhoeven. 2006. “Aid Scaling Up: Do Wage 
Bill Ceilings Stand in the Way?” Working Paper WP06/106. International 
Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.
Gottret, P., G. J. Schieber, and H. R. Waters. 2008. Good Practices in Health 
Financing: Lessons from Reforms in Low- and Middle-Income Countries. 
Washington, DC: World Bank. 
McCoy, D., S. Bennett, S. Witter, B. Pond, B. Baker, J. Gow, S. Chand, T. Ensor, and 
B. McPake. 2008. “Salaries and Incomes of Health Workers in Sub-Saharan 
Africa.” Lancet 371 (9613): 675–81.
Picazo, O. 2008. “ Struggling and Coping to Serve.” The Zambian health work-
force as depicted in the public expenditure tracking and quality of service 
delivery survey.” HRH working paper, World Bank, Washington DC. 
Scheffler, R. M., C. B. Mahoney, B. D. Fulton, M. R. Dal Poz, and A. S. Preker. 
2009. “Estimates of Health Care Professional Shortages in Sub-Saharan Africa 
by 2015.” Health Affairs 28: w849–w862.
Verhoeven, M., and P. Segura. 2007. “IMF Trims Use of Wage Bill Ceilings.” IMF 
Survey Magazine, September 5.
Vujicic, M., K. Ohiri, and S. Sparkes. 2009. Working in Health: Financing and 
Managing the Public Sector Health Workforce. Washington, DC: World Bank.
World Bank. 2008. Public Sector Reform: What Works and Why? An IEG Evaluation 
of World Bank Support. Washington, DC: World Bank.
———. 2010a. “Madagascar: Sustainable Health System Development Project.” 
Implementation Completion and Results Report ICR00001497. World Bank, 
Washington, DC.
———. 2010b. “Rwanda: Country Status Report on Health, Poverty and the 
MDGs.” World Bank, Washington, DC. 
———. Forthcoming in 2013. Ghana: Country Status Report on Health, Poverty 
and the MDGs. Directions in Development, World Bank. Washington DC.
109 
C H A P T E R  7
Politics and Governance in Human 
Resources for Health
Andrew Mitchell and Thomas J. Bossert
Governance structures and political processes shape the human resources 
for the health labor market, determining which reforms are implemented 
to improve labor market outcomes. This chapter reviews recent experi-
ence in Sub-Saharan Africa to suggest how types of political regimes, state 
capacities to make and enforce decisions, and governance arrangements 
between state and nonstate actors influence health labor market dynam-
ics and reform policies. It also illustrates the role that stakeholders often 
play in reform, including the ministries of health, professional associa-
tions and unions, and international agencies or donors.
Government policy can profoundly affect health labor markets, 
 influencing market balances (such as urban-rural, public-private, and 
centralized-decentralized), types of health services offered, and health 
worker performance (provider absenteeism and responsiveness to clients, 
for example), among other elements. Indeed, along with a well-perform-
ing workforce, one of the World Health Organization’s six building blocks 
of a health system is leadership and governance, manifested through such 
actions as planning for a country’s health needs, regulating health sector 
stakeholders, and establishing accountability mechanisms (WHO 2010).
Largely due to political legacies, some governments in Sub-Saharan 
Africa have created conditions that favor health workers in the public 
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sector, while others have overseen policies that support greater sectoral 
pluralism or competition between public and private markets. In the 
public sector, and often as part of wider political reforms, some countries 
provide more local control over managing public health workers than 
others. As Sub-Saharan countries undertake reforms to respond to the 
human resource crisis, they will generally focus on changing government 
policies to alter the labor market.
This chapter reviews recent evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa to 
describe how different governance structures and political processes 
shape health labor markets, and how health system reforms affect the 
health workforce. There are many definitions of governance and politics, 
but most address the rules and practices of decision making—such as the 
roles of authority, legitimacy, and power, as well as the interests of civil 
society, the state, and political institutions and actors, rather than specific 
policies themselves (Brinkerhoff and Bossert 2008).
This chapter focuses on three elements of governance: contextual state 
characteristics (capacity and type of political regime), state policies and 
organizational forms that influence health labor markets (including pri-
vate sector regulation and the locus of decision making for public labor 
markets), and the role of stakeholder political processes in adopting and 
implementing health workforce policies. Although we address these three 
elements separately, they are interrelated.
Many chapters in this book benefit from a combination of regularly 
collected, quantifiable data, but similar sources of data do not exist 
for governance. Such limitations preclude a systematic review of gov-
ernance arrangements and health labor markets in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, though the chapter uses evidence from a range of countries 
and regions. Initial hypotheses relating governance to health labor 
markets were therefore based on our prior knowledge, with evidence 
sought from Sub-Saharan countries that could confirm or reject these 
hypotheses. While the chapter’s country evidence supports the pre-
liminary conclusions, more systematic evidence would strengthen the 
evidence base for those conclusions.
Regime Characteristics
Some state characteristics are apt to influence a country’s ability to make 
and enforce rules for health labor markets. Regime “capacity”—running 
the gamut in Sub-Saharan Africa from long-unstable failed states riven by 
civil war to fairly stable governments generally able to enforce policy—is 
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the first important characteristic. Regime type may play a role as well, 
with models of governance in Sub-Saharan Africa ranging from militaris-
tic or authoritarian regimes (or both) to pluralistic democracies. How far 
regimes are entrenched in power over time, thus how able to promote or 
block health workforce reforms is a final characteristic that can improve 
work place reforms affect labor markets.
Regime Capacity
Sub-Saharan Africa offers many examples of failed or fragile states that 
have little power to impose rules and decisions on either their own admin-
istrative structures or the rest of civil society. In these contexts producing 
and retaining a skilled and motivated public-sector health workforce can 
exceed the government’s financial and management capacities (Brinkerhoff 
2007). Many health workers face stresses daily, including violence-ridden 
environments and health infrastructures that are inadequate due to 
chronic underinvestment. As a result, health workers may be particularly 
tempted to search for a better professional and economic environment, 
either within the country—such as urban areas or the private sector—or 
outside it (Doull and Campbell 2008). These contexts may also increase 
absenteeism, dual practice, and health workers’ demands for informal pay-
ments to compensate for irregular or unpaid salaries.
International nonstate actors and raw free-market supply and demand 
may particularly affect labor markets for health workers in fragile and 
failed states. In some contexts, especially states in, or emerging from, con-
flict, a relatively free and unregulated market for health services can result. 
Unlicensed or unregulated providers may feature strongly, as could heavy 
reliance on out-of-pocket payment for services and major forms of corrup-
tion, especially in the drugs and medical equipment supply chains.
Most health workers in these situations seek the safest locations, often 
urban areas or even abroad. After the civil conflict that began in 2002 in 
Côte d’Ivoire, the health workforce changed greatly as the majority relo-
cated, fled, or could not go to work. Further, the conflict accentuated a 
preexisting urban bias as most health workers relocated to the relative 
safety of the capital, Abidjan (Butera and others 2005). Skills distribution 
can also be adversely affected if the most highly educated (and therefore 
marketable) health workers emigrate to more secure countries. The exo-
dus from both Angola and Sudan, for instance, led to greater use of lower 
skilled workers to meet demand once the conflict stopped (High Level 
Forum on Health Millennium Development Goals 2005). In short, a lack 
of central authority may shape or accentuate preexisting labor market 
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imbalances, such as those between urban and rural workers or between 
worker skill levels.
International donor interventions and support may also profoundly 
affect health labor markets in these contexts. For weak or fragile states, 
donors often provide ministries of health substantial short-term budget sup-
port to enable continued provision of health services. Such support often 
targets personnel who remain in the public sector, providing salary incen-
tives, for example; or to help nongovernmental organization (NGO) health 
providers to deliver services in the place of the public sector (Doull and 
Campbell 2008). Any such actions hold implications for the labor market.
In the Democratic Republic of Congo, for instance, donors supported 
long-standing involvement of faith-based organizations and NGOs, with 
the latter co-managing more than three-quarters of local health zones in 
the 1980s. The Democratic Republic of Congo subsequently built up 
public sector delivery capacity, but the violence that followed the fall of 
the Mobutu regime in the 1990s resulted in the near collapse of public 
services. Faith-based organizations and NGOs assumed responsibility for 
almost all the country’s services—and today manage more than half the 
facilities (Waldman 2006).
In Mozambique internal distortions among public sector health work-
ers were exacerbated during the civil war, from the mid-1970s until the 
early 1990s—both in skills (in the 1980s, unskilled staff made up about 
half the public health workforce, and fewer than 5 percent had a univer-
sity education) and geography (such as a strong urban and hospital bias). 
With significant postwar technical and financial assistance from interna-
tional agencies, the share of unskilled staff dropped to 36 percent 10 years 
later, and professionally trained staff grew to 64 percent. Geographic 
deployment also saw improvements (WHO 2009).
In short, donor choices in these cases—taken in the context of weak 
state capacity—affected the human resources labor markets. Their 
choices shifted the balance of provision to the private sector, making the 
market the arbiter of human resource distribution, even when supporting 
public services.
Regime Type
Most political regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa claim to be multiparty 
democracies, but in fact range from relatively liberal democracies to 
“thinly veiled personal dictatorships,” with the majority somewhere in 
between (Collier and Levitsky 1997). The locus of power frequently lies 
with the executive branch (such as the president), which has historically 
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used state resources to support networks of political clients (van de Walle 
2002). Political scientists have attempted to demonstrate a relationship 
between basic types of regime—from authoritarian to democratic, and 
even more refined distinctions between—and government policies. But 
little evidence emerged that one type of regime is more conducive to 
major reform, such as for redistribution of land, and even less for specific 
health sector policies (Bienen and Herbst 1996).
Even so, recent reforms under two distinct types of regimes in Sub-
Saharan Africa suggest that regime type may influence policies affecting 
health labor markets. A competitive political environment in some 
democracies can create conditions favoring health worker reforms. 
Ghana’s relative success, including that in human resources, is one (rare) 
example. The country’s ability to maintain its democratic regime while 
implementing different policy reforms, without generating major ethnic 
or class conflict, has created a good environment for reforms. Other coun-
tries will probably require major changes to establish such environments.
But some countries with authoritarian governments have also suc-
ceeded. Such regimes emerged from military insurgencies, and are led by 
progressive elites interested in mobilizing international resources toward 
new socioeconomic policies. Like authoritarian regimes elsewhere that do 
not rest on democratic legitimacy, such as China, Cuba, and Vietnam, 
these Sub-Saharan regimes aim to offer the population services or eco-
nomic opportunities as a means of retaining power.
In Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Uganda, for example, regimes emerged that 
were committed to overcoming internal conflicts by providing better 
services to their populations—not only to establish legitimacy, but also 
to promote healing within society. Over time, relatively progressive gov-
ernments have developed in these countries, growing the capacity to 
enforce decisions that implement reforms, including those affecting 
health workers. Certainly, not all authoritarian regimes are interested in 
this kind of legitimacy, preferring repression to services or economic 
opportunities: Zimbabwe is a striking example. It is also possible that 
these currently progressive requires may change their orientation over 
time. Still, such progressive authoritarian regimes are more capable of 
carrying out health workforce reforms than failed states or weaker 
democracies torn by ethnic conflicts, such as Kenya.
Political Entrenchment
Many innovations affecting health labor markets take a long time to realize 
their goals. Political entrenchment—the stability of a particular political 
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elite—can thus affect not only whether reforms are attempted, but also 
whether they are seen through consistently, or repeatedly changed. Under 
authoritarian regimes or even democracies that lack true political contesta-
tion, for example, political commitment to a particular reform may be 
sustainable over a long period. Conversely, pluralist democracies with a 
highly contested balance of power may face difficulties in sustaining com-
mitment to reforms.
Entrenched elites can also block reforms, particularly those in auto-
cratic regimes. In addition, a lack of commitment can inhibit reforms. 
While governments in Uganda have generally been dedicated to fiscal 
decentralization, for instance, top-level leadership has not shown com-
mitment to a planned public-private partnership in health strategy. This 
strategy remained dormant due to government inaction and lack of civil 
society pressure (Peters and others 2009). Zambia, Ethiopia, and Rwanda 
are three examples of countries where political entrenchment affects 
policies governing health labor markets (box 7.1).
Health Sector Governance
The combination of organization arrangement, political regime or legacy, 
and government regulatory policies can shape public-private balances in 
health labor markets. A sectoral balance heavily weighted toward publicly 
provided services, for instance, may be associated with de facto or de jure 
limits on private sector opportunities, dampening the free labor market. 
States’ capacity to enforce regulations directed at private labor markets 
(such as dual-practice) may similarly affect the public-private labor mar-
ket balance and outcomes.
State or Private
In some contexts historically left-leaning political orientations led to 
health care markets dominated by the public sector. In Ethiopia a long 
history of socialism significantly dampened private sector development 
until the mid-1990s, and even today the public sector is more dominant 
than in other Sub-Saharan countries (PSP-One 2007). Similarly, Tanzania 
banned private for-profit practice in 1977. Although the ban ended in 
1991 (individual clinical practice was permitted), research in the early 
2000s suggested that private for-profit facilities continued to struggle to 
survive, inhibited by institutional norms favoring religious-affiliated 
operations. Often these religious-affiliated operations not only charged 
higher prices than for-profit facilities for a common set of services, but 
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Box 7.1
Political Entrenchment and Health Sector Reforms
Under democratic or authoritarian regimes the degree of political entrenchment, 
power, or stability can determine policies and reforms in the health sector.
•  Zambia. In the 1990s health workers were partly delinked from employment 
with the Ministry of Health, and granted contracts with newly created central 
or district boards of health. Delinking brought greater flexibility in staff financ-
ing, including user fees. After a few years, however, the government regarded 
the system as a policy failure, recentralizing it in 2006 and abolishing user fees. 
In both the delinking and relinking decisions, politics played a role. An 
intended full delinking to boards of health never took place because of labor 
union protests, and the subsequent relinking reflected political events, includ-
ing the election of a new government “intent on bringing a ‘new deal’ for Zam-
bia” in health, and the departure of a minister of health who had championed 
the previous reforms.
•  Ethiopia. Since 1994 the Ethiopian government has conceptualized, initiated, 
and driven large-scale fiscal decentralization. Its statist approach was the most 
important factor in promoting adherence to policies. Accompanying the con-
tinuing fiscal decentralization, a recent important health sector reform pushed 
a large-scale expansion of community health extension workers. With more 
than 30,000 health extension workers deployed nationwide, this policy affects 
health labor markets into the future. Just as the fairly powerful position of the 
ruling party helped the earlier efforts to decentralize, its entrenchment may 
prove important in sustaining this expansion, despite limited financial 
resources.
•  Rwanda. As part of a series of health reforms the government institutionalized 
performance-based financing, which pays facilities based on achieving outputs 
instead of providing inputs. Piloted in two districts in 2001–02, and scaled up 
nationwide only five years later, this approach has benefited from sustained 
political commitment from the president downward, as well as significant 
donor support. Both elements are central to the push to use performance-
based financing. They have also contributed to the remarkable speed in going 
from pilot testing to nationwide implementation.
Sources: Peters and others (2009) for Ethiopia; CHESSORE and Wemos Amsterdam (2008) for Zambia; 
and Rusa and Fritsche (2007) and chapter 13 of this volume, for Rwanda.
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also developed services specifically for patients with greater ability to pay 
(partly because of better access to outside investment such as donors) 
(Mackintosh and Tibandebage 2002).
In other contexts where underlying political leanings have not borne 
directly on public-private market distribution, the private sector may play 
a larger role in service delivery, even though regulations tilt the balance 
toward the public sector. In Zambia 80 percent of health workers work 
in government-owned health facilities, though the proportion of private 
health workers has grown. Fairly strict regulations help drive this public-
private balance, such as bonding requirements for graduates of public 
medical schools (who must work for 18 months in public institutions 
after graduation), national guidelines that hinder the opening of private 
clinics, and policies that apparently discourage private sector expansion 
(Garcia-Prado and Gonzalez 2007; PSP-One 2007).
Similarly in Ghana only 65 percent of health workers are publicly 
employed. Part of the reason may be bonding requirements that affect 
cadres—nurses, for example, must either work up to five years for the 
Ministry of Health or repay schooling costs. While some workers obtain 
exemptions from these requirements, the system channels the large 
majority of health graduates into the public health sector after they 
graduate (Buchan and McPake 2007; Garbarino and others 2007).
Across all kinds of political contexts and in most countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa, underdeveloped state capacity to regulate the private 
sector affects health labor markets. Although private health expansion is 
an explicit government policy in Ethiopia, poor regulatory capacity pro-
vides ample room for private moonlighting during public working hours, 
as well as self-referrals by public workers to private practice (Lindelöw 
and Serneels 2006). In these ways, the capacity to regulate and monitor 
the private sector affects opportunities to work there, as well as desire to 
do so, regardless of official regulatory policies.
Decentralization
Over the past 25 years governments in Sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere 
have widely adopted decentralization in the health sector, and in the 
public sector more generally, shifting decision making from central to 
local officials. In health, fiscal decentralization aims to give local authori-
ties greater discretion in using financial resources, while administrative 
decentralization confers greater local authority over a number of func-
tions, such as managing human resources, organizing and delivering ser-
vices, and targeting rules for coverage or exemption from fees. Although 
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organizational reforms in Sub-Saharan Africa often focus on fiscal decen-
tralization, some governments have also conferred greater authority over 
a range of human resource functions—from procedures for candidate 
selection to setting salary levels and bonus payments.
Governmental motivation to decentralize human resource functions 
frequently stems from a reaction to inefficiencies in central management of 
health personnel. In a typical central system, as in Kenya, a public sector 
commission (across civil service or across the health sector) is responsible 
for almost all human resource management, including determining local 
facility and area staffing requirements, allocating posts, selecting candidates, 
controlling staff movements and termination, and determining conditions of 
service, such as salary and allowances (Vujicic, Ohiri, and Sparkes 2009).
Decentralizing selected health workforce is a policy option to redress 
deficiencies in centralized administration and, as governments hope, to 
improve health labor market outcomes. In terms of efficiency, local 
recruitment could shorten the time it takes to fill a position, eliminating 
many steps in central approval. Local authority over hiring could also 
improve the chances that candidates willing to serve across the country 
are matched to positions, as local units can make the selection. When 
such units set salaries and allowances, they can consider local labor mar-
ket conditions and attract and promote the best candidates if they have 
sufficient financing to offer appropriate incentives. Decentralized author-
ity may eventually improve the quality of care as well. Health personnel 
drawn locally and willing to serve locally may be more motivated and 
productive in the workplace (Bossert 1998).
These arguments are often made to support decentralization. But some 
evidence suggests that local authorities may not have enough knowledge, 
funding, or management capacity to exercise these roles, or that local 
political conditions and corruption might reduce the ability of even 
skilled and motivated local administrators to make appropriate decisions.
Decentralization can take a variety of forms, involving a range of 
human resource powers. Relationships between particular decentraliza-
tion arrangements that affect health labor markets are often mediated by 
oversight capacities of officials (both local and national) and mechanisms 
of accountability to both national and local authorities.
Deconcentration, delegation, and devolution. One aspect of decentral-
ization policy is determining who receives greater decision-making power. 
Some forms of decentralization focus power on local health administra-
tors: the deconcentration of authorities to line-ministry officials at lower 
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levels of the system, for example, or delegation to semiautonomous insti-
tutions. Other forms are more political, such as devolving of authority to 
local governments (Rondinelli, Nellis, and Cheema 1984). In practice, 
systems of decentralization can be hybrids. Mozambique, for example, 
has devolved some responsibility to provincial governors—primarily 
decisions on health workers with preuniversity training—who may then 
delegate it to provincial directors of health. During the 1990s, these 
arrangements kept the management of physicians fairly centralized 
(Saide and Stewart 2001).
Human resource functions. A second aspect is how much authority is 
granted for various decisions. Subnational authorities may get power to 
decide on human resource functions, including hiring and firing, tenure 
(salaried or contracted), compensation, transfers, performance manage-
ment, skill mix (such as establishing jurisdictional staffing and facility 
staffing patterns), and training. Many countries decentralize only some 
health workforce power, and corresponding human resource functions, 
such as those involved in primary health care or lower level cadres. Our 
review suggests the following five generalizations for Sub-Saharan Africa.
First, governments can decentralize fiscally without doing the same for 
human resources. Although Ethiopia, Kenya, and Mali devolve budgetary 
decisions on health to local governments, the centers keep control of 
most health workforce functions.
Second, consistent relationships between the official form of decen-
tralization (deconcentration, delegation, or devolution) and decentralized 
health workforce authority are hard to discern. A deconcentrated context 
such as Namibia’s may tend toward even greater local decision making 
than more extensive forms of decentralization, such as delegation in 
Ghana or devolution in Kenya.
Third, decentralization may affect only some (often lower) health cad-
res and institutions. Districts in Tanzania take the lead in recruiting and 
contracting lower staff positions, but only initiate these procedures for 
higher levels. In Uganda nearly all hospital workers are exempt from 
decentralized management (Ssengooba 2005; Steffensen and others 
2004).
Fourth, the decentralization of human resource functions is often lim-
ited to basic administrative functions (such as transfers, training, and 
maternity leave) and not the myriad other functions previously cited. In 
Tanzania and Uganda base salaries largely follow civil service norms, but 
nonsalary remuneration comes under local government authority.
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Fifth, health worker decentralization does not seem systematically 
related to regime type. The traditionally authoritarian regime in Rwanda 
covers a range of health workforce functions, while those in Ethiopia 
(another traditionally authoritarian regime) or Mali (heralded for its 
democratic institutions) are limited primarily to fiscal matters.
These trends show exceptions, but decentralization for human 
resource functions is limited. One reason for this limitation is that his-
torical practices hinder local-authority innovation, relying on promotion 
by seniority, deferring to national civil service standards rather than per-
formance or other locally relevant criteria (Das Gupta, Gauri, and 
Khemani 2003; Olowu and Wunsch 2004).
Evidence on Decentralization and Health Labor Markets
Designing studies that persuasively demonstrate decentralization’s impact 
on health sector performance, including health labor markets, is difficult. 
Lacking such studies, we make the following three points, drawing on 
specific observations.
First, decentralization can improve some conditions that affect health 
labor market outcomes while worsening others, or leaving them 
unchanged. In Uganda most management functions are under district 
authority, while salary scales and payroll management remain central-
ized. Reflecting on that divide, interviews with 800 health workers in 
2005 suggest that health personnel supply improved (interviewees felt 
that district employment processes were generally much faster than 
previously centralized ones), distribution may have improved (poorer 
districts usually had higher levels of workers in their home districts than 
in wealthier ones, which can help retention), and motivation may have 
improved (75 percent of interviewees expressed satisfaction at receiv-
ing salary more predictably and quickly under a decentralized process). 
Box 7.2 describes a stakeholder account of salary consolidation in 
Ghana.
Yet decentralized recruitment proved frustrating and costly for many 
job applicants, potentially affecting the future stock of workers. Many 
workers felt geographically isolated due to new administrative obstacles 
to cross-district transfers. And many felt that local selection was prone 
to nepotism and capture by local governments (Ssengooba 2005). 
Similar evidence has been documented in other Southern African coun-
tries (Tanzania) and worldwide (Indonesia, China), suggesting that such 
experiences may not be uncommon either in Sub-Saharan Africa or 
internationally.1
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Box 7.2
A Stakeholder Account of Salary Consolidation in Ghana
Ghana’s effort to consolidate salaries illustrates the impact of political influence on 
the shape of reforms that affect health labor markets. In 1999, lobbying by the 
Ghana Medical Association to address a lack of overtime compensation culminated 
in the Additional Duty Hour Allowance scheme for doctors. The scheme was admin-
istratively cumbersome, incurred ballooning costs, and was opposed by the Nurses 
Association for creating unequal pay. To address these problems, the public work-
force’s formal employer—the Ghana Health Services—hired an outside consultant 
(a Ghanaian national residing abroad) to work with a team of mid-level technocrats 
to reform the job evaluation process and recommend a new salary structure.
It became clear that the proposed reforms would lead to major changes in 
procedures for compensation and promotions, replacing the discretion granted to 
local managers with a more merit-oriented process. At that point, the Ministry of 
Health wrested control of the reform from the Ghana Health Services, delegating 
negotiations to higher level stakeholders from the Ministry of Health, Ghana Health 
Services, Ministry of Finance, staff of the Presidency, IMF advisors, and Chief Execu-
tives of the main Teaching Hospitals, along with the hired consultant. Pockets of 
opposition surfaced, including chief executives of the teaching hospitals (who 
reported directly to the Minister of Health and resisted being equated with heads 
of regional hospitals who reported to the Ghana Health Services) and the Ministry 
of Health’s director of human resources (who reportedly objected to sharing 
responsibility for implementing the reform with other departmental directors). A 
personal rivalry among key officials further complicated agreement over the plan.
The Ministry of Health took ownership of the reform when the Minister of 
Health, upon recommendations of others, removed the consultant so that reform 
could be done “within Ghana.” After hiring an in-country Ghanaian consultant to 
work with their officials, the Ministry of Health abandoned the scheme developed 
by the original consultant and the Ghana Health Services in favor of one devel-
oped using “their own intuition” about appropriate salaries. The new, consolidated 
salaries were offered to the professional associations as “take it or leave it” offers.
Much turmoil ensued when the government proceeded to pay the wage bill for 
health workers according to these new salaries. Nonphysician health workers 
banded together to protest what they viewed as an unfairly large gap between the 
salaries of doctors and other workers. Nurses in particular complained that the gov-
ernment had abandoned the objective process put in place by the consultant, and 
some initially went on strike (but eventually accepted the salaries reluctantly).
Source: Blanchet 2009.
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Second, the capacity to exercise authority often mediates relationships 
between labor markets and the decentralization of human resource func-
tions. Such decentralization can be administratively costly and require 
basic organizational changes, taxing national resource capacities.2 Those 
charged with managing human (and other) resources rarely have the 
training (Uganda) or the staff (Rwanda, with only 35 people at the central 
Ministry of Health office). Rwanda’s central office has responded by 
deconcentrating management functions—for example by giving district 
health facilities sole responsibility for district staff management—but it is 
unclear whether these staff possess the skills to manage all aspects of 
human resources at their level (Vujicic, Ohiri, and Sparkes 2009). In 
Kenya, even though districts are expected to manage performance of the 
public health workforce, they do not have the legal mandate to do so 
(Steffensen and others 2004). And in Tanzania a study of health workers 
in two districts found that poor recordkeeping and management under-
mined the employee appraisal system, and few appraisals were carried 
out (Manzi and others 2004). Capacity constraints in carrying out decen-
tralized powers can therefore affect a variety of labor market outcomes, 
from the local active stock to individual motivation.
Third, accountability mechanisms matter—an aspect that is important 
from the perspective of political economy as well. Reports from countries 
where locally elected governments play a role in decentralized health 
workforce management suggest that employment procedures can be vul-
nerable to local capture. In Tanzania weak local institutions overseeing 
human resource management are reportedly “easily manipulated” by local 
elites (Munga and others 2009). Qualitative data suggest that some 
health workers there feel that political interference in recruitment by 
district officials—including threats against health managers if they do not 
select local politicians’ candidates—resulted in selecting unqualified 
workers. Indeed, even though the government reduced the powers 
accorded to district politicians to address such concerns, there are indica-
tions of continuing politicization (Munga and others 2009). Such prob-
lems have also been reported in Uganda, where health workers have 
complained of favoritism in employment toward “sons and daughters of 
the soil” (Ssengooba 2005).
Stakeholder Influence
A common thread through the preceding discussion is that the interests 
of different stakeholders shape policy for the health workforce, from 
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designing and adopting new policies to implementing them. Those with 
such a stake often have a strong interest in maintaining the system, while 
others see opportunities to benefit from reforms. Developing political 
strategies to work with stakeholders to address the power of various 
actors can be crucial for the success of reforms affecting health workers 
and their labor markets.
Because health policy reforms usually seek to either alter or entrench 
the balance of power between stakeholders, political challenges are 
common—particularly for workforce reforms. To push through reforms, 
decision makers must assess the political feasibility of a policy, manage 
policy design and acceptance, and create strategies that improve the pros-
pects for implementation (Reich 1996). Such assessment involves evalu-
ating the positions of different stakeholders on the proposed changes, the 
power they can exercise in deciding on those changes, and the opportuni-
ties and obstacles that the governance context offers. Health policy 
reform generally involves common sets of stakeholders, with often similar 
roles in, and positions toward, specific policy reforms (table 7.1).
The ministry of health leads many reforms, but civil service rules and 
other ministries affect the types of reform that it can initiate. In Swaziland 
it had to negotiate with the Ministry of Public Works to lift a ban on 
recruiting foreign nurses to address in-country shortages (Kober and Van 
Damme 2006). Similarly, reforms and policies for preservice education of 
professional health workers often fall under the purview of the ministry 
of education (see chapter 16).
Still, committed political leadership can overcome significant oppo-
sition, as the recent decision by Ethiopia’s prime minister to increase 
substantially the production and deployment of physicians—against 
the resistance of medical schools and professional associations—
demonstrates.3
Professional associations and unions also play an important role, often 
initiating salary-related reforms while blocking initiatives that affect labor 
market structures, such as changing a country’s skill mix, task shifting, or 
introducing nonphysician health workers. Associations in Ethiopia 
strongly resisted junior physician health officers, managing to suspend the 
program for several years (Bossert and others 2007).
International donors are increasingly involved in making and support-
ing policies on human resources for health. Their influence in extremely 
weak states, where they are often the dominant source of public financ-
ing, can shape labor markets. In other contexts, they work in conjunction 
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with each other and with the national government, to varying degrees of 
comfort.
In sum, although stakeholder positions may be similar across countries 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, as elsewhere, their powers and roles vary consider-
ably depending on the regime characteristics, nature of reforms, and 
reformers’ skills in building coalitions of support and reducing opposition. 
Since political processes are not easily determined by generally observed 
rules, each case requires careful analysis and testing of different strategies.
Table 7.1 Stakeholders and Health Sector Reforms Affecting Human Resources 
for Health
Stakeholder Position on reform Power
Government
Ministry of health (national) Improved overall workforce  production; 
increased workforce wages and train-
ing 
High
Ministry of health (subnational): 
 hospital and clinic managers
Increased local stock of human 
 resources for health and local 
wage bill; increased flexibility 
in tenure; increased training
Medium
Ministry of education Increased production; increased 
 preservice training for some 
cadres (for example, physicians)
Medium
Ministries of finance and planning Limited wage bill High
Civil service agency Limited wage bill; restricted  workforce 
to public sector rules
High
Local governments Increased stock; limited wage bill and/or 
employment (subnational)
Low
Nongovernment
Professional associations and 
unions (physicians, nurses, 
 pharmacists, etc.)
Limited production; increased wage bill; 
restricted labor market entry of non-
professional cadres
Medium to 
high
Nongovernmental organizations 
(national and international)
Increased production, stock, wage bill, 
training; increased flexibility in tenure
Low
International institutions (donor, 
technical assistance agencies)
Increased production, wage bill, and 
training (often with special interest for 
specific disease programs)
Medium to 
high
Media Report on conflict and poor 
 performance; often ignore 
reform proposals 
Low to 
 medium
Source: World Bank data.
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Conclusion
This chapter’s analysis suggests the following in Sub-Saharan Africa:
• Experiences in fragile and failed states that are unable to enforce state 
policies can lead to an exodus of skilled health workers, unless donors 
intervene heavily.
• States with relatively stable political regimes can demonstrate capacity 
to spearhead policy reforms and marshal international financial assis-
tance in ways consistent with improving labor market outcomes. These 
may include democratic states that have avoided political polarization 
or fracturing, as well as those founded on a history of authoritarianism 
or insurgent military coalitions, but dominated by an elite committed 
to reforms that improve service delivery.
• State-dominated health systems appear to be moving toward more 
market-oriented systems, and greater regulation is likely to depend on 
overall state capacity.
• The impact on labor markets of decentralizing heath workforce 
 functions is generally limited because of continued centralized salary 
levels, which also create accountability issues affecting labor market 
 outcomes.
• Stakeholder analysis highlights the political and governance issues that 
arise among key stakeholders in reforms affecting health labor 
 markets.
This brief review suggests that more systematic study of the con-
straints and opportunities of different governance structures, processes, 
and stakeholder interactions would provide evidence-based guidance for 
recommendations on improving human resource policies in different 
country settings. In a field dominated by wish lists of technical recom-
mendations for human resource policies, many never adopted or imple-
mented, we need to pay attention to the political processes and the 
structural constraints that require careful strategies if we are to change 
policies in a positive direction.
Notes
 1. See Dominick and Kurowski (2004); Kimaro and Sahay (2004); Munga and 
others (2009); Tang and Bloom (2000); Thabrany (2006); and Turner and 
others (2003).
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 2. Evidence from outside the region suggests that the financial implications of 
decentralization can be heavy: Mexico spent an estimated $450 million in 
administrative costs to transfer its federal health employees to the states 
(Homedes and Ugalde 2005).
 3. Interviews of officials in Ministry of Health by second author 2008.
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Sub-Saharan Africa has very few health workers in comparison to other 
regions of the world, with large variations between and within countries. 
Some of these variations are linked to economic status and others to 
colonial and institutional history. The density of health workers seems to 
be rising, however, albeit slowly. Nurses dominate the workforce. The size 
of the private and informal health workforce is underestimated and little 
is known about its nature and contribution to service delivery. Overall, 
the quality of available data is very poor, and making comparisons is dif-
ficult. There is an urgent need to understand human resources for health 
metrics better, rather than invest in projections and benchmarks made on 
unreliable data. Investments should focus on analyzing current trends and 
finding adequate solutions tailored to each national and sub-regional 
context.
Doctors, nurses, and midwives form the frontline of health care deliv-
ery and management. Several studies present evidence for the link 
between the availability of health workers and better health outcomes.1 
According to the 2006 World Health Organization’s World Health Report, 
of the 57 countries deficient in health workers using this benchmark, 
63 percent are in Sub-Saharan Africa. Since as far back as 2004, reports 
have argued that the region’s scarcity of qualified health personnel is a 
major constraint to scaling up interventions for priority health programs 
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and achieving the health-related Millennium Development Goals. So 
what is the status?
What Do Comparisons to International Benchmarks Tell Us?
The most widely cited health workforce benchmark was established by 
the World Health Organization (WHO) under the Joint Learning 
Initiative (WHO 2006). This benchmark proposes a density of 2.28 
health workers (doctors, midwives, and nurses) per 1,000 people to 
achieve 80 percent coverage of skilled birth attendance (see chapter 2). 
It does not specify, however, the required skill mix, typically measured by 
the ratio of nurses and midwives to doctors.
In addition, many countries have their own benchmarks, usually based 
on a standard skill mix for each type of health facility. For example, in 
Benin a district hospital should have three doctors, while a primary health 
care center should have one. Given that these standards are rigid and do 
not take into account variations in disease burden (HIV/AIDS preva-
lence, for example), more sophisticated benchmarks have been designed 
in countries such as Tanzania and Chad, using clinical guidelines 
(Kurowski and others 2004).
Benchmarks, international or national, should be used with caution, as 
they often lack evidence to support broad implementation in health sys-
tems. They can be useful, however, for international comparisons.
Sub-Saharan Africa Has the World’s Lowest Density of Health 
 Workers
International comparisons reveal that Sub-Saharan Africa has the world’s 
lowest density of physicians, nurses, and midwives—1.33 health workers 
per 1,000 population, well short of the WHO benchmark of 2.28 
(table 8.1). Even South Asia, which is comparable to Africa in economic 
indicators, has a much higher density with 1.81, potentially contributing 
to better health outcomes.
Health Worker Availability Varies between African Countries
Health systems in Sub-Saharan Africa are diverse, and the health work-
force density varies greatly across countries (annex 8A). Eight countries 
have a density above the WHO 2.28 benchmark (the Seychelles, 
Swaziland, Gabon, South Africa, Mauritius, Namibia, Botswana, and São 
Tomé and Príncipe). But most countries (30 countries) do not have even 
one physician, nurse, or  midwife per 1,000 population. Such data must 
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be interpreted with caution, however, because of the low quality of data 
(box 8.1).
Between 1960 and 1998, the density of physicians, nurses, and mid-
wives increased in some countries, if slowly: the density of physicians 
climbed in Burkina Faso, Cameroon, and Kenya, but declined in Ghana, 
Tanzania, and Zambia; the ratio of nurses to physicians rose in Cameroon, 
Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, and Zambia but declined in Burkina Faso, the 
Central African Republic, and Madagascar (Liese, Blanchet, and Dussault 
2003). More recent data show that between 2004 and 2008, the overall 
number of health workers in Sub-Saharan Africa rose by 9 percent, and 
the increase in physicians (21.5 percent) was three times higher than that 
of nurses and midwives (6.5 percent).
The Availability of Health Workers Improves with Economic Status
Health workers generally consume much of the funding for health ser-
vices, so differences in economic development help explain variations in 
distribution. When plotting the density of physicians, nurses, and mid-
wives in Sub-Saharan countries against their per capita gross domestic 
product (GDP), one actually sees a positive association (figure 8.1).
In most cases, the density of health workers rises as GDP rises. Health 
worker density and economic development have, however, a complex 
relationship that cannot be accounted for solely by higher incomes. The 
Seychelles and Gabon, for instance, have higher than expected densities 
(9.44 and 5.45 health workers per 1,000 population) given their rela-
tively low GDPs ($8,687 and $7,501, respectively), while Equatorial 
Guinea has a low density of health workers (0.83) but one of the highest 
GDPs ($15,397).
Table 8.1 Health Worker Density per 1,000 Population by Cadre, 2009
WHO region Physicians Nurses and midwives Total
Africa 0.24 1.09 1.33
Americas 2.29 5.49 7.78
Eastern Mediterranean 1.01 1.42 2.43
Europe 3.25 6.81 10.06
South Asia 0.58 1.24 1.81
East Asia 1.87 2.51 4.37
Western Pacific 1.40 2.08 3.48
Global 1.36 2.75 4.11
Source: Global Health Observatory, World Health Organization (http://apps.who.int/ghodata/#).
134       Ahmat, Bilal, Herbst and Weber
Box 8.1
Quality of Data Is a Major Issue
This chapter’s data came from three main sources—WHO/Global Atlas, Africa 
Health Workforce Observatory, and national observatories. General observations 
can be highlighted from the review of existing data:
• Data completeness varies by country and year (estimates were used when data 
were missing).
• There is limited to no data on some categories of health workers, such as alternative 
mid-level cadres, even in countries with extensive data-reporting  systems.
• Many of the data refer to public health workers only.
• The quality of data varies greatly by country and source (box table 8.1.1), and 
often depends on central and regional capacity to enter, update, and forward 
data to be analyzed. Therefore, although this chapter makes an effort to use the 
best data available—and to point out obvious quality constraints—variations 
in quality remain.
Data from different sources can diverge, and both cross-country and intra-country 
comparisons (when data come from different sources) need to be interpreted with 
caution. The major causes of poor quality data are generally the following:
Box Table 8.1.1 Discrepancies in Nurse Data: An Example from Zambia
Title
Source of data
Difference
Ministry of 
Healtha
General nursing 
councilb
Public health nurses 18 73 55
Registered midwives 347 2,542 2,195
Registered nurses 1,273 5,675 4,402
Registered psychiatry nurses 20 313 293
Registered theater nurses 57 411 354
Registered or enrolled ophthalmic 
nurses
2 12 10
Enrolled midwives 1,754 3,479 1,725
Enrolled nurses 5,205 9,442 4,237
Enrolled theater nurses 36 94 58
Source: Ferrinho and others 2008.
a. Public sector nurses, March 2008.
b. Nurses registered between January 2004 and April 30, 2008.
(continued next page)
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• Methodological differences in collecting and collating health worker data. 
Some of the total numbers may reflect workers registered at the facility level, 
while others may reflect those present in facilities, or show only workers regis-
tered nationally or on the government payroll.
• Data sources vary. Data either come from national censuses, facility surveys, 
national payroll records, or registration lists.
• Numbers of public versus private sector health workers are not well captured, 
and the differing methods can skew health worker numbers. Although most of 
the underlying health workforce data are for the public sector, payroll data in 
countries like Rwanda list publicly paid health workers who work in private 
health facilities. A census or count of health workers in public institutions would 
not capture this segment.
• Health worker has no universal definition. According to the countries, the term 
may include paid or unpaid, formal or informal, and clinical or nonclinical 
health workers. Health cadres also vary across countries: some use the word 
nurse as an umbrella term to cover both enrolled and registered nursing 
cadres, while others use it to refer to registered nursing cadres only. Similarly, 
some countries use the term “laboratory worker,” for example, to include labo-
ratory scientists and laboratory technicians, while others use it for laboratory 
scientists only, labeling the rest “laboratory technicians.” As a result, the num-
bers of aggregated health workers may encompass different categories of 
workers, depending on the country and source.
Box 8.1 (continued)
The Coverage of Health Services Improves with the Availability of 
Health Workers
Using skilled birth attendance as an example—as it stands for an essential 
health service, often considered an indicator of health system functioning—
we see a positive relationship between the coverage of health services and 
the availability of health workers: the higher the density of health workers, 
the higher the percentage of births attended (figure 8.2). Other factors 
(such as population distribution, geography, and culture) are also likely 
important determinants.
Health Worker Distribution within Countries Is Inefficient
Almost all countries in the region are experiencing imbalances in the 
geographic distribution of health workers. Most countries face major 
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Figure 8.1 Per Capita GDP and Health Worker Density, 2005–09
Sources: WHO/Global Atlas (2005–09) and World Bank (2010).
Note: Somalia is excluded as reliable GDP data are not available.
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Figure 8.2 Health Worker Density and Skilled Attendance at Birth, 2005–09
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shortages of health workers in rural areas, even those that do not have an 
overall national shortage. In addition, many health workers move between 
the public and private sectors in their careers. Chapter 9 provides further 
details on these issues.
Out-migration of health workers is a key reason for the diminished 
stock in many countries. African physicians’ migration, estimated between 
10 and 15 percent, is likely much higher than that of other African pro-
fessionals and tertiary-educated workers (Docquier, Lohest, and Marfouk 
2007). Indeed, African physicians’ migration is the highest among all 
developing regions.
The Low Stock of Health Workers Is Detrimental to the Poor
In every Sub-Saharan country, the availability of health workers of all 
categories is generally higher in wealthy areas than in poor areas. Further, 
the difference across quintiles varies from one type of health worker to 
another, with differences among higher level workers greater than those 
among lower level ones. Even if workers are present in low-income areas, 
patients may not use their services for various reasons. Chapter 12 
 discusses in depth some of the equity implications related to health 
worker distribution.
Human Resources for Health Dynamics That We Need 
to Capture Better
What Are the Colonial and Cultural Impacts on Health Workers 
 Availability?
State official languages often reflect colonial histories and cultures, and 
patterns of health workers can be drawn by language region (table 8.2). 
Multiple factors explain the differences in density and growth between 
subgroups: varying production capacities of nurses and physicians; vary-
ing workforce attrition due to retirement, resignation, and death; and 
health professionals’ emigration. For instance, the negative growth for 
physicians in Francophone countries can be explained by the low pro-
duction capacity of physicians in the region and the natural attrition not 
addressed with aggressive training of health personnel.
What Are the Demographics Underlying the Availability of Human 
Resources for Health?
Not all countries in Africa provide gender disaggregation of health work-
ers. Although countries vary greatly, similar patterns emerge: there are 
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more male physicians than women, whereas midwives and nurses are 
predominantly women (figure 8.3). Other cadres of health workers (den-
tists, pharmacists, and radiographers) have a majority of male workers.
Overall, midwives (96 percent) and nurses (73 percent) make up the 
highest proportion of female health workers. Burkina Faso has a large 
male nurse population (83 percent), as do Côte d’Ivoire (82 percent), and 
Chad (78 percent). Cape Verde has a high proportion of female physi-
cians (52 percent), followed by Guinea (51 percent), and Mozambique 
(48 percent). The lowest proportions of female physicians are in Comoros 
(8 percent), Mauritania (10 percent), and Ethiopia (11 percent).
What Is the Appropriate Skill Mix?
Skill mix (or staff mix) refers to either the composition or organization 
of health workers from different professional backgrounds that achieve 
the highest quality of care for the greatest number of people in the 
most cost-effective manner. In economic terms skill mix is “the combi-
nation of health workers that produce a given level of health care 
services at a particular quality for the lowest cost” (Fulton and others 
2010). Policy makers and system managers in Sub-Saharan Africa have 
adjusted the skill mix through shifting tasks and expanding noncon-
ventional cadres to alleviate workforce shortages, especially given 
increased demand for services (Fulton and others 2010).
The optimal skill mix depends on the local context and is influenced 
by inputs, processes, priorities, and funds (adapted from Fulton and others 
2010). Inputs (such as health workers, facilities, and equipment) 
Table 8.2 Densities and Growth Rate of Health Workers by Language, 2005–09
Official 
language 
subgroup
Physicians Nurses and midwives Total
Density/1,000
Growth 
(percent) Density/1,000
Growth 
(percent) Density/1,000
Growth 
(percent)
Anglophone 0.2 6.3 1.31 1.1 1.51 1.9
Francophone 0.18 –3.9 1.21 2.2 1.33 1.3
Lusophone 0.23 2.3 0.84 6.5 0.11 6.1
Arabophone 0.16 n.a. 0.66 n.a. 0.82 n.a.
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 0.24 4.3 1.09 1.3 1.33 1.8
Sources: WHO/Global Atlas (2005–09); Africa Health Workforce Observatory Database (WHO  African Region).
Note: For growth of health worker data, WHO (2004) was the baseline. The Africa Health Workforce Observatory 
provided data for late-2007–08. Estimates for countries without 2008 data were made on the basis of population 
size, leaving constant the ratio of physicians to nurses and midwives, n.a. = not applicable.
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 determine what enters the health system. Processes regulate how the 
inputs are organized and used. Priorities decide which type of service to 
produce (such as primary care, birth deliveries, and antiretroviral ther-
apy), and funds—or the country’s economic development—determine 
what the country can afford. As these four factors vary among and within 
countries, the optimal skill mix has no global benchmark.
There is no optimal nurse to physician ratio. Globally, this ratio is 
1 physician for 2.04 nurses. High ratios of nurses and midwives to physi-
cians likely indicate a physician deficit, while low ratios likely indicate a 
better supply of physicians. For every physician, Southeast Asia has 2.27 
Figure 8.3 Female Health Workers in Total Health Workers, 2005–09
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nurses and midwives, the European Region has 2.1, and the Americas 
have 2.4 (according to WHO regions).
Sub-Saharan Africa has 4.54 nurses and midwives for every physician, 
showing that nursing skills dominate the region’s health workforce. But 
the ratio of nurses and midwives to physicians varies greatly between 
countries (see annex 8A) and according to language grouping: for every 
physician there are 6.72 nurses in Francophone Africa, 6.55 in Anglophone 
Africa, and 3.65 in Lusophone Africa. Still, nurses and midwives are the 
largest health worker category in Sub-Saharan Africa (50.8 percent), fol-
lowed by administrative staff (12.5 percent) and public health workers 
(11.3 percent) (figure 8.4).
What Is the Role and Size of the Alternative Cadres?
Nonphysician clinicians. Nonphysician clinicians are “staff who are not 
trained as physicians but who are capable of many of the diagnostic and 
clinical functions of medical doctors” (Mullan and Frehywot 2007). 
Several nonexperimental studies demonstrated their positive impact on 
cost and quality of care in Africa. In Mozambique surgically trained 
nurses and midwives
administrative and support
staff
community health workers
physicians
other health technicians and
assistants
pharmacists and assistants
laboratory workers
dentists and assistants
public health workers
11.3%
12.5%
9.7%
7.5%
2.8%
2.5%
1.5%
1.5%
50.8%
Figure 8.4 Average Skill Mix in the Sub-Saharan Region by Cadre, 2005
Source: WHO 2005.
Note: The table has data for only 46 countries, given problems of data availability. Cadres were aggregated into 
nine main categories, to allow for comparisons.
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 assistant medical officers produced patient outcomes similar to obstetri-
cians and gynecologists at a quarter of the cost (Kruk and others 2007; 
Pereira and others 2007). In Malawi clinical officers and medical officers 
providing obstetric surgery produced similar patient outcomes (Chilopora 
and others 2007). And in Uganda nonphysician clinicians and physicians 
had considerable agreement on HIV/AIDS diagnosis and treatment as 
well as tuberculosis-status assessment (Vasan and others 2009). More 
rigorous studies are however required (Fulton and others 2010; see also 
chapter 16 of this book).
In 2005, 25 of 47 countries in Africa reported using nonphysician clini-
cians. In nine, including Kenya, Malawi, and Uganda, nonphysician clini-
cians even equaled or exceeded the number of physicians, and there is a 
tendency to raise the number of nonphysician clinicians. Ethiopia, for 
instance, produced 5,000 health officers between 2007 and 2010, putting 
them at the top of the country’s production and use (see chapter 16). 
Ghana, Lesotho, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, and Zambia have also 
committed to expanding their number of nonphysician clinicians (Mullan 
and Frehywot 2007).
Community health workers. Estimates suggest that community health 
workers account for, on average, 11 percent of the health workforce in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, but this number is generally underestimated as com-
munity health workers are not always included in censuses. In addition, 
there are large disparities between countries: community health workers 
in Guinea-Bissau make up 73 percent of the health workforce, while 
more than 30,000 health extension workers in Ethiopia account for 
about half of its health workforce.
A high proportion of community health workers does not necessarily 
mean a low proportion of nurses and midwives. In Swaziland, nurses, 
midwives, and community health workers together make up 89 percent 
of all health workers (36 percent of the total health workers are com-
munity health workers).
Informal sector. The informal sector, though often overlooked, is a sig-
nificant part of health care delivery in Sub-Saharan Africa, and so is its 
workforce. Informal workers—such as home-based care workers, self-
employed health workers, nonregistered community health workers, and 
traditional medical practitioners—form the majority of the health work-
force. The Joint Learning Initiative estimates that for each formal-sector 
health worker there are at least three informal workers.
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These health workers are not reflected in conventional data on the 
health workforce stock. In Lesotho, for example, only 44 percent of those 
working in the health sector are employed by the formal health sector 
(Ministry of Health and Social Welfare of Lesotho 2004). In Sierra Leone, 
there are almost three times as many traditional birth attendants (trained 
and untrained) as the entire formal-sector health workforce (Ministry of 
Health and Sanitation of Sierra Leone 2006).
Conclusion
This chapter has shed some light on what we know, and still don’t know, 
about human resources for health in Africa. We know that there are fewer 
health workers in Sub-Saharan Africa than in any other region of the 
world, even regions with comparable development. We also know that 
there is wide within- and between-country variation in the stock and 
distribution of health workers, with important equity implications. 
Finally, we know that national health worker density is correlated with 
income and delivery care coverage, if weakly.
But we still don’t know many things, because data are missing or of 
poor quality. Further research is therefore needed to better understand 
the impact of culture and colonialism on countries’ health workforce 
stock, the demographics of the health workforce, the determinants for an 
appropriate skill mix, and the role (existing and expected) of alternative 
cadres. Additional areas of poor knowledge include mobility patterns, the 
size of the informal sector, the size of the private sector, and the burden 
of absenteeism and ghost workers.
Therefore, there is a need to think outside the box and tackle the 
underlying causes of poor human resources for health. Major efforts 
should be put in every country to organize sound censuses of all health 
workers through workforce surveys. These could provide an evidence 
base to create more relevant benchmarks, adjustable to local needs and 
epidemiology, perhaps allowing for assessments of the quality of the 
health worker stock. A vast information gap on the number and profile 
of health workers in the private sector also needs to be filled. Finally, 
there is an urgent need to understand human resources for health met-
rics better, rather than invest in projections and benchmarks made on 
unreliable data. Investments should focus on analyzing current trends 
and finding adequate solutions tailored to each country and sub-region 
 context.
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Annex 8A Density of Physicians, Nurses, and Midwives by 
Country and Ratio of Nurses and Midwives to Physicians, 
2005–09
Country
Density per 1,000  population Ratio of nurses 
and midwives to 
physicianPhysicians
Nurses and 
midwives Total
Angola (2005) 0.08 1.19 1.27 14.88
Benin (2008) 0.07 0.86 0.93 12.29
Botswana (2005) 0.4 2.65 3.05 6.63
Burkina Faso (2008) 0.06 0.71 0.77 11.83
Burundi (2005) 0.03 0.19 0.22 6.33
Cameroon (2009) 0.08 0.51 0.59 6.38
Cape Verde (2008) 0.73 1.13 1.86 1.55
Central African 
 Republic (2009) 0.05 0.27 0.32 5.40
Chad (2009) 0.03 0.24 0.27 8.00
Comoros (2008) 0.16 0.6 0.76 3.75
Congo, Dem. Rep. 
(2009) 0.06 0.79 0.85 13.17
Congo, Rep. (2008) 0.11 0.94 1.05 8.55
Côte d’Ivoire (2008) 0.13 0.45 0.58 3.46
Equatorial Guinea 
(2005) 0.3 0.53 0.83 1.77
Eritrea (2008) 0.06 0.77 0.83 12.83
Ethiopia (2008) 0.03 0.28 0.31 9.33
Gabon (2005) 0.29 5.16 5.45 17.79
Gambia, The (2008) 0.03 0.6 0.63 20.00
Ghana (2008) 0.11 0.98 1.09 8.91
Guinea (2005) 0.11 0.56 0.67 5.09
Guinea-Bissau (2009) 0.05 0.62 0.67 12.4
Kenya (2007) 0.17 1.19 1.36 7.00
Lesotho (2005) 0.05 0.62 0.67 12.40
Liberia (2009) 0.01 0.28 0.29 28.00
Madagascar (2005) 0.29 0.32 0.61 1.10
Malawi (2008) 0.02 0.27 0.29 13.50
Mali (2008) 0.08 0.51 0.59 6.38
Mauritania (2009) 0.14 1.02 1.16 7.29
Mauritius(2005) 1.06 3.73 4.79 3.52
Mozambique (2007) 0.03 0.35 0.38 11.67
Namibia (2005) 0.3 3.06 3.36 10.20
Niger (2009) 0.03 0.16 0.19 5.33
Nigeria (2008) 0.37 1.49 1.86 4.03
Rwanda (2007) 0.09 0.65 0.74 7.22
(continued next page)
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Country
Density per 1,000  population Ratio of nurses 
and midwives to 
physicianPhysicians
Nurses and 
midwives Total
São Tomé and 
 Príncipe (2008) 0.26 2.44 2.7 9.38
Senegal (2008) 0.06 0.41 0.47 6.83
Seychelles (2005) 1.51 7.93 9.44 5.25
Sierra Leone (2009) 0.02 0.18 0.2 9.00
Somalia (2006) 0.04 0.17 0.21 4.25
South Africa (2005) 0.77 4.08 4.85 5.30
Sudan (2007) 0.3 0.9 1.2 3.00
Swaziland (2009) 0.15 1.45 1.6 9.67
Tanzania (2007) 0.09 0.24 0.33 2.67
Togo (2008) 0.06 0.32 0.38 5.33
Uganda (2007) 0.08 0.72 0.8 9.00
Zambia (2005) 0.12 2.01 2.13 16.75
Zimbabwe (2008) 0.06 0.93 0.99 15.50
Source: WHO/Global Atlas (2005–09).
Note
 1. See Dreesch and others (2005), Anand and Bärnighausen (2005), and 
Speybroeck and others (2006).
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Rural-Urban Imbalance of Health 
Workers in Sub-Saharan Africa
Christophe Lemière, Christopher H. Herbst, Carmen 
Dolea, Pascal Zurn, and Agnes Soucat
In most if not all countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, the geographical distri-
bution of skilled health workers is imbalanced in favor of urban areas. 
Labor economics theory suggests reasons behind the uneven distribution 
of human resources for health. First, rural labor market demand (rural 
employers’ funding ability to hire health workers) is usually low in Sub-
Saharan countries, often because of a small private for profit sector in 
rural areas, limited decentralization of funding to rural areas, as well as the 
limited ability of rural populations to pay for services (or the limited abil-
ity of employers to charge for services). Second, health worker prefer-
ences often favor urban over rural areas due to differences in monetary 
and nonmonetary compensation (although this varies by cadre, gender, 
and socioeconomic and geographic background). Systematic analysis of 
in-country labor market conditions—including funding for human 
resources for health at all levels and health worker characteristics, prefer-
ences, and remuneration—will lay the foundation for better policy mak-
ing to address the rural shortage.
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Geographic Maldistribution of Health Workers 
within Countries
According to the World Health Organization (WHO), 36 of 47 Sub-
Saharan countries have a critical deficiency of health workers (WHO 
2006). But this focus on national numbers often masks the great defi-
ciency of health workers in rural areas. Imbalances between urban and 
rural areas can be extreme (figure 9.1).1
Applying the Joint Learning Initiative (JLI)-WHO benchmark of 
2.28 health workers (doctors, nurses, and midwives) per 1,000 popula-
tion (or 22.8 per 10,000) to Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, and Senegal 
(four countries that produce many health worker graduates), we see 
that although none of the countries has a critical deficiency of doctors, 
all have a sizable shortage in rural areas. In these four countries—as in 
most other Sub-Saharan countries—the geographic distribution of 
health workers is highly skewed toward urban areas. In Côte d’Ivoire, 
for example, about 70 percent of doctors work in the southern urban 
regions, even though only 40 percent of the population lives there 
(Butera and others 2005).
Figure 9.1 Density of Doctors in Urban and Rural Areas, 13 Sub-Saharan Countries
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Almost all countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have health worker to 
population ratios that are significantly worse in rural areas, whilst sur-
pluses are sometimes evident in urban areas. In Ghana, for example, the 
number of public sector doctors, nurses and midwives per 1,000 popu-
lation is 1.43 in urban Greater Accra, and only 0.67 in the much more 
rural Northern Region. When you include private sector providers, the 
density in Greater Accra of these cadres is believed to exceed the 2.28 
JLI/WHO benchmark (Appiah-Denkyira and others 2012). In Zambia, 
the total number of public and private sector clinical workers in the 
districts of Chililabombwe and Livingstone exceeds 2.5 per 1,000 
population, whereas the rural and marginalized district of Chilubi is 
home to only 0.13 clinical health workers per 1,000 population (Herbst 
and others 2011). In Sudan, nearly 70 percent of health personnel work 
in urban settings, serving about 30 percent of the total country popula-
tion (Sudan CSR—HRH Chapter, 2012).
Wide Variation in Geographic Distribution across Countries
A compact way to compare health workers’ geographic distribution 
across countries is an aggregated index, such as a Concentration index. 
This index, alongside the Gini index and the Lorenz curve, has been 
extended from economics and applied to the health sector to measure 
health indicator imbalances (box 9.1).2
Box 9.1
Overview of Methods for Measuring Geographic 
Imbalances of Health Workers
Munga and Mæstad (2009) present a useful overview of Lorenz and concentra-
tion curves.
Lorenz Curves and the Gini Index
In Munga and Mæstad (2009) the Lorenz curve shows the cumulative share of 
health workers against the cumulative share of the population, with locations 
ranked from the least to the most health workers per capita (box figure 9.1.1).
(continued next page)
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The Gini index measures the aggregate level of inequality, taking the values 
between 0 and 1, with higher values indicating higher levels of inequality. Graph-
ically, the Gini index is the area A/(A + B) in box figure 9.1.1. For discrete distribu-
tions where the observations have been ranked from below, the Gini index can be 
calculated as
G
i n X
n
i
i
n
=
− −
=
∑ ( )
,
2 1
1
2μ
where G is the Gini index, n is the number of observations, Xi is the number of 
health workers in the i th location, and μ is the mean number of health workers.
Concentration Curves and the Concentration Index
Concentration curves, used extensively to characterize socioeconomic inequali-
ties in health, here characterize health worker need. Thus, concentration curves 
plot cumulative expressions of need (that is, the cumulative number of inhabit-
ants, under-five deaths, and HIV+ cases) against cumulative population. In con-
trast to the Lorenz curve, concentration curves are constructed by ranking obser-
vations by an external variable. By using the number of health workers per capita 
as the external variable, Munga and Mæstad (2009) superimpose the concentra-
tion curves in the same diagram as the Lorenz curve (see box figure 9.1.1). So, it 
becomes possible to make statements such as “50 percent of the population have 
Box Figure 9.1.1 The Lorenze Curve and the Concentration Curves 
alternative measure of
cumulative need
(concentration curve)
population-based measure
of cumulative need
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1
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(continued next page)
Box 9.1 (continued)
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access to x percent of the health workers, while their need would represent 
y percent of the aggregate need.”
If need is expressed by the number of inhabitants, the concentration curve is 
simply the diagonal (see box figure 9.1.1). When need is expressed through other 
variables, the concentration curve may run both below and above the diagonal.
Concentration indices measure whether inequalities on average are increased 
or reduced by replacing the number of inhabitants with alternative measures of 
need. Technically, the concentration index is computed in the same way as the 
Gini index, and graphically, the concentration index is the area C/(A + B). When the 
concentration curve lies above (below) the diagonal, the area ‘C’ is assigned a 
negative (positive) value.
The concentration index takes values between −1 and +1. When the index is 0, 
the alternative measure of need does not affect aggregate inequality, compared to 
when need is measured by the number of inhabitants. When the index is negative, 
which would occur if the concentration curve lies anywhere above the diagonal, 
health care needs per capita are on average larger in the districts with the fewest 
health workers per capita. So, the inequalities are larger when we use the alterna-
tive measure of need. The opposite is true when the concentration curve lies any-
where below the diagonal, which would imply a positive concentration index.
Source: Munga and Mæstad 2009.
Box 9.1 (continued)
When applied to nine Sub-Saharan African countries, the concentra-
tion index shows that most face a similar rural-urban distribution prob-
lem for doctors, whilst a more wide variation is evident for nurses 
(figure 9.2).
Variation in Geographic Distribution across Cadres, 
Education, and Gender
In all countries reviewed the distribution of doctors is more skewed 
toward urban areas than that of nurses. Highly trained or qualified health 
workers are more likely to remain in urban areas than those with low 
skills. Health workers with more formal education, such as doctors, are 
heavily concentrated in urban areas and especially sparse in rural areas, 
while cadres with less education, such as nurses or auxiliary nurses, are 
more concentrated in rural areas.
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Tanzania provides an interesting example. Twenty percent of Tanzania’s 
doctors (referred to as medical officers) serve about 80 percent of the 
population, which resides mostly in rural areas. Rural areas have more 
mid-level cadres, such as clinical officers, than urban areas.3 As shown in 
figure 9.3, where all concentration curves4 fall below the diagonal, no 
cadre has an equitable distribution.
Rural areas in Sub-Saharan Africa tend to have a higher proportion of 
health workers without formal training, including community health 
workers, health extension workers, and traditional healers. In Lesotho 
8,600 health workers serve a population that is more than 75 percent 
rural, and only 44 percent have a formal education. The other 4,800 are 
community health workers, most working in rural areas. Sierra Leone is 
home to only 3,736 conventional workers but 10,723 traditional birth 
attendants, mainly in rural districts.
Urban and rural health workers generally have different gender pro-
files. Female workers are more concentrated in urban than rural areas. 
Figure 9.2 Concentration Indexes for Doctors and Nurses 
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Figure 9.3 Distribution of Health Workers per 1,000 Population by Cadre, 
All Districts in Tanzania
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In Zambia women account for the majority of health workers in both 
areas, but are significantly more represented in urban districts. This dis-
tribution also applies to cadres: in rural districts a smaller proportion of 
doctors, clinical officers, and nurses are female (Herbst and others 
2011). Box 9.2 stresses the potentially negative impact the picture on 
distribution has on health care access.
Labor Market Dynamics of the Rural-Urban Imbalance
Labor economics offers two explanations for the rural-urban imbalance 
in health workers, related to the two key features of a labor market: sup-
ply and demand (see chapter 3). They are not mutually exclusive and a 
single country can experience both.
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Box 9.2
Unequal Distribution of Health Workers and Reduced 
Health Care Access
Health indicators are often worse in rural and remote areas—the same areas with the 
fewest health workers. The paradox is often referred to as the inverse care law (Hart 
1971). Since the Millennium Development Goals are closely related to expanded 
coverage of key interventions, such as assisted deliveries or antibiotic treatment of 
pneumonia, it is difficult for rural areas without adequate access to providers of these 
interventions to achieve them.a This is especially true for maternal mortality (Millen-
nium Development Goal 5), because coverage of skilled birth attendants is a critical 
input for lowering maternal mortality (Anand and Bärnighausen 2004).
Some argue that fewer higher level cadres in rural areas is not always problem-
atic, as the rural poor may be less interested in seeking care from higher level  cadres 
than from informal health workers or lower level cadres. Community and tradi-
tional health providers are thought to be more trusted and respected than higher 
level cadres in some remote areas, and thus more appropriate (Stekelenburg and 
others 2005). While evidence shows that the rural poor seek fewer health services 
in general, this may pertain less to their preference for community or traditional 
health providers, and more to the lack of available or adequately performing 
higher level cadres, alongside financial constraints. Many surveys found that when 
the rural poor seek health services, they choose the same services and health 
cadres as the nonpoor (Ouendo 2005).
The uneven gender distribution may also disproportionately affect access to 
care for the rural poor. Rural areas have few midwives, and because women may 
be reluctant to receive care from a male health worker (such as in Niger and Mali 
[World Bank 2011]), and because many rural health workers are male, they may 
not seek care from a trained health worker.b
Notes:
a. Of course, an adequate density of health workers is not the only condition for guaranteeing access to 
care. Rural health facilities should have adequate drugs and equipment. They should also receive suffi-
cient funding from the central level to cover recurrent costs (beside salaries and drugs). In addition, 
there can be bottlenecks related to the demand side, such as cultural obstacles or high user fees.
b. This preference at least applies to antenatal care and intrapartum care.
The first is reduced labor market demand for health workers in rural 
areas, as expressed by the employers’ inability to hire them. Two kinds of 
employers predominate: public employers (government-owned and gov-
ernment-run health care facilities) and private employers (private health 
care facilities) (table 9.1). Governments may fund public-sector health 
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facilities and thus generate demand for labor. Patients may pay user fees 
to both the public and private sector and thus generate income, which 
can contribute to hiring health workers. Donors increase demand for 
health worker labor by subsidizing the public or private sector. Inadequately 
funded demand for health workers in rural areas contributes to the rural-
urban imbalance.
The second explanation is limited supply of health workers, who are 
reluctant to work in rural areas, even when enough funding and demand 
exists. Labor market supply in rural areas is often worse than in urban 
areas due to inadequate monetary and nonmonetary compensation.
Labor market supply and demand help explain rural shortages of 
human resources for health (HRH), as well as the more varied situa-
tion in urban markets. Labor market supply and demand lead to the 
common rural shortage of high-level cadres (which is also occasionally 
present in urban areas), as well as urban underemployment (figure 
9.4). But when observed in a rural labor market in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
the rural labor market finds itself in a market-clearing equilibrium. 
This equilibrium, which is sometimes observed in the urban labor 
market, reflects a perfect match of funding and willingness to work in 
the relevant labor market (see chapter 3).
Labor Demand for Health Workers Is Often Lower in Rural Areas
Funding to employ health workers is often disproportionately available in 
urban areas. This is linked to the fact that public sector funding is often 
disproportionately allocated towards urban areas (where most of the 
more expensive health workers are located), as well as towards secondary 
and tertiary level care provision (hospitals tend to be disproportionately 
located in urban over rural locations).
In addition, the private for profit sector is often more developed in 
urban than in rural areas within countries (Sudan and Uganda are good 
examples). In many countries the demand for labor from not for profit 
Table 9.1 Sources of Demand for Health Workers
Public Private
Institutions 
(facilities)
Government-run facilities employ 
health workers, using government and 
donor funding as well as fees collected 
by facilities.
Private facilities employ health 
workers. Donors support 
nongovernmental organization-
run facilities.
Individuals 
(patients)
Government provides salaries. Patients 
pay user fees to public providers. 
Donors provide salary supplements.
Patients pay user fees to individual 
providers.
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providers, which are often more evenly distributed, is relatively low, and 
often subsidized by public sector funds (see Rwanda, or Uganda for 
example).
Fiscal recentralization (including non functioning decentralization 
arrangements where most of the funding for HRH still ends up in urban 
centers), coupled with abolishing user fees in several countries (or the 
inability to generate them due to a limited number of patients willing to 
purchase services in rural areas), has curtailed local health facilities’ 
income and ability to hire workers. In North Sudan for example, the more 
rural states such as North Kordofan, Kasala, or Red Sea receive much less 
revenue from federal transfers and own sources (user fees) than more 
urban or centrally located states (figure 9.5).
Limited revenues from rural populations constrain private demand for 
health workers. Assessments in Sub-Saharan Africa overwhelmingly show 
that rural populations are poorer than urban ones. Lack of health insur-
ance for rural populations also prevents them from buying adequate 
health services and thus generating revenue and demand for HRH. 
Demand from households in rural areas is therefore lower than in urban 
areas, so revenue from private practice is lower in rural areas. This is an 
important reason why health workers (including civil servants with dual 
jobs) are reluctant to settle in rural areas, as in Mali.5
Figure 9.4 Example of Labor Market Supply and Demand Leading to Urban 
Underemployment and Rural Shortages of Health Workers
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Finally, in countries where most health workers are recruited and paid 
centrally, rural health facilities face inadequate funding of demand 
because few health workers will work in rural areas. Health workers 
assigned to rural areas join in lesser numbers and turnover is high, as in 
Zambia (Picazo 2008).
The Supply of Health Workers for Rural Areas Is Limited by 
Job Preference
Even if rural demand for health workers were adequate, rural jobs are usu-
ally not attractive for health workers (in particular higher level cadres). 
These jobs have higher opportunity costs, including inadequate living and 
working conditions and lead to forgone income (such as revenues from 
private practice, which is usually less profitable in rural areas). Still, 
health workers have different preferences and do not face (or perceive) 
the same opportunity costs. Some may be more likely to work in rural 
areas than others.
Rural jobs and high opportunity costs. Health workers often view living 
and working conditions as substandard in rural areas. Various studies, 
including the World Health Report 2006, stress the lack of career-related 
Figure 9.5 State’s Revenue from Federal Transfers and Own Revenue in 
North Sudan 
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incentives for health workers in rural settings, such as professional devel-
opment and training. Most medical institutions and faculty are in urban 
areas.
A recent study of nursing students in Sub-Saharan Africa shows that 
these future health workers perceive rural areas negatively. Health worker 
students are reluctant to work in remote locations with poor infrastruc-
ture, poor health services, limited housing, and few recreational facilities 
(Mullei and others 2010). Compensation is frequently worse, too. In 
Ethiopia remuneration for doctors and nurses varied greatly between the 
capital city (Addis Ababa) and rural regions (Tigray and Southern 
Nations, Nationalities, and People’s Region) (figure 9.6).
Although most rural areas offer a lower cost of living, such as housing 
rents, school fees, and food (Mullei and others 2010), health workers may 
incur indirect costs. Limited job opportunities for a spouse may lead to 
loss of income, and if the spouse stays in the city, the family may pay two 
sets of housing costs. Similarly, children often remain in the city to com-
plete their education, implying housing costs for them, too. Fewer oppor-
tunities to moonlight are another opportunity cost. In Benin doctors can 
more than double their salary by accepting private clients after hours 
(World Bank 2010).
Health workers have different rural job preferences. Some groups of 
health workers, such as men, younger workers, lower level cadres, those 
with poorer or rural backgrounds, and even those who are intrinsically 
motivated—at times overlapping—seem willing to work in rural areas if 
they receive compensation to make up for the costs of living. Other 
groups, such as doctors, those with children, and those originally from 
urban areas (or trained in urban areas), are generally less willing to relo-
cate, even with a comprehensive incentive package. The motivation for 
working in rural areas varies across cadres and groups.
Highly trained professionals’ preference to work in urban areas in most 
Sub-Saharan countries contributes to the shortage of groups like doctors 
and surgeons in rural areas. In Niger young doctors cited “lack of oppor-
tunities for postgraduate training” as a key reason for not accepting rural 
positions (Souleymane 2005). The picture is often different with lower 
level cadres, although again varies greatly by country. In Ethiopia nurses 
tend to be more willing to work in rural areas than doctors (Jack 2008). 
A study in Ghana found that some lower level cadres appreciate the 
exposure to a wide range of pathologies that comes with rural service. 
Among the reasons the workers cited were that they were sometimes 
Figure 9.6 Sources of Compensation for Doctors and Nurses Vary across Regions in Ethiopia
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called doctor; were given duties above their skill level; had greater bond-
ing among staff, thus facilitating on-the-job learning skills such as surgery; 
had more opportunities to manage teams, developing management and 
leadership skills; and had higher social recognition in villages, with more 
associated gifts (Lievens and others 2007).
Younger health workers may also be more willing to work in rural 
areas. A study in Ethiopia that tracked the graduating nursing class of 
2004 found that while 34 percent were willing to accept a rural place-
ment that year, the proportion declined to 18 percent by 2007 (Serneels 
and others 2008). In Niger older doctors cited “weak remuneration in 
rural areas” as their main reason for not going (Souleymane 2005). 
Many older doctors may face a steep opportunity cost in moving to 
rural areas, because the reputation they built in the city often allows 
them to have a (profitable) private practice (usually alongside their 
public sector duty).
Male workers are also more likely to work in rural areas. One review 
suggests that female doctors are prone to live in the same location as their 
husband’s job (Dussault and Franceschini 2006). In the Republic of Congo, 
as in many Sub-Saharan countries, married couples are required by law to 
live together, “so providers assigned to rural areas marry and move to the 
cities to be with their spouse” (Crigler, Boniface, and Shannon 2008).
Women may be less willing to work in rural areas because of safety 
concerns and socioeconomic profile. For nonnative women without fam-
ily or friends in the region, locating to a rural area without support or 
protection can carry safety concerns. In the Republic of Congo “rural set-
tings are also considered too dangerous for unaccompanied women, as 
they cannot ride buses by themselves or feel comfortable leaving their 
homes to work in the villages at night if needed (Crigler, Boniface, and 
Shannon 2008). With women accounting for more than 61 percent of 
health workers, this further complicates staffing rural regions.” Also, many 
female health professionals come from more educated or urban back-
grounds, making them less likely to accept positions in rural areas.
A health worker’s socioeconomic or geographic background may 
affect his or her willingness to work in rural areas. Serneels’s cohort study 
in Ethiopia (2008) indicates that health workers from rural areas or less 
well-off backgrounds are more motivated to work in rural areas. Some 
lower level or “alternative” cadres, such as health extension workers, may 
be more willing to work in rural areas because they have a rural back-
ground. Much evidence supports the assertion that professionals from 
rural origins more readily settle in remote areas.6
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Altruism may also motivate student health workers to work in rural 
areas. In Rwanda the main reason for final-year medical students to work 
long term in a rural area was the “opportunity to help the poor” (Lievens 
and others 2010). In Ethiopia the most common reason for rural place-
ment among nursing and medical students was “to provide health care 
where it is needed most,” although nursing students cited it more than 
medical students (Serneels and others 2005). That altruism diminished 
over time, once they began working (Serra and others 2008).
Policies Addressing Rural-Urban Imbalances in 
Sub-Saharan Africa
Various policies have addressed geographic imbalances of health workers 
in Sub-Saharan Africa.
The first approach to strengthening labor market demand for health 
workers in rural areas is to increase funding to rural districts and facilities. 
For the public sector, this may be achieved through the true decentraliza-
tion of funding to hire health workers to the rural areas. Fiscal decentral-
ization is already common in many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Depending on the model, funding for rural health worker wages is trans-
ferred to local governments in block grants, as in Ethiopia and Nigeria, or 
earmarks, as in Benin, Mali, and Uganda. Elsewhere, funding for wages is 
directly transferred to facilities, as in Rwanda. Pending sufficient capacity 
to administer such decentralized arrangements (which is not always the 
case), the transferred funds are calculated as a function of needs and 
poverty—using, for example, the needs-based approach—adding to the 
demand for rural workers (chapter 5).
When households pay user fees to public or private practitioners, they 
also contribute directly to fund demand. Given that rural populations are 
usually poorer, this strategy is weaker than in urban areas. Another is to 
set up a health insurance mechanism, subsidizing poorer households’ 
access to care.
Incentives to boost labor market supply for rural health workers, 
whether public or private sector, are also common. Most frequent is low-
ering the opportunity cost of rural employment; almost all countries have 
tested at least one type. They vary widely, from very simple incentive 
schemes (as in Mauritania or Niger) to comprehensive packages (as in 
Zambia). Experience is mixed, with some success in Mali (box 9.3), 
South Africa, and Zambia.7 Yet Niger’s financial incentive program for 
doctors, where one of the few truly prospective evaluations was carried 
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out, had no significant impact. Doctor distribution remained highly 
skewed to the capital city’s benefit, with the proportion of all doctors 
working there staying virtually constant before the program’s launch 
(34 percent) and after (35 percent) (Souleymane 2008).
Intervening in the health labor market and supply-side behavior of 
health workers, many countries have compulsory placement or bonding 
programs, which oblige graduates to work in rural areas after graduation. 
Although such policies may temporarily reduce shortages, they seem to 
have little or no impact on long-term rural retention. Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that they are also difficult to enforce.8
Rural pipeline policies have been implemented in some Sub-Saharan 
countries.9 They place medical and nursing schools in rural areas to 
attract rural students, ensure that admission policies favor health workers 
with rural backgrounds, and adopt a curriculum that emphasizes rural 
health needs and rural work experience.
Benin created a regional medical school in 2001 to train general prac-
titioners (Lemière 2008). Niger established two rural nursing schools in 
2006, and Mali established 11 between 1997 and 2010. Senegal created 
a regional branch of the Dakar medical school in 2008. Ethiopia estab-
lished nursing schools in not only the capital, but also the south and west. 
Box 9.3
Incentives for Recruiting Private Rural Doctors in Mali
Mali supports young doctors in setting up rural private practices, working with a 
nongovernmental organization (Santé-Sud) and the Bamako medical faculty to 
identify young doctors who might be willing to work in rural areas before gradu-
ation (Coulibaly and others 2007). Those interested receive help in preparing a 
business plan that reflects the local population’s incomes.
Once the doctors start their businesses, they get regular mentoring from older 
doctors. They receive a small fixed income ($200 a month) and sometimes hous-
ing from the community. Most of their income comes from user fees, half of which 
they keep. Active rural doctors can earn about $1,000 a month, not much less 
than they would in urban areas.
Since 2000 this strategy has encouraged more than 100 doctors to go to, and 
stay in, rural areas.
Source: Lemière and others 2010.
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Between 2007 and 2009, it created nine new medical schools in regional 
capitals. South Africa has set up a successful program providing scholar-
ships to medical students with a rural background that will return to their 
districts after graduating (Ross and Couper 2004).
Alternative skill mixes for rural areas also show promising results. 
Ethiopia has one of the better-known and more successful programs fol-
lowing the rural pipeline method: between 2003 and 2009, 31,831 health 
extension workers were trained and deployed to rural and hard-to-reach 
communities (Bilal and others 2010). Today, they provide outreach ser-
vices in rural areas, diagnose and treat diarrhea, perform safe and clean 
deliveries, and diagnose and treat malaria and pneumonia.
In Zambia a clinical officer cadre (established in 1936) provides pri-
mary care, particularly in rural areas, to fill the gap of doctors. Clinical 
officers (with skills between a doctor’s and nurse’s) take on key responsi-
bilities, particularly for antiretroviral therapy, including assessments of 
HIV/AIDS patients and follow-up. They refer complicated cases to physi-
cians. In 2007 Zambia had close to 1,270 clinical officers, with about 
70 percent in rural districts (Herbst and others 2010).
Malawi also has clinical officers for rural areas. Ghana has a commu-
nity health program for rural areas. And Rwanda has cooperatives of com-
munity health workers, contracted by health facilities to provide 
Millennium Development Goal-related interventions.
Increasing the skill sets of lower level and mid-level professionals in 
addition to higher level professionals, like general practitioners, has also 
shown positive results when focused on a specific procedure, such as 
obstetrics or antiretroviral therapy. In Mozambique the lack of doctors—
combined with the urgent need for emergency surgical care and maternal 
health skills—called for a reoriented health staff training. Comparing 
1,000 consecutive cesarean sections conducted by medical assistants with 
the same number conducted by obstetricians and gynecologists showed 
no differences in quality (Pereira and others 1996). In Malawi, of more 
than 2,000 emergency obstetric operations performed by clinical officers, 
postoperative outcomes were comparable with those performed by 
medical officers (Philips, Zachariah, and Venis 2008).
Conclusion
Rural-urban imbalances of health workers are a bigger issue than national 
deficiencies, and are a problem in almost all Sub-Saharan countries.
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Two sets of explanations can be identified. The first set stems from 
institutional arrangements that constrain rural demand for health work-
ers: a lack of fiscal or management decentralization in government-run 
sectors, and a lack of health insurance for the rural population, preventing 
them from purchasing adequate health services. The second set stems 
from the high opportunity costs of rural jobs. Health workers are rational 
actors in labor markets and choose not to work in rural areas because of 
these opportunity costs. But, job preferences differ across health workers. 
Some, particularly young workers or those with rural backgrounds place 
less weight on these opportunity costs than other health workers.
These explanations could lay the ground for policies targeting these 
health workers and improving current policies. Sub-Saharan countries 
already experimented with various policies. The results are mixed, and 
these policies need to be better evaluated and refined by country analy-
sis of the supply and demand constraints of the health labor market. 
What is needed? It is necessary to systematically assess health worker 
preferences and current remunerations, and evaluate new policies when 
implemented.
Notes
 1. We do not claim that this issue is unique to Africa. Rural-urban imbalances of 
health workers occur anywhere, including developed countries (WHO 2010). 
We believe, however, that the impact on health outcomes is stronger in coun-
tries where densities of health workers are already very low, as in Africa.
 2. Interested readers can look at Wagstaff and others (2007) and Lemière and 
others (2010) for details on calculations.
 3. This cadre commonly has a skill set somewhere between that of doctors and 
nurses.
 4. A concentration curve is simply the graphical equivalent of a concentration 
index: the closer the curve to the diagonal, the more equal the distribution of 
resources.
 5. See Codjia, Jabot, and Dubois 2010. Health workers, here, are individuals 
working full-time in private practice (“private providers”) and civil servants 
pursuing another activity (private practice) in addition to their normal duty 
(“civil servants with dual jobs or moonlighting activities”).
 6. Studies supporting this conclusion include Rolfe (1995), Dunbabin and 
Levitt (2003), and de Vries and Reid (2003).
 7. In Mali more than 100 doctors agreed to start private practices in rural areas 
(Coulibaly and others 2007). Under the South African Rural Allowance and 
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Scarce Skills Allowance, 28–35 percent of rural health workers who received 
an 8–22 percent salary bonus believed it affected their career plans for the 
following year (Vujicic and Lindelow 2008). The Zambian Health Workers 
Retention Scheme attracted and retained more than 50 doctors in rural areas 
in less than two years (Koot and Martineau 2005).
 8. Zambia’s compulsory one-year placement of young doctors in rural areas was 
not strictly enforced, and when it was, many doctors resigned rather than 
work in rural areas (Koot and Martineau 2005). One exception to enforce-
ment failure can be found outside Africa: Thailand enforced a comprehen-
sive package of benefits and incentives for rural health workers as well as a 
rural pipeline program (Wibulpolprasert and Pengpaibon 2003).
 9. There are no rigorous evaluations, and almost all empirical studies are from 
programs outside Africa. They show evidence of strong impact (see Murray 
and others (2006) and Rolfe and others (1995) for Australia, Rabinowitz 
(1999, 2001) for the United States, and Hsueh and others (2004) for Norway 
and Japan).
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Migration and Attrition
Çağlar Özden and Mirvat Sewadeh
With a quarter of its trained physicians living in Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development countries (OECD), Sub-
Saharan Africa has by far the highest health worker migration of any 
region, while at the same time facing some of the most severe public 
health challenges. This chapter presents an overview of African physi-
cians’ migration and reviews its implications. Using data from a survey of 
Ghanaian physicians who migrated abroad, the chapter explores determi-
nants and causes of migration for one of the most important migrant-
sending countries. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of 
changes in policy and the health care environment that could reduce or 
reverse current migration patterns.
Health Worker Mobility
The mobility of highly skilled workers across international borders is a 
natural consequence of global integration. But developing countries are 
the net losers in the competition for talent. They compete with wealthier 
countries that offer better economic conditions and career prospects for 
highly skilled, and highly sought after, professionals.
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Sub-Saharan countries occupy a special place in the analysis of 
global skilled migration. Over the past few decades, poor economic and 
professional opportunities and unstable political and social environ-
ments drove hundreds of thousands of the best qualified African pro-
fessionals to the rest of the world (Docquier and Marfouk 2006). In 
2000, tertiary-educated workers accounted for 43 percent of total 
migrants from the continent (Docquier, Lohest, and Marfouk 2007). 
The loss of so much skilled labor is worrisome for countries that already 
suffer from low human capital. As tertiary and professional education 
are financed with severely limited public education budgets, poor 
African countries implicitly subsidize rich countries through migration 
of highly skilled labor.
The emigration of health professionals from Africa triggers more con-
troversy and emotion than the emigration of any other professional class. 
Public health experts argue that the medical brain drain contributes to a 
decline in health indicators in many African countries that already face 
some of the most difficult public health challenges in the world (Bundred 
and Levitt 2000). The number of doctors per 1,000 people is less than 
0.05 in many Sub-Saharan countries—and 50 times higher in many of 
the OECD countries that are destinations for African doctors. Africa’s 
low density of medical professionals is among the reasons many countries 
will not meet the Millennium Development Goals on child mortality, 
maternal mortality, and HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases (United 
Nations 2008).
Links between the migration of medical professionals and public health 
outcomes in developing countries are only recently the subject of empiri-
cal analysis. Several new databases on health professional migration enable 
this analysis (Bhargava and Docquier 2008; Clemens 2007; OECD 2008). 
Numerous detailed studies, now complete, provide no clear consensus, and 
the debate will likely continue. Some studies suggest a clear link between 
medical professional migration and health outcomes. Bundred and Levitt 
(2000) and Beecham (2002) point to migration’s direct negative effect on 
the provision of health care services. Bhargava and Docquier (2008) show 
that physician migration contributes significantly to the high adult mortal-
ity from HIV/AIDS-related complications.
Other analyses conclude that migration does not affect public health 
outcomes. Chauvet, Gubert, and Mesplé-Somps (2008) argue that low 
numbers of physicians do not affect human development indicators. 
Clemens (2007) argues that other constraints in health care services are 
more binding than the number of physicians and that migration is not 
responsible for low staffing and public health conditions. Bhargava, 
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Docquier, and Moullan (2011) analyze migration’s effect on child mortal-
ity and vaccinations using a random effects model. Their nuanced results 
suggest that many health indicators improve with physician levels when 
adult literacy exceeds 55 percent. The Bhargava study demonstrates the 
complex links between migration, development, and the social and eco-
nomic environment of the country in question. It finds that the number 
of physicians in a country is only one input in the provision of health 
services, and stopping physician migration would have a positive but 
small impact on human development indicators.
Insufficient health care is a great challenge for development experts 
and policy makers, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. Proper training for 
health care professionals, adequate staffing in rural and high-demand 
areas, and appropriate facilities, equipment, and support staff all influence 
the provision and quality of health care services.
This chapter has three objectives. The first is to examine migration 
among African health professionals, primarily physicians. The second is to 
review the effects of international migration. The third is to present the 
main determinants of physician migration from Ghana.
Emigration Patterns of African Physicians
In 2004 there were about 25,000 African-trained physicians in OECD 
countries, almost a fourth of the total number of physicians in Africa that 
year (Bhargava and Docquier 2008). Migration of African physicians is 
much higher than for other African professionals and tertiary educated 
workers, estimated at between 10 and 15 percent (Docquier and Marfouk 
2007). It is the highest among all developing regions (figure 10.1).
While high migration among African physicians is itself a cause for 
concern, the rise in migration since the early 1990s is even more worri-
some. The number of African-trained doctors working in OECD coun-
tries rose by 91 percent between 1991 and 2005. The increase in the 
number of African-trained physicians working in Africa during the same 
timeframe was comparatively low, at 61 percent (figure 10.2).
African physicians leave their home countries for reasons similar to 
those that motivate the migration of other skilled workers to OECD 
countries. The shortage of qualified health care professionals in OECD 
countries due to rapidly aging populations is one pull. African physicians 
cite higher wages and better professional development prospects in desti-
nation countries, and social and political conditions at home, as their most 
important reasons for migration. Other reasons include insufficient post-
graduate training opportunities and poor practice conditions in Africa, 
172       Özden and Sewadeh
Figure 10.1 Stock of Migrant Physicians in OECD Countries as a Percentage of 
Locally Trained Physicians in Source Region
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especially facilities, equipment, medicine, and support staff. Culture also 
plays a key role in the emigration of physicians. In many African countries 
training and practicing abroad is a mark of success. Medical school faculty 
measure their success by whether their students are competent enough to 
practice in the competitive medical environments of the United States 
and Europe.
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OECD Destinations for Migrant Physicians
The distribution of African physicians among OECD countries has not 
changed much since 1990. The United Kingdom, the United States, 
Canada, and Australia were the top four destinations in both 1991 and 
2004, accounting for more than 85 percent of African physicians in 
OECD countries (figure 10.3). The United Kingdom dominated, with 
55 percent of all Sub-Saharan doctors in OECD in both 1991 and 2004. 
The United States increased its share from a little below 9 percent in 
1991 to more than 13 percent in 2004, surpassing Canada as the second-
largest OECD destination. Ireland became the fifth-largest destination 
for African physicians among OECD countries, and the first among 
European Union members other than the United Kingdom.
Factors influencing physicians’ destination countries are similar to 
those for other emigrant groups, skilled and unskilled. Colonial links, 
language, and economic and career prospects are some of the main 
factors determining the choice of destination. English-speaking coun-
tries dominate as the top destination for African physicians. Welcoming 
immigration policies and open professional environments contribute 
to their popularity.
Most physicians in developing countries are trained or fluent in 
English. Medical practice requires interacting with local populations who 
likely speak only their native languages. As a result, English-speaking 
Figure 10.3 OECD Destinations for African Physicians
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countries are natural destinations for physicians from developing coun-
tries, because learning another language poses a hurdle to successful 
medical practice.
Selective immigration policies in destination countries, which often 
focus on attracting highly skilled labor, are an important factor influenc-
ing migrant destination choices. Laws and professional regulations for 
foreign-trained doctors are also important. For example, if a country’s 
professional medical regulations impose criteria that discriminate against 
foreign-trained doctors, few foreign doctors will migrate to that country. 
Data from 2004 show that language and colonial links are the main deter-
minants of destination choice among Sub-Saharan physicians. France and 
Belgium are the dominant destinations for physicians from Francophone 
countries, and the United Kingdom is the primary destination for physi-
cians from English-speaking countries. The United States also receives a 
fair share of physicians from French-speaking countries, which suggests 
that economic prospects and selective immigration policies can supersede 
language and colonial links in determining destination.
Where Do the Migrant Physicians Come From?
A small group of countries—generally the most populous, with the 
largest physician pools—supply the vast majority of African physicians 
to OECD countries. Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria, South Africa, and Sudan 
(in that order) accounted for more than 87 percent of all African phy-
sicians in OECD countries in 2004. South Africa alone accounted for 
60 percent.
Among the 46 countries with data for 2004, half had migration of 10 
percent or higher (table 10.1). In seven countries more than 30 percent 
of locally trained doctors emigrated. Cape Verde and São Tomé and 
Príncipe, which have high general emigration, fall into this group. Ghana, 
Liberia, Malawi, South Africa, and Zimbabwe, all English speaking, also 
had more than 30 percent migration. Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, 
and Zambia had migration in the 15–30 percent range. Different push 
factors help explain physician migration from these countries. In Ethiopia, 
Somalia, and Sudan, long-term political instability is the main reason for 
physicians to emigrate. In Uganda and Zambia proximity to South Africa 
and the prevalence of English push migration.
Between 1991 and 2004 the vast majority of countries with emigration 
rates over 10 percent experienced a rise in emigration (figure 10.4). Some 
countries, including Malawi, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe, saw especially 
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Table 10.1 African Countries Grouped According to Emigration Rates
Low (less than 
10 percent)
Moderate 
(10–15 percent)
High 
(15–30 percent)
Very high 
(more than 30 percent)
Benin; Djibouti; 
Comoros; Chad; 
Madagascar; Namibia; 
Equatorial Guinea; 
Guinea-Bissau; Côte 
d’Ivoire; Gabon; 
Niger; Burkina Faso; 
Mauritania; Lesotho; 
Kenya; Rwanda; 
Mauritius; Botswana; 
Burundi; Congo, 
Dem. Rep.; 
Mozambique; 
Senegal; Seychelles; 
Suriname; Mali; 
Central African 
Republic; Swaziland
Gambia, The; Angola; 
Tanzania; Togo; 
Guinea; Cameroon; 
Sierra Leone; Eritrea; 
Nigeria; Congo Rep.
Somalia; Uganda; 
Ethiopia; Zambia; 
Sudan
Cape Verde; São 
Tomé and Príncipe; 
Liberia; Malawi; 
Zimbabwe; South 
Africa; Ghana
Source: Medical Brain Drain Database 1991–2004 in Bhargava, Docquier, and Moullan (2011).
Figure 10.4 Countries with the Highest Rates of Physician Emigration 
in 1991 and 2004
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large growth during that period. Small countries are most affected by 
brain drain: Cape Verde had the highest rate of migration at 55 percent, 
followed by São Tomé and Príncipe at 45 percent.
The data on nurse migration are more limited, but indicate that these 
rates are also high. In 2004, 17 Sub-Saharan countries had emigration of 
20 percent or higher for locally trained nurses (figure 10.5). Many coun-
tries with high physician emigration also have high nurse emigration, 
suggesting that similar pull and push factors influence the migration deci-
sions of health care professionals. For example, emigration of nurses from 
Cape Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe are around 40 percent. In Liberia 
the share of nurses who emigrate is double that of doctors.
What Drives the Migration of Physicians?
Migration decisions are complicated. It is almost impossible to identify all 
factors that persuade an individual to move from one country to another, 
and these factors interact in ways that make it even more difficult to 
disentangle their individual effects. In the aggregate, we can identify some 
factors in source and destination countries—the push and pull factors—
that affect overall migration.
Low wages, poor working conditions, lack of professional development 
and career opportunities, and political and ethnic problems are among 
the main push factors. In addition, prevalent infectious diseases such as 
HIV and tuberculosis, together with the shortcomings of health care 
delivery systems, raises disease incidence among African health profes-
sionals. Concern about risks to personal health contributes to increasing 
medical professional migration (Bhargava and Docquier 2008). This pat-
tern leads to a downward spiral where declining health outcomes induce 
migration, which in turn leads to further declines in health care out-
comes.
Africa had by far the most prevalent HIV and tuberculosis in 2005, 
compared with East Asia, South Asia, the Middle East and North Africa. 
As HIV and tuberculosis fell in other regions, they rose in Africa. Africa 
also had the highest rates among developing regions for malaria, measles, 
diabetes, and cancer in 2004.
Limited health resources, including insufficient numbers of health care 
professionals, contribute to poor health conditions. For most health 
resource indicators, Africa has the second lowest among developing 
regions (table 10.2). It also compares poorly with other regions in public 
health expenditures (figure 10.6). Africa’s heavy disease burden, coupled 
Source: Clemens and Pettersson 2006.
Figure 10.5 Emigration among African Nurses
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Table 10.2 Health Resource Indicators, by Region
Hospital beds 
(per 10,000 
population)
Ratio of nurses 
and midwives 
to physicians
Physician density 
(per 10,000 population
Africa 16 9.5 3.6
East Asia 22 3.2 7.6
Middle East 
and North Africa
21 2 13.3
South Asia 12 2 5.1
Source: WHO n.d.
Source: WHO n.d.
Figure 10.6 Health Expenditures per Capita, by Region
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with its low expenditures for public health, contribute to health profes-
sional migration from the continent.
Why Ghanaian Doctors Emigrate
The exodus of Ghanaian doctors is not new. In the 1930s a scholarship 
trained African physicians in the United Kingdom, planting the seeds for 
the first physician migrations from Ghana. For at least 20 years, medical 
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schools in Ghana included a U.K. study component. By 2004 nearly one 
of every three Ghanaian doctors worked in an OECD country, mostly the 
United Kingdom and the United States. A 1999 study estimates that 
fewer than 40 percent of the 489 physicians who graduated from the 
University of Ghana between 1985 and 1994 remained in the country. 
More than half of these 489 graduates immigrated to the United Kingdom, 
and about a third to the United States (Dovlo and Nyonator 1999).
Between 1991 and 2004 the number of Ghanaian physicians in OECD 
countries grew steadily, though at a slower pace than that of domestic 
physicians (figure 10.7).
In 2004 the United States was the largest destination for Ghanaian 
physicians among OECD countries, absorbing 41 percent of all Ghanaian 
migrant doctors (figure 10.8). The United Kingdom followed close 
behind with 39 percent. These numbers are not surprising given the com-
mon language and colonial links. Large numbers of Ghanaian doctors also 
emigrated to Australia and South Africa. Data on those groups were not 
available and are not included in these figures.
A World Bank survey of Ghanaian physicians in the United Kingdom 
and the United States found that they do not come from a random 
sample of Ghanaian society. For example, 56 percent of the physicians’ 
fathers and 27 percent of their mothers have bachelors or professional 
degrees, whereas only slightly above 3 percent of the Ghana workforce 
has a tertiary education (figure 10.9). Parents’ education and social status 
Figure 10.7 Number of Ghanaian Physicians at Home and Abroad, 1991–2004
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Source: Bhargava, Docquier, and Moullan 2011.
Figure 10.8 Distribution of Ghanaian Doctors in OECD Countries, 2004
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Figure 10.9 Education Levels of Migrant Physicians’ Parents
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Source: World Bank Ghanaian Physician Survey as cited in Ozden (2011).
influence their children’s secondary education, which becomes the main 
determinant of entry into the highly selective medical schools.
The social and economic gap between the backgrounds of doctors and 
the rest of Ghanaian society seems to influence most physician career 
choices and preferences, including migration. The top three reasons why 
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the interviewed doctors chose to study medicine include intellectual 
challenge (36 percent), opportunities to help others (20 percent), and 
family influence (18 percent) (figure 10.10).
The World Bank survey offers insights into not only the demographic 
attributes of migrant doctors but also the factors that affected their deci-
sion to migrate. More than 70 percent of Ghanaian migrant doctors cited 
better training opportunities as the top reason for leaving home (figure 
10.11). Another 42 percent cited better medical practice opportunities as 
the top reason. Higher salaries (39 percent) and improved family life 
(45 percent) were also highly ranked. Political stability in Ghana and 
exposure to new cultures seem to have little effect on migration decisions. 
Of Ghanaian immigrant doctors 44 percent practice in university and 
teaching hospitals, which tend to be scientific and professional leaders. 
28 percent are in private practice, and 16 percent are in smaller clinics.
The World Bank survey asked Ghanaian physicians practicing abroad 
what policy changes could keep physicians in Ghana. Better health care 
facilities was the top response, with 71 percent of respondents saying it 
strongly influences migration (figure 10.12). Higher salaries, improved 
pensions, free housing or automobiles, and better educational options for 
children follow close behind. Physicians strongly oppose the mandatory 
service requirements advocated by nonphysicians.
Figure 10.10 Reasons to Choose Medicine
Source: World Bank Ghanaian Physician Survey as cited in Ozden (2011).
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Figure 10.11 Top Reasons for Migration
Source: World Bank Ghanaian Physician Survey as cited in Ozden (2011).
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Figure 10.12 What Would Keep Physicians in Ghana?
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The survey asked migrant doctors to compare life in Ghana with life 
in the destination countries (table 10.3). Forty-one percent stated that 
incomes of physicians relative to other professionals in Ghana are satis-
factory. Only 17 percent were satisfied with absolute physician income in 
Ghana. Close to 90 percent of migrant physicians think both relative and 
absolute incomes are satisfactory in their new country.
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Table 10.3 What Are the Main Differences between Ghana and Abroad?
Ghana Abroad
Bad Average Good Bad Average Good
Income relative to other 
professionals
29 31 41 3 10 86
Overall income 42 41 17 3 8 88
Opportunities for 
professional development
70 25 5 3 1 96
Incentives to work hard 78 18 4 3 8 89
Respect from community 4 11 85 7 34 58
Making a difference for 
others
4 13 83 3 24 74
Source: World Bank Ghanaian Physician Survey as cited in Ozden (2011).
More than 70 percent think professional opportunities and work 
incentives are weak in Ghana. By contrast, 96 percent appreciate the 
professional opportunities in their new countries, and 89 percent find 
that work incentives are strong.
Social issues tend to cut in favor of Ghana. More than 80 percent of 
respondents think doctors in Ghana receive great respect from the com-
munity and make a big difference in the lives of others. In destination 
countries, only 58 percent feel they receive respect and 74 percent think 
they make a difference. While most physisicans believe social respect and 
fulfillement are greater in Ghana, these factors do not outweigh the pro-
fessional and financial benefits of practicing abroad.
Diaspora externalities—benefits that the diaspora generates for the 
home country—are analyzed in the migration literature. In addition to 
remittances, diasporas can create crucial links for trade, finance, and tech-
nology transfers. Sixty-seven percent of surveyed Ghanaian physicians 
sent remittances home in the 12 months preceding the survey. The aver-
age remittance was slightly more than $10,000, a relatively low share of 
the average annual physician income. Given that most doctors are from 
upper income families, their remittances are not likely to have a big 
impact. Families use remittances for general expenses (83 percent), wed-
dings and funeral expenses (41 percent), housing (33 percent), school 
fees (30 percent), and health expenses (figure 10.13).
Remittances are not the only links between migrant doctors and 
Ghana (figure 10.14). Migrant physicians often return to Ghana for lei-
sure and business travel. Many diaspora physicians provide advice to 
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Source: World Bank Ghanaian Physician Survey as cited in Ozden (2011).
Figure 10.13 Remittance Expense Categories
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Figure 10.14 Main Links with Ghana
Source: World Bank Ghanaian Physician Survey as cited in Ozden (2011).
medical students considering emigration. Slightly more than 20 percent of 
respondents provided free medical service to Ghanaians abroad, and more 
than 40 percent send medical books and equipment to Ghana. While their 
investments in housing and land in Ghana are high (70 percent), other 
business links are minimal. More than 70 percent of respondents explored 
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opportunities to invest in health-related business in Ghana, but only a 
small minority did so. This gap indicates problems in the overall business 
climate in Ghana.
The World Bank survey asked migrant physicians how many siblings 
they had, and how many were in the same country with them. A large 
portion of the siblings are also migrants, so physician migration appears 
to be part of larger decision making with consequences for all family 
members.
Ghanaian migrant physicians often remain emotionally tied to Ghana. 
More than 60 percent of respondents think they will return to Ghana 
within the next 10 years. Although a large portion of doctors stay in their 
destinations permanently, the majority would like to return to Ghana.
The Exodus of African Doctors—How Bad Is It?
Policy makers and some economists argue that physician emigration hurts 
the continent in three respects (Hagopian and others 2005). First, migrant 
physicians leave behind distressed health sectors that cannot care for a 
young and growing population. Second, their migration undermines the 
health sector’s ability to organize and expand, ultimately leading to the 
contraction of health institutions. Third, their migration hollows out 
the middle class in Africa, with adverse impacts for economic and politi-
cal development.
Several studies examine the impact of physician migration on health 
conditions in home countries.
• Anand and Bärninghausen (2004) find that the density of health work-
ers is significant in accounting for maternal mortality, infant mortality, 
and under-five mortality.
• A later study by the same authors suggests that health worker density 
is significantly correlated with coverage of three vaccinations (Anand 
and Bärninghausen 2005). When the impact of doctors and nurses were 
assessed separately, only nurse density was positive and significant, 
while doctor density was not associated with coverage of the three vac-
cinations.
• Arah, Ogbu, and Okeke (2008) find in simple correlations that coun-
tries with better maternal health are likely to have higher physician 
migration and more human resources for health. For example, coun-
tries with higher migration to Australia have lower maternal mortality 
and more births attended by skilled staff.
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• Bhargava and Docquier (2008) find that doubling the physician migra-
tion rate is associated with a 20 percent rise in adult deaths from 
AIDS.
• Clemens (2007) finds that Africa’s low staffing and poor public health 
conditions are the result of factors entirely unrelated to migration of 
health professionals, such as segmented health workforce labor markets 
in the sending countries.
A benefit of physician migration is “brain circulation,” where highly 
skilled immigrants return home after acquiring new skills that benefit the 
home economies. Return migration of African doctors could indeed ben-
efit Africa’s health sector. But the Ghana survey indicates that no evi-
dence shows a large-scale return migration among African physicians.
Physician migration also has financial ramifications for African coun-
tries. African governments heavily subsidize medical education. In West 
Africa a medical education costs between $2,000 and $10,000 per stu-
dent a year, excluding personal costs incurred by the student. Ghana 
spends $9 million a year on medical education, Nigeria $15–$20 million. 
Because most students come from upper income families and their later 
remittances flow back to their immediate relatives, publicly funded 
medical education of migrant doctors implies a transfer from lower 
income to higher income parts of society.
Conclusion
Policies for financing education are relevant to international migration. 
Most economists recommend that students should pay for part of their 
education, particularly if they migrate soon after graduation (Clemens 
2008). But tuitions that reflect education’s actual cost would limit eligibil-
ity to the rich because most African countries lack credit markets to finance 
education. And given the positive externalities that professionals generate, 
subsidizing professional education from public funds makes sense.
When Ghanaian migrant physicians were asked how much they would 
be willing to pay for their tuition (assuming they could borrow at low 
interest rates during their education), their answers varied widely. Many 
viewed education as a public good. But more than half indicated that 
they would be willing to pay $4,000–$10,000 in light of the financial 
opportunities they realized thanks to their education.
Ghanaian medical schools follow a tiered tuition system, with partial 
(or full) cost recovery for a portion of students—including those from 
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foreign countries—and free tuition for others, mostly based on academic 
merit. Other African countries should consider this model. A tiered sys-
tem might generate extra revenue which, in turn, could raise student 
supply and reduce reliance on government funding. Since a large part of 
the financial gains from migration accrue to the migrant and his or her 
social network, a partial recovery of education costs is economically effi-
cient. The exact details of such policies will be critical to their success.
Different types of medical education could reduce emigration and 
increase health care workers in African countries. By training physicians’ 
assistants rather than physicians, or health aides rather than nurses, a 
country may retain more of its qualified health workforce. Because train-
ing costs are lower for physician assistants than physicians, a country can 
afford to train more workers, which might improve overall health care 
outcomes. Less qualified professionals can provide many of the same 
critical services provided by physicians and nurses, such as immuniza-
tions. And migration may decline because the demand for less qualified 
professionals is likely to be lower in destination countries. These policy 
suggestions are controversial because they require a tradeoff between 
quantity and quality.
Policies that take effect after education is completed could also affect 
migration. Mandatory national service, especially in underserved rural and 
poor areas, is frequently suggested. Many countries, such as South Africa, 
implement national service requirements with varying coverage and suc-
cess. The Ghanaian survey reveals that such policies can be unpopular 
among doctors. Such requirements should cover a reasonable time period. 
Otherwise, they could reduce the demand for education or lead to imme-
diate emigration to escape the requirement.
Countries might also impose additional taxes or payments on migrants. 
Although such policies are efficient and fair, they may be difficult to 
implement because they require the cooperation of destination countries 
(Wilson 2008). Extra salaries are frequently granted to professionals 
(especially in health care) who stay in their home countries. No convinc-
ing evidence shows the cost effectiveness of such policies, given the vast 
wage gaps between the destination and origin countries. Restrictions on 
travel and refusal to issue passports or diplomas to students and recent 
graduates are also mentioned as options to control emigration.
Countries can encourage professionals to return home, offering return 
expenses, subsidized housing, and assistance in finding jobs. Again, no 
systematic evidence shows that these sorts of policies work. Policies that 
aim to attract the diaspora home are likely to create distortions, penalizing 
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professionals who never migrated or subsidizing returnees who planned 
to return anyway. One simple policy that can provide significant benefits 
at low fiscal cost is removing inherent biases against returning profession-
als, such as recognizing qualifications or experience obtained abroad. 
African doctors living abroad frequently mention this in surveys and 
interviews.
Because wealthy western countries are the main beneficiaries of the 
migration of African health professionals, perhaps these countries should 
finance education expenses in the origin countries. But training directly 
financed by OECD governments might further encourage migration by 
focusing on OECD licensing requirements. African countries may be bet-
ter served by OECD donations for health education. OECD scholarships 
or study abroad programs may be effective, but students use such pro-
grams as an entry into the labor markets of the destination countries. Due 
to public pressure, many OECD governments (such as the United 
Kingdom) follow “ethical” recruitment practices for medical profession-
als. Scant evidence shows that these policies work, despite significant 
political and diplomatic effort.
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Public and Private Practice of 
Health Workers
Tim Ensor, Pieter Serneels, and Tomas Lievens
Until recently the public sector was nearly the only health care supplier 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. Although it remains the dominant supplier today, 
the private for-profit and not-for-profit sectors are gaining importance. 
Doctors and nurses have adjusted to this new reality, but health care 
policies are slow to catch up. In many countries policies are still based on 
a model with the public sector as the sole supplier. As a result, ineffective 
policies do not allocate health workers optimally across sectors. Parasitic 
forms of dual practice are prevalent.
Health Sector Options in Sub-Saharan Africa
In recent years, private sector health care options—both for-profit and 
not-for-profit—have expanded throughout Sub-Saharan Africa, with 
profound implications for the health sector. Health workers can choose 
from a wider set of jobs, each with its own benefits and drawbacks. A 
better understanding of how health workers perceive and choose 
between the public and private sectors is crucial for improved policy 
making.1
The public and private sectors are distinct in many ways. The public 
sector, often starved of cash, may struggle to retain and motivate  workers. 
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The private for-profit sector is perceived as poaching staff to  deliver 
sophisticated care mainly to urban elites. Private not-for-profit organiza-
tions, often viewed as a better-funded alternative to the public sector, 
attract individuals with similar, often altruistic, motivations.
Although there is some truth in these stereotypes, they mask 
important links between the sectors. Many workers move or work 
across sectors during the course of their careers. A considerable num-
ber begin their careers in the public sector and either move to the 
private for-profit sector, or combine public and private sector prac-
tice, routinely dividing their days. Although these links should be 
included in health care delivery assessments, human resource policies 
often overlook them.
Much of the data in this chapter comes from qualitative semistruc-
tured group discussions with different levels of health workers and users 
of health services. Group discussions in each country followed the same 
research design to allow cross-country comparison. These discussions 
sought a deeper understanding of performance and career choice among 
health workers to generate hypotheses for future quantitative research. 
A total of 48 doctors, 125 nurses, and 63 health care users participated 
in the group interviews over the three countries.2 In Ethiopia and 
Rwanda the qualitative preresearch was followed by quantitative sur-
veys. In Ethiopia the authors conducted a cohort study of 90 medical 
and 219 nursing students. The students were interviewed first during 
their final year of training and again three years later, after entering the 
labor  market. In Rwanda a quantitative survey of 123 medical and 288 
nursing students focused on expected career paths and occupational 
preferences.3
The data highlight four issues. First, jobs in the different sectors have 
distinct characteristics, and health workers often have a well-defined 
preference for a job in one sector over a job in another. Second, health 
workers may prefer to move from one sector to another over time. As in 
other sectors of the economy, private health is often reluctant to invest in 
training, preferring to employ workers with experience. Young health 
workers, aware of this preference, often start their career in the public 
sector to improve their chances of finding a private sector job in the 
future. Third, many work in two sectors simultaneously, particularly in 
the public and private for-profit sectors. Fourth, health workers’ individ-
ual characteristics play a role in sector choice. For example, health work-
ers with altruistic motivations are more likely to prefer a job in the 
not-for-profit sector.
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Distribution of the Health Workforce across Sectors: 
Empirical Evidence
Few data measure manpower by sector for Sub-Sahara Africa. While 
international agencies such as the World Health Organization maintain 
information on numbers of public health workers, there is no similar 
information about workers outside the public sector. Even at the country 
level these figures are often difficult to obtain. Professional bodies are a 
potential source of information, but they often do not track employment 
sectors.4 Workforce surveys are another potential source of information 
(Gupta and others 2003), but they often fail to gather information on the 
sector of employment and tend to rely on a small sample of health work-
ers. In-depth health sector surveys are a more reliable source, but they are 
available for only a limited number of countries.
One way to obtain figures for cross-country comparison is to consider 
the total number of health workers registered with professional bodies 
and subtract public staff numbers. Although these estimates offer an idea 
of the orders of magnitude, they suffer from measurement errors. First, 
they overestimate the number of active health workers outside the public 
sector, because individuals who are inactive or working abroad are 
counted. Second, estimates underestimate the number of health workers 
outside the public sector because many combine jobs in the public and 
private sectors, and in some cases are permanently absent from health 
workers public sector job. The estimates thus include registered health 
workers who are not working in the public sector.
Among a selection of Sub-Saharan countries, an average of 42 percent 
of registered doctors work outside the public sector (figure 11.1). This 
number varies from 20 percent in Tanzania to 52 percent in South Africa. 
In a subset of these countries with available data, 32 percent of registered 
nurses work outside the public sector.
It is even more difficult to obtain reliable figures on whether the dis-
tribution of health workers between the public and private sectors has 
changed. Patient spending, formally called “private expenditure,” provides 
some insight. Figure 11.2 reports the results for 39 countries in Sub-
Sahara Africa over a five-year period using annual data. The solid line, and 
the corresponding vertical axis on the left, indicates that patient spending 
(formally “real per capita private health expenditures”) rose from $17 to 
$30. The dotted line, using the vertical scale on the right, indicates that 
patient spending in the private sector as a proportion of total patient 
health expenditures fell from 62 percent in 2001 to 57 percent in 2005.
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Figure 11.1 Nongovernment Sector as a Proportion of Total Health Sector 
Workers, Selected Countries
Ugandaa
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Source: Authors’ calculations from data obtained from the South Africa Medical & Nursing Council; Ministry of 
Health Sierra Leone; Macro International’s Service Provision Assessment Ghana, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Uganda; 
World Bank, Ethiopia.
a. Excluding workers in the private for-profit sector.
Figure 11.2 Trends in per Capita Private Health Spending and Its Proportion of 
Total Health Spending in 39 Sub-Saharan Countries
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These numbers should be interpreted with care. For example, patient 
spending as reported in figure 11.2 reflects out-of-pocket expenditures. 
Patient expenditures in the public sector may be covered at least in part 
by the state. Even so, the data suggest that while private sector growth was 
strong over the studied period, the share of private spending as a propor-
tion of total spending declined. This signals strong public sector growth.
Apart from health worker preferences, three factors influence the size 
and composition of the medical workforce: demand for health care in the 
private sector, budget constraints in the public sector, and the importance 
of the not-for-profit sector.
Rapid economic growth stimulated demand for private services by an 
increasingly wealthy middle class in Malaysia and Thailand (Hanson and 
Berman 1998) and other Asian countries. This growth may also occur in 
established or emerging middle-income African countries such as South 
Africa. For most Sub-Saharan countries, however, poor  economic 
 performances through the 1980s and 1990s constrained development of 
both the public and private medical sectors. As many countries adopted 
structural adjustment programs to instill fiscal discipline, public expen-
ditures declined. This decline led to a persistent slide in the real salaries 
of civil servants—including health workers—and their reduced numbers 
(McCoy and others 2008).
At the same time, countries have encouraged private sector health ini-
tiatives. Policy makers may welcome dual practice as a way for doctors to 
secure decent salaries without pressuring public funds (Sewall 2000). In 
Tanzania real per capita public health spending fell substantially during 
the 1980s. This decline, together with economic liberalization policies 
allowing private practice, accelerated the private sector’s development. As 
a result, the number of private dispensaries and hospitals increased rapidly 
(Kumaranayake and others 2000). In the mid-1990s the Ethiopian govern-
ment cautiously allowed private initiative in the health sector after adopt-
ing a structural adjustment program (Lindelöw and Serneels 2006).
Faith-based not-for-profit providers play an important role in health 
services in many African countries. This role has changed over time and 
many networks now receive direct funding from the government or devel-
opment partners. The most significant change, however, is the emergence 
of numerous new not-for-profit providers. High volumes of aid to Africa 
during the 1980s and 1990s and expanded HIV/AIDS funding funneled 
through nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) partly fed this trend. 
While in the past not-for-profit organizations were often associated with 
a church, the sector now includes large  international and local  organizations 
with sizable budgets to hire well-trained health  professionals.
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Choosing between Public and Private Sector Jobs
From a labor economics perspective, the choice between different types 
of employment is typically modeled on the happiness or utility derived 
from job attributes. Two types of attributes are central in these models: 
effort and earnings. Health workers choose their job or sector based on 
the labor effort they are required to supply and the payment they receive. 
Payment is typically interpreted broadly and includes benefits. Each 
health worker will evaluate options and choose the one with the highest 
utility. Although other job characteristics are explicitly considered in this 
model of decision making, they are indirectly included because the model 
assumes that unfavorable attributes require higher compensation.5 The 
classic model assumes that labor markets function perfectly and that 
workers select the job or sector that offers them the highest utility. 
Applied to the health sector, this model implies that some workers will 
select the public sector, some will select the private for-profit sector, and 
some will select the private not-for-profit sector. This simplification 
clarifies some basic mechanics of sector choice.6
Intrinsic motivation falls outside the classic labor economic model but 
is worth examining. As argued elsewhere in this volume, intrinsic motiva-
tion plays a role in job choice, particularly in professions where a personal 
mission is important (Besley and Ghatak 2006). This role helps to explain 
why some health workers prefer to work in the not-for-profit sector: they 
are willing to accept lower pay in exchange for a better match between 
their own beliefs and the beliefs of their employer. Recent work finds 
empirical evidence that is consistent with this type of mission matching 
(Serra, Serneels, and Barr 2010).
The following labor economics framework for health worker choice 
takes these different components into account. An individual health worker 
(i) derives happiness or utility (U) from a wage (w), effort to deliver (e), 
and the difference between the organizational ethos and the personal mis-
sion (mj − mi). These factors are specific for each of the three sectors (j).
 U u w e m w e m mij ij ij ij i ij i ij i i j= ( ) = − + −( ), , α α α1 2 3
where a1i, a2i, a3i reflect the importance health workers give to earnings, 
effort, and mission matching and wages may or may not be a  function of 
effort.7 A health worker will choose to work in the public sector when he 
or she derives more utility from a public sector job than from a job in 
either of the other sectors, that is Ui1 > Ui2 and Ui1 > Ui3.
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To determine which attributes health workers value and which sectors 
they associate those attributes with, we carried out structured group dis-
cussions with doctors and nurses in Ethiopia, Ghana, and Rwanda. In 
each country we interviewed selected doctors and nurses8 using the same 
study design, so we could compare the results across countries. Table 11.1 
presents an overview of the job attributes mentioned most frequently and 
indicates whether the attribute was considered attractive (+) or unat-
tractive (−) by the majority of respondents.
Overall, health workers associate the public sector with low and often-
delayed salaries, low access to training, lower required effort, public wel-
fare orientation, and a disconnect between effort and pay or promotion. 
This is consistent with findings from other studies. A study in Cameroon, 
for instance, indicated that government workers wished to stay in the 
public sector even in the face of wage cuts because of the job security 
(Israr and others 2000). But evidence also shows that despite the alleged 
security of a public sector job, receiving one’s salary regularly is far from 
guaranteed. Evidence from Sierra Leone indicates that public health 
workers’ salaries are often months in arrears (Ensor, Lievens, and Naylor 
2008). Similar findings are reported in Ghana (Witter, Kusi, and Aikins 
2007) and Zambia (Ministry of Health of Zambia 2007). In Zambia 
10 percent of workers report making unofficial payments to administra-
tors to speed up payment. This contributes to workers’ decisions to 
engage in dual practice.
The public sector is also associated with corruption, confirming evi-
dence from anthropological research in seven Francophone African coun-
tries showing that a culture of corruption and free riding is embedded in 
parts of the public health sector (Jaffré and Olivier de Sardan 2003). 
McCoy and others (2008) confirm low salaries for other countries, 
though they suggest that public sector wages are not lower everywhere.
By contrast, health workers typically associate the private for-profit 
sector with hard work, higher pay, performance-related pay, access to 
modern equipment, and a more dynamic work environment. On the 
down side, they associate the for-profit sector with profit-oriented 
behavior that may require overprescribing to cover costs of expensive 
equipment.
Health workers primarily associate the private not-for-profit sector with 
rural locale and a mission of patient care. Remuneration in the  not-for-profit 
sector falls between for-profit and public sector wages and may be tied to 
performance. Health workers also associate access to training and exposure 
to an international environment with the not-for-profit sector.
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Table 11.1 Health Worker Perspective on Work Sectors: Attributes Associated with the Different Sectors in Ethiopia, Ghana, and 
Rwanda
Public sector Private for-profit sector Private not-for-profit sector
Incentive −   Lower salary
−   Delayed payment
+   Job security
+    Social recognition and 
status
+    Access to further training 
and specialization
+    Allows for clinical practice 
and facility management 
experience
+    Allows for absenteeism, 
embezzlement and dual 
practice
+ Higher salary
+ Urban location
+ Access to modern technology
−    Salary usually less than in 
for-profit sector
+/– Rural location
+   Access to training
+    Possible access to 
international labor 
market and training
Effort +   Accepts lower effort
+/– Lack of supervision
−    Lack of performance pay 
and promotion, 
independent of effort
− Expects hard work
− Close supervision
+ Elements of performance pay
−   Expects hard work
−   Usually close supervision
+    Elements of performance 
pay
Mission +   Public welfare oriented
−   May be prone to corruption 
−  May require profit-driven health 
care (for example, encourage 
use of certain equipment)
+ Provide high-quality health care
+   Strongly altruistic
+   Often pro-poor
Source: Authors’ analysis of qualitative data from group discussions with health workers in Ethiopia, Ghana, and Rwanda.
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Health workers value the same job attributes differently. In the end, 
they choose the jobs that make them happiest. Because the public sector 
pays lower salaries but offers job security and accepts lower effort and 
supervision, it may attract less ambitious and risk-averse health workers 
or those keen to moonlight. But the public sector’s access to training and 
specialization may also attract young and ambitious health workers. 
Private for-profit organizations usually offer higher but less secure pay 
and are more likely to draw health workers motivated by extrinsic incen-
tives. Private not-for-profit organizations tend to attract health workers 
with high intrinsic motivations.
This framework underlines how health workers compare jobs across 
sectors. Given the public sector’s historical dominance, policy makers 
tend to overlook the private sector. By failing to recognize that health 
workers compare public with private for-profit and not-for-profit jobs, 
they risk formulating ineffective health worker policies. Human resource 
policies should be based on a comparative analysis that explicitly accounts 
for how policy changes affect health worker tradeoffs between jobs in all 
sectors. For example, policy makers must know the income doctors derive 
from dual practice in urban centers to calculate the rural hardship allow-
ance that will effectively increase the uptake of rural public jobs.
The more explicit the links between the sectors, the more important a 
comparative analysis of the effects of human resource policies across sec-
tors becomes. In the next two sections we discuss two types of links 
between the sectors. The first considers why workers may prefer to 
change sectors over time; the second looks at how workers are active 
simultaneously in different sectors.
Moving from Public to the Private Sector Over Time
The labor economics framework presented above assumes that health 
workers stay in the same sector throughout their careers. But evidence 
from qualitative research indicates that health workers move between 
sectors. A common pattern is for workers to move from the public to the 
private sector, though some instances of reintegrating into the public sec-
tor, sometimes after return migration, are documented.
One reason for the move from the public to the private sector is a 
change in the health care supply. The gradual emergence of a private 
health sector over the last three decades in Sub-Saharan Africa grew 
 private job openings. In Ethiopia physician employment in the private 
for-profit sector expanded from 1 percent in 1996 to 17 percent in 2006, 
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and in the not-for-profit sector from 8 percent to 23 percent over the 
same period.9
Health workers may change sectors over time as part of their long-
term career plan. Given the lower earnings in the public sector, many 
health workers prefer jobs in the private sector. Because private health 
care tends to be comparatively expensive to the patient, the private sec-
tor relies primarily on demand from a wealthy, often urban, but only 
slowly emerging middle class. This puts a natural ceiling on the sector’s 
size. In addition, the scarcity of venture capital, the absence of well-
functioning credit markets, and the regulatory hurdles to starting a pri-
vate health business may limit the sector’s growth. Together these factors 
limit the demand for labor in the private for-profit sector such that not 
all health workers who want a private sector job can get one. Because 
worker supply exceeds demand, private for-profit employers can be 
selective, choosing whom they consider the best or most skilled health 
workers. Health workers may therefore prefer to accumulate human 
capital in the early years of their career.
The labor economics framework presented above can be extended to 
take this perspective into account, using a more dynamic view of the 
employment decision. Taking a lifetime perspective, utility is now deter-
mined by the discounted sum of utilities across different periods, allowing 
for the health worker to have a job in a different sector in each period. 
Income in each period is now a function of the human capital accumu-
lated in the previous periods (ht−1).
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In this modified framework, an individual may choose an employment 
route that delivers a relatively low income early on but offers opportuni-
ties for formal training and experience that will raise future earnings 
(Ben-Porath 1967). For the private employer, selecting the most skilled 
and experienced workers also helps to solve the classic inability to reap 
the benefits of investment in human capital of personnel. As in other sec-
tors of the economy, private health firms are reluctant to provide training 
to health workers if they are uncertain that they will internalize the 
gain—for instance, if the worker leaves the firm for another organization 
that offers a higher salary.10 Furthermore, the private sector serves a 
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middle class that requests high-quality services and well-trained  personnel. 
As a consequence, health workers are more likely to start in the public 
sector where they build human capital, improving their prospects for 
private sector employment later on.
More factors may contribute to health workers’ decisions to work for 
the public sector early in their careers. As in other labor markets where 
the public sector is dominant, the limited demand for labor in the pri-
vate sector causes health workers to wait in the public sector for a pri-
vate sector job to become available.11 Younger workers tend to be more 
mobile and more likely to switch jobs, so private employers avoid hiring 
them, as they impose transaction costs. A worker early in his or her 
career is also less likely to secure the capital or client base required to 
establish a private practice. Low average incomes limit demand for pri-
vate sector services. In these circumstances private practice becomes a 
speculative venture, and chances of feasibility and success increase as a 
health worker’s career matures.
As workers age and assume family responsibilities their valuation of 
job attributes may change. For example, their target income may go up, 
making private income more attractive. The likelihood of this scenario 
increases when salaries fail to rise substantially over time, as is common 
in public health sectors, where civil service wages rise marginally with 
years of service.
Empirical evidence shows that workers seek employment in different 
sectors at different stages of their careers. Health workers in Ethiopia, 
Ghana, and Rwanda emphasize the distinct qualities of jobs in each sec-
tor. Workers often suggest that there is an “ideal career path,” which 
starts in the public sector, possibly in a rural area. According to this ideal 
path, health workers gain clinical and facility management experience in 
public sector positions before completing further training or specializa-
tion. Later, the health worker moves to the private sector, possibly by 
establishing a private practice.
I would advise to start in the rural areas and in the long run, after having done 
clinical work, when one needs money, one can look out for other opportuni-
ties, the private sector, NGOs that pay more. 
Doctor, rural district, Rwanda
I think the private sector is often for people who are nearing the tail end of 
their service. Such people become consultants after having served the public 
for years. 
Doctor, rural district, Ghana
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Concerning requirements, the public sector is least demanding; it’s the 
diploma only; the faith-based sector, it’s the diploma and the recommenda-
tion; the private sector is more demanding, they require both experience and 
recommendation.
Doctor, rural district, Rwanda
Quantitative evidence from Rwanda indicates that almost all stu-
dents graduating from training first work in the public sector. About 
half the students expect to work outside the public sector after five 
years, and more than 60 percent expect employment outside the 
 public sector in the long term.12 Evidence for Ethiopia shows that two 
years after graduation 82 percent of doctors retain a public sector 
 position,13 substantially above the labor market average of 60 percent. 
That suggests a similar gradual shift from public to private sector over 
the course of the doctor’s career.
Qualitative research for Rwanda confirms the importance of the pub-
lic sector in providing access to further training and in offering a secure 
salary, albeit lower than outside the public sector (Lievens and Serneels 
2006). In Ghana respondents felt that the public sector offers more 
opportunities for training and specialization, though larger private facili-
ties may have on-the-job opportunities to update skills. Group discus-
sions in Ethiopia also highlighted the high workload and lack of training 
opportunities in the private sector (Lindelöw and Serneels 2006).
I served five years in the private sector and have not attended any form of 
training. If it were not for the higher earnings, I would not stay in the private 
sector.
Doctor, rural district, Ethiopia
In the private hospitals personal development does not come in at all.
Doctor, Accra, Ghana
A specialization is generally obtained in the public sector; it’s far more 
 difficult to specialize in the private sector.
Doctor, Kigali, Rwanda
The group discussions also revealed the sophistication of health work-
ers’ view of training. Nurses in Ghana, for example, acknowledged train-
ing as a draw to the public sector but only if it is of sufficient quality. 
Training posts in Accra hospitals are perceived as being more valuable 
because they take place in a well-resourced environment with good 
equipment (Garbarino and others 2007).
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A career path approach may also explain the choice of job location. 
Health workers in Ghana, for example, suggest that rural areas provide 
learning-by-doing training because the absence of senior staff, lack of 
equipment, and large variety of diseases forces them to develop their own 
skills quickly and broadly (Garbarino and others 2007).
Mobility between sectors can vary substantially across countries. 
Health workers in Ghana can easily move from the public to private sec-
tor, but reintegrating is more complex. Health workers hoping to move 
back into public service face long wait times and adverse regulations: 
years of experience outside the public sector are not counted, for exam-
ple, when calculating position and salary. These obstacles discourage doc-
tors and nurses who want to move back to the public sector after long 
spells of employment in the private sector. Although they have gained 
considerable experience, they must pick up where they left off a long 
time ago (Garbarino and others 2007). In Rwanda, however, movement 
between the public and private sector seems fairly straightforward.
I started working in the public sector and then left for the private sector. 
I can’t see any obstacle to introduce my file for a place in the public sector, 
like any other interested party. (…) So I know that if I postulate like the oth-
ers my chances are equal to the others.
Nurse, Kigali, Rwanda
The interviews in Ethiopia underline the barriers doctors face in estab-
lishing their own clinics. Limited access to capital and slow and burden-
some regulations are significant hurdles (Lindelöw, Serneels, and Dessalegn 
2005). Health workers in Ghana point out that opening a private clinic 
is capital intensive and requires a good client base, clinical experience, and 
familiarity with sophisticated equipment. The administrative barriers to 
setting up a business are onerous, but the biggest challenge is accumulat-
ing sufficient startup capital (Garbarino and others 2007).
Simultaneous Links between Sectors: Dual Practice
A health worker may not need to choose to work exclusively in the pub-
lic or private sector. Dual work in both sectors is a feature of medical 
labor markets around the world. A seminal survey of 138 medical doctors 
working in the public sector in low- and middle-income African, Asian, 
and Latin American countries found that 87 percent maintained a second 
job (Macq and others 2001). Accurate and detailed information on the 
prevalence of dual practice remains limited.
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Dual practice comes in a variety of forms. At one end are private 
 doctor clinics, group practices, and even private hospitals run by 
 out-of-hours public sector staff. At the other end is the unofficial pay-
ment provided to medical staff in public facilities for providing what 
should be free service, also a form of dual practice. Unofficial payments 
may buy extras such as improved room service. Private clinics and hospi-
tals run by out-of-hours public employees tend to be predominant in 
systems where dual practice is tolerated or permitted. Unofficial pay-
ments to public health workers can be present in any system but particu-
larly where dual practice is officially illegal.
We can extend the original static model presented earlier to reflect 
dual practice. In the spirit of shirking models, dual practice can be mod-
eled as the use of public office for private gain (Rijckeghem and Weber 
1997; Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984; Yellen 1984). In this framework the 
public sector offers an additional benefit: an individual can remain in the 
public sector but undertake private practice by embezzling publicly con-
tracted resources such as time, services, or practice space. Abstracting 
from the utility derived from mission matching, which we expect to be 
less important for those who engage in embezzlement of resources from 
the public sector, we extend the model presented earlier as follows:
U u w e w p f w e p w t pfij i ij ij ij i ij i ij i ij= ( ) = − + −( )( ) −⎡⎣ ′, , , , *α α β1 2 1 ⎤⎦
where p is the probability of detection, wij’*t the earnings in the second 
sector, and f the fine or sanction if caught. b then reflects the importance 
(or otherwise) given to the possibility of taking up a second job.
In the dual practice framework the possibility of a second job is an 
additional factor driving sector choice. The value of this benefit depends 
on the expected income from the secondary activity, which in turn 
depends on the wage in the second sector, the probability of being caught, 
and the penalty if caught. In Sub-Saharan Africa a worker typically does 
not run the risk of losing his or her job for engaging in dual practice. If 
the additional terms are positive, jobs that permit dual work will be more 
attractive to workers. Within this framework a higher wage in the main 
activity does not automatically end dual practice.14 Efforts to end dual 
practice are likely to succeed only if the probability of being detected and 
the sanction if caught are substantial.
Empirical studies across Latin America offer some support for the dual 
practice framework. They suggest that raising real wages has relatively 
little impact on unofficial payments and other illicit practices when the 
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probability of detection is low (Di Tella and Savedoff 2001). The qualita-
tive research for Ethiopia and Rwanda also suggests that the chances of 
being caught in the act and fined are low in the public sector (Serneels 
and Lievens 2008).
An alternative approach is to regard shirking and absenteeism in devel-
oping countries as a survival strategy. In economic terms an individual 
requires a target subsistence income, and below it he or she is willing to 
indulge in unofficial behavior. In these circumstances simply increasing 
monitoring and punishment for unofficial activity is counterproductive. 
Attempting to curtail prohibited behavior by, for example, clamping 
down on required work hours may induce workers to leave the public 
sector entirely (Ensor 2004).
Empirical evidence points to various motivations for dual practice. 
Nonfinancial motivations include more decision-making powers, greater 
flexibility in work schedules, and the ability to offer better service by 
spending more time with patients or offering more treatment options 
(Humphrey and Russel 2004; Svab, Progar, and Vegnuti 2001). Available 
studies appear, however, to be primarily confined to richer countries. The 
overwhelming reason for a second or dual job in low-income countries is 
financial. Employees engaged in dual practice seek either to raise house-
hold income to a subsistence level or provide an improved lifestyle for 
family through, for example, the ability to attend better schools or acquire 
better health care (Van Lerberghe and others 2002). A discrete choice 
experiment in Ethiopia found that the ability to work in private practice 
was the most highly prized job attribute (valued at 48 percent of the base 
public sector salary) and one of the main reasons why health workers are 
reluctant to work in rural areas (Hanson and Jack 2010). Qualitative find-
ings from Ghana and Rwanda also emphasize the central role of additional 
income from dual practice in the popularity of urban jobs.
A number of studies support the notion that dual practice and unof-
ficial activity may be coping strategies that begin early in a worker’s 
career (box 11.1). Public sector salaries are often not sufficient to support 
a worker and family. A study of doctors in Portuguese-speaking African 
countries found that an average public wage provides sufficient income 
for seven days a month (Ferrinho and others 1998). One respondent in a 
study in Tanzania suggested that the main reason for private payments to 
public staff was that salary itself can “never sustain even food for the 
whole month” (Stringhini and others 2009).
In Rwanda dual practice tends to be unofficial and, at least for doctors, 
mainly confined to urban areas. Motivation is largely financial. Medical 
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Box 11.1
Dual Practice in Ethiopia
The Ethiopia cohort study shows that even at an early stage in their career medi-
cal professionals adopt dual practice. It found that three years out of college, close 
to 20 percent of doctors worked exclusively in the private sector and a further 18 
percent had a secondary job in a private clinic (box figure 11.1.1). Usually a 
 secondary job in the private sector is work as a clinician in a private facility 
although there were a few cases of public doctors working in a private (medical) 
college. For nurses, secondary practice opportunities are rarer but still possible. 
The number of medical professionals engaged in dual practice tends to grow as 
the health workers develop career experience. The main motivation for dual 
 practice in Ethiopia is to increase earnings (Serra, Serneels, and Lindelöw 2008).
Box figure 11.1.1 Proportion of Ethiopia Cohort, by Sector, 2007
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The survey results underline the weakness of the current regulations. While work-
ers whose studies were funded by the government require an official “release” to 
work in the private sector, the vast majority of doctors active in the private sector 
(70 percent) did not obtain this release. Complementary qualitative discussions indi-
cated that absenteeism and nonapproved private employment are rarely punished.
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officers work in private facilities, and nurses often provide clinical services 
through pharmacies. The Rwanda focus group discussions drew attention 
to the parasitic nature of much dual practice. One user described doctors 
using public clinic hours “to ‘embezzle’ patients to their private sector 
practice.” Another user suggested that doctors may even make public 
hospital experiences less pleasant for patients or extend the lead time for 
lab results to encourage patients to come to their private clinic (Lievens 
and Serneels 2006). Dual practice is almost structurally embedded in the 
health system. According to one survey, half the medical students who 
expect to be working in the public sector five years after graduation 
anticipate an additional income of 47 percent of their base public salary 
from dual practice (Lievens and others 2010).
Health workers and users in Ghana point to frequent dual employment 
for financial reasons. Higher educated health workers such as doctors and 
professional nurses who pursue second jobs tend to do so in the health 
sector. Lower educated health workers are more likely to have nonhealth-
related second jobs. Doctors say that income from moonlighting comple-
ments their salary; auxiliary nurses suggest that their base salary is not 
sufficient to cover basic needs (Garbarino and others 2007).
In Accra, depending on your rotation, you could close around 2 pm to do a 
four-hour locum in a private clinic and then come home by 6 or 7pm. There 
is also the tacit arrangement with colleagues to stay in for us so that when 
we come back we will make up the time lost.
Doctor, rural district, Ghana
Opinions on whether dual practice interferes with the public delivery 
of services are split. Some analysts believe that the practice is largely 
parasitic, with private practice eating into the hours and quality of care a 
public worker can provide to patients. Others believe the relationship is 
symbiotic, and that dual practice ensures that staff can afford to work in 
the public sector and provides them with credibility to develop a success-
ful secondary private practice.
There is little doubt that unregulated dual practice can severely inhibit 
public sector functioning. In some parts of rural Bangladesh worker 
absenteeism is largely attributed to doctors who are treating private 
patients in the cities (Chaudhury and Hammer 2003). In Ghana health 
workers suggest that combining two jobs is exhausting, leading to 
decreased efficiency and negative attitudes toward patients. Invariably 
workers give priority, in hours and effort, to their private sector jobs 
(Garbarino and others 2007).
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Regulated dual practice, by contrast, may improve the quality of pub-
lic services. The best public practitioners are likely to be the most sought 
after during their private hours. Gonzales proposes circumstances where 
the incentive to develop out-of-hours private practice leads to enhanced 
efforts to diagnosis and treat public sector patients (González 2004).
A study of Portuguese-speaking African doctors found that most doc-
tors engaging in private practice acknowledged its negative impact on the 
quality of public provision (Ferrinho and others 1998). But it also recog-
nized that the practice may have “a stabilizing effect on qualified person-
nel” by allowing them to achieve a better level of income from within the 
sector. Indeed, without the additional income the quality of public services 
may also suffer. As one respondent in a survey in Cameroon remarked, 
“low salaries do not allow one to practice medicine ethically, our morale is 
down and this encourages malpractice” (Israr and others 2000).
Individual Characteristics and Intrinsic Motivation
Though the public and private sectors are clearly linked, and health work-
ers may move between sectors or work in both at the same time, each 
sector may attract distinct profiles of workers, with distinct preferences 
and characteristics.
We currently have little insight into demographic differences among 
workers in different sectors. Existing studies do not find differences in gen-
der, ethnicity, or marital status. A number of studies find that health work-
ers who grew up in a rural area are more likely to work in a rural area, 
where the private for-profit sector is often less prevalent. Some evidence 
shows that the private sector tends to attract older workers (Serra, Serneels, 
and Barr 2010) and that religious workers may be more likely to work for 
religious organizations. The private for-profit sector seems to attract the 
most technically competent workers (measured by medical knowledge 
tests), while not-for-profits may attract less technically competent workers 
(Leonard, Masatu, and Vialou 2007; Serra, Serneels, and Barr 2010).
Intrinsic motivation in job choice is receiving increased attention. In a 
simplified framework, one can distinguish extrinsic and intrinsic motiva-
tions. Extrinsic motivations include financial reimbursement and other 
rewards, such as professional advancement and training opportunities. 
Intrinsic motivations include a desire to help others or fulfill professional 
norms. This is clearest in the not-for-profit sector, which often has a mis-
sion to provide health care to the poor. But intrinsic motivation may also 
play a role in the public sector (Deci 1975).
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Le Grand talks about “Knights” and “Knaves,” suggesting that because 
Europe’s public sector salaries are traditionally modest and stable, and the 
sector emphasizes service, trust and motivation, it attracts more altruistic 
individuals (Knights) (Le Grand 2003). NGOs can be better placed to 
fulfill intrinsic motivation by providing a “better match between the ends 
of the organization and its workers” (Besley and Ghatak 2007). 
Government services are often influenced by electoral vicissitudes, but 
NGOs can maintain a stable focus on organizational goals and ethos (see 
chapter 14 for an overview of intrinsic motivation in job choice).
Group discussions provide both direct and indirect evidence that dif-
ferent sectors employ different profiles of health workers. Discussions 
confirm that health workers choose a job and sector based on their pref-
erences and self-select in particular sectors. The discussions also indicate 
that it may be overly simplistic to characterize health workers in the 
private for-profit sector only by a preference for financial advancement. 
The Ghana focus group discussions suggest that health workers are 
attracted to the private sector for its clear rules and accountability, apart 
from the higher salary (Garbarino and others 2007a). In Rwanda and 
Ethiopia workers often feel that higher quality care is possible in the 
private sector because of the better standards of equipment, while there 
is little supervision or discipline in the public sector (Lindelöw and 
Serneels 2006). This suggests that those who wish to work in a well-
regulated environment offering high standards are attracted to private 
providers if the public sector cannot offer these attributes.
Increasing evidence shows the importance of intrinsic motivation. In 
Rwanda more altruistic students were more likely to prefer a public sec-
tor job in the long term and require a lower salary to work in less popular 
areas such as rural or high-HIV prevalence areas (Lievens and others 
2010). In Ethiopia results from contingent valuations suggest that chances 
for promotion and other income opportunities increased the preference 
of final-year medical and nursing students to join the private for-profit 
sector (Serra, Serneels, and Lindelöw 2008). In contrast, health workers 
with more philanthropic preferences, measured both by a survey and an 
experimental measure of pro-social motivations, are more likely to work 
in the not-for-profit sector and earn lower wages than their colleagues 
(Serra, Serneels, and Barr 2010). In Tanzania the potential for clinical 
excellence measured by a vignette technique is lower for workers in the 
not-for-profit sector, but the gap between actual and potential perfor-
mance is smaller, indicating both lower competence and higher commit-
ment in not-for-profit sector workers (Leonard 2002).
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In Ghana health workers report that faith-based organizations offer 
salaries comparable to the public sector but are characterized by a higher 
commitment, suggesting that these organizations attract more committed 
workers (Garbarino and others 2007a).
The mission hospitals are better than the public hospitals. They have stronger 
ethics and make sure everything goes accordingly. The doctors are there at 
the right time to take care of the people. When you go to a public hospital 
you will find that most of the doctors working there own a private clinic and 
give that priority. 
User, Accra, Ghana
Drawing a conclusive picture about health worker profiles in different 
sectors remains difficult, if only because not everyone gets their preferred 
job, and some may end up in a job that does not match their preferences. 
In the many countries with smaller private sectors, the public sector is 
more likely to harbor health workers frustrated by the gap between their 
preferred and actual job. This highlights the importance of how health 
workers are allocated to posts. A mismatch between health worker and 
post may lead to frustration, poor motivation, and efforts to change jobs. 
A number of countries regulate allocation, which may lead to more mis-
matches. In Ethiopia public health workers were allocated to rural and 
urban posts through a lottery. In this system workers may be placed in 
jobs they do not want. This makes it difficult for good physicians to signal 
their quality and may compromise the allocative efficiency of the labor 
market, possibly encouraging brain drain (De Laat and Jack 2008).
Conclusion
In many Sub-Saharan countries, policies continue to emphasize the 
dominant—if not exclusive—role of the public sector in health service 
delivery. While this was appropriate in the past, it is unlikely to be the 
best solution for the future. The private for-profit health market has 
gradually expanded in many countries, supplying higher quality services 
to a wealthier and often urban middle-class. And many new not-for-profit 
health suppliers have been established over the years, with more donor 
funding. In many countries the private sector now provides a sizable and 
growing share of the health services and health-related jobs.
Public policies should acknowledge the links between the public and 
private health sectors—or risk having health workers end up in jobs that do 
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not correspond with their preferences. This mismatch leads to frustration, 
efforts to change jobs, and nonproductive forms of dual practice. It may 
also result in high concentrations of workers in urban centers. Regulations 
that impose high entry and exit barriers to prevent movement between 
sectors, or that try to force workers into rural service without compensating 
for the income lost from urban dual practice, are counterproductive.
Policy makers have attempted to recapture hours from the private sec-
tor by banning private practice or providing incentives to health workers 
to not engage in it. These policies raise major regulatory problems. It is 
difficult to enforce such bans (García-Prado and González 2007), primar-
ily because professional practice remains largely unobserved to the regu-
lator. Ample evidence shows that medical professionals find multiple 
ways to develop their own informal medical practice with unofficial pay-
ments, kickbacks, and absenteeism from their public sector job. The 
Ethiopia cohort study reveals how quickly new professionals develop 
secondary practices, even without official permission to practice (Serra, 
Serneels, and Lindelöw 2008).
A ban on private practice may have other unintended consequences. 
Doctors and professional nurses are highly marketable internationally, 
and the drain of workers to richer countries is a well-established develop-
ment issue (Connell and others 2007). Preventing professionals from 
undertaking private practice may induce them either to leave the sector 
entirely or migrate overseas. It is beyond the scope of this review to 
examine policies to tackle the “brain drain” issue.
In some countries the public sector “buys out” practitioners to refrain 
from private practice. Used in several countries, these “nonpractice” 
allowances can be too expensive for many low-income countries (Jan and 
Bian 2005), as the value of private dual practice to individuals is consider-
able. In Ethiopia contingent valuation experiments found that the ability 
to work privately is worth almost half the public sector wage (Hanson 
and Jack 2010). In Burkina Faso private practice is not officially permit-
ted, and reported earnings from secondary sources are modest (around 
17 percent of income). Yet a study found that workers are unwilling to 
accept contracts prohibiting private employment (Ensor, Chapman, and 
Barro 2006). On average, workers (mostly nurses and assistant nurses) 
required a salary increase of around 100 percent before committing (on 
pain of losing their jobs) to refrain from private work. The same workers 
require a salary increase of at least 50 percent before accepting an alterna-
tive contract for a job 50 kilometers from their current workplace. These 
results suggest that buyout may not be the best way forward.
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Another approach is to allow dual practice while requiring guaranteed 
hours in the public sector. It recognizes the benefits of private practice but 
also acknowledges that it can lead to a decline in the quality of public 
service. Young practitioners often value their public position, while more 
experienced health workers want the freedom to practice privately. If dual 
practice can be regulated in the context of a better-remunerated but real-
istic public contract, this may provide a more effective and cheaper alter-
native to outright bans on practice. And if public sector salaries increase 
enough, they may result in an actual foregoing of private practice.
In Ghana private practice is not prohibited but a substantial rise in 
public sector income seems to have sizably reduced the financial incen-
tive to undertake additional private work. According to one study private 
midwives earn more than 40 percent less than their public sector coun-
terparts, while public sector doctors’ proportion of earnings from dual 
practice is relatively small, below 10 percent (Witter, Kusi, and Aikins 
2007). Public salaries for doctors are now sometimes higher than private 
salaries (Ministry of Health of Ghana and World Bank 2009).
An additional approach is for public agencies to purchase private 
health services—a form of public-private partnership. Purchasing priority 
services from the nongovernment sector can widen the range of services 
available to publicly financed or priority populations. The premise of 
public-private purchasing is based on the idea that nongovernment ser-
vices can, in certain circumstances, offer at least as good value for money 
as public alternatives. There is some support for this. Evidence from 
Tanzania suggests that not-for-profit providers are able to deliver higher 
service quality than the public sector without paying more or recruiting 
significantly better qualified personnel, perhaps attributable to the moti-
vation from a decentralized management model (Leonard, Masatu, and 
Vialou 2007). This approach typically requires both a mature nongovern-
ment sector able to deliver quality basic services and public service’s 
capacity to specify and monitor contracts.
To improve policies, we need to collect more evidence. We see four 
main areas for future research and data collection. First, we need better 
basic data on the numbers of health workers in each sector, including 
overlaps through secondary and dual practice. Second, we need to better 
understand what impedes growth of the private sector. Limited purchas-
ing power and lack of business capital are undoubtedly important, but 
there are also bureaucratic regulations that deter formalized private busi-
ness arrangements in favor of unofficial practice. Third, we need to better 
understand the distinct characteristics of health workers who prefer to 
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work in one sector over another, including performance differences, com-
mitment, and so on. Fourth, we need to extend work on how health 
workers choose or end up in different sectors, and how this might be 
exploited to enhance service delivery. While addressing these issues may 
seem challenging, this chapter presents insights from a small and emerg-
ing body of work that offers a starting point for further analysis. It also 
shows that a systematic approach can generate useful insights and inform 
policy making about fruitful ways forward.
Notes
 1. In many countries there has been a boom in underqualified or unqualified 
health workers providing health care, including selling drugs. This segment of 
the private health market is not considered in this chapter.
 2. For more details see Lindelöw and Serneels (2006), Lievens and Serneels 
(2006), Garbarino and others (2007a, 2007b), and Lievens and others 
(2010).
 3. See Serneels and others (2010) and Lievens and others (2010), respectively.
 4. Although private sector health workers may be required to register with the 
government, registration records are often unreliable and poorly managed. Even 
when registration records are reliable, they may be collected at the local level.
 5. This relies on the theory of compensating differentials or hedonic pricing, 
which argues that wage (or price) differences reflect differences in attractive-
ness of the attributes.
 6. In reality we typically do not observe labor supply only, but rather the meet-
ing of labor demand and supply. The more recent literature emphasizes the 
matching process between types of workers and types of jobs, rather than the 
selection of types of workers into types of jobs (Blundell 1999; Cahuc and 
Zylberberg 2004).
 7. Where wages are not a function of effort, we substitute: wij = wij (eij).
 8. We selected the participants to create maximum variation in dimensions of 
interests like gender, having children, current sector of work, and combining 
public and private work or not.
 9. Authors’ calculation based on PHRD data.
 10. Some large private organizations, including not-for-profits, may provide train-
ing if they are confident that they offer attractive career prospects and can 
retain their staff. In the largest organizations, specialist postgraduate qualifica-
tions may be available that are comparable to those in the public sector.
 11. This is common in labor markets with a large public and small private sector. 
See, for instance, Mengistae (1999).
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 12. Lievens and others 2008. While requirements that students with government 
funding work for the state for a period following graduation may play a role, 
the data indicate that these rules are often poorly understood and enforced. 
For instance, a third of students in Rwanda who receive state support suggest 
they have no obligation after graduation.
 13. Evidence indicates that rules requiring graduates to seek permission to work 
in the private sector are poorly enforced in Ethiopia as well.
 14. A more general presentation allows for the embezzlement and use for 
private purpose of resources other than time: U u w e w p fij i ij ij ij= ( )′, , , ,  
= − + −( ) ( ) −⎡⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥∑α α β1 2 1i ij i ij i kkw e p I r pf ,where I(rk) is the income 
derived from embezzling resource, k.
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Equity approaches to human resources for health typically focus on 
 geographic inequalities. This chapter extends those approaches by assess-
ing human resource inequalities from an economic perspective. The data 
on economic poverty confirm that poor groups are less well served than 
better-off groups. They also suggest a tenuous relationship between geo-
graphic and economic approaches to poverty, since many better-off 
 people live in poor geographic areas, while many poor people live in even 
the best-off areas. Much more than a geographic focus will be needed to 
reach poor people.
This chapter offers an initial look at Africa’s human resources for 
health from an equity perspective, covering the five countries where the 
World Bank is conducting comprehensive studies: Ethiopia, Ghana, 
Mozambique, Rwanda, and Zambia. These countries are in different parts 
of Sub-Saharan Africa and have different historical traditions. Economic 
conditions vary widely between them: overall incomes range from $220 
per capita a year in Ethiopia to $770 in Zambia; economic inequalities, 
measured by the Gini coefficient, vary to an unusually low .30 in Ethiopia 
to a far higher .50 in Zambia (World Bank 2009).
The Equity Perspective
Davidson R. Gwatkin and Alex Ergo
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Concepts and Definitions
“Health equity” is a normative concept that refers to the absence of 
“health inequity,” which in turn is typically defined as “health inequality” 
that is unfair and avoidable.1 According to this definition, health inequity 
is one type of health inequality—an empirical concept that refers to any 
intergroup or interindividual difference in health, regardless of whether it 
is unavoidable, unfair, or both.
Health inequalities often qualify for consideration as health inequities—
but not always, since some inequalities are widely viewed as unavoidable 
or fair. (Examples include higher death rates among elderly people than 
young adults, which seem unavoidable; and special wages for hazardous 
occupations, often seen as fair in light of the extra health risks.)
Some types of health inequality might even be necessary to achieve 
health equity, as with human resources for health. Disadvantaged groups 
usually suffer from poorer health than better-off ones, and thus have a 
greater need for the services of health personnel. For the many who argue 
that health equity requires service availability to be proportionate to 
need, such equity would call for more available workers per capita to 
disadvantaged group members.
Applying these definitions across groups raises the question of how to 
delineate groups. Traditionally, the most common approach for studying 
developing countries has been to divide people by economic status, espe-
cially income. Since such status is usually difficult to assess, proxy measures 
like occupation, education, or place of residence are often used instead.
More recently, changing concepts of development and poverty have led 
to additional measures, such as gender, race, religion, and health status, and 
to measures like education and place of residence as dimensions of inequal-
ity and inequity in their own right, rather than simply proxies for some 
other measure like income. Thus one prominent recent formulation, 
expressed as the acronym PROGRESS, puts forward eight dimensions of 
inequality worthy of concern: place of residence, race, occupation, gender, 
religion, education, socioeconomic status, and social capital (WHO 2004).
Implications
Concepts and definitions like these are fairly clear in principle, but leave 
ample room for uncertainty and disagreement in practice. Opinions vary 
widely about what is remediable and fair, for example, and thus whether 
a particular inequality constitutes an inequity. (Is affirmative action to 
lessen disparities fair?) Similarly, different schools of thought pay far 
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more attention to different dimensions of inequality. (Development 
economists tend to focus on economic inequalities; human rights practi-
tioners on gender, ethnic, and religious disparities.)
There is no intellectually satisfying way to select from these different 
outlooks. Nor can any coherent presentation accommodate nearly all of 
them, so we must choose guiding concepts and definitions that are at 
least partly—and sometimes largely—arbitrary. Here are our choices, 
which will guide what follows.
First, all the inequalities that appear most prominently in discussions 
of health status, service availability, and service use constitute inequities. 
This statement implies that all people have the same right to healthy lives 
and adequate health services, regardless of their gender, ethnicity, religion, 
or economic status.2 It also implies that differences in health status, ser-
vice availability, and service use are avoidable, and can be greatly reduced 
at a cost that lies within the range of what an enlightened society can 
reasonably bear.
Second, the economic dimension of inequality is intrinsically signifi-
cant, and important enough to merit explicit attention. It is especially so 
for those concerned with progress toward the Millennium Development 
Goals, because these are expressed primarily in economic terms: the first 
goal, for example, calls for a 50 percent reduction in the proportion of 
people living on less than $1 a day—the classic definition of severe eco-
nomic poverty.3
(This is not to argue that other dimensions of poverty like gender, race, 
and religion are unimportant. The argument is simply that the economic 
dimension of health inequity is important enough for a focus on it to be 
legitimate, particularly in cases like the present, where practical consider-
ations impose a need to limit the discussion.)
Third, place of residence is a proxy for some other measure of poverty 
like economic status, rather than something that is of interest in itself. 
This implies a greater concern for the well-being of a poor person, 
whether in a rural or urban area, than that of a rural resident, whether 
poor or rich. It also implies that people living in rural areas or remote 
provinces are of interest not because of where they live, but because they 
are more likely to be poor than urban residents.
The Economic and Geographic Dimensions of Health Equity
The third of the foregoing points is especially relevant because discus-
sions of human resources for health give far greater prominence to the 
geographic than to the economic dimension of poverty. Whole 
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papers—including a chapter in this volume—have been written on the 
geographic maldistribution of the health workforce, which is skewed 
toward urban and better-off areas. Although many envisage geographic 
differences as proxies for differentials in economic status, the extensive 
reading undertaken for this paper found no explicit references to eco-
nomic inequalities in access to or use of health human resources.
Whether this distinction between geographic and economic differences 
has practical consequence depends on two things: the geographic distribu-
tion of poverty within a country, and the economic status of the people 
served by health workers in the parts of the country where they live.
Consider first the geographic distribution of poverty, measured by the 
percent of people living below a poverty line. Suppose that, to redress a 
current geographic imbalance in available health workforce, a country 
decides (and is able) to assign all new health workers to areas with the 
highest prevalence of poverty. How many of these new workers would be 
available to the country’s poor?
Two extreme situations illustrate the range of possible answers to this 
question. First, imagine that all the economically poor people in a country 
are in one province, and all the people in that province are economically 
poor. Increasing health workers in that province alone will benefit all of 
the country’s poor, without any “leakage” to its better-off. Second, sup-
pose that economic poverty is evenly distributed throughout the country, 
with the same proportion of people in each province living below the 
poverty line. In that case, focusing on only a few parts of the country 
would produce no greater accuracy than randomly distributing the new 
health workers across all its provinces.
It is safe to expect that the situation in most countries, perhaps all, lies 
somewhere between these two extremes. But the extremes are so far 
apart that differences among countries can still be quite large.
For four of the countries of interest here—Ethiopia, Ghana, Mozambique, 
and Zambia—it is possible to determine the size of those differences from 
the estimated proportion of the population in each district living below 
the poverty line.4 These estimated proportions permit us to assess who 
would benefit (the economically poor or better-off), and how much, from 
stationing all additional health workers in, for example, the poorest 
50 percent or 25 percent of the country’s districts—that is, in districts with 
the highest percent of the population living below the poverty line.
The data can be addressed from two perspectives. The first examines 
how many better-off people live in economically poor areas, and thus 
could benefit from additional health workers posted there (a figure often 
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referred to as leakage, or error of inclusion) (figure 12.1). The second 
concerns the number of economically poor people who live outside poor 
areas, and would be missed by any services delivered outside those areas 
(undercoverage, or error of exclusion) (figure 12.2).
On average, 48 percent of people in one of these countries—or in a 
randomly selected district in one of them—lives above the poverty line 
(see figure 12.1). When chosen from the poorest half of all districts only 
about 35 percent live above the poverty line, and 28 percent when cho-
sen from a district in the poorest quarter.
So, focus on the poorest half of districts can reduce the potential 
leakage of benefits to the nonpoor by about a quarter (48 percent to 
35 percent), while focus on the poorest quarter of districts can lower 
leakage from 48 percent to 28 percent (see figure 12.1). This reduction 
indicates a significant drop in beneficiaries that do not belong to the 
highest priority population—the nonpoor. But, it still falls well short of 
perfection, since more than a quarter of people in the service areas is 
above the poverty line.
Such precision comes at a cost, however, as the second perspective 
shows (see figure 12.2). The data indicate that, in each country, a large 
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Figure 12.1 Geographic Distribution of the Non-Poor in Ethiopia, Ghana, 
 Mozambique, and Zambia
Source: World Bank data.
Note: A poor district is one of the country’s poorest 50 percent of districts; a very poor district is one of the 
country’s poorest 25 percent of districts. Ethiopian data are available for only around 90 percent of zones 
(referred to as “districts” here for the sake of comparability). Averages are unweighted.
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Figure 12.2 Geographic Distribution of Poverty in Ethiopia, Ghana, Mozambique, 
and Zambia
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portion of the population below the poverty line lives outside the poorest 
districts. On average, almost half (46 percent) of the poor live outside the 
economically poorest half of districts; nearly three-quarters (74 percent) 
live outside the poorest quarter of districts. These people would be missed 
by a program taking only a geographic approach to identifying the poor.
At this point, the second of the two considerations mentioned at the 
start of this section comes into play: the economic status of the people 
served by the additional health workers within the parts of the country 
where they are assigned. This consideration is important because, as just 
seen, some nonpoor people live in even the poorest districts, while some 
poor people live in the districts where poverty rates are lowest overall.
Such a pattern presents two possibilities. First, additional health per-
sonnel assigned to the poorest district might serve many people who are 
not economically poor. To be sure, it would be hard to go too far astray 
when working in an area where, for example, more than 80 percent of the 
population is below the poverty line. Still, in even the poorest parts of the 
poorest countries, there is likely a significant minority of people who are 
considerably less poor than others; and some types of health personnel 
(for example, specialized surgeons in district hospitals that charge for 
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surgical procedures) would benefit primarily the better-off within the 
areas covered.
Second, health professionals in better-off districts might serve mostly 
poor people if they work in programs designed with those people in 
mind—for example, clinics where field workers regularly visit poor people 
to ensure that they come for health services.
Focus on the geographic dimension of poverty can take us much of the 
way toward reaching the economically poor, but by no means all the way. 
The relationship between the geographic and economic dimensions of 
poverty is far from exact. If the objective of a human resources for health 
policy is to serve economically poor people, it will need to look beyond 
its current emphasis on disadvantaged areas.
Availability of Health Workers to the Poor
What can be said about health workforce equity from an economic rather 
than geographic perspective? Given the scarce attention paid to the eco-
nomic perspective, limited empirical information is available. Still, 
enough exists to justify summarizing it, if only as a starting point for the 
further explorations that are required.
There are two types of information: the availability of health workers 
to economically disadvantaged people, and the use of health workers by 
those people.
The information on health worker availability presents an indirect 
estimate of health workers per 1,000 people, for each economically 
defined 20 percent (quintile) of the population. Analysts construct these 
estimates by combining data from two sources. One comprises the same 
data on poverty prevalence (and number of people) in each district that 
formed the basis of the calculations represented in figures 12.1 and 12.2. 
The second source is information about the number of health workers 
drawn from national censuses of health personnel. Since data from such 
censuses are available only for Ghana and Zambia, the discussion will be 
limited to these countries.
Tabulating these data consists of three steps: first, to sort districts in 
order of the proportion of the population below the country’s poverty 
line, from high to low; second, to divide the districts into five groups, each 
containing 20 percent of the country’s population; and third, to calculate 
the health worker-to-population ratio for each of the five population 
groups, by calculating the average number of workers (weighted by dis-
trict population).
226       Gwatkin and Ergo
Limited confidence can be placed in the results of this exercise, however, 
due to the large variation in health worker availability among districts 
within each population quintile. Still, the pattern of differences shown 
from those results is regular and in line with reasonable expectations. If one 
interprets them with this statistical limitation taken into account, they cau-
tiously suggest two findings—and an instructive exception.
The first finding is that the availability of all categories of health worker 
is higher in areas inhabited by better-off people than in areas inhabited by 
the poor (figure 12.3). Worker density is far higher in the highest quintile 
than in the lowest two quintiles for each type of health worker in each 
country. Also noteworthy is the shape of the curve across the quintiles: 
worker density is more or less equal across the two or three bottom quin-
tiles, then rises rapidly as one moves up the economic scale—mirroring the 
pattern for infant and child mortality in Africa.5
The second finding, also in line with expectations, is that the difference 
across quintiles varies from one type of health worker to another, with 
greater differences among higher level workers than among lower level 
personnel. Ghana has about five times as many high-level workers serving 
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Figure 12.3 Density of Health Workers by Economic Quintile, Ghana and Zambia
Source: World Bank data.
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The Equity Perspective       227
the highest quintile of the population than the lowest, compared with 
1.5–2 times as many mid-level or lower level workers. Zambia is similar, 
though less extreme. There, the doctor-to-population ratio for the top 
quintile is just under five times that for the bottom quintile, compared 
with around 3.5 times for nurses and midwives. As with density shown in 
figure 12.3, the largest differences are between the top 20–40 percent of 
the population and the bottom 60 percent. Across the bottom quintiles, 
differences are relatively small.
The instructive exception concerns community health nurses in 
Ghana. There are around 3,200 such nurses, salaried mid-level employees 
of the government’s Ghana Health Service who are recruited from and 
trained near where they are subsequently posted.6 Such providers are a 
pillar of Ghana’s current 2007–11 health human resources strategy, 
which calls for their number to increase by 20 percent annually.7
These community health nurses are more prevalent in areas where 
poor people live than in those inhabited primarily by the better-off. 
Certainly, the interquintile range is not large: the bottom two quintiles 
have about 23.5 community health nurses per 100,000 people, com-
pared with about 19.5 in the top two. But even this orientation toward 
the poor, modest as it may be, is enough to make the community health 
nurse program stand out against the distribution of the other, higher-
level workers, who are much more common in areas where the best-off 
people live.
Use of Health Workers by the Poor
There is a sharp distinction between availability of health workers and use 
of their services. Even when workers are in areas inhabited primarily by 
the poor, many people might not use them. Expense is an obvious reason 
for this, especially where user fees apply. Another reason is knowledge: 
poor and uneducated people might know less about the potential benefits 
from available services than their better-off peers. Or poor people might 
fear contemptuous treatment by service providers belonging to a higher 
social stratum.
These factors make it important to go beyond availability and look at 
use. The most relevant data on use come from household surveys that 
cover the type of health providers visited by different economic groups 
for different problems. The most widely available, and those used here, 
were performed under the auspices of the Demographic and Health 
Survey (DHS) program, which has sponsored surveys typically covering 
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5,000–30,000 households, sometimes many more, in more than 75 low- 
and middle-income countries.8
Data from a recent DHS survey are available for each of the five coun-
tries here: 2005 in Ethiopia, 2003 in Ghana, 2003 in Mozambique, 2005 
in Rwanda, and 2001–02 in Zambia. Each survey contains information on 
25–30 or more household possessions and characteristics, enough to con-
struct a viable wealth index for measuring economic status.9 Two factors 
limit the survey information on visits to health workers. First, the basic 
DHS survey is oriented toward maternal and child health, so survey data 
have nothing to say about health service use by adults and the elderly, 
which constitute a large portion of total use. Second, maternal and child 
health information tends to report the type of facility visited rather than 
type of provider seen.
Despite these drawbacks, it is possible to present a rather clear pic-
ture of two related types of service provided by professionals in the 
formal health sector: antenatal care and attended deliveries (figures 12.4 
and 12.5).10
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Two summary points on antenatal care can be made on the basis of the 
data in figure 12.4. First, in all four countries, nurses or midwives provide 
at least some antenatal care to almost all pregnant women, in the poorest 
as well as the best-off economic groups. Coverage is almost always close 
to 80 percent, and usually more, regardless of economic quintile. In 
Ghana and Rwanda coverage is actually higher in the lower and middle 
groups than in the topmost. In only one—Mozambique—is there a 
notable difference in coverage between the lowest and highest quintiles.
Second, doctors provide much less antenatal care overall, and what 
they provide is concentrated among higher quintiles. In only one group 
(Ghana’s highest quintile) do doctors deliver antenatal care to more than 
a quarter of pregnant women. On average, doctors provide such care for 
only around 4 percent of women in the lowest quintile, compared with 
about 20 percent of women in the highest.
For delivery attendance the picture changes, especially with respect to 
nurses and midwives. As with antenatal care, nurses and midwives pro-
vide many more services than doctors. But unlike antenatal care, where 
nurses and midwives saw most poor as well as most better-off women, 
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deliveries by doctors and nurses and midwives are primarily of children 
born to women in higher economic groups.
These data need little explanation (see figure 12.5). Nurses and mid-
wives deliver, on average, around 20 percent of babies born to women in 
the poorest population quintile, compared with more than 80 percent of 
those born to women in the highest. Doctors deliver babies of almost no 
women in the bottom quintile, and about 15 percent of those in the top 
quintile.
Conclusion
What has been said here is about all there is to say on the topic at hand 
until further information is available.11 What remains, in closing, is to offer 
three suggestions about its significance—about the value addition of look-
ing at the maldistribution of Africa’s health workforce from an economic 
perspective, rather than continuing to focus on geographic imbalances.
First, a solid argument exists for retaining a strong geographic focus, 
even if one considers place of residence as no more than an imperfect 
proxy for economic status: poor areas are far easier to identify than poor 
people, which can be an important point in African countries with weak 
administrative structures. Correcting geographic inequalities in health 
worker distribution is an obvious way to start correcting other types of 
inequality in access, including the economic.
Second, from an analytical perspective, an economic-inequality approach 
to health worker issues can identify patterns missed by a more conven-
tional geographic outlook. Much of this approach confirms what is already 
known from geographic studies: for example, that access to health workers, 
especially higher level workers, is much easier for better-off than for dis-
advantaged groups. At the same time, some potentially significant, less 
intuitively obvious findings have emerged—particularly which health per-
sonnel strategies seem to work better than others in reaching the poor.
The most significant of these findings touches on antenatal care by 
nurses and midwives. They appear to serve 80 percent or more of even 
the poorest women, offering services that, while far from ideal, seem 
complete enough to provide some health benefit (box 12.1). Might these 
workers constitute a platform for delivering additional services, simple 
but potentially valuable to disadvantaged groups?
A second example is the Ghana program of community health nurses, 
who seem considerably more likely than other personnel to be available 
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Box 12.1 
How Good Is Antenatal Care for Poor Women?
It is encouraging that so many poor women receive at least some antenatal care. 
But how good is it?
Hints about the quality of care, as defined in terms of its comprehensiveness, 
are available from the same DHS surveys that provided the data on antenatal care 
in figure 12.4. Surveys asked women obtaining antenatal care which of the follow-
ing services they had received: recording weight, height, and/or blood pressure; 
taking a blood or urine sample; and providing an iron supplement, tetanus injec-
tion, and/or information about where to go in case of complications.a
The findings, expressed in unweighted averages for Ethiopia, Ghana, 
Mozambique, Rwanda, and Zambia, show that:
•  Women in the poorest quintile of the population received an average of 4.2 of 
seven services.
•  Ninety percent received the one service that professionals could provide with-
out additional supplies or equipment: information about where to go in case of 
complications.b Eighty-four percent were also weighed, and 56 percent received 
a tetanus injection. Urinalyses were less frequent, received by 28 percent of 
poor women.
•  The number of services rose steadily by economic status, with the top quintile 
of women receiving around 5.3 of the services.
Source: World Bank data.
a. The survey counts the absence of response as a failure to receive the service in question.
b. This is an unweighted average for Ethiopia, Ghana, Mozambique, and Rwanda; data for Zambia are 
unavailable.
to the poor. Are there lessons to be drawn from this experience for other 
countries?
A third finding concerns the concentrated use of traditional practitio-
ners among the poor (box 12.2). Does this constitute a reason to renew 
efforts to upgrade their skills as a more central part of human resources 
for health?
The third contribution of an economic perspective is the most funda-
mental: geographic inequalities form only part of the overall economic 
inequality story. Yes, they are an important part, and as noted above, 
addressing them is often an obvious place to start. But as argued in the 
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section Availability of health workers to the poor, better-off areas almost 
always have many poor people, just as poor areas have many relatively 
well-off people.
Thus to focus on poor areas alone is to miss what health personnel in 
high-income areas can do to reach disadvantaged groups, and to overlook 
the possibility that health workers in low-income areas might not be serv-
ing many of the poor people there. It is necessary to look beyond geo-
graphic maldistribution if the economically poor are to benefit fully from 
health workforce strategies.
Notes
 1. This definition is a paraphrase of the classic definition of health equity pre-
sented in Whitehead and Dahlgren (2006).
 2. The statement also implies that all people have an equally strong desire to use 
health services once the services are available, so there is no volitional element 
in any observed disparities in health service use.
Box 12.2
Traditional Practitioners and the Poor
While the patients of most African health providers are concentrated among the 
better off, one group of medical personnel appears to serve primarily the poor, at 
least for basic maternal and child care, for which data are available: traditional 
practitioners.
The best-known type of such practitioner is the traditional birth attendant. 
According to the DHS surveys, such attendants helped with 34 percent of births 
among the poorest quintile of women in the countries covered. This figure 
declined to 30 percent in the middle quintile, and 13 percent in the top 
quintile.a
The same general pattern applies to treatment of childhood cough, diarrhea, 
and fever. Traditional practitioners’ involvement in such conditions is lower than 
for deliveries in the countries with available information. But services that tradi-
tional providers deliver in this area are concentrated primarily among the poor. 
On average, such practitioners deal with approximately 12 percent of cases in the 
lowest population quintile, compared with 4 percent of cases in the highest.b
a. All figures are unweighted averages for trained and untrained traditional attendants in Ethiopia, Gha-
na, Mozambique, Rwanda, and Ethiopia.
b. Unweighted averages for Mozambique, Rwanda, and Zambia.
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 3. More on the Millennium Development Goals is at: http://www.un.org/
millenniumgoals/poverty.shtml.
 4. For Ethiopia, poverty line data have been calculated from Central Statistical 
Agency of Ethiopia, Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (2004); 
population figures come from Central Statistical Agency of Ethiopia (2007). 
Poverty data for Ghana, for 2000, are taken from Coulombe (2005). 1997 
data for Mozambique are drawn from Simler and Nhate (2005). 2000/02–03 
data for Zambia appear in Simler (2007). (Mozambique and Zambia figures 
refer to the international poverty line of $1 per day in 1986. In Ethiopia and 
Ghana, the reference is to the country’s national poverty line.)
 5. Africa mortality figures are from Gwatkin and others (2007).
 6. Information on characteristics of community health nurses is from Nana 
Twum-Danso, pers. comm., March 2010.
 7. Figures for annual intake of certified community health nurse training pro-
grams appears in Ministry of Health of Ghana (2007).
 8. For more of the DHS, see http://www.measuredhs.com.
 9. Further detail can be found in Rutstein and Johnson (2004).
10. The data in both figures exclude Ethiopia because the survey there did not 
differentiate among the different types of health professionals providing the 
services. Overall, the Ethiopia data for all types of health professionals pro-
duce a picture similar to that for comparable data from the other countries: 
for both antenatal care and delivery, coverage by a professional is far higher 
for women in the upper than the lower economic quintiles (12.7 percent in 
the lowest quintile, compared with 58.1 percent in the highest for antenatal 
care, and 0.8 percent versus 30.9 percent for attended deliveries).
11. Such additional information need not be difficult to develop, at least in prin-
ciple, since its production would require relatively modest supplements to the 
information currently collected through routine household surveys. For basic 
maternal and child health, it would mean expanding the services DHS sur-
veys, disaggregated by qualifications of service provider. Information about 
the use of medical personnel for other services could be gathered by modify-
ing the health modules of the questionnaires in household expenditure stud-
ies to include questions about the type of provider for individual services.
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Pay for performance (P4P) is generating interest in Africa. This chapter is 
an early look at Sub-Saharan Africa’s experience with this approach. To 
date more than 20 African countries have pilots or programs providing 
some elements of P4P to their health workers. The chapter proposes a 
framework to analyze how P4P affects the number, distribution and per-
formance of health workers, and examines the evidence from the litera-
ture to date. The experience of Rwanda is an example of how P4P can be 
an essential component of a reform program to strengthen the availability 
and performance of health workers in Africa. The number of health 
workers in rural areas increased and performance improved. But the 
design of P4P related reforms matters. Looking forward, the experience 
from other African countries will need to be carefully documented.
Why Pay for Performance in Sub-Saharan Africa?
Many policy makers in Sub-Saharan countries believe that pay for per-
formance (P4P) can address deeply entrenched problems, fostering better 
results and efficiency in the health sector. To date more than 20 countries 
have pilots or programs providing some elements of P4P to their health 
workers (World Bank 2010). Rwanda and Burundi have P4P as part of 
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their national health systems. Sierra Leone and Burkina Faso are prepar-
ing to follow suit. Are these policy makers right?
How Pay for Performance Improves Health Worker Outcomes
P4P can be defined as the “transfer of money or material goods condi-
tional on taking a measurable health related action or achieving a prede-
termined performance target” (Eichler and Levine 2009). It is payment 
for attaining well-defined results and can affect workforce outcomes in 
three main ways (following the framework in chapter 1): number, distri-
bution, and performance of health workers.
P4P can potentially affect the number of health workers by providing 
additional resources to salary supplements and wages. Giving higher 
wages to health workers (according to the labor market framework in 
chapter 3) leads to more health workers available to work and potentially 
less migration.
P4P can also affect the distribution of health workers if it encourages dif-
ferent payments for specific areas or populations with specific needs. Chapters 
9 and 15 suggest that including equity or geographic distribution as part of 
performance-based indicators could lead to better pay for health workers 
serving in poor areas, growing their number (Zurn and others 2004).
Finally, as discussed in recent policy debates, policy makers introduced 
P4P to improve the performance of health workers, which can have sev-
eral dimensions (in the framework of chapter 5). P4P can affect produc-
tivity by providing direct incentives linked to the quantity and quality of 
services supplied (box 13.1).
Global Experience of Pay for Performance
The literature strongly suggests that P4P mainly influences the quantity 
of services produced. Its impact on quality is promising but less well 
studied. In fact, pay-for-quality is still at an early stage, with governments 
and insurers—particularly in Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) countries—searching for the best ways to 
maximize its impact and reduce its adverse effects.
Globally, P4P offers four main insights.
First, the impact of fee-for-service (or pay-for-quantity) on producing 
and consuming health services is clear. When governments or insurers pay 
for each unit of output, and as long as the fee is greater than the marginal 
cost, providers increase output, and consumers consume more of it 
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Box 13.1
Health Worker Performance
To examine the impact of P4P we propose a simple health workers’ performance 
model with two dimensions: what health workers know (x-axis)—the ability to do, 
including technical knowledge—and what health workers do (y-axis)—actual 
services in both quantity and quality (box figure 13.1.1). Ideally health workers 
would always operate at their full potential and do what they are capable of 
doing. At this point, they work at what we call their production possibility frontier. 
But in reality many workers do less than what they know (the “know-do” gap of 
chapter 5), creating a performance gap. Traditional supply-side interventions lead 
to higher ability to do, but have limited impact as they only shift the—rather 
low—performance curve. P4P is expected to shift the performance curve and 
bring it closer to the production possibility frontier, leading to much higher per-
formance with comparable intensity of traditional supply side intervention.
Box Figure 13.1.1 A Simple Two-Dimensional Model of Health Worker 
Performance
Ideally, health workers would  always 
do what they are able to do—that is, 
work at the  production possibility 
frontier.
What they have (ability/technology)
What they do:
(services/
quality) 
But in most contexts there is a perfor-
mance gap, between potential and 
actual  performance.
Production
This lessens the impact of  traditional 
supply-side  interventions (T1 to T2). 
QA
QA
T2T1
But P4P could increase the impact of 
 traditional interventions.
Ability/technology
T1 T2
QA4
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(Barnum, Kutzin, and Saxenian 1995; Christianson, Leatherman, and 
Sutherland 2007). Fee-for-service is thus expected to lead health workers 
to produce more, improving the intake of essential health interventions, 
particularly if targeted toward the poorest areas and underserved groups. 
In Haiti a before-and-after study showed that payments for immuniza-
tion and assisted deliveries led to an increase of outputs and coverage 
with these indicators (Eichler and others 2006).
Increasing quantity may, however, come at the expense of access and 
quality. P4P may induce adverse incentives that exacerbate inequalities 
in access to health care (Greene and Nash 2009), involve “gaming” strat-
egies (Khanduja and others 2009), or encourage adverse selection by 
health providers to avoid more sick patients (Karve and others 2008).
Second, the impact of P4P on quality of care is less clear cut (Eldridge 
and Palmer 2009). Most global evaluations reveal positive results for 
quality (as well as efficiency and patient outcomes) (Dudley and others 
2004; Greene and Nash 2009). A review of experience in OECD coun-
tries concludes that many P4P schemes show promise for improving 
quality (Scheffler, Fulton, and Borowitz 2010). A before-and-after study 
of the United Kingdom’s Quality and Outcome Framework P4P pro-
gram found that quality increased for some ailments (asthma and diabe-
tes) but not for others (heart diseases) (Roland and others 2009). In 
California a study of 230 physician groups showed a rise in quality met-
rics of 3 percent annually (Robinson and others 2009). Studies in Brazil, 
by contrast, have not shown a clear effect of P4P on quality or efficiency 
(Borem and others 2010; La Forgia and Couttolenc 2008). A major 
weakness of all studies is, however, that they do not include control 
groups, because most P4P programs are implemented without a rigorous 
evaluation component (Khanduja, Scales, and Adhikari 2009).
Third, the positive effect of P4P is observed in these studies in a con-
text where payments go to providers’ organizations, including single 
practices, raising the firm’s incentives to be more productive. When used 
to provide bonuses to individual public servants in integrated civil ser-
vices, however, P4P generally has little effect (OECD 2005). Some quali-
tative research even suggests that P4P may compete negatively with other 
incentives, public ethos, or health workers’ self-motivation.2 To be effec-
tive, P4P likely requires some provider autonomy and purchaser-provider 
separation, allowing the firm to determine individual incentives.
Fourth, most authors recognize that how P4P is used and designed 
determines its success or failure. The U.K. experience suggests that its 
P4P program may have chosen targets that were too easy, because most 
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providers reached the maximum points (Doran and others 2006). The 
thresholds there were subsequently adjusted. Prices set too low can also 
lead to P4P being ineffective.
The objectives of P4P schemes in developed and developing countries 
are different (Eichler and Levine 2009). Those in developed countries 
aim to improve the quality of care, reducing less desirable services in 
favor of more desirable ones, and lowering costs (Bell and Levinson 2007; 
Greene and Nash 2009). In Sub-Saharan Africa, the main issues are still 
related to insufficient access and low use of services, particularly for high-
impact interventions and for the poor. For the next decade, the four main 
objectives of P4P in Africa are therefore likely to be:
• Increase the intake of proven high-impact Millennium Development 
Goal-related health services that require universal coverage, such as 
immunization, insecticide-treated nets, assisted birth delivery, and 
emergency obstetrical care.
• Improve the quality of these interventions to maximize impact.
• Provide flexible remuneration increases to health workers to improve 
retention and reduce migration.
• Increase health services for the poor through higher payments for 
health workers in rural or poor urban areas, thus improving demand for 
human resources for health in urban areas.
A Country Example: Rwanda’s Performance-Based Financing
Rwanda scaled up its national P4P program since 2005 on the basis of a 
positive evaluation of a three-year pilot phase in two provinces (box 13.2). 
The program channels funds directly from the treasury to the bank accounts 
of the country’s 400 health centers—40 percent faith-based and 60 percent 
public—on the basis of a contract, with the payment based on 13 quantita-
tive indicators and 13 qualitative measurements (tables 13.1 and 13.2).
The PBF payment schedule uses a three-part price model for facilities 
and a two-part model for health workers. PBF payments to health facili-
ties are based on the formula:
Paymentit j ijt
j
k ikt
k
k ikt
k
PU w S
w S
=
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
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Box 13.2
Rwanda, a Story of Successful Reforms
With about 10 million people in Central Africa, Rwanda is one of the world’s 
poorest countries. During 2000–07 the Demographic and Health Survey showed 
a rise in facility-based deliveries from 39 percent to 52 percent, and family plan-
ning from 10 percent to 27 percent, alongside a 30 percent decrease in infant 
mortality.
These results can largely be attributed to a paradigm shift in public finance 
and service delivery subsidized by the public purse, based on five pillars.
The first is decentralization of health services, with a strong emphasis on 
government structures that are community-based. The fiscal decentralization 
was rapid, immediately translated into large sums of cash to local govern-
ments. Block grants gave flexibility to local governments—some were 
earmarked (to achieve national goals) and some were not (to foster local 
initiatives).
The second is the Imihigo, a performance contract between the country’s 
president and district mayors. It has multisectoral indicators for all key sectors, 
including agriculture, health, and infrastructure. Health has few indicators, but 
they are focused on high impact interventions: family planning, assisted birth 
delivery, insecticide-treated nets, and enrollment in microinsurance, all priorities 
the central government established as essential to the Millennium Development 
Goals. The earmarked grants were aligned with the Imihigo, whose indicators 
were used to monitor the grants’ impact.
The third is community-based health insurance, which supports locally owned 
and managed risk-funding pools from user premiums collected in sub-districts. 
The treasury and donors (mainly the Global Fund to Fight Tuberculosis, AIDS, and 
Malaria) subsidize the micro-insurance pools, called mutuelles, for about 20 per-
cent of the population. In 2002–09, enrollment in health insurance rose from 
about 4 percent to 91 percent, expanding service use.
The fourth is the autonomy of health facilities. In 2008 Rwanda granted full 
autonomy to facilities, including the right to hire and fire health workers. This was 
the most dramatic reform (few governments have moved in that direction in Sub-
Saharan Africa).
The fifth is P4P, called performance-based financing (PBF).
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Table 13.1 Indicators and Fees for Performance-Based Financing, Rwanda
Performance-based financing output indicator (Uj) (Pj) Amount paid per case
Curative case 0.18
Prenatal care, first visit 0.09
Pregnant women who completed four prenatal care visits 0.37
Pregnant women given tetanus vaccine 0.46
Pregnant women given preventive treatment for malaria 0.46
At-risk pregnancy referred to hospital for delivery 1.83
Growth-monitoring visit for child ages 12–59 months 0.18
Fully vaccinated child 0.92
Malnourished children referred 1.83
Deliveries at the health center 4.59
Family planning, new users (DIU, pills, injections, implants) 1.83
Family planning (DIU, pills, injections, implants resupply) 0.18
Emergency referrals 1.83
Source: World Bank data.
Table 13.2 Quality Indicators for Performance-Based Financing, Rwanda
Service Weight
Share of weight 
allocated to 
structural 
components
Share of weight 
allocated to 
process 
components
Means of 
assessment
General 
administration
0.052 1.00 0.00 Direct observation
Cleanliness 0.028 1.00 0.00 Direct observation
Curative care 0.170 0.23 0.77 Medical record 
review
Delivery 0.130 0.40 0.60 Medical record 
review
Prenatal care 0.126 0.12 0.88 Direct observation
Family planning 0.114 0.22 0.78 Medical record 
review
Immunization 0.070 0.40 0.60 Direct observation
Growth 
monitoring
0.052 0.15 0.85 Direct observation
HIV services 0.090 1.00 0.00 Direct observation
Tuberculosis 
service
0.028 0.28 0.72 Direct observation
Laboratory 0.030 1.00 0.00 Direct observation
Pharmacy 
management
0.060 1.00 0.00 Direct observation
Financial 
management
0.050 1.00 0.00 Direct observation
Total 1.000
Source: World Bank data.
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and where Pj = payment per unit of each PBF service j (13 output 
 indicators); Uijt = number of patients using service j in facility i in period t; 
Sikt = 1 if facility i has quality characteristic k in period t (13 quality char-
acteristics); wk = weight for characteristic k, weights sum to one (500 points 
total ).
PBF is one of five mechanisms of health facility payments  (figure 
13.1). Eighty percent of PBF payments are for health worker incentives. 
An individual’s additional income is not, however, directly linked to the 
services he or she provides, but is calculated as a salary bonus based on 
skills, years of service, and attendance weighted for the overall PBF of the 
facility. The remaining 20 percent is used for operating costs, equipment, 
and other nonlabor costs.
PBF payments are made every quarter. A district-level steering 
 committee approves the payment with reference to a quantity audit, a 
quality assessment, and a supervision report prepared by the district 
supervision team. One focal point in the administrative district conducts 
the quantity audit, and the district supervisors conduct the quality assess-
ment (based in the district hospital). Supervisors randomly sample 
patients to identify phantom patients, and conduct random visits to verify 
the quality score. A study found less than 5 percent of patients to be 
phantom (Management Sciences for Health, Boston).
capitation PBF
special purpose
grants
80%
20% user fees and copayments
wages NW recurrent capital
payments from health insurance
health center
variable
f (years of service, attendance, skills, PBF price coefficient)
fixed
f (skills, years of service, government grid)
Source: World Bank data.
Note: PBF = performance-based financing.
Figure 13.1 Fund Flows to Rwandan Health Centers
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Impact Evaluation in Rwanda
An impact evaluation of PBF was nested into the P4P program. Its objec-
tive was to look at the incentives’ effect on both the quantity of services 
(measured as use of essential services) and their quality. It also examined 
the impact on child health and the availability and financing of human 
resources for health.
Design
During the scaling-up and rollout of the program, 7 districts of the 30 in 
the country were allocated to a control group. Health facilities in this 
group received equal funding to the facilities under the PBF program 
through a general input contract, but no results-based payments. The 
control group helped distinguish the effect of the results contract from 
the effect of increased payments and resources.
The evaluation sampled 166 primary care clinics (of 401 in the coun-
try) chosen from “naïve” districts that had no previous experience with 
P4P. The clinics were grouped into similar pairs based on population 
density, rainfall, and predominant livelihood (figure 13.2).3
These clinics were then randomized into a phase 1 (treatment) group, 
which implemented the P4P program 2006, and a phase 2 (control) 
group, which implemented the program two years later. District alloca-
tion was subsequently modified, however, because the decentralization 
process redesigned district boundaries on the basis of administrative cri-
teria. Some clinics were then reallocated to different groups to ensure 
that the districts would be homogenous and have all their clinics as either 
treatment or control. This affected two of eight pairs in the experimental 
design where the treatment and control districts switched, as P4P had to 
be expanded to all clinics in partially covered districts.
To isolate the incentive’s effect (provider payment) from that of addi-
tional resources (increased supply), control facilities received financial 
compensation that was not linked to performance, calculated as the aver-
age compensation provided to the treatment facilities. Both groups were 
granted the same flexibility in spending the funds, which could be used 
for paying salary bonuses or purchasing other nonlabor inputs.
Both facility-based and population-based data were collected. These 
included administrative use and outcome data, information on staffing, 
budget, equipment and drugs, and exit interviews of pregnant women. 
Household surveys were also conducted in all 166 clinic areas, collecting 
socioeconomic characteristics, service use, and child anthropometric 
information for a random sample of 13 households in each area.
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Quality of care (both competency and quality rendered) was measured 
through health worker observations and patient exit interviews. Knowledge 
and competency were assessed through interviews of health workers 
using standardized vignettes, based on the Rwandan Clinical Guidelines 
(Minisante Rwanda) (23 items). Quality rendered was estimated through 
exit interviews assessing the actual clinical content of care. The “know-do” 
gap (or provider effort, see chapter 5) was then estimated by comparing 
provider knowledge and actual behavior.
The baseline data showed no difference between the intervention and 
control clinics for expenditure and use of services, confirming that the 
samples were comparable.
Impact on Health Worker Funding, Numbers, and Distribution
From 2003 to 2007 the transfers to provinces and districts rose from 
about 37 percent to 85 percent of the recurrent budget. Financing to 
human resources tripled from $6.7 million to $21.4 million. PBF grew 
Source: Baginga and others 2011.
Figure 13.2 Design and Sampling of the Rwandan P4P Impact Evaluation
30 districts in Rwanda
EST. 400 health centers
8 districts assigned to comparison
86 health facilities
10 districts assigned to treatment
86 health facilities
preintervention survey
January–March 2006
proposed: 1,040 households
Actual: 1,002 households
postintervention survey
April–July 2008
86 health facilities
1,007 health facilities
postintervention survey
April–July 2008
86 health facilities
1,115 health facilities
facilities started receiving P4P
payments between
June–October 2006
preintervention survey
January–March 2006
proposed: 1,118 households
Actual: 1,114 households
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Source: Minisante-Country Status Report on Health and Poverty (2009).
Note: Total health personnel in publically funded facilities has almost doubled in 3 years.
Figure 13.3 Increase in Number of Health Workers, Rwanda 
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more than 10-fold from $.8 million to $8.9 million, reaching $1–$2 per 
capita in 2007. Wages increased by 60–100 percent depending on the 
clinic. This relative bonus is a much larger than generally implemented in 
OECD countries, where the bonus payment was 5 percent or less of the 
physician and hospital earnings, except in the United Kingdom where it 
is estimated to be 15 percent.
As Rwanda carried out decentralization and reform, personnel in pub-
licly funded facilities almost doubled in four years (2005–08) (figure 
13.3). A large share of these workers was hired for rural facilities, improv-
ing the distribution of the health workforce.
It is not clear however whether the performance contract played a 
role as compared to the size of the bonus. Whether or not the clinics 
were receiving funds on the basis of performance did not affect the num-
ber of health workers hired by the clinics. This is probably due to health 
workers’s bonus not being directly related to performance. Clinics 
receiving non performance related lumpsums provided comparable sal-
ary bonuses to their health workers. Yet the P4P approach allowed the 
flexibility for clinics to hire the health workers they needed and increase 
their remuneration.
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Impact on Performance: The Quantity and Quality Effects
Over the period of analysis, all health interventions went up. Most health 
indicators improved in 2005–07 (Sekabaraga and others 2001). Use of 
most services increased in both the treatment and the control groups, as 
the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS 2000–05 and 2007) show. 
Assisted deliveries were low (about 10–15 percent) before the reform; 
they started to climb in 2005 for both groups (figure 13.4), but grew 7 
percentage points more in PBF facilities.
Using the productivity framework presented in section 1, we can 
see that PBF had an independent effect on the quantity of services in 
the treatment group (see figure 13.4) (Basinga and others 2011). After 
2006 the use curves of the treatment and control facilities start 
diverging, with better performance in the treatment group. We can 
see a similarly significant effect for preventive child visits (growth 
 monitoring). More growth monitoring and early identification of mal-
nourished children led to an increase in weight for age 0–12 months 
and increase in height for weight at 24–48 months. No effect was 
found on immunizations, antenatal care, or curative care (Gertler and 
Vermeersch 2012).
Figure 13.4 Increased Deliveries at Health Facilities, Rwanda
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PBF also had a positive effect on quality of care. It was similar at base-
line in both treatment and control clinics, but after two years the quality 
of antenatal services improved in the treatment group (figure 13.5) 
(Gertler and Vermeersch 2012).
Most important, the quality of antenatal care improved even more for 
providers who had a higher competency, showing a synergistic effect of 
basic knowledge and incentives (figure 13.6). It has been desmonstrated 
that PBF reduces the efficiency gap by 3.5 percentage points, or about 
20 percent of the gap, on average (Gertler and Vermeersch 2012).
A Question—And Some Possible Answers
To date, the impact evaluation in Rwanda is the only rigorous analysis of 
incentives’ effect in a low-income country. Availability and distribution of 
health workers improved, their remuneration increased. Improvements in 
service use and quality over time were observed in both P4P and control 
Figure 13.5 Impact of Pay for Performance on Antenatal Care 
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Figure 13.6 PBF Improves the Performance of Better Trained Health Workers
Source: World Bank data.
groups, as both received greater resources. The treatment group that 
received more resources with a P4P contract performed better on several 
indicators. P4P appears to leverage traditional interventions, such as train-
ing and monitoring, as more competent providers performed better when 
incentives were introduced.
A key question: Why could we measure impact for some interven-
tions but not others? One answer is the design of the evaluation, which 
aimed to measure the impact of the incentives independent of addi-
tional resources. P4P’s potential to leverage more resources and 
increase remuneration—and thus health worker motivation—cannot, 
however, be neglected. It certainly played a role in Rwanda as health 
workers in both the treatment and control group saw their income 
rise.
Another answer is the role of the other reform pillars. Fiscal decentral-
ization, autonomy, and health insurance also contributed to increased use 
and quality of services. The role of Imihigo was particularly important in 
establishing political accountability and a culture of results. As Imihigo 
and other reforms were simultaneously implemented in all districts, P4P’s 
effect may have been underestimated and could be higher in other coun-
tries if its entire size could be captured in the design.
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A third answer is that relative prices are important, and the incentive 
system needs to get the interrelationship right. The observed effect on 
assisted delivery is likely related to the fact that the bonus was highest for 
this intervention, and the return on effort was high and in the provider’s 
control.
Conclusion
P4P, taking off in Sub-Saharan Africa, appears to improve the availability 
distribution and performance of health workers, increasing quantity and 
to some extent quality of services. The Rwanda impact evaluation con-
firms that P4P can improve both health worker productivity and service 
quality. It shows that incentives play a role and that the health system 
probably “gets what it pays for.” Several countries are implementing the 
strategy, and some of them—including Burundi and Burkina Faso—are 
institutionalizing the approach and practicing it nationally.
Rwanda also shows, however, that P4P is no panacea. It did not have 
an effect on all interventions. Many questions remain about how to 
maximize the effect on all important health interventions. The long-term 
political economy effects are also unknown. As several countries are now 
implementing the strategies and conducting impact evaluations (Benin, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Zambia), we may learn more on the 
conditions that make P4P valuable in improving the performance of 
health workers in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Yet the approach seems promising to address some of the health sec-
tor’s problems. The flexibility of the P4P approach within the Rwanda 
reform package lead to health workers working in larger numbers in 
rural areas and being better paid. Bonus payments better link salary 
increases to improved performance—an outcome attractive to policy 
makers. Performance-based transfers for facilities help separate purchas-
ing and provision, and reduce the conflict of interest of local govern-
ments. They also provide an avenue for civil service reform and 
flexibility in wage policies. Wages can be brought more in line with the 
labor market and are no longer constrained by rigid civil service rules and 
wage bills constraints (chapter 6).
As more and more African countries implement P4P approaches it will 
be essential to evaluate those experience rigorously. This will require 
using a broad set of metrics that include number distribution remunera-
tion of health workers as well as performance in terms of quantity and 
quality of services delivered.
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Notes
 1. The Millennium Development Goals call for a two-thirds decrease in child 
mortality by 2015 relative to the 1990 baseline (UNICEF 2008).
 2. This is likely explained by the complexity of assessing and attributing perfor-
mance in multitask and team activities, such as those in the health sector 
(Holmström and Milgrom 1991).
 3. The details of the design and analysis can be found in Basinga and others 
(2010).
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C H A P T E R  1 4
Intrinsic Motivation
Kenneth L. Leonard, Pieter Serneels, and 
J. Michelle Brock
This chapter starts with the model of health worker performance pre-
sented in chapter 5, examining the role of intrinsic motivation in more 
detail. Much evidence on intrinsic motivation comes from outside the 
health service literature, but a growing body of evidence indicates that 
intrinsic motivation is consequential in health care, for at least two reasons. 
First, the motivation of health care workers is one of the more important 
elements of the health care system, and we will show empirical evidence 
that intrinsic motivation is a central part of total motivation. Second, 
although evidence increasingly shows that extrinsic incentives can change 
the performance of health workers, little evidence shows how this type of 
motivation interacts with health workers’ intrinsic motivation.
Intrinsic motivation and its role in service delivery have received con-
siderable attention. Earlier writings suggested that it was especially rele-
vant for social and public services,1 such as teaching and health care, 
which are often described as “vocations.” Intrinsic motivation may there-
fore be as important as—if not more than—motivation derived from 
extrinsic incentives, even though the latter receives more attention in 
policy debates.
Recent literature recognizes this, revitalizing the debate on the relative 
roles of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation (box 14.1). Delfgaauw and Dur 
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Box 14.1
Intrinsic Motivation in the Words of Health Workers
Serneels and Lievens (2008) discuss the results from focus group discussions with 
health professionals and users of health services, focusing on motivation, norms 
related to professional and workplace culture in Rwanda.
Self-Regarding Motivation and Job Choice
Health workers in Rwanda make generous use of religious vocabulary when 
describing their motivation to work in the health sector, using words like “voca-
tion,” “devotion,” and “apostolate.” Since health workers can choose where they 
work in Rwanda, and social relations are perceived as less important to get a job 
than in the past, those with high intrinsic motivation self-select into positions they 
like—such as posts in the faith-based sector or in rural areas. The for-profit sector, 
which often puts more demands on health workers and provides higher pay-
ment, may draw a different profile of health workers. The public sector seems to 
attract health workers who plan to continue for further specialization, or those 
who do not find a job in the for-profit or not-for-profit private sector.
Some say being a health worker is an apostolate.
Doctor in a rural district
Whether you want it or not: when you study medicine, you have a vocation. 
If you do not have this vocation, you will fail. A doctor needs to be perma-
nently devoted; a doctor without devotion is not a doctor.
Doctor in Kigali
When you have a vocation, it is impossible to do something else.
Auxiliary worker in a rural district
There is always this vocation, which pushes you to continue even if conditions 
are not met: the salary, the equipment, the other colleagues, the  professional 
environment; but since lives are threatened, you are pushed to continue, the 
situation is more or less comparable in the public, private, or faith-based sector. 
Doctor in a rural district
We always work longer than planned in the timetable, it’s a vocation; you 
cannot leave a patient because it’s time to go.
Nurse in Kigali
(continued next page)
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Professional Norms
With the foundation of the Ordre des Médecins in 2001, professional norms are 
receiving considerable attention, and health workers place high hopes in this self-
regulatory body to enforce internal rules and provide credible punishment where 
needed. Nurses have expressed their desire to have an Order soon.
The regulations are clear, if you are working for the government, you are 
expected to have a proper attitude.
Doctor in a rural district
The bylaws consist of a number of rules to follow. If a person does not respect 
a rule, he is told so and informed about the sanction, the first time orally, the 
second time in writing. If it happens another time, the sanction is applied. 
Nurse in a rural district
If you compare the public and the faith-based sector, you’ll find that there are 
more problems in the public sector because the health workers know they 
cannot be sacked easily. 
User in a rural district
I have the impression that there is a system in place that guarantees when it 
really goes very badly, when it is absolutely clear that there is a problem, 
then, something is done. 
Doctor in Kigali
Since the order of doctors has been created, there have been investigations, 
and some doctors have been suspended. 
Doctor in a rural district
People love to go to the private sector because health personnel there speak 
kindly. They treat few patients and take time to speak at length with them; 
consequently, when the patients leave the health centre, they are happy.
Auxiliary worker in Kigali
Extrinsic Motivation, Intrinsic Motivation, and Workplace Norms
In 2001 the Government of Rwanda started the Initiative for Performance in a 
number of public and faith-based facilities. The Initiative for Performance  specified 
Box 14.1 (continued)
(continued next page)
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that a portion of the government funding a facility receives would depend on its 
performance. The Initiatives for Performance in Rwanda measure the facility’s per-
formance, and not the individual’s, so the facility receives the reward if it  performs 
well. The facility determines how to distribute the premium among the health 
workers, and there is scope to pay higher wages to better-performing health 
workers; it can also use the funding to hire extra personnel. Thus, extrinsic motiva-
tion interacts with intrinsic motivation through workplace norms.
A health worker knows that if he does not perform well, if he is absent, if he is 
too late, if his service is not appreciated, this will decrease the premium the 
health centre receives. It makes personnel control each other. Everybody 
knows that the one who works badly can be sacked and risks being accused 
by his colleague; this leads to a higher degree of accountability and increases 
productivity. 
User in Kigali
Usually one is the only doctor to consult. But with the Initiative for  Performance 
(IP), one recruits, and instead of one doctor, you’re, for example, five. So there’s 
an improvement in the work conditions and one is no longer stretched. 
Doctor in a rural area
(2008), Prendergast (2007), and Francois (2000) show that intrinsically 
motivated public service providers exert more effort and require fewer 
extrinsic incentives than self-interested providers. Evidence from quanti-
tative and experimental analysis confirms this. Since most health workers 
are driven by both intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, however, it is impor-
tant to understand how these two sources of motivation interact.
Insights from Economic Theory
The study of intrinsic motivation in economics is grounded in the litera-
ture on “social preferences.” This section reviews the terminology and 
insights commonly used in this field, focusing on what is relevant for 
health service delivery, to build a model that examines the role of intrin-
sic motivation for health service delivery in developing countries.
Economists evoke the term social preference to explain decision mak-
ing that goes beyond self-interest. Charness and Rabin (2002)  characterize 
Box 14.1 (continued)
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a person with social preferences as “not maximizing own monetary pay-
offs when those actions affect others’ payoffs” and consider people to be 
both self-interested and concerned with the payoff of others. Behavior is 
pro-social when individuals voluntarily engage in activities that are costly 
to themselves but benefit others (Bénabou and Tirole 2006).
Becker (1974) explains individuals’ willingness to contribute to public 
goods by suggesting that they gain from consuming the public good and 
are willing to provide it when others do not. Sugden (1982) suggests that 
individuals may feel a moral obligation to contribute to the public good, 
even if they do not consume it. Andreoni (1989, 1990) builds on Sugden’s 
insight, suggesting that individuals contribute to the material gain of oth-
ers because it makes them feel good. According to Andreoni, individuals 
contribute to a public good for two reasons: first, they demand more of 
the public good, as in the Becker model; second, they get private benefit 
from their gift, which Andreoni refers to as a “warm glow.”
Rabin (1993) argues that individuals’ interest for other’s welfare is 
conditional, viewing reciprocal kindness as the driving force of pro-social 
behavior. Feeling good about doing something nice for another may also 
depend on who the recipient is or how they react to the gift. Bénabou and 
Tirole (2006) bring in concerns for social reputation and self-respect, con-
centrating on happiness derived from others’ perceptions. Ellingsen and 
Johannesson (2008) go one step further and include the “feeling of being 
esteemed” by others, or pride. This is equal to the other’s actual esteem for 
you, weighted by how much you care about the other’s esteem.
This analysis assumes the existence of a public good or a setting where 
individuals can make gifts to others. Thus, health care workers may appre-
ciate that there is health care, they may experience a warm glow from 
helping people, or they may earn esteem from being seen to have helped 
people. It is important to think about pro-social behavior in a work envi-
ronment, where the organization as a whole, the employer, and coworkers 
are potential beneficiaries of actions. To the extent that workers exert 
more effort than is minimally required to retain their job, they may be 
acting out of interest for the welfare of any or all of these groups. At the 
same time, employers attempt to shape their employees’ behaviors using 
extrinsic and intrinsic tools.
The literature on social preferences also examines workplace behavior, 
focusing on “crowding out,” organizational goals, and norms. Kreps 
(1997), following the insights of others,2 shows how extrinsic motivation 
such as rewards and punishments may dissuade individuals from working 
as hard as they otherwise would. This is referred to as crowding out of 
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intrinsic motivation, because extrinsic motivation replaces rather than 
supplements it.
Kreps identifies two reasons why this may happen: task ambiguity and 
a change in preferences due to external cues. The first arises when the 
compensation metric is not well connected to the underlying task, 
encouraging workers to refocus effort on the metric rather than the task. 
This improves effort as it is measured, but can cause people to contribute 
less to the public good. A change in preference occurs when the effort 
previously defined as “something I do that benefits others,” changes to 
“something I do that I need to be compensated for doing.” Loosely, the 
employer teaches employees not to enjoy something by insisting that 
they need to be directly compensated for it.
A number of papers discuss how crowding out may be addressed, 
including trust (Sliwka 2007) and rewarding employees with status 
(Fershtman and Weiss 1993). Other work in this vein includes Canton 
(2005), Seabright (2004), Francois (2007), and Acemoglu, Kremer, and 
Mian (2008). The literature provides a well-vetted economic argument 
for the possibility that extrinsic incentives may crowd out intrinsic 
incentives.
Some authors have argued that the way employers respond to 
employees depends on the organization’s goals. Francois (2003) con-
cludes that a not-for-profit organization is better than a for-profit alter-
native for obtaining “care-motivated effort,” in the form of labor 
donations, even when effort earns pecuniary rewards.3 Besley and 
Ghatak (2005) extend this reasoning and emphasize mission matching 
between employers and workers. They argue that health care providers 
with stronger pro-social missions find a better match with a not-for-
profit employer and, as a consequence, will deliver the same effort for 
a lower wage.
Many authors take a different approach, examining norms, suggesting 
that individuals follow rules of behavior and earn utility from conforming 
to (or deviating from) these rules. According to Ramalingam and Rauh 
(2009), the principal, or the employer, determines the work ethic for the 
firm and the employee chooses whether or not to internalize that work 
ethic. Basu’s (2006) theory of teacher truancy in India supports the idea 
that norms are important for determining behavior in the workplace. In 
Basu’s work, however, norms are not set by the employer but preexist in 
society. Akerlof and Kranton (2008) explore these ideas more thoroughly 
to focus on how effort is monitored, arguing that “what matters is . . . how 
employees think of themselves in relation to the firm.”
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Intrinsic Motivation and Health Care: A Framework for Analysis
We now integrate these concepts from the general economics literature 
into a framework to better understand motivation’s role in health care. 
The delivery of such care combines dimensions discussed above. First, 
health care has components of a social good, because it tries to improve 
the health of patients and the population as a whole.4 Second, it occurs 
in a workplace. And third, it is subject to professional norms. Individual 
health workers draw motivation from different sources depending on 
time, place, and context. We develop a typology, focusing on the sources 
of motivation and social preferences, leading to eight types of intrinsically 
motivated physicians (table 14.1).
A first distinction is between social preferences that are other- regarding 
and self-regarding. Other-regarding orientation involves a reciprocal gift-
exchange in which effort earns the esteem of others, whereas self-regarding 
orientation corresponds to the warm glow from doing something good for 
another.
A second distinction is whether health workers see their activities as 
helping patients or peers. Other-regarding behavior can be motivated by 
desire for the esteem of patients or peers, and self-regarding behavior by 
the warm glow of doing something good for patients or for peers (the 
organization or profession, for example).
Since other-regarding patient-oriented health workers seek the esteem 
of patients, they focus on patient satisfaction, whereas self-regarding 
patient-oriented health workers focus on performance and therefore the 
patient health. Peer-oriented health workers, by contrast, focus on shared 
norms, which may not be the same as performance. Although peers are, 
by definition, better able than patients to evaluate the value of services, 
they are not always present or able to notice that value. Thus, other-
regarding behaviors—motivated by peer esteem—are more likely than 
Table 14.1 Sources of Intrinsic Motivation, Social Preferences, and Physician 
Types
Patient oriented Peer oriented (norm-based)
Neutral Identity-based Neutral Identity-based
Other-regarding Status seeking Discriminating 
status seeking
Scrutiny responsive Approval seeking
Self-regarding Altruistic Discriminating 
altruistic
Norm conforming 
(professional)
Subgroup norm 
conforming
Source: World Bank data.
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self-regarding behaviors to focus on services that are observed or noticed 
by peers.5
A third distinction is whether the health worker is differentially moti-
vated by the identity of the patient or peer. A self-regarding health 
worker may care more about the well-being of some patients than others 
(the poor, for example), and an esteem-seeking health worker may care 
more about the esteem of some patients than others (for example, the 
poor or the educated). Similarly, a peer-oriented health worker may care 
more about the esteem of some health workers than others.
The Eight Physician Types
From these social orientations and sources of intrinsic motivation, we 
construct eight physician types.6 Status seeking is a form of patient-based 
esteem, when health workers enjoy the esteem of all patients and seek 
it by providing services that increase patient satisfaction. Some health 
workers may value the esteem of particular types of patients (or devalue 
the esteem of others), so the source of motivation varies by patient 
characteristics. These health workers exhibit discriminating status seek-
ing, and seek the esteem of some patients more than others, providing 
more  satisfaction-enhancing services for the preferred group.
We choose the term altruistic to describe a health worker who gains 
utility from knowing that his or her patients are better off—even when 
those same patients may not know that they are better off, or even appre-
ciate the health worker’s efforts. This self-regarding patient-oriented 
behavior can be discriminating or nondiscriminating based on the charac-
teristics of the patients. Thus, discriminating altruistic health workers may 
feel even better when they help the poor or underserved.
A health worker with a scrutiny-responsive personality is one motivated 
by the esteem he or she earns from peers. Approval seeking is a form of 
scrutiny responsiveness; this health worker responds to some peers more 
than to others.7 Both personality types focus on services that conform to 
peer-based norms and are in some sense observable to their peers. Ideally, 
peer-based norms are also performance-enhancing services (though they 
may not achieve this). Self-regarding peer-oriented health care workers 
are not motivated by esteem from their peers, but gain utility from con-
tributing to their workplace, organization, or profession. Norm-conforming 
personalities measure themselves against the expectations (norms) of 
the entire profession, while subgroup norm–conforming personalities mea-
sure themselves against norms that apply to a smaller group of peers. 
Unlike other-regarding peer-oriented personalities, norm-conforming 
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 personalities are not exclusively focused on observable services: they gain 
utility from knowing that they have contributed, not from being recog-
nized as having contributed. When norms are general and tied to perfor-
mance, norm-conforming personalities are professionals. Professional 
health workers provide services that conform to (and improve the image 
of) the profession by improving the health, not the satisfaction, of all 
patients. Professionals resist direct control over their activities precisely 
because they believe professionalism is necessary where such control is 
not useful. In the words of Freidson (2001):
The two most general ideas underlying professionalism are the belief that 
certain work is so specialized as to be inaccessible to those lacking the 
required training and experience, and the belief that it cannot be standard-
ized, rationalized, or (as Abbott put it)8 “commodified.” 
Intrinsic Motivation in the Health Performance Model
The model of health performance in chapter 5 suggests that health work-
ers exert effort, which means that patients experience four attributes of 
a visit to a particular health care worker: presence, performance, satisfac-
tion, and expense. Effort is costly for health workers, but they get utility 
from income as well as performance, satisfaction, or expense. Extrinsically 
motivated health workers gain utility from income, and the employer of 
the health worker can choose to tie income to performance (or satisfac-
tion); intrinsically motivated workers get utility not only from income but 
also from providing the other three attributes.
A health worker can also care about performance in general, as well as 
performance in a particular environment or for a particular service. He or 
she can care about satisfaction in general, or about satisfaction for particular 
types of patients. And he or she can care about the expenditure of patients 
in general, or about the expenditure of particular types of patients.
Table 14.2 shows the weights that particular personalities place on 
each of these three attributes, as well as on income. Each column assumes 
that the health worker fits one personality exactly; in reality, many health 
workers have features of multiple personalities. The table also assumes 
that behavior norms are based on the same understanding of medical 
activities as performance—where norms exist, they improve behavior 
with respect to performance.9 Note that, to the degree that health work-
ers care about expenses, they prefer low expenses for their patients.
The following two examples illustrate how to read this table. Status-
seeking personalities weigh general satisfaction highly, and are different 
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Table 14.2 Health Worker Personalities and Utility, Weights Assigned to Service Attributes in a Physician’s Utility Function
Service attributes
Physician types
Status 
seeking
Discriminating 
status seeking Altruistic
Discriminating 
altruistic
Scrutiny 
responsive
Approval 
seeking
Norm 
conforming
Subgroup norm 
conforming
Performance
General Low Low High High Low Low High Low
Service and 
 environment 
based
Low Low Low Low High High Low High
Satisfaction
General High Low Low Low Low Low Low Low
Identity based Low High Low Low Low Low Low Low
Income Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low
Expenditure
General Low Low High Low Low Low Low Low
Identity based Low High Low High Low Low Low Low
Source: World Bank data.
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from discriminating status seekers who put a high weight on the  satisfaction 
of some patients and potentially the expenses of some patients. Norm-
conforming personalities weigh performance highly, as opposed to sub-
group norm-conforming personalities who put different weights on 
performance depending on the environment. (All personalities put a low 
weight on income.)
Intrinsic Motivation, Job Choice, and Occupational Choice
What can this framework teach us about the type of job or sector that 
certain types of health workers choose, or even about the kind of indi-
vidual who would choose to be a health worker? A career in health care 
provides the opportunity to earn money, esteem, and self-satisfaction. 
Different jobs and subsectors may differ in income, kinds of patients 
served, and esteem from peers or patients. How much more likely are 
certain types of health workers to choose certain types of jobs, or certain 
subsectors of work, such as a rural or urban area, public health or clinical 
care, hospital or clinic, and high-infected, high-risk areas or low-infected, 
low-risk areas?
No matter what their motivation, all health workers are concerned 
about income. Though some ignore monetary compensation when choos-
ing to work hard, they still care how much they are paid. Consider, for 
example, a purely extrinsically motivated health worker and a profes-
sional health worker, each choosing between a low-incentive, low-effort 
public sector job and high-incentive, high-effort private work. The extrin-
sically motivated worker compares the two sectors and chooses the one 
that works out best. But because he or she is only motivated to provide 
effort by extrinsic motivation, the worker finds it hard to decide: the 
income is preferred in the high-incentive job, but the required effort is 
higher as well. The professional health worker, however, provides high 
effort in either sector, but in the high-incentive sector is well paid to do 
what he or she likes, and will be surrounded by other workers delivering 
high effort. This self-sorting may cause the high-incentive sector to 
deliver high quality and the low-incentive sector to deliver low quality.
Or it may not. If the high-incentive sector compensates health workers 
for some services but not others, the extrinsically motivated health 
worker will do only those things that are compensated. The professional 
continues to provide high quality but the extrinsically motivated health 
worker does not. Moreover, the very fact that the high-incentive sector is 
attractive to the extrinsically motivated may cause other health workers 
to hold everyone in that sector in low esteem. Recall that the peer 
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esteem-seeking health worker gets utility from the esteem of peers, and 
this esteem drives his or her willingness to exert effort. So if health work-
ers perceive the high-incentive sector as less worthy, they will not esteem 
people who work in that sector. This will lower the utility of many intrin-
sically motivated health workers but will not influence the extrinsically 
motivated provider. The difference in pay and effort across sectors may 
thus have adverse consequences on the choices of professional health 
workers.
The same reasoning applies to the job choice of status-seeking health 
workers who care about patient esteem. If patients no longer esteem 
health workers who are paid for their every action, patient-oriented 
 status-seeking health workers may prefer to work elsewhere.
Altruistic health workers have similar complications. They feel a warm 
glow when providing health care to others. Like professional health work-
ers, they provide high effort and are therefore attracted to the high-
incentive sector. Because they do not draw motivation from peers or 
patients, they are not concerned with how these two groups perceive 
them. They are concerned, however, with the fees that their patients have 
to pay and with the types of patients they are likely to see. So if the high-
incentive sector charges higher fees than the low-incentive sector, or is in 
a place that isolates them from poorer patients, their utility declines (but 
not the utility of extrinsically motivated health workers).
In short, facing choices between multiple jobs that differ in incentives, 
professional and altruistic health workers may choose work environ-
ments that compensate them well for their efforts, even when compen-
sation is not their main concern. But a perverse and opposite result is 
also possible. A high-incentive job could attract health workers moti-
vated only by money and who do not provide any effort that is not 
compensated, leaving professional and altruistic health workers in the 
low-incentive sector.
The same reasoning can be applied to career choice, or the choice of 
whether to work in health. Individuals who enjoy warm glow may choose 
a job outside the health sector, as may individuals who care about esteem. 
For example, if health care professionals perceive the health sector as 
transformed into a lucrative, profit-oriented, pay-for-service industry, 
then those who look to help the poor, feel good about helping the poor, 
or derive utility from high esteem may be driven from the health sector. 
Such a result would not come from the increase in pay for health workers 
but from its direct link to effort, and illustrates the occupational choice 
variant of crowding out of intrinsic motivation.
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Empirical Evidence
This section discusses direct and indirect empirical evidence on motiva-
tion. We rely on evidence from three sources: qualitative research 
(interviews), laboratory experiments (asking subjects to make decisions 
in controlled situations), and quantitative survey evidence of actual 
behavior. The qualitative research is especially interesting when com-
bined with quantitative evidence, and we use it in this way. But we 
cannot observe motivation directly—we can only measure its manifesta-
tion. We summarize existing evidence on motivation’s impact on behav-
ior, and then discuss evidence on the possible sources of motivation.
The Impact of Motivation on Behavior
Experimental evidence. Most recent evidence on motivation, drawn 
from the experimental literature, comes from developed-country set-
tings. That literature shows a common focus on comparing intrinsic and 
extrinsic (usually monetary) motivations. The advantage of laboratory 
experiments comes from controlling payoffs and the ways that individu-
als can earn them. While motivation remains unobservable, the experi-
ment can be designed to test the source of variation in behavior—for 
example, revealing whether people make decisions solely for their own 
benefit or for that of others.
Pro-social behavior has been documented in countless laboratory 
experiments. In public-good games, where individuals are asked to con-
tribute to the general good, Goeree, Holt, and Laury (2002) and Andreoni 
(1995) show self-regarding and other-regarding motivations, respectively. 
Results from a range of experimental settings show that individual behav-
ior cannot be explained by self-interest alone (Andreoni and Miller 2002; 
Forsythe and others 1994; Palfrey and Prisbrey 1996, 1997). Many studies 
document gift exchange in the workplace to explain how workers decide 
on effort (Akerlof 1982; Gneezy and List 2006; Gneezy and Rustichini 
2000; Rigdon 2002). This evidence from relatively simple games forms the 
foundation for a more detailed look into pro-social attitudes among work-
ers. While the evidence for pro-social behavior is overwhelming, how to 
interpret the sources of this social behavior remains a crucial  challenge.
Some studies examine how individuals react to combinations of intrin-
sic and extrinsic motivation. Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) conducted 
experiments that paid some subjects to do a task but not others. Higher 
compensation induced higher effort if offered at the outset, but when 
subjects were moved from no compensation to compensation,  performance 
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was lower. In an investigation of taxi drivers in New York (using actual 
data, not laboratory experiments), Farber (2008) found that many set a 
target income, taking leisure after reaching their goal for the day, and 
forgoing income if the goal was reached before normal quitting hours. 
This is counterintuitive because it means that when their effective wage 
increased (earning more in less time) they stopped working earlier, not 
later as economic theory would predict.
Dohmen and Falk (2011) also illustrate the consequences of motiva-
tion for selection. They find that different experimental payment schemes 
systematically attract people with different abilities, preferences, self-
assessments, personalities, and gender. In other words, health worker 
performance may differ by sector because each sector attracts health 
workers with varying levels of motivation.
Other quantitative evidence. Encouraged by increasing awareness among 
economists that behavioral traits can influence labor market outcomes,10 
nonexperimental evidence is emerging, though less voluminous, on moti-
vation’s role. The quantitative evidence of intrinsic motivation focuses on 
observed differences in worker behavior that can be explained either by 
qualitatively described sources of motivation or by theoretical models of 
intrinsic motivation. Green, Machin, and Wilkenson (1998), are a good 
example of the first, reporting that U.K. employers cite deficits in candi-
dates’ motivation and attitudes as the primary reason for recruitment 
problems. Rotolo and Wilson (2004) find evidence of “higher civic mind-
edness” (measured by people’s likelihood to volunteer outside the work-
place) of nonprofit employees. They find a positive correlation between 
that and job type.
Similarly, Gregg and others (2008) compare donated labor, measured 
as unpaid overtime, in “caring industries,” between public (not-for-profit) 
and private (for-profit) organizations. Those with more unpaid overtime 
have “high public service motivation.” They find that people working in 
caring industries are more likely to choose a job in the public sector. But 
they also generate evidence that people who switch between the private 
and public sectors do not change their propensity to put in extra hours 
after switching.
Jaffré and Olivier de Sardan (2003) conclude that health worker moti-
vation is important, after carrying out anthropological research on health 
care delivery in seven capital cities in Francophone Africa. In Ethiopia the 
primary motivation students identify for becoming a health worker is “to 
help people” (Serneels, Lindelöw, and Montalivo 2004).
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Using data on final-year medical and nursing students, Serneels and 
others (2007) concentrate on social preferences as their proxy for motiva-
tion and find that those who are more motivated to help the poor are 
more likely to choose a job in rural areas. Using a similar approach, they 
confirm these results for a joint analysis of Ethiopia and Rwanda (Serneels 
and others 2010) and for Ghana (Akleh 2009), suggesting that the results 
from studies by Rotolo and Wilson and by Gregg and others are relevant 
for health workers.
Interviews with health workers in Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Ghana sug-
gest that certain positions attract more motivated health workers than 
others (Lievens, Lindelöw, and Serneels 2009; Lindelöw and Serneels 
2006; Serneels and Lievens 2008). In all three countries, health workers 
who choose to work in rural areas are perceived as having a stronger 
vocation and more motivation. Those working at for-profit private 
facilities are perceived to be more money oriented and less intrinsically 
motivated, while those working in not-for-profit facilities are perceived 
to be more motivated.
The evidence is also important for the sector that health workers enter. 
Serra, Serneels, and Barr (2010) find evidence in Ethiopia that philan-
thropically motivated health professionals, as measured by experimental 
and survey measures, self-select the not-for-profit sector (rather than the 
public and for-profit sectors) and find confirming evidence for Besley and 
Ghatak’s (2005) prediction that mission matching increases organization 
efficiency.11 Serneels and others (2010), using panel data for Ethiopia, 
show that unobserved individual willingness to work in rural areas, after 
controlling for monetary incentives, are also highly correlated with prox-
ies of intrinsic motivation, and predict sector choice.
Leonard and Masatu (2008) show how the Hawthorne effect  (chapter 5) 
demonstrates intrinsic motivation in the average clinician in outpatient 
settings in Tanzania. When a peer arrives to observe a clinician, that clini-
cian initially increases effort greatly to earn the esteem of the peer. When 
the peer does not provide feedback, however, the clinician no longer 
experiences pride from earning esteem of the peer, causing him or her to 
return to previous effort, even while the peer is still observing. When 
clinicians are motivated only by extrinsic concerns, they will ignore the 
peer if they believe the peer cannot help or hurt their position, or they 
will strive to impress the peer independent of feedback if they believe the 
peer can help or hurt them. The analysis shows that only intrinsic 
 motivation, here as peer esteem, can explain the pattern observed by the 
Hawthorne effect.
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Leonard, Masatu, and Vialou (2007) and Leonard and Masatu (2010b) 
compare the performance of public, private, and nongovernmental orga-
nization (NGO) employees in Tanzania, showing that competence does 
not fully explain their effort. Clinicians in NGOs and private facilities 
provide better care even without higher training. Although this result 
does not distinguish between extrinsic and intrinsic sources of motiva-
tion, it does demonstrate the importance of work environment in moti-
vating health worker effort.
Leonard and Masatu (2010a) attempt to measure whether clinicians 
are professional in their job, as defined above. They find that clinicians 
demonstrate three types of behavior: high levels of rewarded and unre-
warded effort, high levels of rewarded effort and low levels of unrewarded 
effort, and low levels of both types of effort. Professionally motivated 
clinicians and altruistic clinicians should exert high rewarded and unre-
warded effort because they highly value the profession and patients’ 
health, respectively. Peer esteem-seeking clinicians only provide high 
effort for services and activities that are observed by their peers. Health 
workers who are not motivated by professionalism or esteem will provide 
low levels of observed and unobserved effort.
Using this typology to classify clinicians in their study area (Arusha 
region, Tanzania), Leonard and Masatu find that approximately 20 per-
cent of clinicians show behavior consistent with professional or altruistic 
behavior, providing high rewarded and unrewarded effort. These clini-
cians are almost evenly distributed across the public, not-for-profit, and 
private for-profit sectors. Combined with the findings from Leonard and 
Masatu (2007), which considers the same study area, this suggests that 
professional or altruistic health workers are a key source of high-quality 
care—and that while “nonprofessional” clinicians in the public sector 
provide low levels of observed effort, those in the not-for-profit and pri-
vate for-profit sectors provide high effort. In short, these institutions 
motivate people who are not self-motivated.
Explaining and Changing Health Worker Motivation
The natural way to look at intrinsic motivation is to consider it an indi-
vidual “preference” or “taste,” with some health workers having higher 
motivation than others for unexplained reasons. Economic analysis usu-
ally takes this approach. But, as for other personality traits, this raises the 
question of whether intrinsic motivation is constant over time, and the 
deeper question of whether it is innate—predetermined by genetics or 
early childhood experiences—or the result of socialization.
Intrinsic Motivation       271
Although we know very little about the latter, evidence shed light on 
the former. Serneels and others (2004) find that pro-social preferences 
among health workers have a part that is stable over time. They also observe 
changes over time, however, suggesting that intrinsic motivation consists 
of time-variant and time-invariant parts, fitting with the notion that intrin-
sic motivation is internalized norms over time (Deci, Cascio, and Krusell 
1975)—and since norms may change, motivation may also change.
We now examine the evidence and theory that support changes in 
motivation based first on norms and then esteem.
Norms. Most evidence on norms comes from experiments and, referring 
to a range of social preferences, shows how group culture can alter behav-
ior. Experiments show that subjects in teams may punish socially ineffi-
cient behavior of group members and so elicit greater cooperation.12 
Carpenter (2002) finds that familiarity between subjects seems to 
improve the efficacy of punishment in public-good games, suggesting that 
group stability may be important. When both reward and punishment are 
allowed, efficiency may be even further improved (Dickinson 2001; 
Sefton, Shupp, and Walker 2007).
A number of studies analyze the interplay of workplace norms and 
financial incentives. Playing the role of workers in a laboratory experi-
ment, subjects delivered more effort when wages were set higher, 
explained as behaving according to norms—to share fairly and recipro-
cate acts of generosity (box 14.2; Charness 2004; Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and 
Box 14.2
Generosity, Workplace Norms, and Protocol Adherence
A recently completed study in Arusha Region of Tanzania, financed in part by the 
World Bank, examined pro-social tendencies in a laboratory setting. After giving 
health workers money, the researchers measured how much the health workers 
were willing to share with strangers in another room whom they would never 
meet (known in the economics literature as the “dictator game”). About 37 per-
cent of the health workers in this study gave at least half of the money they 
received to the stranger, even though they knew they would receive nothing in 
return and the recipient would never know who gave them the money. The 
researchers (Brock, Lange and Leonard) explore the implication of the assumption 
(continued next page)
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that these clinicians are more generous than those who did not share at least half 
of the money. Comparing the sample of generous and not generous doctors, the 
researchers examine clinicians’ adherence to medical protocol in the outpatient 
setting. They find that generous doctors provide almost 10 percent higher quality 
than those who are not generous. This suggests a strong association between a 
simple form of intrinsic motivation and health care quality.
In addition, they look at how the health workers in the sample react to peer 
scrutiny (the Hawthorne effect) and an encouragement intervention in which 
health workers were asked by a peer to work harder and then visited about six 
weeks later (box table 14.2.1). (See Brock 2011 for details of the study and the 
interventions.)
Box Table 14.2.1 Protocol Adherence and Changes in Protocol Adherence 
for Generous Doctors
Public Voluntary sector Private
All Generous All Generous All Generous
Proportion of doctors who are generous in each sector
32 35 48
Baseline protocol adherence for the reference patient
77 84 (+7) 87 (+10) 87 (+10) 95 (+18) 82 (+5)
Percentage point change in protocol adherence when faced with peer scrutiny
+7 +4 −3 (N.S.) −3 (N.S.) −10 −1 (N.S.)
Percentage point change in protocol adherence six weeks after encouragement visit
+17 +17 −2 (N.S.) +3 (N.S.) −2 (N.S.) +12
Source: Brock, Lange, and Leonard.
Note: A linear regression model and the use of a reference patient allows adherence to exceed 
100 percent in a few cases. N.S. = not significant at the 10 percent level.
Box table 14.2.1 shows four comparisons: the percent of doctors in each sector 
who are labeled as generous; the protocol adherence of doctors in each of three 
sectors (public, voluntary sector, and private) by whether they are labeled as gen-
erous; the change in protocol adherence for each of these doctors when faced 
with peer scrutiny; and the change in protocol adherence for the same doctors 
six weeks after the encouragement visit.
Generous doctors are found in all three sectors, particularly the public. Coun-
ter to prevailing assumptions, the only sector more likely to have generous  doctors 
is the private.
Confirming most studies in Africa, the baseline quality of care is lowest in 
the public sector and highest in the private sector. In the public sector, 
(continued next page)
Box 14.2 (continued)
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 generous  doctors provide higher quality care than other doctors do (7 percent-
age points higher than their public sector peers). In the private sector, both 
types provide higher quality care than the public sector, but generous doctors 
provide lower quality care than others in the private sector (5 percentage 
points higher than the average public sector doctor compared to 18 percent-
age points higher). There is no difference between generous and nongenerous 
doctors in the NGO sector.
In the public sector, both generous and nongenerous doctors change their 
behavior when faced with peer scrutiny, but NGO doctors do not change their 
behavior. In the private sector, nongenerous doctors do less when faced with 
peer scrutiny but generous doctors do not change their behavior.
In the public sector, both generous and nongenerous doctors exhibit a large 
change in behavior after the encouragement (17 percentage point increase in 
quality, over a 20 percent increase in quality). NGO doctors, on the other hand, do 
not change their behavior. In the private sector, generous doctors raise their qual-
ity by 12 percentage points over their baseline, but nongenerous doctors have no 
change in behavior.
These results suggest that generosity is important when there is weak supervi-
sion and few extrinsic reasons to care for patients; generosity improves public 
sector doctors’ performance but not NGO or private sector doctors, who have 
other reasons to provide high quality care. Being observed by a peer changes the 
setting for a public sector doctor and encourages him or her to do more; it does 
not change the setting much for an NGO sector doctor, who interacts more fre-
quently with his peers. The presence of a peer can cause a private sector doctor 
to do less, suggesting that private sector doctors may be over-providing care 
under normal circumstances.
It would be surprising if NGO sector doctors improved care when told that 
their work is important; they should already know this. Public sector doctors are 
clearly missing this encouragement, information, and attention in their normal 
settings. Some private sector doctors also respond positively to encouragement, 
suggesting it is absent from their normal practices.
If we think of peer scrutiny and encouragement as alterations to incentives 
that health workers usually face, we see changes in behavior resulting from these 
alterations as evidence of workplace norms that are not optimally exploited for 
improving quality of care. These findings support this chapter’s view that there are 
multiple sources of motivation and that existing workplace norms are one of the 
more important sources of intrinsic motivation.
Box 14.2 (continued)
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Riedl 1993). Some work shows how extrinsic incentives may crowd out 
efficiency-enhancing social norms (Huck, Kubler, and Weibull 2003).
Other illustrations on the role of workplace norms in motivation come 
from nonexperimental evidence. Bartel and others (2004), studying dif-
ferent branches of the same U.S. bank, found that employee attitudes 
differ between workplaces, affecting workplace productivity. Bandiera, 
Barankay, and Rasul (2005), identifying group characteristics like size, 
homogeneity of nationality, skills that affect behavior, argued that collu-
sion, not altruism, drives cooperation between workers. Finally, Hamilton 
and others (2003) show how a shift from individual pay to group perfor-
mance pay can greatly change (in their case raise) productivity. Here, too, 
is evidence on the interplay between workplace culture and incentives.
Applied to the health sector, the evidence suggests substantial differ-
ences in workplace norms across facilities. A specific example is between 
sectors. With differences in effort norms, remuneration schemes, and the 
types of health workers they attract, facilities in the private for-profit sector 
may develop an entirely different workplace culture than public or non-
profit operations. This difference may translate to client services. Interviews 
in Rwanda indicate that private for-profit facilities are more client oriented, 
but also more money oriented, and have a heavier work load, while health 
workers in not-for-profit facilities have a reputation for being dedicated. 
Public sector facilities are perceived as having weak work ethics.
Professional norms also affect motivation. Workers typically acquire 
norms in professional training, and survey evidence suggests that norms’ 
strength can vary across schools (Serneels and others 2007). Professional 
organizations enforce such norms. Norms’ importance in motivation is 
perhaps best reflected in the Hippocratic Oath, where doctors take a vow 
to “treat the sick to the best of one’s ability.”
Additional group or society-wide norms influence motivation. Growing 
evidence shows how religious norms may play a role, with religious work-
ers described as “more committed” (Lievens and others 2011) and found 
to be less absent in Uganda (Reinikka and Svensson 2003). Health work-
ers in Rwanda frequently use religious terms to describe the importance 
of intrinsic motivation, with words like vocation and apostolate to 
describe their own motivation. Serneels and others (2007) find that stu-
dents from a Catholic NGO school in Ethiopia are more philanthropic 
than students from other schools. Religious norms may also lead to sepa-
rate institutions. Serneels and others (2010) discuss how the funding of 
Adventists in Rwanda is organized as a local bonding scheme, encourag-
ing health students to take up a job in a rural area.
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As discussed, recent evidence from experimental and survey work 
indicates that group and workplace norms and culture can strongly affect 
individual motivation and behavior. Barr, Lindelöw, and Serneels (2009) 
provide some specific evidence for health workers. Conducting a labora-
tory game with health workers in Ethiopia to test for embezzlement, they 
find that when the game is framed as health care delivery, the standard 
deviation in embezzlement increases, and more experienced workers 
embezzling more. They interpret this as evidence that health workers 
have socialized into corrupt behavior: they have revised their preference 
or reference point and adapted their behavior.
Esteem. Earning esteem is a crucial source of motivation for health work-
ers with other-regarding preferences. Low motivation among health 
workers who derive esteem from peers thus indicates that they do not 
believe their effort will earn esteem. The Hawthorne effect demonstrates 
what happens when a health worker has the opportunity to earn esteem: 
effort rises significantly. So, if effort is normally low, it means that these 
health workers are not presented with an opportunity to earn esteem. 
The lack of such opportunity is apparent in the isolated rural practitioners 
described in chapter 5: they are required to travel to town to meet with 
their peers or supervisors and have no chance to earn esteem from their 
daily activities.
Those who seek esteem from patients are presented with opportuni-
ties for esteem with every service they provide. Esteem is earned, how-
ever, from patient satisfaction, not performance. These health workers 
may, in fact, be satisfied with the esteem they earn from patients, but this 
does not translate into high-quality care because patients may value the 
wrong services. This is what health workers themselves argue: if they do 
the right thing, patients are not satisfied.
There is more to this. It has been well documented (perhaps most 
convincingly by Jaffré and Olivier 2003) that clinicians in Francophone 
Africa are often rude to their patients, appearing unconcerned with 
patient esteem. This can be explained in two ways: either these health 
workers gain no utility from esteem, or the interaction is not “salient.” 
Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008) argue that esteem is earned only from 
salient interactions—that is, you must value the other person in the inter-
action before you care whether they esteem you. This view fits the typical 
health situation more accurately: health workers do not respect their 
patients and so do not care about their opinions. It is not difficult to see 
how this can lead to a bad equilibrium outcome, where health workers 
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provide no effort because they do not care about the esteem of patients, 
and patients do not esteem health workers because the health workers 
provide low effort. How can we break this vicious circle?
Still, when health workers try to exert more effort than normal, 
patients notice and appreciate the change (Leonard 2008). So, although 
the doctors might earn esteem from doing the wrong thing, they also earn 
esteem from doing the right thing. What remains to be seen is whether 
there is a way to get health workers to value their patients’ esteem and to 
get patients to deliver esteem noticeably to health workers.
If esteem is to become a type of currency in the health care system, its 
value will come from its scarcity. If every patient esteems every health 
worker, no health worker will value esteem. The advantage of esteem as 
currency is that, whereas income is held by the wealthy and not by the 
poor, esteem is held more evenly across the economic spectrum. There is 
a stock of potential esteem in rural and poor Africa, whereas the financial 
resources necessary for a functioning health system are held in the capital 
or economic strongholds. Esteem can never pay for medicine or feed the 
family of a health worker, but it can be currency that encourages the 
health worker to provide more effort.
Conclusion
Intrinsic motivation plays an important role in the decision to become a 
health worker, what sector to work in, whether to exert effort, and what 
services to provide. But it is not as simple as an internal drive to do the 
right thing. This chapter shows that various types of motivation, and the 
resultant personalities of health workers, are driven by different environ-
mental factors, and that these types and personalities can lead to differ-
ences in quality of care, by sector and patient.
The literature on intrinsic motivation in health care in Africa shows 
that such motivation is inadequate to ensure high-quality care across the 
system, but that, nonetheless, many health workers provide services 
mainly because they care about their patients. This suggests that many 
health workers might be motivated by extrinsic motivation, but it also 
suggests that extrinsic motivation may adversely influence those who are 
intrinsically motivated.
The chapter raises the possibility of crowding out, where increases in 
extrinsic incentives change who decides to be a health worker, who enters 
what sector, and (potentially) how health workers feel about their patients. 
Whereas extrinsic motivation must become a greater concern in  improving 
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health worker performance, care should be taken to understand intrinsic 
motivation and the impact of extrinsic incentives on intrinsically moti-
vated health workers.
Experimental evidence suggests that norms change and that this can 
lead to changes in behavior. Many health workers in Africa have long 
worked in an environment that discourages effort and tolerates activities 
that fail to improve the population’s health. At the same time, organiza-
tions (public and private, for example) have different norms, raising the 
possibility that all health workers can gain utility from collectively fol-
lowing different sets of norms. On less evidence, the same could be said 
for esteem: health workers who ignore their patients’ esteem may gain 
utility from esteem in different sets of circumstances.
Notes
 1. See, for instance, Deci, Cascio, and Krusell (1975).
 2. Deci 1971, 1972; Deci, Cascio, and Krusell 1975.
 3. The theory relies on a residual claimant story, where the individual worker 
prefers not to donate extra effort in the event that their boss is the one to gain 
from the work. If, instead, a worthy cause reaps the rewards from extra work, 
the pro-social worker is more likely to donate additional labor. Since the 
result holds even when effort earns extrinsic rewards, there is no crowding 
out; organizations with a culture of profits elicit fewer “labor donations” than 
organizations with a nonprofit culture.
 4. Whether health is a public good (as defined in economics) is not important 
to an individual’s pro-social preferences. What matters is whether health is 
seen as contributing to the welfare of society and whether there is a social 
construct that individuals deserve good health.
 5. Peers can evaluate the services of a health worker even when they are not 
physically present. Referral systems, for example, facilitate peer evaluation 
and feedback, although generally proximity improves the chances of seeking 
and earning peer esteem.
 6. Note that these types describe physicians with respect to intrinsic motivation 
and do not exhaustively classify physicians with respect to other types of 
motivation.
 7. We do not consider the desire to impress one’s employer as part of these as it 
is typically driven by extrinsic motivation, namely to obtain promotion or a 
pay raise. Of course, this may lead to some peers being held in high regard, 
and other health workers more anxious to seek their approval.
 8. See Abbott (1991).
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 9. Thus, we do not consider norms that make behavior worse such a “norm” to 
mistreat patients; this would be the absence of a positive norm in the view we 
have here. In addition, we are not allowing for norms over other aspects of 
care such as patient satisfaction.
 10. For instance, Bowles, Gintis, and Osborne (2001) and Heckman, Stixrud, and 
Urzua (2006).
 11. It may seem odd to single out the nonprofit sector. In principle, we would 
expect the public sector and public servants to be motivated by the notion of 
public service, a mission that, especially in a poor country, seems closer to 
philanthropy than profit maximization. In many low-income countries, how-
ever, including Ethiopia, the original mission of the public sector—to provide 
adequate health services to all segments of the population—has been eroded 
by decades of central planning, weak monetary incentives, and poor account-
ability, leading to widespread opportunism on the part of public health care 
providers (Lindelöw and Serneels 2006).
 12. For instance, Ostrom, Walker, and Gardner (1992) and Fehr and Gächter 
(2000).
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Facility-Level Human Resource 
Management
Christophe Lemière, Christine Mahoney, and 
Jennifer Nyoni
Researchers have widely explored human resource management (HRM) at 
the central level. This chapter focuses on management at the facility level 
and its impact on health worker motivation. HRM is an important factor 
in health workers’ performance, but researchers have paid little attention 
to it in Africa. Several features of health systems—including management 
training and accountability—can make decentralization of human resource 
decision making and supportive management styles more prevalent, two 
“success factors” that are rare in African public health systems.
What Is Effective Human Resource Management?
HRM can be defined simply as the institutional and behavioral ways the 
following decisions are made: recruitment, selection, allocation, perfor-
mance appraisal, compensation, promotion, ongoing training, career 
development, retention, safety, employee discipline, termination, and 
transfers.1 An effective human resource manager motivates workers to 
perform by aligning workers’ goals with those of the organization and 
narrowing the gap between an employee’s ability and performance.
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A review of the extensive theoretical literature on effective HRM is 
far beyond the scope of this chapter,2 and its usefulness would be limited 
because no evidence on African health sectors is available to confirm 
(or deny) its theoretical propositions. So, we focus on two HRM “best 
practices.”3
• Decentralization of HRM decision making to the local level, or increasing 
line managers’ autonomy. This can be effective because line managers 
have the most accurate and current information on health workers’ 
ability, effort, and performance.4
• Supportive management styles. This practice can have a positive impact 
on employee performance.5 A supportive manager treats employees 
fairly, grants them appropriate autonomy in completing tasks,6 and pro-
vides feedback that motivates the employee to develop skills. For feed-
back to motivate in this way, it must focus on specific behaviors that 
the employee can control, use subjective behavioral terms, and be given 
at the appropriate time and place.
We hypothesize that, to observe these best practices, managers 
need to:
• Be adequately trained in management skills, particularly in a supportive 
management style.
• Have adequate autonomy in their decision making to manage effectively.
• Have consistent incentives and be accountable to manage effectively. 
These incentives can come from numerous motivational sources; some 
examples are managers’ pay structure, their access to adequate 
resources, and how they are monitored. Conversely, managers should 
not have incentives that compete with effective management of their 
subordinates (such as getting paid more to do off-site training than to 
manage on-site).
Our simple analytical framework is summarized in figure 15.1.
Improving Health Worker Performance through Human 
Resource Management
Data are scarce on health worker performance in Africa. Because of this 
scarcity, and because some studies exist on African health workers’ moti-
vation, we use motivation as a proxy for performance (Dieleman and 
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others 2006). This section explores evidence on how the  above-mentioned 
best practices in HRM—decentralization and supportive management 
styles—improve motivation.
Giving Line Managers Autonomy in Decision Making 
(HRM Decentralization)
HRM decentralization grants line managers the autonomy to recruit, 
appraise performance, and reward or sanction their staff, rather than defer 
these decisions to higher level off-site managers. This autonomy can be 
effective because line managers have daily interaction with employees, 
giving them the most accurate information on how employees perform, 
leading to better-informed performance appraisals.
Few African countries have this kind of decentralization, at least in the 
government sector, and its implementation has usually been partial, 
inconsistent, or both. Ghana and Tanzania offer relevant examples. In 
these countries, substantial efforts have been made to decentralize HRM, 
but line managers still cannot hire or fire workers, except casual staff 
(WHO 2009).
An important success factor for health sector decentralization is “to 
ensure that the newly empowered organization is required to deliver 
clearly identifiable and measurable objectives. At the same time, the 
Figure 15.1 A Simple Framework for Analyzing Relationships between 
Management and Health Workers’ Performance
adequate
training of
managers
HR management
decentralization
HR management
supportive
styles
other factors of
health workers’
performance
consistent incentives for
managers
(accountability mechanisms
and compensation schemes)
sufficient
decision
space granted
to managers
Health workers’
performance
Source: World Bank data.
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 organization is given the necessary resources and discretion over their use, 
to permit these objectives to be met” (Ensor and Ronoh 2005). That has 
rarely happened in Africa, especially in health.
Previous studies have assessed the impact of such decentralization on 
African health sectors, and all conclude that there is either no impact or 
that it is negative (Kolehmainen-Aitken 2004; Wang and others 2002). 
But, these studies explored only the government sector. Because most 
countries have not fully decentralized government HRM, these studies do 
not paint the full picture.
Thus one must look at the private sector to assess the impact of HRM 
decentralization in Africa.7 For full decentralization—where facility 
 managers are granted resources and decision rights in line with their 
objectives—the best evidence comes from Tanzania (Leonard and Masatu 
2008; Mliga 2003).
In 1996 Mliga studied performance of clinicians in government-run 
facilities and private not-for-profit (faith-based) facilities, along one 
dimension: the quality of care. He collected information through direct 
clinical observations. Mliga ranked facilities by degree of decentraliza-
tion,8 defining a facility as fully decentralized if the manager had the 
power to recruit and fire workers, set salaries, and pay these salaries. This 
HRM structure was found only in the not-for-profit private sector; the 
government-run facilities were constrained by highly centralized HRM.
Mliga found a significant association between the degree of decentral-
ization and the quality of care provided by clinicians. This association 
was even stronger for one component of quality: attentiveness, which has 
been shown in other studies to be more strongly related to clinicians’ 
motivation than to their experience or technical skills (Leonard and 
Masatu 2008). Mliga concluded that “local control of personnel, along 
with staff salaries linked to facility revenues, gives health care providers 
the incentive to provide quality service and to attract clients” (Mliga 
2003, 220).
Leonard and Masatu (2008) performed a similar analysis from 2001 to 
2003 in Tanzania, measuring various confounding factors in each facility: 
staffing and training levels, availability of drugs and equipment, and pos-
sible Hawthorne effects. They found that even after controlling for these 
factors the association between degree of decentralization and quality of 
care provided by clinicians remained strong and positive.
They conclude: “the success of these [private] organizations is not due 
to the greater capacity of their employees nor to the presence of large 
numbers of professional clinicians, but rather to their ability to get each 
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clinician to work at levels closer to their ability. As such, this finding adds 
empirical weight to the argument that management, not simply training 
or medicines, must be addressed in order to improve health care in devel-
oping countries” (Leonard and Masatu 2008, 21).
Adopting Supportive Management Styles with Health Workers
Decentralizing HRM will result in more autonomy for health manag-
ers’ decision making, but this may not be enough to improve effective-
ness of health workers’ management. Managers must also be trained in 
HRM. This training should help managers relate to their employees 
and master technical tools, such as HRM strategic planning, in order to 
improve performance. Indeed, supportive monitoring (as opposed to 
“controlling” monitoring) is widely acknowledged as a major source of 
motivation and job satisfaction. Frustration from a lack of “supportive 
monitoring” was noted by a Tanzanian health worker: “The supervision 
is not friendly and lovingly done. (…) You can see two people having 
papers and pen in their hands coming asking questions like a police-
man; it is not a friendly one but faults-finding supervision” (Manongi, 
Marchant, and Bygbjerg 2006).
We focus on two aspects of supportive monitoring, both with available 
evidence on African health sectors: fairness and respect displayed by line 
managers to their employees, and autonomy granted by line managers to 
employees in completing their tasks.
Being fair and respectful with workers. An important body of literature 
shows that fairness and respect by managers contribute greatly to work-
ers’ motivation and job satisfaction.9 For instance, in behavioral econom-
ics, Ellingsen and Johannesson (2007) argue that
Economic theory generally, and the principal-agent model specifically, 
emphasize the role of material incentives. The standard assumption is that 
people work hard only if they receive monetary compensation for doing so. 
However, a substantial body of evidence contradicts the standard economic 
model. Many salaried academics, for example, work diligently year after year, 
continuing to exert themselves as they approach retirement, although finan-
cial incentives are then usually absent. (…) While workers appreciate mon-
etary rewards, they also get utility from what (they believe) others think 
about them. Thus, employers can pay their workers with a combination of 
monetary rewards and respect. 
(Ellingsen and Johannesson 2007, p. 135).
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Evidence on African health sectors shows that health workers highly 
value fairness and respect by managers. A survey of health workers in 
Uganda found that an important cause of motivation was how respectful 
a supervisor was to them.10 Gilson, Palmer, and Schneider (2005) 
observed similar responses in South Africa. In Malawi, McAuliffe (2009a) 
explored the relationship between job satisfaction and interaction with 
managers, finding that managers’ honesty and fairness could explain 45 
percent of variance in job satisfaction. In this study health workers 
appeared to be motivated more by “procedural justice” (the HRM deci-
sion-making process used by managers) than by “distributive justice” 
(how equitable the results of the HRM decisions are).
Conversely, health workers’ motivation can be strongly effected when 
they are abused by managers. Punitive, subjective feedback can be ver-
bally abusive. This behavior does not seem rare, at least in Uganda, where 
24 percent of health workers reported having been recently abused 
(physically, emotionally, or verbally) by their managers (Hagopian and 
others 2009).
While showing respect is probably a question of adequate training for 
managers, fair decision making seems much more difficult to implement. 
Managers may learn to show employees respect through management 
training. But fairness in HRM decisions is not just a matter of a manager’s 
attitude—it is also influenced by the legal and organizational constraints 
managers face every day.
With the rampaging clientelism in African public sectors,11 manage-
ment decisions (local or central) are rarely based on an accurate appraisal 
of health workers’ performance. To restore some neutrality in health 
workers’ appraisal, a promising solution lies in pay-for-performance (P4P) 
schemes, currently rolled out in Rwanda and Burundi. A key feature of 
these schemes is external appraisal of health facility performance—and 
indirectly of health workers’ performance (chapter 13). This external and 
therefore neutral evaluation can reduce clientelism and nepotism in 
rewarding health workers.
Granting autonomy to health workers in completing their tasks. Another 
aspect of a supportive management style is giving workers autonomy in 
their tasks. Many management specialists have shown that task autonomy 
can increase a sense of empowerment, and therefore performance, of 
workers. Tendler (1994) found that health community workers in Brazil 
performed more effectively when they had wide autonomy in their 
duties, even when carrying out tasks beyond their job descriptions.
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Similar evidence has not been found in Africa, where many health 
 workers seem to value precise job descriptions and detailed operating 
procedures. In Mali, for example, a study reported that “lack of a clear job 
description” is a major demotivating factor for health workers.12 Similarly 
in Malawi, McAuliffe (2009b) found that “control over practice” (the 
ability to carry out tasks not explicitly mentioned in one’s job descrip-
tion) contributed much less than “management support” in explaining 
health worker motivation.
These disturbing results could be related to other African non-health 
case studies showing that worker performance increases when standard 
operating procedures are introduced (D’Iribarne and Henry 2007). This 
suggests that more “red tape” may lead to better performance, a result 
that contradicts management theories. Additional research is needed.
Why Is Good Human Resource Management so Rare in Africa?
As argued earlier, to be effective, managers need to be trained, be allowed 
to manage (through decentralization), and have incentives to do so. But 
these ingredients seem rare in African public health sectors. We now 
explore why.
Managers’ Training
Evidence abounds that very few health facility managers have received 
any systematic health management training. Being a doctor is usually 
considered sufficient to manage a health facility. That explains why in 
Uganda, 55 of 56 directors of district health services are physicians 
(Dwyer and others 2006). In some other countries, such as Ghana and 
Tanzania, doctors are required to have a degree in public health or man-
agement to be managers. But even with these minimal requirements, few 
health care managers are qualified. In Ghana only 36 percent of hospital 
directors have such a degree. Purpose-trained managers are very rare and 
usually serve as administrative staff (WHO 2009).
Two reasons could explain the lack of management training. The lim-
ited capacity of governments to invest in training programs is one. 
Another is lobbying by doctors’ bodies. Many argue that only physicians 
can manage health facilities. One suspects that these lobbies continue to 
frame the debate as “who should manage a health facility?” rather than 
“what skills are needed to do this?” Moving the debate to the second 
question would probably allow for progress in health management train-
ing programs. The strong reluctance of doctors’ lobbies to give up these 
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jobs may be related to the fact that health management positions can be 
more lucrative than clinical ones, encouraging doctors to become manag-
ers rather than provide patient care.13
Decentralizing Human Resource Management
African government health sectors show many forms of HRM decen-
tralization. One is common in countries that have adopted community 
involvement in health management (usually in relation to the Bamako 
Initiative),14 as in Mali (World Bank 2004) and Benin (World Bank 
2010). Communities in these countries have been granted some con-
trol over local health facilities, notably to recruit and pay health work-
ers out of revenues from user fees. These health workers are not civil 
servants. They have “precarious” contracts and are usually underpaid. 
Rigorous evidence is lacking, but their productivity and quality of ser-
vices seem low.
A handful of countries have pursued more ambitious strategies target-
ing civil servants, not just community-funded health workers. Uganda, for 
instance, sets civil service salaries nationally but allows benefits and allow-
ances to be defined locally (Kolehmainen-Aitken 2004). Similarly, 
Tanzania implemented some decentralization in recruiting civil servant 
health workers (Munga and others 2009).
Ghana went further and set up a “board” system, where civil ser-
vants in the health sector are managed differently than other civil 
servants. Little evidence shows, however, that these changes have 
affected HRM because this “board” system (such as the Ghana Health 
Service) still centralizes the main decisions, including hiring, promot-
ing, and firing.
Even fewer countries have started to “delink.” In this radical policy, all 
civil servants become contract-based employees of local government 
health entities. Zambia experimented with this approach in the 1990s, 
but returned to its traditional system in 2006.15 Rwanda launched a 
similar experiment in 2007. Results seem more promising, though they 
have not yet been rigorously analyzed.
Most African governments have been reluctant to decentralize HRM 
for civil servants, including health workers. A main reason may be clien-
telism. Political leaders may use civil servant recruitment to build political 
and social support, such that civil servants become an important clientele. 
Clientelism may then become a major part of the national social contract, 
enforced daily by unions, rendering decentralization more political than 
technical. Decentralization can breach this social contract.16
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Managers’ Incentives and Accountability
Base salaries of health facility managers are usually little higher than 
those of other health workers.17 But their positions are coveted as they 
allow the employee to earn additional (sometimes illegal or informal) 
income in several ways. Managers decide, for example, which staff can go 
on training, including themselves, and therefore who receives daily allow-
ances for training.18 This motivation inevitably keeps managers away on 
training for a large portion of their time,19 and they may take some of 
their employees’ daily allowances. Managers also have access to more 
informal payments (extracted from patients) than other wealth workers. 
And, they can determine their own work schedule, allowing them to 
work more hours privately.20 In short, managers have little incentive, if 
any, to make their facility perform well and attract more patients.
Similarly, accountability mechanisms are rare. Managers are usually 
appointed in a discretionary manner, not on the basis of past performance. 
They are seldom appraised (World Bank 2009, 2010).21
Conclusion
This review points to two conclusions. The first is the dearth of evidence 
on this topic for Africa. We found rigorous studies for few aspects of the 
relationship between HRM and health workers, perhaps because public 
health policy makers and development researchers still view HRM as a 
new field in Africa. They are more familiar with the concept of central-
level HRM planning, and may not be aware that facility-level HRM can 
contribute greatly to health workers’ motivation—or more often demoti-
vation. As behavioral economists enter the field, more analytical efforts 
may be devoted to HRM in health.
The second is that there may be too much emphasis on HRM training 
(GHWA 2008). It is important of course, but institutional arrangements 
also greatly effect HRM, including decentralization of HRM decision 
making and implementation of consistent and effective incentives and 
accountability. These are major areas to be explored in future research to 
understand how HRM of health workers can improve performance.
Notes
 1. This chapter is not a comprehensive review of management of health workers 
in Africa. For that, see, for example, Fritzen (2007) and Egger and others 
(2005). Our perspective is more focused.
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 2. Buchan (2004) provides a useful overview.
 3. Best practices in HRM result in effective performance. They are generally 
adapted from similar organizations in the same field where they have proven 
successful.
 4. Grindle (1997), analyzing performance of government workers in 29 organi-
zations in Bolivia, the Central African Republic, Ghana, Morocco, Sri Lanka, 
and Tanzania, found that organizations where local managers have autonomy 
overwhelmingly have better-performing employees.
 5. For instance, Drach-Zahavy (2004) found that when nurses have supportive 
management, their performance is more effective.
 6. Oldham and Cummings (1996) offer a more precise definition of a sup-
portive style of supervision: “When supervisors are supportive, they show 
concern for employees’ feelings and needs, encourage them to voice their 
own concerns, provide positive, chiefly informational feedback, and facili-
tate employee skill development” (p. 611). Conversely, “when supervisors 
are controlling, they closely monitor employee behavior, make decisions 
without employee involvement, provide feedback in a controlling manner, 
and generally pressure employees to think, feel, or behave in certain ways” 
(p. 611).
 7. Here, we refer to the not-for-profit private sector, given the lack of evidence 
on the for-profit (commercial) private sector (in Africa).
 8. In this paper, the degree of HRM decentralization was a composite index 
reflecting the ability (or not) of managers to fire their employees, the hierar-
chical level at which salaries were set, and the hierarchical level making deci-
sions on staff deployment.
 9. See, for instance, Falk and Kosfeld (2004) or Ichino and Mauhlheusser (2004).
10. Hagopian and others 2009. One health worker reported, “My immediate 
supervisor cares about me as a person” (p. 869).
11. Clientelism refers to a social organization characterized by patron-client rela-
tionships. Relatively powerful and rich patrons promise to provide relatively 
powerless and poor clients jobs, protection, infrastructure, and other benefits 
in exchange for votes and other forms of loyalty, including labor. In develop-
ing countries many civil servants act as agents of these patrons. Consequently, 
decisions by these civil servants are driven more by the need to please their 
patron than to provide neutral and high-quality services (see, for instance, 
Rauch and Evans 2000).
12. Dieleman and others 2006, p. 4. This piece of evidence has to be interpreted 
with caution. One could rightly argue that the absence of (precise) job 
description does not equate with task autonomy (and reciprocally). 
Ultimately, task autonomy depends on the management style, with or with-
out a job description.
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13. Studies in Africa on official and unofficial revenues of health workers are 
extremely rare. But one in Benin found that although hospital managers and 
clinicians have similar base salaries (about $400 a month), hospital managers 
could earn 50 percent more, simply through collecting more of the daily 
allowances given for attending training sessions (Kanakin, Kessou, and 
Koutchikap 2008).
14. The Bamako Initiative—sponsored by UNICEF and WHO, and adopted by 
African ministers of health in 1987—was based on the realization that by the 
late 1980s many countries, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, were burdened 
by a lack of resources and practical implementation strategies. Many patients 
had lost confidence in the inefficient and underresourced public health 
facilities. The Bamako Initiative was based on the concept that communities 
should participate directly in the management and funding of health facilities. 
One of the features of the Bamako Initiative was to allow health facilities to 
hire health workers to be paid with user fees.
15. One reason for this reversal is the following. Civil servants’ unions required 
that all pension benefits be paid in full and in advance to the civil servants 
agreeing to become contract-based workers; the government could not face 
this tremendous financial burden.
16. Note that HRM decentralization does not—by itself—prevent clientelism. 
When recruitment is decentralized, it may simply change who is the patron 
(that is, local politicians instead of national politicians). In other words, oppo-
sition to decentralize HRM can be explained by an understandable reluctance 
of national politicians to lose control on their clientele.
17. A generalist doctor in the government-run sector in many West African 
countries earns about $400 a month, and a regional health officer less than 
$500.
18. A study in Malawi found that a nurse can earn the equivalent of 35–40  percent 
of monthly salary by attending a five-day training session (MSF 2007). 
Kanakin, Kessou, and Koutchikap (2008) record similar figures for Benin.
19. Kanakin, Kessou, and Koutchikap (2008) found that in Benin facility manag-
ers in a health district could spend about 20 percent of their time on training, 
generating daily allowances equivalent to six months of salary. This district 
was not supported by donors (usually heavy funders of training), strongly sug-
gesting that these findings grossly underestimated the real situation. See also 
Ridde (2010).
20. As said, the overwhelming majority of health managers are doctors. They 
usually combine their role of manager with clinical work. That leads to 
high absenteeism among managers, naturally detrimental to good man-
agement.
21. P4P schemes may help change this situation (chapter 13).
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Preservice training defines how and, often, where health workers practice. 
It determines the cadre, skill, motivation, and expectations of health 
workers, influencing all aspects of the labor market. This chapter explores 
how preservice education affects stock shortfalls, performance, and distri-
bution of health workers in Sub-Saharan Africa. It analyzes the latest data 
on African health training schools from a labor market viewpoint. The 
chapter first explores the factors in preservice education that contribute 
to the low stock of health workers, particularly among certain cadres. It 
then examines the dynamics within preservice training institutions that 
may lead to inadequate health worker performance. Finally, the chapter 
reviews how existing preservice training approaches lead to distribution 
imbalances among health workers and suggests alternate approaches to 
correct this imbalance. The chapter closes with a call to policy makers 
and stakeholders to renew attention to training adequate numbers of 
highly qualified health workers, willing and able to serve Sub-Saharan 
Africa’s underserved populations.
Preservice education largely determines the supply and quality of 
health workers. In Sub-Saharan Africa the supply of health workers is too 
low to meet demand, and the quality of health services does not meet 
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local needs. The situation in rural and underserved areas is dire, as the 
majority of health workers seek employment in urban areas.
How do education and training affect the stock, performance, and 
distribution of health workers in Africa? These three elements are often 
interconnected: the same conditions that contribute to the low stock 
may contribute to poor performance and inequitable distribution. But it 
helps to explore each element separately, noting that some overlap is 
inevitable.
How Preservice Education Leads to the Low Stock
Sub-Saharan Africa does not train enough health workers to meet its basic 
health needs. The Joint Learning Initiative and World Health Organization’s 
(WHO) 2006 World Health Report estimate that Africa requires a million 
additional health workers just to meet primary health care needs. WHO 
cites the scarcity of training opportunities for health workers as a major 
cause of this shortage (Anyangwe and Mtonga 2007).
The shortage of training spots may be even greater than previously 
thought. A recent WHO analysis revealed that in 10 of the 12 African 
countries surveyed, preservice education is insufficient to maintain cur-
rent health worker density. Even if attrition was limited to mortality and 
retirement (excluding migration and career changes), it would take the 
combined countries 36 years to meet the Millennium Development Goal 
targets for physicians, and 29 years to meet the targets for nurses and 
midwives. Some countries have such low graduation numbers that under 
current conditions they will never reach the WHO’s minimum target of 
2.28 health professionals per 1,000 population.
Shortfalls of Specific Cadres
The low health worker stock in Sub-Saharan Africa occurs both in the 
aggregate and in particular occupations. Some countries that appear to 
have adequate numbers of health workers do not have the appropriate 
skill mix to meet basic needs. Large numbers of one cadre may mask short-
ages in others. Both the absolute low stock and the stock imbalance (often 
referred to as “skill mix imbalance”) damage health systems (Naiker and 
others 2009). A country may have plenty of nurses but a dire shortage of 
pharmacists and lab technicians, severely constraining the nurses’ ability to 
delivery care (Dussault and others 2009). This analysis focuses on physi-
cians, because they are the most studied and documented cadre. Additional 
research is needed on the training of nonphysician health workers.
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In her global analysis of medical schools, Eckhert (2002) found that 
Africa had the highest ratio of population to medical schools, with 9.09 
million people per medical school, compared with 1.67 million people 
per medical school in Europe. The shortfall’s size is compounded by the 
fact that many African medical schools graduate fewer than 20 students 
per year. The positive news is that the number of African medical schools 
increased tenfold from 1955 to 2001, with most of the growth in the last 
two decades, as countries began to permit private medical schools. As a 
result, countries must establish or strengthen school accreditation and 
professional licensure programs to maintain the quality of graduates.
Africa has a great gap to close. There are only 87 medical schools in 
the 46 Sub-Saharan countries, with a total population of 417 million 
(Hagopian 2004). The distribution of schools is uneven and tends to be 
highest in countries that have permitted or encouraged private medical 
schools. Nigeria, home to 27 percent of Sub-Saharan medical schools, 
welcomes private education. Eckhert notes that 16 Sub-Saharan coun-
tries with populations between 5.4 million and 17.8 million have only a 
single medical school—clearly not enough to meet their needs. Eleven 
countries have no medical school (Anyangwe and Mtonga 2007). 
Countries with more medical schools per capita tend to have better 
health indicators, but they also tend to be wealthier.
The number of physicians produced in Africa is also limited by small 
class sizes. The average number of students per class year is 300 in 
Western Europe and 500 in China, Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet 
Union. In most African medical schools there are fewer than 100 students 
per class year, and many have fewer than 50. It is unclear why African 
medical schools do not make adequate use of their resources to produce 
more medical students per class. With only 5,100 new graduates a year, 
Africa has the lowest number of annual medical school graduates per 
capita of any region.
Training shortfalls are large throughout Africa. Ethiopia’s population is 
75 million but until recently it trained only 200 doctors a year. The United 
Kingdom has a population of 60 million and trains 6,000 doctors a year. The 
paucity of graduates is particularly troubling given Africa’s rapid growth in 
population, set to increase 150 percent from 1998 to 2050. It is unreason-
able to expect that Africa’s existing medical schools will both make up the 
current physician deficit and compensate for the rise in population. With 
population growth and the likely increased demand as African economies 
improve, the shortage of physicians and other health workers will worsen 
unless annual graduation numbers improve (Kinfu and others 2009).
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In additional to graduating too few doctors, African preservice  education 
institutions underemphasize prevention and public health, leading to 
shortages of public health cadres. In their analysis of public health preser-
vice education in Africa, Beaglehole, Sanders, and Dal Poz (2003) con-
clude that Africa is training significantly fewer public health workers than 
it needs. This undertraining extends from frontline workers (such as sani-
tarians) to mid-level workers (such as public health nurses) and to high-
level workers (such as biostatisticians).
Disconnect between Training Institutions and Country Conditions
Low stock, poor performance, and uneven distribution can all be traced 
in part to the disconnect between training institutions and local condi-
tions. Schools, rarely connected with local employers, are unaware of 
employer needs for numbers, cadres, skills, and other attributes (Okwero 
2009, pers. comm. with K. Tulenko). This divide tends to be greatest in 
countries where the ministry of education rather than the ministry of 
health is responsible for health science training institutions (Beaglehole, 
Sanders, and Dal Poz 2003).
For many countries the lack of qualified local students limits the num-
ber of health workers they can train (High Level Forum for the Health 
MDGs 2004), as does the lack of qualified faculty (Dolvo 2003). 
Countries can establish special health high schools in rural district capi-
tals and offer bridging courses to help less qualified students catch up. 
The Walter Sisulu Medical School in South Africa and the medical school 
in Malawi both discovered that bridging programs augment their output 
of highly qualified graduates. Malawi, with a bridging program, tripled its 
medical school enrollment from 20 to 60 (Broadhead 1998).
Much of the health worker shortage is attributable to training institu-
tions’ focus on clinical and specialty training to the exclusion of public 
health training (Anyangwe and Mtonga 2007). The AfriHealth Project’s 
mapping of advanced public health training in Africa revealed that more 
than half of countries (55 percent) do not have a postgraduate public 
health program (Ijsselmuiden and others 2007). Francophone and 
Lusophone countries are less likely to have public health programs than 
Anglophone countries. Such programs tend to focus on training physi-
cians in public health skills rather than other clinical or nonclinical cadres, 
such as engineers, veterinarians, or primary public health specialists. With 
fewer than 500 full-time staff, the “total academic public health work-
force in Africa could fit into the department of epidemiology at Johns 
Hopkins” (Ijsselmuiden and others 2007, p. 918). Some countries such as 
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Ethiopia, however, are developing large programs of indigeneously devel-
oped training (box 16.1).
Box 16.1
Ethiopia’s Health Extension Workers
Impressive success stories are emerging from Africa’s efforts to produce adequate 
numbers of appropriately trained health workers. Perhaps the brightest example 
is Ethiopia, and its scale-up of health extension workers and health officers.
There are three reasons for Ethiopia’s success. The first is leadership. The Minis-
ter of Health, Dr. Tedros Ghebreyesus, provides strong, consistent leadership and 
gives priority to training more health workers to meet basic needs.
The second reason is that Ethiopia flooded the markets with qualified workers. 
The Ministry of Health acknowledged that in the face of growing health worker 
demand from wealthy countries, Ethiopia could not compete for salaries, and that 
its health workers would continue to emigrate. In response, Ethiopia adopted a 
“flooding” strategy, producing large numbers of health workers. Some workers will 
leave the country, but many will stay and deliver services to their home communi-
ties. The unleashed power of private health science schools contribute to the 
flooding. Extended families and the diaspora are also frequently tapped to pay for 
preservice education—this is viable in the health sector, where graduates are 
practically guaranteed jobs that pay better than average in the country.
The third reason for Ethiopia’s success is the Ministry of Health’s choice of which 
health worker cadres to scale up. After analyzing the disease burden and access to 
care, the ministry concluded that the greatest health needs were preventive and 
primary care in communities. Looking at health worker retention in communities, 
the ministry decided to focus on health extension workers and health officers. Health 
extension workers deliver a basic package of preventive services including sanita-
tion, immunizations, contraception, and basic malaria, diarrhea, and pneumonia 
diagnosis and treatment. Health officers are roughly equivalent to nurse practitio-
ners and are able to perform curative care for the most common health conditions 
that contribute to excess morbidity and mortality in Ethiopia.
A total of 31,831 health extension workers were trained and deployed through 
2009, exceeding the Ministry of Health’s target of 30,786. Because health officers 
require more training and more sophisticated training sites, their numbers have 
not grown as quickly, but the numbers are still impressive compared with other 
countries. The ministry expects more than 5,000 health officers to graduate in the 
next five years.
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High Student Attrition Rates
Another reason for the shortfall in health workers is high student attrition, 
in some countries 40 percent or higher (Lugina 2006). Medical schools in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo report attrition as high as 95 percent 
(Longombe 2009). Attrition wastes resources, time, and money, resulting 
not only in personal disappointment for students but also in long-term 
economic losses—both direct, such as the potential loss of trained health 
workers, and indirect, such as the loss of future earnings. Nurses and phy-
sicians can earn tens to hundreds times more than the average gross 
domestic product per capita in their countries and often serve as the eco-
nomic heads of their extended family. The attrition of a single student can 
thus have permanent ripple effects on dozens of people. Other indirect 
effects and long-term costs of attrition include the loss of tax revenue 
from that individual and the loss of income by those who would have 
been treated for the worker but died or lost days of work due to illness.
High attrition is attributed to various factors including family obliga-
tions, student or family member illness (especially HIV/AIDS), lack of 
funding for school fees or living expenses, lack of adequate academic 
preparation, lack of appropriate study skills, lack of dorms and other 
infrastructure, and lack of student mentoring and support (especially to 
identify and support students at risk of dropping out). Policy makers need 
additional information on attrition to design and implement initiatives to 
identify and support students at higher risk of dropping out.
Lack of Adequate Financing
In many countries the government is the sole source of financing for 
health worker education, which limits the number of health workers who 
can be trained. There are many reports that qualified students cannot 
enter training or drop out due to the lack of student loans or scholarships 
(Kemp and Tindiweegi 2001). Some countries ban private health training 
schools. If governments lift these bans, they can tap private funding for 
capital investments in schools, increasing the overall investment in health 
worker education. African countries must create financing systems that 
take advantage of varied financing sources, including public and private 
grants and loans, private investors, nongovernmental organizations, faith-
based organizations, future employers, international recruiters, the 
diaspora, and donors.
Inadequate financing may also affect the health worker distribution. 
High fees select wealthier urban students and are a barrier for students 
from underserved communities, who are more likely to work in these 
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communities after training. And high student debt may drive health 
workers to the private sector or abroad, where they can earn more money 
to pay off student loans. This phenomenon is widely seen in the United 
States, where higher educational loans drive medical students away from 
lower paid primary care.
The rigid schedules of many training programs present another finan-
cial constraint for students. Most training programs in Africa are full-time, 
leaving little room for students with jobs or family obligations. Programs 
that are inflexible in their schedule shut out a potential pool of qualified 
students. Some institutions are becoming more flexible with evening and 
weekend training or modular training (sometimes called “sandwich” train-
ing), which alternates periods of training with periods when the student 
is free to work, tend a farm, or care for his or her family. A flexible pro-
gram at the University of the Western Cape in South Africa improved 
equity in access to training.
Links between Training and Migration
Almost all health worker retention and immigration studies show that 
lower level workers are more likely than their higher level counterparts 
to stay in rural areas and service underserved populations (see chapters 9 
and 10). These frontline workers provide valuable preventive care, such 
as education on nutrition and sanitation, as well as support to clinical 
care, such as bathing and feeding patients. Unfortunately many countries 
are eliminating training programs for frontline workers and focusing on 
higher level workers. Rwanda recently eliminated training of lower level 
nurses (Capacity Project 2007). Not only do higher level workers take 
longer and cost more to train, they are also more likely to emigrate or to 
serve in urban areas, which already have the highest densities.
Several factors motivate health science graduates to emigrate rather 
than practice at home, including curricula more aligned to developed 
country than developing country needs (Eastwood and others 2001; 
Oman and others 2007). Students usually practice in tertiary or quater-
nary hospitals that are completely different from the community clinics 
and district primary hospitals that need health workers most (Parry and 
Parry 1998). As a result, doctors trained at many African universities are 
better prepared to work in western health systems than in an African set-
ting (Tulenko and Preker 2012).
Three factors are strongly associated with retention and rural practice: 
a rural background, targeted training for rural practice at the postgraduate 
level, and positive clinical and education experiences in rural settings as 
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part of undergraduate medical education. In their study of migrant 
Ghanaian nurses and physicians, Ozden and Winter (2009) found that 
health workers have strong ideas about which schools’ graduates are most 
likely to find work abroad—a recruiting point for these schools.
In the past many African countries sent students abroad for all or part 
of their training. Programs such as the U.K. Overseas Doctors Training 
Scheme institutionalized this practice (Sridhar 2000; Welsh 2001). These 
programs are now widely seen as ineffective, because graduates rarely 
return, and if they do, their skills do not match the disease burden and 
available technology in their home country (Macdonagh, Jiddawit, and 
Parry 2002). The loss of Malawian medical students to practices in the 
United Kingdom and South Africa is one of the reasons Malawi founded 
its medical school.
Even today, many African medical schools send graduates to a more 
developed neighbor, such as South Africa, or to a former colonial ruler. 
Many students never return. Of African physicians 10 percent practice 
in just two wealthy countries: the United States and Canada. Thirty 
percent of Ghanaian physicians and 43 percent of Liberian physicians 
practice abroad (see chapter 10).
Malawi has improved its stock of physicians through preservice educa-
tion. Until the 1990s Malawi sent health science students abroad for train-
ing, either in Africa or elsewhere. The costs were extraordinary and few 
graduates returned to Malawi to practice. Manchester, England has more 
Malawian doctors than all of Malawi. To address the issue, the govern-
ment founded its first medical school, tailored to the country’s needs. The 
Malawi College of Medicine follows an integrated curriculum focusing on 
local health needs. In the first two years of study it introduces basic sci-
ences in relation to clinically relevant health problems. About 25 percent 
of the curriculum’s contact hours are dedicated to community health. 
The aim is to produce doctors rooted in Malawi, with the right compe-
tencies and attitude to serve where they are most needed. Students spend 
more time learning to prevent, diagnose, and treat diseases that affect 
poor Malawian communities—like diarrhea, malnutrition, pneumonia, 
malaria, and HIV/AIDS—than diseases more prevalent in developed 
countries, like cancer, diabetes, and dementia.
Malawi’s strategy has borne fruit. Graduates of the Blantyre-based 
medical school are far more likely to stay: of the first 168 graduates, 112 
still work in Malawi. Malawi’s recent retention is better than most 
other African medical schools, which do not make a point of training to 
meet community needs. Improving the health worker stock by tailoring 
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education to community needs has been so successful that Malawi is now 
 starting schools of dentistry, pharmacy, and physical therapy.
Public Sector Monopolies on Preservice Education
Many African countries do not permit private health science schools, 
severely limiting resources for preservice education and therefore the 
number of graduates. Yet, many Sub-Saharan countries that increased 
the health worker supply rely on faith-based, not-for-profit, or for-profit 
private institutions. In the 1990s Ethiopia allowed private nursing 
schools to open, eliminating the shortage of nurses without cost to the 
government. In Uganda faith-based hospitals are the primary preservice 
trainer of nurses.
Private health science schools are more likely to be located in rural 
or underserved areas than public schools (Longombe 2009). Situated 
in such areas, they can fill a critical gap in services. Ministries of health 
and education should improve coordination to maximize health system 
resources for education and training. They should also integrate public 
and private clinical training and ensure adequate supervision. 
Accreditation bodies are needed to ensure the quality of both public 
and private schools.
A study by the Gates Foundation found that 35 percent of all African 
medical schools are private and private schools are the fastest school 
ownership model in Africa (Gates 2010). It is estimated that a higher 
percent of nursing schools are private, for example in Tanzania 55 percent 
of nursing schools were faith based, and their graduates are more likely to 
work in underserved communities (Capacity Project 2009). Faith-based 
schools increasingly require postgraduation contracts as a condition on 
acceptance, requiring that graduates work for them for a year or two to 
repay training costs.
School Governance
In many countries the ministry of education rather than the ministry of 
health governs health science schools, leading to budgetary problems 
and opening a rift between the trainers and future health sector employ-
ers. When the budget for preservice education is separate from the 
ministry of health budget, the ministry of health cannot set preservice 
education as a priority over other investments. Many ministries of health 
build clinics they cannot staff and buy drugs they cannot dispense 
because they do not have the budgetary flexibility to shift funding to 
preservice education.
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Ministries of health should be responsible for health science schools, 
increasing budgetary flexibility and enabling schools to take advantage of 
the technical knowledge, clinical access, and employer status of the 
 ministry of health. Oversight from the ministry of health could better 
align training, research, health system, and population needs. Training 
institutions should, however, maintain a relationship with the ministry of 
education to take advantage of its pedagogical knowledge.
How Preservice Education Does Not Lead to Good Performance
In addition to failing to produce enough health workers, preservice 
training institutions often fail to produce high-performing health work-
ers. Several factors—knowledge, skills, motivation, and the enabling 
environment—affect health worker performance, and preservice training 
influences all of them.
Misaligned Curricula
In their analysis of public health preservice education in Africa, Beaglehole 
and others (2003) determined that the majority of graduates do not have 
the skills or experience to perform their jobs adequately. They cite out-
dated teaching methodologies, a lack of field experience, and the shortage 
of appropriate mentors for public health students. Health workers carry 
the knowledge and skills they learn in preservice training throughout 
their careers. In-service education rarely affects the long-term practice of 
health workers. Health workers may practice differently immediately fol-
lowing an in-service training course, but over the long run they revert to 
previous practices.
Even when the quality of education is high, there may be a mismatch 
between curricula and local conditions. Schools do not align their curri-
cula with local disease realities, particularly the disease burden of the 
poor. In Mozambique nonphysician surgeons receive no training in 
HIV/AIDS, even though it is the most common disease they treat. 
Research should identify the competencies needed to meet prevalent 
health needs and guide curriculum development accordingly.
Rwanda, recognizing that its previous curricula and student evaluation 
emphasized knowing more than doing, updated its curriculum with the 
help of the United States Agency for International Development’s 
Capacity Project, establishing a competency-based curriculum that 
emphasized actual practice. It followed the Malawian model of tailoring 
content to meet the community’s most pressing needs (Capacity Project 
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2007). Other medical schools are moving to a need-driven and outcome-
driven education program, following a social accountability model of 
health worker production. Examples include South Africa’s Walter Sisulu 
University and community-based programs at Jimma University in 
Ethiopia and University of Gezira in Sudan. Makere University in Uganda 
and the National University of Rwanda are making epidemiology-based 
curriculum revisions.
Curricula should also reflect local practice conditions. Health workers 
trained almost exclusively in hospitals may learn to diagnose illness with 
laboratory tests and imaging unavailable in community facilities.
Low Motivation
Poor health worker performance is often attributed to inadequate 
knowledge. A growing body of evidence shows that this is not so. 
Recent studies by Leenard and others (2010) and Mæstad, Torsvik, and 
Aakvik (2010) in Tanzania found a significant gap between health 
workers’ knowledge and action in diagnosing and treating patients 
(see chapters 4, 5, 11, and 14). When asked how to examine a child 
with fever, for example, a physician may list all the proper elements 
(take temperature, determine heart rate, auscultate lungs, and so on) 
but when actually examining a child, the same physician may not even 
touch the child, even when high patient load is not an issue. The gap 
between what a health worker knows and what a health worker does, 
the “know-do gap,” is thought to result from lack of motivation to do 
a good job. By recruiting students who are more motivated to help 
others and integrating motivation into curricula, schools can produce 
more motivated graduates who make better use of their skills. Student 
selection criteria should be based not only on academic performance 
but also on predictors of a future practice in rural and underserved 
areas, such as rural upbringing and a demonstrated interest in serving 
others.
Poor Educational Infrastructure
World Bank studies in Ghana, Liberia, and Sierra Leone indicate that the 
libraries, equipment, and physical plant of many schools are deteriorated 
or out of date. Many institutions need to upgrade their facilities and 
equipment. Investments in technology should, however, reflect the reality 
of student needs. Similarly, cosmetic improvements are often overempha-
sized. Motivated students can learn just as well in a classroom with peel-
ing paint as they can in one that is freshly painted. 
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Skill Mix Imbalances
Most African countries use an outdated health team model that is 
overly reliant on physicians and specialists. This model results in 
unnecessarily high costs in training and paying health workers. It also 
creates inefficiencies in providing care and neglects disease prevention 
and population health (Chen and others 2004). The Global Health 
Workforce Alliance’s Task Force on Scaling Up Education estimates 
that the annual cost of training a doctor in Africa is twice as much as 
the annual cost of training a nurse, and five times the annual cost of 
training a community health worker (Crisp, Gawanas, and Sharp 
2008). Countries that pursue a health team strategy biased toward 
nurses and doctors will spend more money and retain fewer health 
workers than those that pursue an evidence-based strategy of training 
frontline workers to meet local needs. WHO’s Commission on 
Macroeconomics and Health recommends that the skill mix of various 
priority cadres and their practices should be aligned with the diseases 
that must be addressed to reach the Millennium Development Goals 
by 2015 (Commission on Macroeconomics and Health 2001). Education 
systems must develop workforces able to meet the actual needs of local 
health systems, rather than workforces built around traditional profes-
sional roles.
Poor Quality Teaching
Even when curricula are up-to-date and aligned with country needs, 
teaching remains poor in many schools. Courses are taught by formal 
lecture, with little opportunity to interact. Students learn by rote memo-
rization rather than practice or case studies. Teacher quality usually is not 
assessed, and there is no mechanism for students to provide feedback on 
teacher performance. Faculty receives little support to improve their 
teaching. Many faculty advance through seniority or research rather than 
the effectiveness of their teaching, the primary goal of any health science 
school.
The International Training and Education Center for Health works in 
Mozambique to improve the pedagogy of professors in the medical offi-
cer training program. It focuses on building skills to assess teaching tech-
niques, lesson planning, the schedule and flow of courses, and the 
relevance of course material to the realities of practice (Jacob and others 
2009). When the program began, only 36 percent of professors had any 
knowledge of adult learning theory and participation methods. The 
Center has continued mentoring professors to improve their effectiveness 
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(Kawooya and others 2010). Jhpiego has a similar program to support 
teaching staff in Côte d’Ivoire.
How Preservice Education Leads to Distributional Imbalances
Africa is predominantly rural, and the majority of preventable deaths and 
disabilities occur in rural areas. Yet only 23 percent of doctors and 
38 percent of nurses practice in rural areas in Africa (Anyangwe and 
Mtonga 2007). In South Africa rural-born physicians are three times 
more likely to work in rural areas than urban-born physicians (de Vries 
and Reid 2003). They are also more likely to be primary care physicians 
(83 percent) than the urban-born (55 percent), and therefore to better 
serve South Africa’s health needs. When reporting reasons for choosing 
their practice location, one of the main factors differentiating rural-born 
physicians was their desire “to feel needed.”
Given that most African countries are predominantly rural and that 
the disease burden is greatest in rural areas, this evidence has profound 
implications for the future of recruiting health worker students.
School Factors and the Maldistribution of Health Workers
Various elements of preservice education can increase the likelihood of 
graduates to work in underserved areas. A study in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, which is 70 percent rural, examined the effect that a 
medical school’s rural location (rather than rural origin of the students) 
has on graduates’ practice sites (Longombe 2009). The study showed that 
81 percent of the graduates from rural medical schools served in rural 
areas, compared with 24 percent of the graduates from urban medical 
schools. Of graduates of both rural and urban schools, 55 percent work 
within 78 kilometers of their school, supporting a widely held belief that 
health workers prefer to practice near where they trained. In addition, 
graduates of urban schools are more likely not only to work in urban 
areas, but also to leave the province where they were educated and prac-
tice elsewhere in the country.
Hanson and Jack (2010) show that graduates of Catholic schools 
express a greater willingness to work in rural areas than graduates of 
public schools. It is unclear whether this is due to traits in the students 
before recruitment or whether these attitudes developed in response to 
the social missions of Catholic schools. Graduates of faith-based 
schools, which tend to be in underserved rural communities, are more 
likely to work in underserved areas than other graduates. Again, it is 
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unclear whether this is due to the selection of students with higher 
levels of altruism or whether factors related to the education experi-
ence increased altruism.
In many countries the shortage of professors is a hurdle in expanding 
preservice education to rural sites. One solution is to expand rural-based 
preservice education through information and communication technol-
ogy, particularly Internet-based learning. As broadband Internet and cell 
phone coverage grow in Africa, distance education becomes more viable. 
Lectures could be broadcast on the Internet or prerecorded on DVDs. 
Health science schools, in the same country or even several countries, can 
pool and share faculty. Students training in rural district capitals could 
take advantage of teaching by specialists in centers of excellence in the 
capital. Even basic technologies, such as cell phones, can support the 
supervision of students doing clinical rotations in rural clinics.
Collaboration among training institutions can also help expand pre-
service training to rural and underserved areas. The Training for Health 
Equity network is a collaborative of need-driven and outcome-driven 
medical schools in neglected, rural, and remote regions of Africa, Asia, 
Australia, North America, and Latin America. Its core mission is to 
raise the number, quality, retention, and performance of health profes-
sionals in underserved communities. Member schools direct their edu-
cation, research, and service activities toward the priority health 
concerns of the community they serve. The network is developing and 
testing joint evaluation tools to assess programs’ impacts on health 
system and community needs, including retaining graduates where 
they are needed the most.
Student Profile and Maldistribution of Health Workers
Students from urban areas, particularly capital cities, are greatly overrep-
resented in medical and nursing schools. This is the case even in countries 
that consider origin from an underserved population as an admissions 
criterion. In the only public medical school in Mozambique, 44 percent 
of the students are from Maputo or Maputo province, jurisdictions with 
only 6 percent of the country’s population (Sousa and others 2007). This 
imbalance means fewer physicians are willing work in rural areas. 
Throughout Africa a career in health, especially as a physician, is seen as 
a means to move to the capital or to a wealthy country. The Mozambican 
data reveal that most medical students, even those from outside Maputo, 
expect to practice in an urban area. In addition, the majority of the 
Mozambican medical students surveyed indicated that they planned 
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either to work exclusively in the private sector or to combine private and 
public practice, even if educated in public schools.
The data also show that health careers are a family business. Ninety 
percent of Mozambican medical students surveyed had at least one parent 
working in health care. This has significant implications for student 
recruitment. Not only do schools need to recruit more students from 
rural areas, but also should recruit students with a stated desire to serve 
underserved communities. In addition, students must shift their idea of a 
health care career from one of urban elitism to one of service to the 
underserved. Curricula should reflect this shift by integrating social jus-
tice and ethics discussions and experiences.
Conclusion
Over the next five years many resources will be invested in scaling up 
health worker training. These investments must be evidence-based and 
follow best practices (box 16.1 examines a successful program in 
Ethiopia). More research is needed on health worker education in 
Africa—high-quality research that goes beyond program descriptions to 
ask critically important questions about what type of health workers 
programs should teach, what to teach them, how to teach them, and how 
many of them to enroll.
WHO estimates that Sub-Saharan Africa needs to grow its number of 
health workers by 140 percent (around 1 million) to attain the basic 
coverage needed to meet the Millennium Development Goals (Anyangwe 
and Mtonga 2007). A concerted political effort and major investments 
from stakeholders—including governments, professional councils, unions, 
and donors—is essential to train this high number of workers to deliver 
quality health services in all areas of their countries.
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Becoming a Health Worker Student
Petra Righetti, Roger Strasser, Peter Materu, and 
Christopher H. Herbst
Successful recruitment into health science education programs depends 
on high-quality secondary education and future career options to attract 
motivated applicants. Beyond an adequate supply of well-prepared stu-
dents, successful health science training programs require capable institu-
tions. In most cases the number of applicants to health programs exceeds 
the admission rate by 70 percent, demonstrating that limited institutional 
capacity is a barrier to greater access to medical and health science educa-
tion. This capacity deficit is reflected in a lack of equipment, infrastruc-
ture, and teachers throughout Sub-Saharan Africa. Government and 
other institutions can increase the accessibility and quality of tertiary 
health education programs in three main ways. They can improve science 
education in secondary schools. They can provide better remuneration to 
health workers. And they can boost institutional capacity by lowering the 
costs of health training programs through modular courses, distance 
learning, and localized training in rural areas.
Health Science Education in Context
The path to employment as a health worker starts with enrolling in a 
health education program. Most Sub-Saharan countries face lower enroll-
ments in health science fields than in other tertiary programs, contribut-
ing to the overall shortage of health workers. This chapter addresses three 
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components of health science education enrollment. First, it examines 
constraints on enrollment from the student perspective, considering 
students’ academic preparation, their perceptions of the private returns 
to tertiary health science education, and the financial and time barriers to 
health science education. Second, it examines constraints on enrollment 
from an institutional perspective, highlighting the capacity and resource 
gaps that hinder institutions’ ability to absorb students. Third, it reviews 
the government’s role in supporting broader access for students and 
greater institutional capacity through targeted policies.
To understand the causes of health worker shortages, it is important to 
look at the wider health service and education contexts. In most African 
countries the majority of people live in rural areas. Frontline health care 
providers in these areas are not registered nurses or doctors but practical 
nurses and medical assistants. To the extent possible, this chapter addresses 
admissions into education programs for these mid-level health workers, as 
well as doctors and nurses. The training of frontline and mid-level health 
workers often takes place informally, however, and documentation is scarce. 
So, this chapter draws conclusions primarily from official health systems 
and formal tertiary training, which have available documentation.1
African countries inherited hierarchical education systems designed 
for the elite. Most education systems have changed little since the colo-
nial era, despite capacity and quality issues caused by more recent socio-
economic and political developments. Sub-Saharan Africa’s youth 
population, growing rapidly, is now more than four times its 1950 level. 
In response to the changing demographics, the international community 
has shifted funding from tertiary education to lower education. As more 
students complete secondary education, demand for tertiary education 
increases (table 17.1). The growth of enrollments in tertiary education in 
Africa is now the highest in the world—16.3 percent average annual 
growth for 1999–2004 compared with 6.6 percent in the rest of the 
world (World Bank 2010).
From 1980 to 2000, as tertiary education rates grew, Sub-Saharan 
Africa experienced economic decline and austerity. University budgets 
shrank or stagnated amid rising enrollments and inflation. From 1991 to 
2006 the mean ratio between the average increase in enrollments and the 
increase in resources was 1.45. In the rest of the world public financing 
has generally kept pace with growth in higher education students. Sub-
Saharan Africa is the only region with a decline in the volume of public 
expenditure per student at the tertiary level (30 percent over the last 
15 years). Unit costs fluctuated from $6,800 in 1980 to $1,200 in 2002 
and to $2,000 in 2006 (World Bank 2010).
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The shortages in financial and human capacity hit schools of medicine 
and nursing, which are comparatively expensive, particularly hard (World 
Bank 2008f). Clinical specialties—which require adequate facilities, close 
supervision during training, and other expensive inputs—were also 
affected by cost constraints in the education system.
The private provision of higher education is expanding in response to 
limited public financing. Even so, private providers remain on the periph-
ery. Tertiary institutions that are not universities are the fastest-growing 
private providers and generally emphasize law, social sciences, and eco-
nomics and business, because of their lower start-up costs (World Bank 
2008a). Usually located in urban areas, private institutions undertake little 
research and tend to respond to student interest rather than labor market 
demand (World Bank 2008a). For these reasons, their role is limited in the 
provision of health science programs.
Enrollment Patterns in Health Science
Despite the large increase in demand for higher education, tertiary enroll-
ment ratios in the region are low, ranging from 1 percent in several coun-
tries to 17 percent in Mauritius, with the majority somewhere between 
2 and 4 percent.2 These numbers are attributable to socioeconomic 
inequality, gender inequality, low secondary enrollment, increased cost-
sharing, poor institutional capacity, and high graduate unemployment.
In this already constrained context, health science faculties register 
particularly low student intakes compared with other fields (figure 17.1). 
Among the countries analyzed, South Africa currently enrolls the most 
health science students (51,720), followed by the Democratic Republic 
of Congo (13,019), Tanzania (3,991), Zimbabwe (3,086), and Madagascar 
(2,671). Swaziland enrolls the least at 386 (Kotecha 2008).
Table 17.1 Enrollments in Tertiary Education in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1991–2004
Country
Average annual growth of tertiary enrollment (%) Total growth 
1991–20041991–96 1996–99 1999–2004
Sub-Saharan Africa
 (regional total) 7.5 10.1 8.7 189.5
Central Africa 4.7 2.4 9 108
East Africa 6.2 10.2 8.4 170.9
Southern Africa 8 −2.5 2.8 56.7
West Africa 9 26.4 12.1 448.3
Source: World Bank 2010.
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Tertiary enrollments are especially low relative to country populations 
(table 17.2). Among 20–24 year olds an average of 95 percent of eligible 
individuals do not have access to tertiary education. Of the 4 percent 
enrolled in tertiary programs, only 5.6 percent study health sciences. The 
Democratic Republic of Congo (18.9 percent), Malawi (11.1 percent), 
and Tanzania (11.4 percent) have the largest intake of students in health 
sciences among the countries analyzed.
Constraints on the Supply of Health Worker Students
Enrollment in health science programs in Africa is affected by the stu-
dent applicant pool in three ways. First, secondary schools do not ade-
quately prepare students in math and science, fields central to health 
science programs. Second, the financial and time costs of health worker 
education are often prohibitively high, presenting a barrier to otherwise 
qualified applicants. Third, students perceive the benefits and draw-
backs of health education differently. In some countries employment in 
the health sector is considered prestigious, but in others the sector 
struggles with wage and workload issues that make health education less 
desirable.
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Table 17.2 Enrollment in Tertiary Education and Health Sciences, by 
Relevant Age Group
Country
Population 
aged 20–24 
(2010) 
(thousands)
Numbers 
in 
tertiary 
education
Numbers 
in health 
science 
(undergraduate)
Percent of 
relevant age 
group in 
tertiary 
education
Percent of 
tertiary 
education group 
in health science 
(undergraduate)
Angola 1,723 47,373 1,394 2.75 2.94
Botswana 215 15,710 346 7.31 2.20
Congo, Dem. 
Rep. 6,071 57,664 10,880 0.95 18.87
Lesotho 230 8,508 no data 3.70 no data
Madagascar 1,937 41,691 2,077 2.15 4.98
Malawi 1,325 7,869 873 0.59 11.09
Mauritius 95 9,720 427 10.23 4.39
Mozambique 2,100 46,865 1,201 2.23 2.56
Namibia 233 8,378 63 3.60 0.75
South Africa 4,720 746,538 36,389 15.82 4.87
Swaziland 153 5,785 386 3.78 6.67
Tanzania 4,322 33,420 3,823 0.77 11.44
Zambia 1,339 14,395 755 1.08 5.24
Zimbabwe 1,674 52,453 2,587 3.13 4.93
Total 26,137 1,096,369 61,201 4.19 5.58
Source: Data from SARUA and Edstats.
Secondary Education’s Impact on Tertiary Health Studies
To understand the low intake of health science students, it is important to 
examine the outcomes of the secondary education systems that produce 
potential tertiary students. The portion of students who complete second-
ary education in most African countries does not exceed 20 percent and 
in many cases is close to 5 percent or lower.3 Students who complete 
secondary education are generally from the highest income quintile, so 
the pool of graduates is small and inequitable. Despite the exponential 
increase in enrollments at all levels, access to secondary and tertiary edu-
cation in Sub-Saharan Africa remains more highly restricted than in other 
regions.
Students in Sub-Saharan Africa perform poorly in secondary leav-
ing exams, especially in disciplines requiring higher cognitive skills, 
such as math and sciences. Based on documented exams, the majority 
of students in the region pass in the lowest category (World Bank 
2008d). Three Sub-Saharan countries participated in the 2003 Trends 
in International Mathematics and Sciences Study, which measured 
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student ability in math and science. These three countries—Botswana, 
Ghana, and South Africa—came in last with the overall lowest scores 
(World Bank 2008d). Low performance in math and science may ori-
ent students, either by choice or by default, away from medicine to 
less scientific faculties, such as humanities and social science.
Although science and math scores are low, secondary schools empha-
size math and science in their curricula. Science and math are compulsory 
at junior secondary and senior secondary levels in all countries, which 
means that every secondary-school student takes three to four years of 
science and math (World Bank 2007). Senior secondary schools offer 
elective science courses, including biology, physics, chemistry, physical 
science, and science and technology (World Bank 2007).
The Financial and Time Costs of Medical Education
The higher fees and longer duration of health science studies compared 
with other faculties can deter enrollment in health science programs. 
Health science schools are costly because the required technology, labo-
ratories, and practical training limit enrollment capacity (World Bank 
2008c). A study of Chad, Madagascar, Mauritania, Niger, and Rwanda 
shows that unit costs of scientific programs in public institutions are on 
average 1.8 times higher than those of other programs (humanities, 
social science, other) (World Bank 2008c). At Uganda’s Makerere 
University School of Public Health, local students pay $2,500 per year in 
tuition plus an additional $5,000 in registration fees, examination fees, 
travel, accommodation, stationery, books, and computers.4 These costs 
are an impossible burden for many potential students given Uganda’s 
average per capita income of around $1,200. Even training programs for 
mid-level cadres have high fees relative to income per capita (table 17.3). 
Because financing mechanisms such as scholarships and loans are limited, 
Table 17.3 Training Costs per Year for Nonphysician Clinicians in Selected 
Sub-Saharan Countries
Training costs per year in US$ 
(tuition plus room and board)/year Length of training (years)
Ethiopia 1,200–1,500 3
Ghana 4,000 1
Malawi 2,000 3
Tanzania 1,300–2,000 3
Zambia 1,000–1,500 3
Source: Mullan and Frehywot 2007.
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there are few opportunities for lower socioeconomic groups to finance 
their studies.
In addition to their high costs, medical programs require significant 
investments in time. Senegal’s two public universities offer medical pro-
grams that last four to eight years. In Kenya medical education for doctors 
lasts five to six years. The long duration and traditional pedagogy in 
medical schools partly explains why these programs are unappealing to 
students. Students may find the opportunity cost of a six-year investment 
in an expensive education too high.
The Role of Student Perceptions in Health Science 
Education Enrollment
Student perception of health science professions are mixed and vary 
according to the specific profession. Medical degrees are traditionally 
considered prestigious. For countries like the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Tanzania, and Malawi (see table 17.2), the higher number of 
students choosing the medical track correlates with the prestige and 
security of a medical position. At the University of Ghana, for example, 
students’ consistent first choice is the medicine program.5
Students generally perceive the labor market for health workers as a 
source of guaranteed employment. Job assurance is a valued component 
in a student’s choice of faculty, especially given the struggles in many 
African economies to absorb graduates. Moreover, the medical track is 
associated with high future incomes, especially if the student ends up in 
private practice. Finally, the possibility of working overseas motivates 
many future doctors and nurses.
But in some countries the labor market for health professionals is per-
ceived as struggling—with relative wage rigidity, heavy workloads, and a 
lack of facilities, promotion opportunities, and supervisory support 
(WHO 2006). Nursing and mid-level health professions are considered 
especially dangerous, isolated, and low paid (WHO 2006). As wages in 
the public sector remain low, many health workers must supplement 
their government salary to repay student loans by taking on second jobs 
in private practice or nonmedical fields.
Students’ exposure to health care systems and medical role models 
when growing up also affects their perceptions of health sciences. 
Students apply for medical and nursing programs because they are 
familiar with doctors and nurses. They may have little information 
about or experience with the wider range of available health profes-
sions, a knowledge deficit that can contribute to the lower intake of 
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health professionals in some countries. Classroom case studies also 
affect student perceptions. Recent studies show that education experi-
ences can shape personal values and choices. Examples of health 
workers in rural areas or different professions in the medical field 
influence students’ career choices (Kaye, Mwanika, and Sewankambo 
2010).
Applicants to tertiary studies in Sub-Saharan Africa can now 
choose from a greater variety of institutions than ever. In response to 
growing demand, private education has exploded in the region, 
including specialized institutions that focus on distance (World Bank 
2008a). In Ghana alone, private universities’ share of enrollment shot 
up from 4 percent to almost 20 percent in the last four years. In the 
last five years nine private universities opened in Ghana (Ministry of 
Education of Ghana 2008). The private sector can offer short profes-
sional training programs at low cost. Moreover, private institutions 
can provide learning opportunities through distance learning or open-
source programs, which in theory have lower operating costs than 
face-to-face learning (World Bank 2008c). The overall growth in edu-
cation choices influences health science enrollment: when applicants 
are spread over many options, those applying to any single program 
decline.
The “feminization” of some health professions also affects health sci-
ence enrollment rates and patterns. Women may be less attracted to 
physician training in regions where it is viewed by society as incompat-
ible with traditional values and family assignments (box 17.1). They may 
be drawn instead to nursing, often perceived as more in line with tradi-
tional gender roles. Women may also gravitate to nurse training rather 
than physician training because of gender-related disparities in invest-
ments throughout the education system. The regional average gender 
parity index at the junior secondary level is 0.84. At the senior secondary 
level it is 0.89, meaning that fewer women finish secondary education 
and thus are eligible for tertiary (World Bank 2008b). Those who access 
tertiary education tend to enroll in nursing and midwifery schools, which 
require less qualification, funding, and time. When access to education 
increases, including access to math and science at the secondary level, 
women choose medical and nursing schools in greater numbers. In 
Canada, Australia, and the United States the number of female doctors 
exceeds males. In South Africa women outnumber men in nursing, 
obstetrics, and physiotherapy.6
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Capacity and Financial Constraints on Enrollment
Health science institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa are limited in their 
capacity to enroll students. As student numbers grew in recent years, 
infrastructure and staff numbers remained the same or even dropped. In 
2007 there were only 493 full-time faculty in public health in Africa 
(854 when part-time staff are counted). In 2005 there were only 
42 doctoral students and 55 master’s students in public health in Sub-
Saharan Africa (Ijsselmuiden and others 2007). These numbers do not 
reflect doctoral and postdoctoral students who either train outside Sub-
Saharan Africa or train informally through doctoral-level programs that 
are not accredited or institutionalized. South Africa trains specialists 
from other countries, and has agreements with other governments for 
improved student mobility and international accreditation.7
Box 17.1 
Physician Education in South Africa, with an Emphasis on 
Women
Since 1994 higher education policy in South Africa has been committed to equity 
of access, irrespective of race and gender. Researchers investigated progress 
toward these goals for physician education, with an emphasis on gender. They 
used databases from the Department of Education, the Health Professions Coun-
cil of South Africa, and the University of Cape Town Faculty of Health Sciences to 
explore undergraduate trends at all eight medical schools, and postgraduate 
trends at University of Cape Town.
Women have outnumbered men in medical undergraduate enrollments since 
2000, with figures ranging from 52–63 percent at seven of the eight medical 
schools in 2005. The rate of change in the medical profession lags behind, how-
ever, and it will take more than two decades for female doctors to outnumber 
male doctors. A study of University of Cape Town postgraduate enrollments 
shows that women increased to 42 percent of postgraduate medical enrollments 
in 2005. Female postgraduate students concentrated in disciplines such as pedi-
atrics and psychiatry, making up 11 percent of enrollments in the surgical disci-
plines between 1999 and 2005. Overall, reforms support the changing profile of 
medical enrollments and highlight questions about women’s career choices and 
the social factors influencing these choices.
Source: Brier and Wildschut 2008
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The lack of adequate funding affects the teaching and research capac-
ity of health science institutions by limiting their ability to offer faculty 
adequate remuneration and to invest in new infrastructure, research 
facilities, and equipment. According to 2007 World Health Organization 
figures, 29 of Africa’s 53 countries offer no postgraduate training in pub-
lic health. Eleven countries (20.7 percent) have one program and an 
equal number offer more than one program (Ijsselmuiden and others 
2007). Anglophone Sub-Saharan countries and North African countries 
have more developed postgraduate public health training programs than 
Francophone, Lusophone, and the one Hispanic country in Africa. The 
largest gap is in the Lusophone group, where 91 percent of the popula-
tion lives in a country without graduate public health programs. Thirty-
four percent of Francophone Africans live in a country without a graduate 
public health programs (Ijsselmuiden and others 2007). In Uganda most 
higher education teaching posts remain empty because of low salaries 
and unattractive benefits (INHEA). In Zimbabwe the medical faculty 
sought to reduce its enrollment from 120 students to 70 because of the 
lack of lecturers (Meldrum 2003). Low numbers of qualified teachers is 
one of the major reasons universities in Rwanda restrict admissions into 
specialized programs (Sy 2008).
As a result of both low institutional capacity to absorb the growing 
number of applicants and poor academic preparation of candidates, 
schools and faculties restrict access to safeguard quality. In Uganda the 
number of candidates eligible to enter university rose 12 percent annu-
ally from 1994 to 1999. The total rise in the number of candidates with 
two advanced passes (the mark of eligibility to enter university) in the 
same period was more than 50 percent. In 2000 the number of eligible 
candidates surged to 24,000 (INHEA. Even secondary institutions have 
started limiting the intake of students from lower to upper secondary. 
The transition rate from junior to senior secondary education declined 
from 72 percent to 60 percent, reflecting more selectivity in the face of 
a rapid increase in junior secondary graduates (UNESCO 2009).
A similar pattern occurs in health sciences. In Tanzania the Muhimbili 
University College of Health Sciences enrolled only 43 percent of appli-
cants in 2004–05 (table 17.4). In Ghana too, health training institutions 
across different disciplines are unable to accommodate a much larger 
supply of qualified secondary students, which exceeds the capacity of 
schools to enroll, train and produce them (figure 17.2). Schools have 
limited fiscal capacity to invest and expand their capacities in an environ-
ment where most public institutions charge low or no tuition (Appiah 
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et al. 2012). In Benin the government halted admissions of new students 
to the national midwifery and nursing schools for two years, claiming 
concern about the declining quality of applicants (Lemière 2008). In 
many countries the demand for enrollment into health sciences by eligi-
ble students is greater than the capacity of institutions to absorb them.
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Figure 17.2 Applicants and Enrollment at Selected Health Training Institutions in 
Ghana, 2008 
Source: Appiah, E; Herbst, C; Soucat, A, 2012: Human Resources for Health In Ghana: Towards Evidence based 
Interventions, 2012, Directions in Development, World Bank, forthcoming.
Table 17.4 Applied and Admitted Candidates for Muhimbili University College of 
Health Sciences, Tanzania
School
2000/01 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05
Applied Admitted Applied Admitted Applied Admitted Applied Admitted
Medicine 269 150 357 179 336 183 388 185
Dentistry 30 30 36 6 46 44 52 47
Pharmacy 124 29 102 44 133 35 186 80
Nursing 20 23 24 25 22 19 25 25
Public 
health
34 21 37 22 60 35 43 30
Total 477 253 556 276 597 316 186 80
Percent 
admitted 53 49.6 52.9 43
Source: Muhimbili University College of Health Sciences website, Facts and Figures.
330       Righetti, Strasser, Materu, and Herbst
Promising Government and Institutional Interventions
Several governments are intervening to correct the access and quality 
challenges in the tertiary sector, particularly in health science faculties. 
Some interventions achieve substantial results and can encourage similar 
solutions in other countries.
From the early 2000s, Ghana increased the average remuneration for 
all public sector employees by 44 percent to make public service more 
attractive. Remuneration for Ghana Education Services staff was the larg-
est component of the wage bill, increasing by 23 percent. Remuneration 
of health service staff increased by 181 percent. In addition, the govern-
ment is attempting to alter enrollment distributions to favor science and 
technology fields. Today, 70 percent of students study humanities and 
social sciences and only 30 percent study science and technology. The 
government is trying to reverse these numbers by changing the structure 
of programs and distribution of students to reach 70 percent enrollment 
in science and technology. Science and technology graduates will likely 
have better employment prospects and contribute more to the develop-
ment process of the country (World Bank 2008e).
Countries are piloting new methods to provide greater training to 
medical and mid-level health students at lower costs, with a focus on 
localized training and contextual learning. Evidence shows that curri-
cula should be linked to the local context in which students will prac-
tice. Although evident, this approach was not applied (Strasser and 
Neusy 2010). Community-based training, socially responsive education, 
and a range of apprenticeship models are being tested in a number of 
countries to reach rural areas. A focus on mid-level professionals lowers 
costs and supports competitive pricing (UNESCO 2008). Ghana’s five-
year work program stresses scaling up mid-level cadres, particularly 
nurses and midwives, and improving their salaries and benefits (Beciu 
2010). Other countries have also intensified their mid-level health 
workers training.
New technologies and broadband connectivity bring innovative 
options for learning and knowledge sharing. Open-source and distance 
learning can ease coverage constraints in remote areas. Many countries 
are testing these options, and the benefits must still be analyzed in light 
of the required financial investments. The results of these innovative 
methods should be benchmarked to education standards.
Ethiopia’s Ministry of Health, in partnership with the Open University 
in the United Kingdom, is piloting open and distance learning medical 
Becoming a Health Worker Student       331
training with students at St. Paul’s Millennium Medical School in Addis 
Ababa, which opened in 2008. The program consists of a “blended learn-
ing” curriculum that will combine hands-on training with study through 
learning resources, including printed materials, interactive DVDs and 
CDs, and videos of lectures and demonstrations (Open University n.d.). 
In Kenya the African Medical and Research Foundation offers computer-
based distance education to 4,500 nurses through a network of 127 
schools and E-Centers. Enrolled students work toward certification as 
registered nurses using a mix of computer and clinical learning. These 
hybrid methods provide access to students in rural areas without impos-
ing relocation costs. They also extend specialized skills in rural areas. 
Countries like Kenya, Nigeria, and Tanzania, which have a high dispersion 
of their nursing pool, are ideally suited for this model. In Kenya and 
Tanzania talent is spread across six to seven major regions. These regions 
usually have a commercial hub or major hospital that can afford comput-
ers and instruction equipment (IFC 2008).
At the secondary level governments are intervening to include com-
pulsory science at both junior and senior levels. Greater demand for 
higher level skills often drives these reforms. Countries are moving 
toward knowledge-based economic development, which requires higher 
cognitive skills. The main constraint to executing these reforms is the 
lack of qualified teachers, textbooks, and equipment at the secondary 
level. As highlighted earlier, the low test results of African countries in 
international benchmarking exams expose the poor implementation of 
these reforms.
Some countries are designing health science faculties that offer mul-
tiple subdisciplines and cross-subsidization with other faculties. Since 
most forms of medical education require similar fixed investments in 
laboratories, medical equipment, and buildings, schools that have multi-
disciplinary courses can become financially sustainable through cross-
subsidies. By offering multiple disciplines and sharing facilities with other 
faculties, they can increase the overall volume of students and amortize 
their capital costs over a larger revenue base. There are also examples of 
self-standing medical institutes that provide different health programs. 
Herbert Kairuki University, a nonprofit, fully accredited private medical 
university in Dar es Salaam, offers multiple degrees in courses ranging 
from holistic medicine to graduate courses toward a medical degree. It 
even has its own teaching hospital. This type of solution requires govern-
ment support through regulations that facilitate private education while 
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maintaining strict quality standards and student loan financing systems 
(UNESCO 2008). Similar solutions that take advantage of economies of 
scale are being adopted in Swaziland.
Conclusion
Successful recruitment into education programs for health workers 
requires high-quality education and rewarding career pathways. In addi-
tion, graduates of these programs must have the requisite skills and incli-
nation to provide health care to the populations with greatest needs.
With the number of applicants exceeding admission rates by 
70 percent in most countries, one of the main barriers to increased 
medical and health science education is the limited institutional capac-
ity of these faculties, expressed by the lack of equipment, infrastruc-
ture, and teachers.
Greater access to tertiary health science schools will depend on gov-
ernment regulations that broaden institutions’ autonomy to pay com-
petitive salaries, set tuition fees, and establish programs that adopt new 
methods of teaching and learning. Government regulations should also 
enable institutions to respond to economic needs through mechanisms 
such as short-term programs for mid-level health workers. As institutions 
gain autonomy, governments should assure the maintenance of quality 
standards and provide financing for lower socioeconomic groups. 
Governments should also encourage the involvement of more private 
education providers, which can help close the gap between applications 
and enrollments. A priority for governments should be facilitating the 
involvement of private providers while regulating and monitoring their 
performance since there often are more private institutions than public 
institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa (UNESCO 2008).
The focus on scaling up health workforce education is not just about 
resourcing “more of the same.” In most cases, frontline health care provid-
ers in Africa are not registered nurses or doctors, but practical nurses and 
medical assistants. Education initiatives should focus on graduating health 
workers who will strengthen the local health care system—consistent 
with evidence showing that students recruited from rural and under-
served areas, and educated in that context, are more likely to choose a 
career in a rural setting (Strasser and Neusy 2010). Recruitment into 
health worker education programs should be part of a wider system that 
supports health workers so they can care for their own people in rural and 
underserved areas.
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Notes
 1. The number of admissions into health training programs does not equal the 
number of health professionals available in the future. Health workers may 
leave the profession or emigrate. Because of this uncertainty, the numbers in 
this chapter might be skewed.
 2. See SARUA (2009) for comparison, gross enrollment rates in Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development countries average 60 percent.
 3. http://epdc.org/static/Retention.pdf.
 4. http://www.musph.ac.ug/programmes_mhsr.html.
 5. Authors’ interviews, University of Ghana.
 6. Prof. Ian Couper, Chair of Rural Health in the Wits Faculty of Health 
Sciences, written comments.
 7. Prof. Ian Couper, Chair of Rural Health in the Wits Faculty of HealthSciences, 
written comments.
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Paying for Higher Education Reform 
in Health
Alexander Preker, Hortenzia Beciu, Paul Jacob 
Robyn, Seth Ayettey, and James Antwi
This chapter reviews the economics of scaling up education for health 
workers in Sub-Saharan Africa. It considers four interlinked issues. First, 
the chapter examines the varying costs, both initial and recurrent, of 
increasing the number of health workers trained. Second, it explores 
potential sources for the additional financing needed to scale up training, 
including the amounts required under alternative scenarios. Third, the 
chapter evaluates whether it is possible for countries to get better value 
for their money in health worker production through different financing 
and aid mechanisms. Fourth, it reviews some of the regulatory constraints 
on improved financing of health education. The chapter lays out some 
policy options for reform and scenarios for future spending and financing 
trends. It provides regional estimates for Africa and relies on specific 
examples from Ghana while drawing on relevant examples from the 
United States and other countries.
The delivery of health care is labor intensive (Mandel and Weber 
2006), and the production of a qualified health workforce is capital inten-
sive. With major health worker shortages in both developing and devel-
oped countries, policy makers everywhere are trying to determine how to 
scale up the production of health workers (Scheffler 2008; Scheffler and 
others 2009). There is a considerable body of work on estimating health 
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worker labor market targets (Scheffler and others 2010; Soucat and 
Scheffler, forthcoming; WHO 2006), but few analyses examine the recur-
rent and capital cost implications for training institutions and partnering 
ministries.1 This chapter addresses that omission by examining the cost 
implications of scaled-up health education.
The Cost of Training Health Workers
Several factors are relevant to estimating the cost of scaling up health 
worker education. These include the training institution’s recurrent oper-
ating costs and the associated investment costs before and during the 
scale-up. The number of students trained and the time required to gradu-
ate additional health workers also affect training costs (Preker and others 
2008).
The total recurrent operating costs of scaling up health worker educa-
tion are based on the average cost of training existing students, the mar-
ginal cost of training additional students, and the total number of students 
trained. Total capital investment costs are based on initial investment, the 
depreciation of assets over time, the investment cost of increased intake, 
and the shadow cost of access to free or highly subsidized capital. The 
total number of students depends on enrollment, the dropout rate, stu-
dent transfers, course repeaters, and the output of students. The time 
frame required for scaling up health worker production will vary accord-
ing to the time needed to invest in improved standards or grow produc-
tion capacity, and the time to train a student in a specific program.
This section examines two variables that determine total health 
worker training costs: recurrent expenditures and total investment. For 
both analyses, Ghana is a useful case study.
Recurrent Expenditures in Training Health Workers
In many countries the cost of training is only a small part of overall 
health care spending (Association of American Medical Colleges 2011). 
Among U.S. schools, public and private, an average of 3.5 percent of 
schools’ revenues come from tuition (Association of American Medical 
Colleges 2011). In Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development countries, only 2 percent of total health expenditures is 
spent on the recurrent cost of educating health workers (Simoens and 
Hurst 2006). African countries follow a similar pattern, with one consid-
erable difference: the cost of undergraduate education is often borne by 
at least one ministry (the ministry of health or education), with support 
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from development partners and nongovernmental organizations. These 
contributions are rarely captured in subsequent cost analyses.
Because medical education straddles both the education and health 
sectors, quantifying the overall recurrent expenditure is complex. The 
analysis should consider how the costs of laboratories, utilities, infrastruc-
ture maintenance, teacher salaries, administrative and fixed overhead, and 
educational and reference material are divided between the two sectors 
(Beciu and others 2009; GHWA 2010). In preservice settings, some infra-
structure facilities used for training or housing health students are shared 
with other university students. Similarly, the infrastructure for in-service 
training is typically shared with service delivery programs. As a result, it 
is difficult to separate the costs of training health workers from the costs 
of training other university students, or of providing health care services.
In most developing countries there is no clear picture of the cost ele-
ments and figures associated with undergraduate and postgraduate edu-
cation. The authors of this chapter, in their study of Ghana, analyzed the 
cost of scaling up health worker education at a national level with data 
on capital and recurrent expenditures from a sample of training organiza-
tions, supplemented with data from Ministry of Health and Ministry of 
Education. The information gleaned may be useful to other countries in 
the region that are exploring ways to increase their output of health 
workers.
Recurrent expenditures in context: The Ghana case. Estimated train-
ing costs for health workers in Ghana vary according to their cadre 
(table 18.1). With the exception of professional training for doctors 
and dentists, and bachelor-level training for nurses, the estimated train-
ing costs include only the direct cost of preservice training. The costs 
for training doctors, dentists, and bachelor-level nurses also include the 
indirect overhead and operating costs shared with the institutions that 
provide tertiary education during the preclinical phase of the training. 
Lack of detailed data on indirect costs at the university level for all 
cadres makes it difficult to reliably attribute the indirect costs of uni-
versities’ fixed overhead. To facilitate the analysis, the authors assumed 
a 25 percent overhead cost for each institution.
Many of the professional training institutions surveyed said that expen-
ditures were considerably below the level needed for quality teaching. For 
medical schools the respondents felt that current spending was about 
50 percent below necessary spending (Beciu and others 2009). When 
calculating training costs it is important to note that following their 
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 preclinical education, medical students receive postgraduate in-service 
training at teaching hospitals and clinics. The cost of a fully trained special-
ist far exceeds that of his or her preclinical training. In 2008 the rector of 
Ghana’s College of Physicians and Surgeons estimated that the average 
cost for postgraduate training per student a year was around $10,000.2
Nurse training costs vary with the level of the training institution and 
the number of students enrolled. It costs much more to train a nurse in 
a school of allied health sciences than in some of the freestanding insti-
tutions that are not part of a university. It costs less to train nurses in 
schools with high enrollment rates, such as those where community 
health nurses train.
The cost element is not the only relevant variable. Learning experi-
ences also differ according to institution type. The real cost of training 
nurses and midwives at health science schools is probably higher than 
estimated, largely due to underspending and the indirect costs of related 
clinical training, which the Ghana study did not address. If hospitals pay 
clinical staff, as is the case for most nurse trainers, the study likely 
Table 18.1 Expenditure on Health Training Institutions in Ghana
Profession Years
Annual 
cost
Total 
recurrent 
cost 
(dollars)
Total 
capital 
cost
Investment 
ratio 
(percent)
Doctors 6 8,975 18,084,625 236,883 1.3
Specialists 4 10,785 3,235,500 43,000 1.3
Dental surgeons 5 7,500 1,132,500 54,307 4.8
Pharmacists 4 3,161 2,174,768 31,114 1.4
Professional nursesa 3 990 7,661,610 1,126,450 14.7
Midwives 3 2,376 3,466,584 72,450 2.1
Laboratory technicians 3 2,600 483,600 10,000 2.1
X-ray technologists 3 2,600 530,400 10,000 1.9
Pharmacy technicians 2 350 14,000 300 2.1
Community health 
nurses (certificate)
2 323 1,093,678 239,353 21.9
Health assistants 2 386 1,387,516 117,419 8.5
Medical assistants 3 500 193,000 40,000 20.7
Others 3 300 588,000 5,000 0.9
Total n.a. n.a. 40,045,781 1,986,276 5.0
Source: Beciu and others 2009.
Note: At the time of the study 1 Ghananian cedi was equivalent to $1. The cost calculation is based on an aver-
age cost coming from the Ghana preinvestment study, coupled with the capital investment budget data from 
the Ministry of Education (National Council on Higher Education) and Ministry of Health. n.a. = not applicable
a. Combines the four categories across different costs (diploma, bachelor, and postgraduate).
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underestimates the cost of training nurses in Ghana. Physicians who 
work in teaching hospitals in Ghana are usually hired and paid by the 
university. Their costs are reflected in school expenditure sheets and 
thus were included in the study’s estimates.
The average annual cost of training a doctor in Ghana is about nine 
times the cost of training a professional nurse and more than three times 
that of training a midwife. As Ghana moves toward middle-income status, 
the costs of medical education will approach those in high-income coun-
tries, though today those numbers remain far apart.
Data on aggregate trends in the cost and number of students trained 
in Ghana are rarely available, and those available cover only short periods. 
With limited data it is difficult to calculate the marginal cost of increasing 
enrollment. Based on selected examples, the marginal cost of increasing 
enrollment in settings with sufficient staffing and physical capacity 
should be small, because the largest costs associated with training are 
salaries and infrastructure. Adding a few students to a class does not raise 
the overall cost greatly, due to the low cost of items such as textbooks, 
laboratory supplies, and other variable costs. These investments do not 
rise commensurate with enrollment, though several directors of medical 
training institutions expressed views to the contrary.
The cost structure of training institutions is heavily skewed toward 
salaries and bonuses, especially for higher education (figure 18.1). Salaries 
and bonuses make up almost 90 percent of the total recurrent expendi-
tures of medical and dental schools in Ghana. The proportion of recur-
rent expenditures dedicated to salaries and bonuses declines with each 
decrease in education level, reaching around 60 percent among schools 
for community health workers and health assistants. Training for health 
professionals is more labor intensive than other types of higher education 
due to the need for low teacher-student ratios, ideal for one-to-one men-
toring in preclinical and clinical settings.
Ghana’s health training schools rarely use foreign lecturers for training. 
Medical schools and schools of health sciences, which employ some full-
time international teachers, were the exception. In postconflict settings 
universities often rely, however, on short- and long-term contracts with 
international teachers to cover core disciplines. Higher labor costs and 
smaller student numbers relative to fixed overhead combine to drive up 
the cost of medical education in these countries. Given the high salaries 
and prevalence of international teachers, and the ratio of nonteaching 
staff to teaching staff (in some cases 2 to 1) (Bankya and Elu 2001), the 
costs associated with medical education are very high.
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The Investment Costs of Training Health Workers
Because medical education straddles the health and education sectors, 
identifying overall capital expenditures is complex. The costs of land, 
infrastructure, and specialized medical equipment contribute to overall 
capital expenditures, as do initial investments in educational and refer-
ence materials, laboratories, utilities, and subsequent depreciation costs. 
The infrastructure for training health workers (mainly at the university 
level)—particularly libraries, dorms, cafeterias, and sometimes laborato-
ries—is often shared with other university students.
The infrastructure for in-service training is also used for service deliv-
ery. Just as it is difficult to separate the recurrent costs of health service 
training from the recurrent costs of health service delivery, it is equally 
difficult to separate the investment costs of training from the investment 
cost of service delivery. Capital investments in medical education tradi-
tionally include two institutional parts: an undergraduate training institu-
tion and a teaching hospital. These structures are often vertically 
integrated. Although some training organizations operate separately, many 
are associated with neighboring tertiary-level teaching facilities.
Figure 18.1 Cost Structure of Health Training Institutions in Ghana
Source: Beciu and others 2009.
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The land for training institutions is often acquired at a highly subsidized 
rate and not properly monetized as part of overall investment cost esti-
mates. Initial infrastructure and equipment quantities are constrained by 
limited budgets and may be inferior to what is needed. Once built, infra-
structure is not depreciated at the standard 20- to 30-year life (which 
should be shorter in the harsh climate in Sub-Saharan Africa). Likewise, 
once bought, teaching equipment is not depreciated at the standard 5- to 
7-year lifecycle. There is often a rapid deterioration in the capital stock 
shortly after the institutions are built.
Capital cost estimates for scaling up the education of health workers 
should include rehabilitating or upgrading existing facilities and green-
field investments in new facilities. The need for rehabilitation or green-
field infrastructure investment varies within each country context. 
Postconflict countries like Liberia and Sierra Leone have significant 
greenfield investment needs due to the destruction of infrastructure and 
equipment during their civil wars.
Investment costs in context: The Ghana case. Recent preinvestment 
studies in Sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere suggest that it costs about 
$40 million to build a new medical school to train an intake and output 
of 250 students a year. Preinvestment costs for larger schools that include 
medical specialties and strong research capacities may reach $160 million 
(Temple University, School of Medicine n.d.). Relatively stable countries 
like Ghana may realize improvements in capacity by rehabilitating exist-
ing training schools.
Investments by Ghana’s Ministry of Health in the training of diploma 
nurses, community health nurses, and health assistants allowed training 
institutions to scale up in recent years. Continued investments have not 
kept up with the depreciation of infrastructure and equipment. As a 
result, the cost of upgrading existing facilities varies depending on the 
number of schools, the state of existing infrastructure and staffing, and 
the desired capacity of the training program.
Although the situation differs from country to country, several obser-
vations from Ghana may be relevant to other countries. First, total 
spending on health education training by the Ministry of Health 
($25 million) is much higher than spending by the Ministry of Education 
($15 million). Second, the average annual unit cost and total cost of 
training highly professional staff under the Ministry of Education is 
much higher than lower cadre training through the Ministry of Health 
(GHc7–8,000, or ~$7–8,000, recurrent per graduate under the Ministry 
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of Education compared with ¢800 under the Ministry of Health). 
Third, capital investment by the Ministry of Education is very low as a 
ratio of recurrent to capital spending (1.3–4.8 percent) compared with 
international norms of 6 percent. Fourth, there appears to be consider-
able underinvestment by the Ministry of Health in programs for mid-
wives and technicians, but much higher recent expenditure on 
professional nurses, community health nurses, and medical assistants 
(14.7–21.9 percent). Fifth, the total average annual investment per pro-
fessional student is around ¢116, while the average annual investment 
on lower skilled workers is around ¢86.
Primary Financing Sources for Health Worker Education
The funding sources for health worker education are similar to those for 
health worker salaries and services. Funds from governments, student fees, 
nongovernmental organizations, the private sector, endowments, and 
domestic and foreign donors all support health worker education (fig-
ure 18.2). Although there are exceptions, health insurance funds usually 
are not used for training.
Figure 18.2 Sources of Financing
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In most low-income countries the public sector largely assumes 
responsibility for financing both recurrent and capital investment in 
health worker higher education. In the United States and Europe student 
fees are a nominal portion of revenues. When public sector contributions 
are smaller, donors and alumni play a larger financial role, especially in 
developed countries. In developing countries student contributions make 
up a higher percentage of school revenues. If teachers and teaching infra-
structure remain insufficient, the financial resources generated from 
student tuition in developing countries can cover only investment costs. 
Discussions with the managers of private for-profit schools in Ghana, 
Kenya, Mozambique, and Tanzania reveal that the government is often 
reluctant to buy services or pay student tuitions at for-profit institutions. 
Although there may be exceptions, the private sector is largely respon-
sible for generating its own funding.
The not-for-profit status of many training institutions limits the 
sources of capital available to finance their investment needs. Limited 
institutional capacity may also constrain higher private investment in 
educating health workers. According to studies on the shortage of nurses 
in the United States, efforts to scale up nursing education are constrained 
primarily by the shortage of nursing faculty (American Association of 
College of Nurses 2006). The shortage of nurses in the United States is 
so severe that federal policies actively target higher student enrollment 
and expanded nurse training capacity. The lack of sufficient teaching staff 
is also problematic in Sub-Saharan Africa. Countries such as Ghana, 
Liberia, Mozambique, and Sierra Leone face pressures to raise enrollment 
even though they lack adequate numbers of teachers.
Countries that are resource-constrained often do not have the financial 
and legal infrastructure that typically allows students to borrow money to 
finance their education. Rates of return for individuals who invest in a 
medical education are typically high enough to provide a financial incen-
tive. Estimates for initial personal investment requirements such as time 
and access to capital are not available in many developing countries. 
Some information exists from Latin American countries where tertiary 
education has a strong private financing component.
Developed countries offer direct-to-student financing to help realize 
the positive returns on medical education. For the most part it is not 
available in developing countries. Studies on investments in medical 
education examine the personal expected rates of return to investing in 
a long and expensive education, presenting a picture of the demand 
forces for medical education. There are typically high rates of return to 
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individuals who invest in medical education and thus strong demand for 
it. But there are significant demand constraints from limited access to 
financing and high opportunity costs in the general labor market.
One study estimated a private rate of return to secondary and higher 
education at about 20 percent, based on tuition for a medical student at 
the University of Witwatersrand in South Africa, and salary and cost of 
living for doctors in South Africa and the United States (World Bank 
1998). A South African doctor can earn ten times more in the United 
States over 20 years than if he or she remains in South Africa.
The government is the main funding source for training health workers 
in Ghana, though some money is generated from student fees, grants, and 
donations. Domestic and foreign student fees as a percentage of total 
revenues are higher for schools that train lower cadres. Donations of 
books and laboratory equipment also contribute to in-kind revenues, but 
their value was not monetized for this study. With very few exceptions, 
the in-kind contribution was not significant, appropriate, or systematic 
among the schools sampled. Endowments and other innovative financing 
mechanisms are not widely used or routinely reported as part of overall 
financing.
Demand for slots in medical schools is high in low- and middle-income 
countries. Among the sampled schools, public nursing schools in Ghana 
turn away 30 percent of qualified applicants because they do not have the 
capacity to train them (Beciu and others 2009). In 2009 the Tubman 
National Institute of Medical Arts in Liberia had 101 qualified applicants 
for a capacity of 25 students.3 As noted by Dr. Tabeh Freeman of the 
Tubman National Institute: “It is not possible to increase the number of 
students without capital investment. The maximum capacity of a class-
room is 25 students; so to increase the number of students, we must have 
additional classrooms. Currently, we have a problem with enrolling more 
students because of classroom space.”
Regulatory Constraints to Better Funding Options
Even if governments do not directly control student intake, medical 
schools and health worker training institutions are still highly regulated 
by government and self-regulating bodies. These regulatory bodies can 
influence the supply of medical schools and health worker output either 
by limiting the number of slots available in medical schools, or requiring 
a minimum standard for accreditation, such as student-teacher ratios or 
space per student requirements, which raise the costs of producing 
medical graduates.
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Constraints on supply distort the link between spending on higher 
education and the number of graduates produced. There is a strong cor-
relation between financial allocation in tertiary education and output of 
graduates, but due to governing bodies’ influence over the supply of 
health professionals, this correlation is not as strong in medical education 
as in other areas. The financing of medical schools is not necessarily linked 
to physician output.
The high degree of regulation in medical education may illustrate 
one reason why most medical schools worldwide (both public and pri-
vate) receive some public funding, even in more market-oriented envi-
ronments. The high degree of supply regulation raises costs of 
production and limits the profitability of medical schools (box 18.1). 
Where medical school supply is heavily regulated, even indirectly, 
there are high hurdles for new entrants and limited scope for schools 
Box 18.1
The Effects of Self-Regulation and Financing on Medical 
Education: Physician Supply in the 21st Century
In the United States physician supply is controlled through medical school 
accreditation, entrance requirements, and sometimes entrance caps, physician 
licensure requirements, and caps on available residency positions. Medical schools 
must be accredited by the Liaison Committee on Medical Education, which is 
empowered by two nongovernmental bodies: the American Medical Association 
and the American Association of Medical Colleges. At a minimum, medical schools 
must be accredited by the Liaison Committee on Medical Education to receive 
federal grants or partake in federal loan programs.
From 1930 to 1965 the growth in physician supply held pace with population 
growth of about 1 percent a year. The physician growth rate could not, however, 
keep up with the rising demand for health care that resulted from technological 
improvements and increases in prepaid group practice plans. During this time 
the self-regulating controls on physician supply led to a series of government 
interventions. In 1941 the U.S. Department of Justice accused the District of 
Columbia Medical Society and the American Medical Association of conspiring to 
monopolize trade in physician services. In 1963 the U.S. Congress passed the 
Health Professions Educational Assistance Act, which required medical schools to 
increase capacity and allow foreign doctors to practice. Under the provisions of 
(continued next page)
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to generate revenues from increasing output from their core business 
of producing doctors. U.S. medical schools do not generate much rev-
enue from student tuitions. Although tuition in the United States is the 
highest in the world, it covers only a small fraction of the total operat-
ing revenues (Jones and Korn 1997). Medical schools rely on income 
from other services to subsidize teaching.
Box 18.1 (continued)
this law, states built more medical schools, and existing schools received more 
government funding with the condition that medical student enrollment rise by 
at least 5 percent a year (Getzen 1997). Within two decades the number of medi-
cal school graduates more than doubled (box figure 1).
The 1963 legislation had a sizable impact on medical student enrollment and 
output. Enrollment and graduate output increased rapidly while medical school 
revenues grew modestly. Medical school revenues grew fastest from 1980 to 
1995, while the number of medical students remained fairly constant.
Source: Keuffel, Preker, and Ly (2010), based on Getzen (1997).
Box Figure 18.1.1 Medical School Enrollment and Revenue 
Patterns, 1960–95
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Developing countries are less likely to have effective systems to regu-
late the quality of medical schools. Sub-Saharan countries usually have 
independent or semi-autonomous professional bodies in charge of medi-
cal licensing, accreditation, and certification but may not be able to 
enforce their regulations. On the other hand, some countries either do 
not have accreditation or certification bodies, or these bodies are not 
capable of conducting their certification processes in a timely and effi-
cient manner. In addition, varying laws (or lack of laws) influence the 
governance of higher education institutions. The governments of Benin, 
Cameroon, Madagascar, and Tanzania directly oversee their universities. 
Other countries, such as Angola, Guinea, Ghana, Liberia, and Sierra 
Leone allow universities to be autonomous.
Private Contributions to Scaling Up Health Worker Training
Where public resources are constrained, the private sector may fill the 
void and foster opportunities to scale up health worker education (box 
18.2). In the Democratic Republic of Congo the number of medical and 
nursing graduates doubled from 2001 to 2003, largely due to private 
sector-led growth in training health workers (WHO 2006).
A study by the International Finance Corporation estimates that, 
given the public sector’s resource constraints, there is a private invest-
ment opportunity of $1.7 billion in medical education in Africa (IFC 
2007). The study gives examples in Senegal and Tanzania, where the 
private sector offers sustainable models of nursing and medical educa-
tion while innovating to solve resource constraints. The Institut Santé 
Services, a private nursing school in Senegal, functions with student fees 
as its sole revenue source. In Tanzania 90 percent of the revenues of 
Hubert Kariuki Memorial University come from student fees, and the 
rest from its hospital services.
The private sector still faces limitations in developing countries, espe-
cially in Africa. Many of the constraints applicable to promoting private 
industry are also relevant to medical education. Many countries lack the 
requisite legal and financial infrastructure to increase access to invest-
ment finance for private firms and to enable individuals to invest in their 
education through student loans.
Private investment in health worker education is a sensitive issue in 
many countries because education funding traditionally falls within the 
public sector’s jurisdiction. Some commentators express concern that 
private sector involvement will compromise the quality and access to 
education. This does not need to be so. Private investment should be 
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accompanied by regulatory oversight to establish minimum standards 
and appropriate targeting of education opportunities to safeguard equi-
table access for low-income students. Equitable and inclusive education 
is key to ensuring the production of quality health workers who can 
serve in high-need areas.
Box 18.2
Private Medical Education in India
In India the private sector is a major provider of medical education. Over the last 
five decades the number of undergraduate medical institutions grew eightfold, 
and the number of student slots fivefold, due mostly to the private sector. Whereas 
private medical colleges had a small share of the market in the 1950s, they now 
account for more than 45 percent of all medical institutions in India.
Merit-based entrance exams determine admissions to public medical schools. 
Private medical schools also offer subsidized “merit seats” based on exams. The 
remaining private school slots are allocated through a “management” quota that 
considers merit but imposes substantial student fees. Despite laws requiring 
transparent merit-based admissions and minimum infrastructure and faculty 
standards for private institutions, anecdotal evidence suggests that higher tuition 
fees and inadequate staff and infrastructure compromise student quality.
Private allopathic medical schools are set up mainly in wealthier states, linked 
to the growing inequality of enrollment as the share of wealthy medical students 
rises. Because physicians tend to practice near where they studied, the distribu-
tion of new physicians in India favors the richer states. The emigration of some top 
graduates from highly ranked public institutions adds to the problems of physi-
cian distribution. Despite the significant private sector-led scale up of physician 
output, equity problems remain in accessing health care in India.
Source: Mahal and Mohanan 2006.
Box Table 18.2.1 Inequality in Access: Distribution of Seats for Bachelors of 
Medicine and Surgery
Public Private
Seats 
(number)
Share 
(percent)
Seats 
(number)
Share 
(percent)
Bottom 50 percent income 4,712 30 520 7.8
Top 50 percent income 8,008 63 6,115 92.2
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Getting Better Value for Money
Countries should explore options to obtain better value for money in 
financing higher education in health. Mobilizing additional resources and 
using available resources more efficiently can realize better value. In 
recent years the international community increased aid to the health sec-
tor in developing countries. Many vertical programs, previously neglected, 
benefited from these resources.4 These programs are now at risk of failing 
due to an insufficient and inappropriate mix of human resource cadres.
Two aspects of vertical programs undermine their impact and restrict 
health worker resources more broadly. First, although many vertically 
funded programs devote significant resources to short-term training and 
other capacity-building activities, few support the preservice and under-
graduate education of health workers. At the same time, vertical programs 
compete for funding with basic education. Unless this misallocation of 
resources is rectified, current financing strategies will not only damage 
priority programs but also continue to block advances in human resource 
development.
Second, vertical programs lead to wage inflation and competition for 
staff within the health sector. This competition reduces the ability of 
horizontal programs, such as maternal and child health, to function effec-
tively. Many core horizontal programs now face a severe shortage in staff 
because of the distortion caused by a disproportionate amount of donor 
money flowing into a few programs.
Countries also face internal challenges. National health worker educa-
tion systems are often plagued by inefficiency. The unit costs of training 
can be reduced through four channels. First, governments and training 
institutions can stem the loss of resources by reducing the dropout rate 
and brain drain. Second, governments can encourage greater collaboration 
among schools, countries, and regions. By sharing staff and teaching 
facilities across different schools and among countries, training programs 
can reduce costs. Third, health worker education programs can reduce 
costs by sharing the delivery of preclinical training with the basic science 
programs of associated universities. Fourth, appropriate use of modern 
teaching aids and technology adaptation can reduce unit costs in health 
worker training.
Policy makers need detailed country-level information to determine 
the best approaches to financing the scaling-up of health worker training. 
Individual countries make their own decisions about appropriate tradeoffs 
in the numbers and types of health workers they can support. They must 
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also define their priorities for aid expenditures with development 
partners and international financial institutions.
Governments and donors can enlarge the fiscal envelope for investing 
in plans to scale up health education through several courses of action. 
Governments can increase their commitments to the health and educa-
tion sectors, particularly the share of these sectors dedicated to health 
education. They can coordinate health education programs, including 
those between countries, to improve efficiency through both shared fac-
ulty and facilities and integration in preclinical training between health 
education programs and undergraduate science training. Donors can 
focus on preservice education to address the supply and quality of educa-
tion in the medium to long term.
Scenarios for Financing Health Worker Education
In collaboration with Results for Development, we applied a costing tool 
to estimate the various scenarios for scaling up health worker education 
in Ghana (table 18.2). We altered the scenarios by varying the assump-
tions about the available resource envelope; the cost of absorbing health 
workers into the labor force at different staffing levels, skill mixes, and 
remuneration; and the recurrent and capital costs of educating more 
health workers up to the affordable staffing level.
Best-Case Economic Scenario
For this analysis, the best-case scenario is 7 percent annual economic 
growth and 15 percent government spending on health. Under these 
conditions Ghana would affordably reach the targeted human resources 
staffing set out in the Ministry of Health’s human resources policy by 
2017. We assumed no changes in the desired skills mix or the relative 
Table 18.2 Health Expenditure Scenarios, Ghana
Scenario
Annual 
economic 
growth 
(percent)
Public health expenditures, 
2017 (percent of 
government expenditures)
Total public 
spending on 
health, 2007 
($, millions)
Total public 
spending on 
health, 2017 
($, millions)
Best case 7 15 600 1,200
Current trends 4–5 9 600 900
Worst case 0 4.5 600 300
Source: World Bank data.
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wage bill. Before concluding that 2017 workforce targets are affordable 
under the best-case economic scenario, we examined training schools’ 
abilities to scale up health worker production to reach targets and 
adjusted this for school dropout and workforce attrition (emigration, 
internal migration, retirement, deaths, and other exits from clinical 
practice).
Under the best-case economic scenario, at current production levels 
some programs would not reach the target number of health worker 
graduates needed to attain the desired affordable staffing levels until 
2030. The problem is most acute in the high-level cadres under the 
Ministry of Education, such as doctors, specialists, dental surgeons, and 
pharmacists. The limited training capacity for midwives and pharmacy 
technicians under the Ministry of Health is also acute, and at the time of 
the study these two cadres did not receive sufficient resources to achieve 
the desired scale-up.
Current-Status Scenario
The costing tool defined the current scenario in Ghana as 4–5 percent 
annual economic growth and 9 percent government expenditure on 
health. Under current economic conditions and with the government’s 
current ability to increase budget allocations to the health sector, the 
government would need to lower staffing targets for highly skilled 
staff by 25–33 percent to meet the 2017 target. Even at these lower 
targets, a large annual increase in training costs ($25 million) and 
investment costs ($20 million) under the Ministry of Education would 
be necessary.
Under the current economic conditions and the government’s ability 
to increase its budget allocation, current production levels for profes-
sional nurses, community health nurses, and medical assistants under the 
Ministry of Health would overshoot the targets. This can be avoided if the 
Ministry of Health scales back these areas and shifts part of the budget to 
the training programs for midwifery, where there is an acute shortage.
Worst-Case Scenario
The worst-case scenario is defined as 0 percent annual economic growth 
and 4.5 percent government spending on health. Under these conditions, 
expanding the current workforce would be unaffordable, and training 
schools would need to retreat to replacement levels in their graduate 
output. There could be an erosion in the wage bill, which would force the 
health sector to rely on lower qualified and less expensive staff.
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Conclusion
The cost implications of scaling up health worker training are significant, 
particularly in the health and education sectors. A realistic understanding 
of the initial and recurrent costs, coupled with a broader array of financ-
ing options and an easing of regulatory constraints, is key to increasing 
production of health workers.
The Ghana example shows that decision makers need detailed 
country-level analyses to support recommendations on the best policies 
for financing the scale-up of health worker training; each country func-
tions within its own political, economic, and policy contexts. Individual 
countries must determine the tradeoffs required to support the num-
bers and cadres of health workers needed to meet national targets—and 
together with development partners and international financial institu-
tions, determine aid priorities.
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Notes
 1. Partnering ministries may include ministries of health, ministries of educa-
tion, ministries of industry and innovations, ministries of science and technol-
ogy, and other ministries involved in stewardship of the health training 
schools.
 2. Ghana College of Physicians and Surgeons, 2008 Postgraduate Expenditures 
Estimates.
 3. Correspondence with Dr. Tabeh Freeman, Tubman National Institute of 
Medical Arts on September 7, 2007.
 4. “Vertical” programs focus on a particular theme or disease. The Global Fund 
to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria and the Global Alliance for 
Vaccines and Immunizations are examples of large vertical programs. In 
contrast, “horizontal” programs focus on broader issues within the health 
sector.
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